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July 2007

July 31, 2007

David Wessel Sends Us to Bill Poole on Milton Friedman

Milton Friedman's monetary framework--his idea that the nominal money stock growth rate should be pegged, and that the government should either shovel reserves into the banking system at a furious rate or pull them out in order to keep the nominal money growth rate stable--was always clearly a second or even a third-best. Positive or negative shocks to velocity would cause episodes of inflation or depression which Friedman's rule would ignore.

William Poole now thinks that Friedman was wrong, and too pessimistic, and that the Fed has done better over the past quarter century than the Friedman rule would allow. David Wessel blogs:

Economics Blog : Milton Friedman Wasn’t Right About Everything: William Poole, a self-described “card-carrying monetarist” who is now president of the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank, says the Fed’s track record over the past 25 years is better than it would have been had it followed Milton Friedman’s prescription of maintaining steady growth in the money supply.

[Poole:] “I believe that the Fed’s actual adjustments of its federal funds rate target have yielded superior outcomes since 1982 to what we would have observed under steady money growth,” he said in the prepared text of a speech to delivered today – behind closed doors — at the University of Missouri to mark the 95th anniversary of the late Milton Friedman’s birth. “I also believe that advances in knowledge permit us to say with some confidence that these gains are not just an accident of Alan Greenspan’s special skills and intuition,” Mr. Poole said.

So what’s the secret? Persuading the public, businesses and the markets that the Fed won’t let inflation get out of control or, in the jargon of economists, “anchoring inflationary expectations.”

“Everything Milton argued about money stock control is true,” he added, “but the effect of inflation expectations on the practice of monetary policy itself was, I believe, a missing element in the analysis. The economy functions differently when inflation expectations are firmly anchored. If a central bank allows expectations to become unanchored, then interest-rate control becomes a dangerous and potentially destabilizing policy. But should the practice of monetary policy depend on how well inflation expectations are anchored? I do not recall Milton discussing this question, perhaps because he believed that the best way to maintain well-anchored expectations over time was for the central bank to commit to steady and low money growth under all circumstances.”

Tom Slee on Distributed Collaborative Filtering: The Netflix Prize: 300 Days Later

A very interesting experiment, on lots of levels:

Whimsley: The Netflix Prize: 300 Days Later: Online DVD rental outfit Netflix caused a real buzz last October when it announced the competition. If anyone can come up with a recommender system for predicting customer DVD preferences that beats its own algorithm (Cinematch) by a certain amount, Netflix will hand over $1million. The prize got a lot of attention because it exemplifies the idea of crowdsourcing. Not only does Netflix rely on crowdsourcing of DVD ratings (user ratings of DVD titles) but the competition itself is an attempt to use crowdsourcing to develop the algorithms to make the most of those ratings. Instead of doing the work itself, or hiring specialists, Netflix lets whoever anyone enter their competition and pays the winner...

[...]

As soon as you start looking at the data set it becomes obvious why it is so difficult to get good results. Databases don't have the linear algebra and other mathematical tools for taking a run at the prize but they are convenient for exploring data sets, so I loaded the data into a SQL Anywhere database (The developer edition is a free download, and I'll provide a perl script to load the data if you really want it) and started poking around. Here are a few of the more obvious oddities (all these observations have been posted elsewhere - see the Netflix prize forum for more):

  • Customer 2170930 has rated 1963 titles and given each and every one a rating of one (very bad). You would think they would have cancelled their subscription by now.
  • Five customers have rated over 10,000 of the 17,770 titles selected - and presumably they also have rated some of the others among the 60,000 or so titles Netflix had available when they released the ratings. Are these real people?
  • Customer 305344 had rated 17654 titles. Even though Netflix make it easy to rate titles that you have not rented from them (so they can get a handle on your preferences) can this be real?
  • Customer 1664010 rated 5446 titles in a single day (October 12, 2005).
  • Customer 2270619 has rated 1975 titles. 1931 were given a 5, 31 were given a 4, 10 given a 3, 2 given a 2 (Grumpy Old Men and Sex In Chains) and a single title was given a 1. That title? Gandhi, which has an average rating of over 4 and which less than 2% of those who watch it give a 1.
  • The most often rated movie? Miss Congeniality with ratings by over 232,000 of the 480,000 customers. And which title is most similar to it in terms of ratings (using a slightly weighted Pearson formula)? Bloodfist 5: Human Target.
  • Most highly rated - Lord of the Rings: Return of the King (Extended Edition), with 4.7...

[...]

So what I get from the Netflix prize is that there are probably significant limits to recommender systems. Even the smartest don't do a whole lot better than the simple approaches, and a lot of work is required to eke out even a little more actual information from the morass of data. It seems surprisingly difficult to get reliable, factual information on this important question of how useful they can be. Part of the reason is that they are new - Amazon has only been in business for about ten years after all - and part of the reason is that the behaviour of these systems is often a closely guarded secret despite the aura of openness that web companies cultivate.

This matters because there is a surprising amount riding on the effectiveness of recommender systems. Silicon Valley's new-economy enthusiasts see them as the key to developing a new level of cultural democracy: they see recommender systems as a trebuchet hurling rocks at the castles of the old elite of mainstream media, big publishers with big marketing departments, big-chain book stores and Hollywood sequels. Recommender systems are claimed to embody the "wisdom of crowds". The idea is that everyone just publishes stuff (blogs, wikipedia entries and so on) and amateur readers or viewers decide what has merit by their actions (rating stories, buying and rating books and DVDs and so on). The work of critics is "crowdsourced" to customers, but it is the recommender system that distills these ratings to yield the aforementioned wisdom.

If faith in recommender systems is misplaced, then the new boss may look much like the old boss only with more computer hardware. There is a danger that recommender systems may simply magnify the popularity of whatever is currently hot - that they may just amplify the voice of marketing machines rather than reveal previously-hidden gems. Even worse, their presence may drive out other sources of cultural diversity (small bookstores, independent music labels, libraries) concentrating the rewards of cultural production in fewer hands than ever and leading us to a more homogeneous, winner-take-all culture.

I'm no futurist, but I see little evidence from the first 300 days of the Netflix Prize that recommender systems are the magic ingredient that will reveal the wisdom of crowds.

Robert Guth on Craig Mundie of Microsoft

In the Wall Street Journal:

Behind Microsoft's Bid To Gain Cutting Edge - WSJ.com: Throughout its history, Microsoft has been slow to grasp some of the computer industry's biggest technology shifts and business changes. When it decides to embrace an innovation, the company has often succeeded in chasing down the leaders, as it did years ago with Lotus Development Corp. on spreadsheets that allow users to organize data, and a decade ago with Netscape Communications Corp. on Web browsers that transformed the experience of using the Internet. For years, this catch-up-and-surpass approach worked well.

Early this decade, however, companies such as Google Inc. and Apple Inc. exposed holes in the approach. Microsoft was slow to see the potential in Web search and online advertising, and despite heavy investments, has so far failed to catch industry leaders Google and Yahoo Inc. It also was late coming to market with its own music player, and despite a push, remains far behind Apple. Today, a host of Web-based software services from Google and others threaten to reduce the importance of Microsoft's personal-computer software.

One year ago, Mr. Gates, the company's chairman, announced that in June 2008 he would give up his post as "chief software architect."... Mr. Mundie got the other half of the job -- charting the company's long-term technology course....

He joined Microsoft in 1992. As head of the consumer group, he helped shepherd such non-PC products as videogames, interactive television and software for cellphones. Later, he took on nettlesome tasks such as fighting piracy in China, pushing Microsoft to develop more secure software, and improving the company's relationships with governments around the world. He developed a reputation as a visionary with start-up projects, but less skilled at managing them as going concerns, he and other Microsoft executives say....

Microsoft's product groups -- business units built around products such as Windows and Office that produce much of the company's cash -- have long had enormous clout in its corporate culture. Star product-group managers, the company's so-called shippers, get the big, profitable products like Windows out the door year after year. For them, meeting deadlines is all-important; longer-term thinking about technology isn't....

Mr. Mundie has been warning his Microsoft colleagues for years about a coming shift in semiconductors that could upset the company's most important businesses. Chip makers such as Intel Corp. have been working on a way to increase semiconductor power without causing the chips to overheat. It involves sticking what amounts to multiple chips -- or "cores" -- onto a single chip, creating "multicore" chips.

Some software experts contend that the change is so radical it will require software for large server computers and PCs to operate differently than it has for decades. It is unclear, however, how quickly the change will come, and what Microsoft, the world's largest software maker, will have to do to navigate it. Mr. Mundie contends it will come sooner than many people think, and it will require new programming languages and techniques...

Felix Salmon on Noise--Literally: Noise--Traders

He watches Jim Cramer, and is scared:

Finance Blog - Market Movers by Felix Salmon: Great Moments in Punditry: Jim Cramer on Housing - Portfolio.com: Is it worth responding to this as though it's rational? Is this what passes for informed commentary on TV these days? I can see how it gets ratings, in a train-wreck kind of way – hell, I'm blogging it. But the idea that wealthy people will stop paying their mortgages because their houses are "fungible" (unless we get a 100bp cut in the Fed funds rate, of course) – it's like some kind of incredibly unfunny parody. Nouriel Roubini et al might be shrill, but at least there's coherent logic to their position.

What scares me is that this could be a rare and genuine glimpse into how traders actually think. In which case the Great Moderation and decline in volatility of recent years is doomed to die a sudden and extremely unpleasant death.

Some traders tend to think this way: they add a lot of volatility to the order flow. Do the Cramers have a material effect on price patterns, or do they just create trading opportunities for more sophisticated investors. That is a hard question.

July 29, 2007

Nikola Tesla's Machines Live!

Georgetown Energy Museum 600 Griffith St. Georgetown, CO 80444

1.44 MW hydroelectric polyphase AC generating plant, in service since
1900.

Nikolai Tesla's machines live!

Brad DeLong


The ideas of economists and political pholosophers... Are more
powerful than is commonly understood...

July 28, 2007

A Historical Document: Paul Gigot of the Wall Street Journal Predicts the Failure of Clintonomics

One evasion in Ken Auletta's piece on the Wall Street Journal stands out: his quoting without comment of Norman Pearlstine's claim that Paul Gigot “was a first-rate reporter...”

Here was my first encounter with Gigot's reporting--in this case, reporting on me, one of the heads of Alicia Munnell's staff at the U.S. Treasury in 1993.

Damned if I know what Paul Gigot is talking about when he says of my boss that: "Alicia Munnell is in denial, even though her staff has calculated that Mr. Feldstein is right." I think "Mr. Feldstein is right" might mean "upper-bracket tax collections fell in fiscal 2001 (because of the recession)," rather than what Gigot wants you to think it means--that "the tax-rate hikes of 1990 discouraged work and put us on the far side of the Laffer curve."

If that's not what Gigot means, he's making s--- up: I was there, I was Alicia Munnell's staff, and I know:

Oops! Weren't We Going to Soak The Rich? By Paul A. Gigot 908 words 9 July 1993 The Wall Street Journal: On his way out the door in January, a cheeky Bush official scribbled the same tax phrase again and again on a Treasury blackboard for the new Clinton team: "Low rates, broad base." The incoming Clinton Treasury minions, more rueful than cheeky, erased the phrase each time the new White House requested ever higher tax rates. Mark the rueful down as prophets. The first evidence on income-tax receipts for 1991 is now rolling in from the Internal Revenue Service, and the usual eye-glazing numbers are suddenly eye-popping. To wit, the rich paid less in taxes even though their tax rates went up. The nonrich paid more even though their tax rates stayed the same. President Clinton, meet the Laffer Curve.

This news is the elephant in the room of this year's tax debate, since we keep hearing that the fate of the world hangs on President Clinton's promise to reduce the deficit by "$500 billion." Most of this windfall, Mr. Clinton assures us, will come from "the rich." But what if those tax revenues from the rich turn out to be a mirage? Then isn't the Clinton tax program doomed to fail, even as mere deficit reduction? And shouldn't Democrats think again before they commit tax hari-kari at next week's House-Senate conference? Of course they should, but this year's Democratic theme song seems to be that old "MASH" movie anthem, "Suicide Is Painless."

The 1991 numbers are so striking because they're the first since the Great 1990 Budget Deal, which was more or less the test drive for Clintonomics. Rates had to be raised on "the rich," we were told then, in order to produce a river of new tax revenue. Well, this is one river that didn't run through it. For we now know that total income-tax receipts fell in 1991, the first decline since 1983. And they fell in a strange and revealing way, as the chart below shows. For the rich -- defined as the top 850,000 income-earners in each year (making about $200,000 or more) -- 1991 tax receipts fell by $6.5 billion, or 6.1%. But for everyone else, tax receipts actually rose in 1991 -- by $3.3 billion, or 1%. This odd dichotomy makes it difficult to attribute the revenue decline merely to a slow economy: The rich wouldn't have a bad year if everyone else had a good one. And, in fact, total income rose 3.3% for the year.

So what happened to the rich? It's impossible to know for sure, but the likely answer is that they changed their behavior in response to higher rates. Maybe they sheltered more income. Or stuffed more of it into 1990 to take advantage of that year's lower rates. Or perhaps they worked less. In short, they responded to "incentives," as economists say, and produced less income subject to tax. This reverse-windfall is underscored by other 1991 numbers. Income from businesses fell 5.5% for the rich, but rose 2.2% for the nonrich. For so-called Subchapter S small businesses, which would get slammed again by Mr. Clinton, income dove 10.5% for the rich but rose 6.2% for everyone else. All of which proves what populist, middle-class free-marketeers like me call the paradox of progressivity: To really soak the rich, keep their tax rates low.

Listen to Martin Feldstein, the Harvard economist who has never been mistaken for a wild supply-sider: "The evidence is strong that in 1991 they picked up rates at the top and revenue fell. This should make Democrats think twice about whether the tax rates they're now talking about will raise the revenues they expect." Mr. Feldstein figures they'll get only about a quarter of the $25 billion a year they advertise.

The Clinton administration knows all this, by the way, but wants it kept quiet until the tax bill passes. Treasury economist Alicia Munnell is in denial, even though her staff has calculated that Mr. Feldstein is right. Treasury's Larry Summers knows better, but is preoccupied with Japan and trade. Other Democrats don't even want to hear about it. That's because for them taxing "the rich" is about class-war politics, not revenue. It's about having a foil to run against. But that's no excuse for Republicans, who've been just as silent about all this. Bob Dole's timid Senate Republicans didn't even offer an amendment to strip the higher rates out of the tax bill. Ohio Rep. John Kasich, supposedly the boy wonder of the budget, has made people wonder by endorsing higher rates. Like George Bush and Nicholas Brady, too many Republicans are still afraid James Carville might accuse them of belonging to a country club.

But now is the time to lay down markers for the next economic debate, educating voters about the con job they are about to experience. An optimist said last year that either the Clinton presidency would be successful, or it would be educational. But that assumes someone does the educating.

Life Imitates Art: (That is, economist Art Laffer)

Income tax payments (in $ billions)
1991 1990
"The Rich" $ 99.6 $106.1
Everyone Else $ 348.6 $345.3

Hoisted from Comments: Land Transport in 1776

Hoisted from comments: Monte Davis writes:

Grasping Reality with Both Hands: Brad DeLong's Semi-Daily Journal: John Keegan notes somewhere that in the War of Independence, when the colonists desperately needed the captured cannon from Ticonderoga and Crown Point, it took three months to get them the ~200 miles to the siege positions around Boston. Land transport was HARD before rails, all-weather roads, and fossil-fueled engines...

Of course, back in 1776 nobody would have moved cannon from Fort Ticonderoga to Boston by land in peacetime: you would have used water as much as possible. Only the fact that it was wartime and the British fleet dominated the seas made them drag the cannon across the hills and mountains of New England.

Tyler Cowen: Underappreciated Economist E. Glen Weyl

Tyler Cowen writes:

Marginal Revolution: Underappreciated economists: a continuing series: Today I will pick E. Glen Weyl, a mere Youngling, who is studying at Princeton University.  Here is his paper on neural networks, and the abstract:

I consider a potential neural basis of overconfidence, the well-documented tendency of individuals to overestimate the precision of their predictions. I present a simple, classic connectionist model for predicting a binary variable. I show that while the network initially makes weak predictions (in the middle of the probability range) regardless of input, after observing randomly generated data it learns to be overconfident in the sense that when presented with other, unrelated random data it makes strong predictions. The model matches behavioral data in that it shows overconfidence growing with experience and then, eventually, declining. The model shows how overconfidence, far from being a surprising fallacy, can be seen as a natural outgrowth of statistical over-fitting in the brain.

Glen probably won't be underappreciated for long.  Here is his seminal paper on two-sided markets (e.g., Match.com).  There is already talk he will be a leading economist of the next generation...

July 27, 2007

Herbert Hoover's Story on the Kaiping Mines

Herbert Hoover's story on the Kaiping mines appears to have been that he was lied to by his bosses--with whom he remained on excellent terms, however.

From Walter Liggett (1932), The Rise of Herbert Hoover (New York: H.K. Fly), p. 111 ff.:

The action between Chang Yen-mao and the Chinese Engineering and Mining Company of Tientsin, plaintiffs, versus Charles Algernon Moreing, Bewick, Moreing, and Company, and the Chinese Engineering and Mining Company, Limited, of London, defendants, was brought to trial on January 18, 1905, before Justice Joyce in the Chancery Division.... On March 1, 1905, Justice Joyce delivered from the bench a long verbal decision in favor of the plaintiffs....

[...]

Chang [Yen-mao] described the circumstances under which he signed the deed.... He said he repeatedly refused to sign... its terms did not agree... with his agreement with [Herbert] Hoover. Upon being told by Hoover that the deed was merely meant for the purpose of registration in England, and that the memorandum would be the ruling instrument, he eventually signed... with reluctance....

Chang told in detail of... threats... by Hoover... that the mines would be confiscated by the [European] Allied governments and that he and the Chinese stockholders would get nothing [if he did not agree to the terms]....

[...]

In opening the defense, Counsellor Hughes made a long speech in which he protested against charges of fraud or misrepresentation.... Hughes defended the issuance of 625,000 shares of promoters' stock and added, "Mr. Moreing did not profess to go to China as a philanthropist."...

Mr. Hoover took the stand.... He said that Detring told him that the deed of July 30, 1900, had been approved by Chang. (Both Detring and Chang denied this.)... Hoover declared he had always considered the memorandum binding, and always had insisted that it be carried out. On cross-examination he said that he did not know... that the memorandum's provisions had not been incorporated into the articles of association. He also disclaimed knowledge of the financing.... Under cross-examination he said that he had told Chang and Detring that the provisions of the memorandum were incorporated in the articles of association, and that he had not known differently until he returned to London. He admitted the whole of his negotiations with Chang and Detring when he returned to China had been on an "incorrect basis."...

Counsellor Levitt produced a letter written by Hoover... [in which] he had said that "the China board would have in itself the entire management of the company's property in China, and that H[is] E[xcellency] Chang would be director-general [of the mines] for life." Hoover admitted the statements were not true, but explained that when he wrote the letter he thought them true. Hoover said he... had tried to carry out the terms of the memorandum and as long as he was in China thought he had succeeded. Then he was shown a letter... by himself.. which stated that the changes which he had inaugurated... [were to give] the new manager "complete control immediately upon arrival" in order that "the future administration [of the mine] might be preserved from any interference by the Chinese board."...

[Hoover] admitted reading a letter which de Wouters had written to the board of directors in London.... Hoover admitted that he had not asked de Wouters to alter the letter, or not to send it, but insisted nevertheless tht he was not in accord with de Wouters on this point and that the letter did not correctly represent the situation...

The Memorandum. The Pall Mall Gazette, February 2, 1903

Kaiping Mines: Memorandum of Agreement Between Chang Yen-Mao and Herbert Hoover

A historical document:

February 19, 1901: Memorandum Relating to the Reorganization of the Chinese Engineering and Mining Company:

In consequence of the disturbances of last summer [1900] and the state of hostilities thereby created, serious danger arose... [the possibility of] the confiscation of the [company's] property on account of the company's semi-official character in connection with the Chinese government... [or] the cession by compulsion of the company's property.... [I]t was thought in the interest of the Imperial government and the company's shareholders to convert the company into an Anglo-Chinese company registered under English laws and protection[s].

Another motive was... [to raise] additional capital by gaining foreign shareholders for the undertaking....

H[is] E[xcellency] Chang [Yen-Mao], Director General of the company, accordingly appointed Mr. Gustav Detring to make the necessary arrangements... with Mr. H.C. Hoover, acting on behalf of Mr. C.A. Moreing... [to draw up] a deed of sale... [so] Mr. Moreing... [could] take the necessary steps with regard to the raising of capital in Europe and registering the company under British laws....

[I]t has today been settled and decided that the company shall in the future be constituted and managed as follows:

(1) The share capital of the company to be one million pounds sterling.
(2) The Chinese shareholders [of the old company] to receive twenty-five shares of one pound each for each original share of one hundred taels each [i.e., total par value of £375,000].
(3) The bona-fide liabilities of the Chinese Engineering and Mining Company... shall be taken over by the new company....
(4) It is especially agreed to honor and repay the loans obtained from the Imperial government. 200,000 taels is to be paid out of the first funds and balance as quickly as possible [i.e., £35,000].
(5) The stockholders whether Chinese or foreign shall have equal votes at all meetings of the shareholders....
(6) The management of the company shall be conducted by two boards of directors, one in China and one in London.
(7) H[is] E[xcellency] Chang [Yen-Mao] will be Director General resident in China as before in general charge of affairs, and as such will have equal powers with foreign directors in China.
(8) The management of the property of the company in China will be in the China Board.
(9) The London Board will be elected by all the shareholders, Chinese and foreign.
(10) ... "limited" means that the shareholders are in no case responsible for more than the nominal amount of their shares.
(11) ... all the legal taxes and duties payable to the Chinese government will be paid by the company as before.
(12) ... the Director General will be the channel of all communication between the Imperial Authorities and the company.
(13) ... the company will be managed... to make Chinese and foreign interests harmonize on a fair basis of equality... [to] enrich the government and the people.
(14) All the unsettled accounts of the company and questions relating to land tenure will be adjusted equitably by mutual consultation.

Herbert C. Hoover
Chev. de Wouters
Chang Yen-Mao
Gustav Detring

The Pall Mall Gazette on the Kaiping Mines in 1903

A historical document: From the Pall Mall Gazette, February 2, 1903:

Chinese Engineering and Mining Company: An Interesting Story from Tientsin: Some Facts that Await Explanation:

The report of the meeting of Chinese shareholders in the great Chinese Engineering and Mining Company... is very interesting reading indeed. To all appearances, the European directors owe the Chinese shareholders... a tardy explanation of their apparent failure to comply with the terms of the memorandum....

Excellency Chang Yen-Mao sketched the events of 1900... thought advisable to register the company under British laws for the dual purpose of protecting the property and opening the doors for... European capital....

The next speaker was Mr. Detring... consulted [in 1900] by his Excellency... as to the best means of securing the property from aggression. It was ultimately decided to admit foreign capital and register the concern as an English company.... Mr. Hoover, as representative and adviser of Messrs. Bewick, Moreing, and Co... undertook a mission to London, where he formed a company of £1,000,000, out of which the Chinese script should rank as £375,000; of the balance, £100,000 was to be called up at once, and the remainder as required....

[N]ow a crowd of employees arrived from Europe without the slightest knowledge of the China board that they were coming.... Two months previously news had casually come to Mr. Detring's notice of a [London company] debenture issue of £500,000 at 6 percent. The debentures carried a bonus of £250,000 in shares standing at 70 to 100 percent premium at the date of issue. "So the reason for the issue," as Mr. Detring truly goes on to say, "was not apparent."

Nothing satisfactory by way of explanation of these strange happenings could be gained....

The Chinese board contend that the £625,000 [in par value of stock] allotted to the promoters is excessive.... [O]n the face of it, a very strong indictment indeed is made out against the European heads of this remarkable company...

If I understand the transaction correctly, the old shareholders of the company received 37.5% of the stock, the promoters--Bewick, Moreing, and Company--took 37.5% of the stock for themselves in return for a capital contribution of £100,000, and a bunch of bond buyers not otherwise identified received 25% of the stock and bonds of £500,000 principal value with coupons of £30,000 per year in exchange for their contribution of £500,000. At the moment of the bond issue, Detring claims, 25% of the stock had a then-current market value of between £425,000 and £500,000.

As I said, Herbert Hoover's testimon at the London Chancery trial appears to have been that he negotiated with Chang Yen-Mao in good faith but that his bosses at Bewick, Moreing misinformed him--but Hoover appears to have remained on excellent terms with them even so.

Strengthening IMF Surveillance

Mark Thoma reads Rodrigo Rato on "surveillance":

Economist's View: "Strengthening IMF Surveillance": The Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, Rodrigo de Rato, discusses attempts to and strengthen IMF surveillance over the economic policies of member nations:

For many years, the IMF has engaged its member countries in a process known as "surveillance," in which it monitors, analyzes, and consults on each country's economic policies - both exchange rate policies and relevant domestic policies. These regular checkups help to identify potential vulnerabilities and maintain economic stability. However, the increasingly complex policy challenges of the globalized economy demand a fresh look at this process.

This June, the IMF's Executive Board did just that...

Paul Krugman likes to say that IMF surveillance is (a) tremendously valuable when it serves to strengthen the internal political hand of factions in a country committed to reality-based economic policy, but (b) tremendously harmful when it serves to strengthen the internal political hand of factions in a country committed to pointless deflationary austerity--and that it is hard for outsiders to figure out what effects they are really having.

I think surveillance has the additional important effect of keeping people in the IMF more-or-less current on what is going on, so that if a crisis does develop the staff has a better chance of giving their bosses good advice as to how to deal with it.

GDP Revised Down for Last Three Years

Sudeep Reddy on the GDP revisions:

Economics Blog : GDP Revised Down for Last Three Years: The changes lowered the average annual growth of real GDP to 3.2% from 2004 to 2006, 0.3 percentage point less than the earlier figures.... The BEA’s annual revisions are made each July to incorporate new and more comprehensive data...

Mark Thoma Is Puzzled by Endorsements of David Brooks's Last Column

Mark Thoma writes:

Economist's View: Questions for Prominent Economists: A couple of things from Greg Mankiw and George Borjas caught my attention, so I want to make sure I understand what they are saying. First, Greg Mankiw says:

Brooks on the Economy, by Greg Mankiw: A prominent Harvard economist emails me to recommend David Brooks's column from a few days ago. He calls it "truly fantastic and obviously correct." With such a strong recommendation from a colleague, I ... read Brooks. ...[T]he Brooks piece is well worth reading. It is far more informed by cutting-edge economic research than most things you find on the op-ed pages...

[M]y question is if Greg (and "prominent economist") stand behind all the claims in Brooks article (see here for a list of posts questioning the claims)? If not, if this isn't a blanket endorsement, could you please give us more guidance as to where you agree or disagree so we can better evaluate your position?...

Here's the start of Brooks:

Brooks on the Economy: If you've paid attention to the presidential campaign, you've heard the neopopulist story line. C.E.O.'s are seeing their incomes skyrocket while the middle class gets squeezed. The tides of globalization work against average Americans while most of the benefits go to the top 1 percent.

This story is not entirely wrong, but it is incredibly simple-minded. To believe it, you have to suppress a whole string of complicating facts. The first complicating fact is that after a lag, average wages are rising sharply. Real average wages rose by 2 percent in 2006, the second fastest rise in 30 years.

The second complicating fact is that according to the Congressional Budget Office, earnings for the poorest fifth of Americans are also on the increase.... [B]etween 1991 and 2005, "the bottom fifth increased its earnings by 80 percent, compared with around 50 percent for the highest-income group and around 20 percent for each of the other three groups."

The third complicating fact is that despite years of scare stories, income volatility is probably not trending upward. A study by the C.B.O. has found that incomes are no more unstable now than they were in the 1980s and 1990s.

The fourth complicating fact is that recent rises in inequality have less to do with the grinding unfairness of globalization than with the reality that the market increasingly rewards education and hard work...

My reaction is that none of these first four are "obviously correct," let alone "fantastic."

Brooks's first two facts are cherry-picked and unrepresentative--note the limitation of the first "fact" to an average--not a median--number over a very short period, and note the restriction of the second to "earnings" rather than "incomes." Brooks's third "fact" appears to be wrong: at least as I read the studies http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/80xx/doc8007/04-17-EarningsVariability.pdf http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/77xx/doc7777/01-31-Volatility.pdf, individual earnings volatility increase from the 1960s-1970s to the 1980s-1990s-2000s, but shows little change within that latter period, while family earnings volatility rises from the 1980s to the present. But as Peter Orszag says, "the number of studies on the topic is limited, however, so it is too early to reach firm conclusions about the precise timing or magnitude of any [possible] increase."

And Brooks's fourth "fact" is simply incoherent: increased rewards to education and to hard work and to luck and to choosing the right parents is not an alternative to the grinding mills of globalization but is, instead, the channel through which the mills of globalization grind.

I realize that when one says that David Brooks is "far more informed by cutting-edge economic research than most things you find on the op-ed pages," he means to give faint praise: the bar is indeed low. But surely there is at least one other New York Times columnist whom one should praise first for the economic sophistication of his arguments, even if one does find his points politically unpalatable?

July 26, 2007

Tyler Cowen Quotes Tim Blanning on a Coach and Four

London-to-Manchester by land in 1750 was like London-to-Sidney by air today in lots of ways. Tyler Cowen sends us to Tim Blanning:

Marginal Revolution: The World We Have Lost:

Four or six draught animals were needed to pull a coach and they had to be changed every 6 to 12 miles, depending on the condition of the roads.  In England it was calculated that one horse was needed for every mile of a journey on a well-maintained turnpike road.  So, for the 185 miles from Manchester to London, 185 horses had to be kept stabled and fed to deal with the seventeen changes required by the stagecoaches which traveled the route.  Those horses in turn required an army of coachmen, postillions, guards, grooms, ostlers and stable-boys to keep them running.  As a coach could carry no more than ten passengers, fares were correspondingly high and out of reach of the mass of the population.  A journey from Augsburg to Innsbruck by stagecoach, although little more than 60 miles as the crow flies, would have cost an unskilled laborer more than a month's wages just for the fare.

That is from new and excellent The Pursuit of Glory, Europe 1648-1815, by historian Tim Blanning.  The best parts of this book -- which are very good indeed -- are the early sections on the economic history of transportation.

Mark Stein: Options Backdating Indictments

Mark Stein writes:

News Blog - Daily Brief: Options Scandal Fallout - Portfolio.com: A federal grand jury in Manhattan indicted the former chief financial officer of SafeNet Inc. on charges of securities fraud and conspiracy for her role in the alleged backdating of millions of dollars of employee stock options. The U.S. Attorney's office in Manhattan said Carole Argo "engaged in an illegal scheme to deceive SafeNet's board of directors, shareholders, and auditors, as well as securities analysts, the S.E.C., members of the investing public, and others." Her goal, it asserted, was to facilitate the "systematic backdating of options grants" and to conceal how much those backdated grants were costing the company and its shareholders.

Prosecutors didn't say precisely how much the practice allegedly did cost shareholders of SafeNet, a computer-security firm in Belcamp, Maryland. But Ron Walker, a U.S. postal inspector, said that Argo and several unnamed co-conspirators executed a "carefully planned scheme" that netted them "millions of dollars." Backdating the options let Argo and others buy stock for less than their fair-market value on the day the awards were made. That virtually guaranteed a risk-free gain even if the stock price did not rise after then. At the same time, prosecutors say, they said in public filings that "no gain to the options is possible without stock price appreciation, which will benefit all shareholders."

In a separate case in San Jose, California, the S.E.C. filed a civil lawsuit against the former chief executive of KLA-Tencor Corp.... The commission said Kenneth Schroeder repeatedly backdated options after becoming C.E.O. in 1999... undeterred by a lawyer's written warning in March 2001 that "Any attempt to set a price before such a grant is made raises substantial risks under securities and tax laws."

"Corporate executives who deliberately backdate options grants and skew their books to hide compensation expenses are misleading shareholders and investors about the earnings of the company and painting a false picture of executive pay," U.S. Attorney Michael J. Garcia said in a statement.

Academic Journals and Referees

Tyler Cowen blogs this:

Marginal Revolution: Economic Inquiry has a new policy: R. Preston McAfee (a great choice) is the new editor, and he writes in a mass email today:

More insidious, in my view, is the gradual morphing of the referees from evaluators to anonymous co-authors. Referees request increasingly extensive revisions. Usually these represent improvements, but the process takes a lot of time and effort, and the end result is often worse owing to its committee-design.... The system is broken. Consequently, Economic Inquiry is starting an experiment. In this experiment, an author can submit under a 'no revisions' policy. This policy means exactly what it says: if you submit under no revisions, I (or the co-editor) will either accept or reject. What will not happen is a request for a revision....

Robert Waldmann Wants to Deny Robert Samuelson His Free Speech Rights!

He writes, apropos of Robert Samuelson of the Washington Post:

Robert's Stochastic thoughts: Robert Samuelson wrote a very very bad op-ed which contained a claim which interested Matthew Yglesias: "eliminate tax subsidies (mainly the mortgage interest rate deduction) for housing, which push Americans toward ever-bigger homes. (Note: If you move to a home 25 percent larger and then increase energy efficiency 25 percent, you don't save energy.)"

[Matthew] Yglesias notes that 0.75*1.25 is less than one, and suggests a remedial arithmetic course.

I am willing to go further and make a personal sacrifice. I have a mustache. I am willing to support an unconstitutional law that no person who had a mustache on July 26 2007 can ever write an op-ed ever again (damn that would ban Matt too. Cut it off before it's too late).

July 25, 2007

More on the Kaiping Mines: Jonathan Spence's Asides, and Albert Feuerwerker's Review of Ellsworth Carlson

China specialists see and can almost touch an alternative history in which late-nineteenth century China managed to match the political and economic achievements of Meiji Japan, and in which China stood up economically, politically, and organizationally at the same pace of the Japan that won its short victorious war against Russia in 1905, negotiated as an equal with Britain and the U.S. over warship construction in 1921, and was perhaps the eighth industrial power in the world by 1929. In his In Search of Modern China, for example, Jonathan Spence praises the nineteenth century:

Confucian statesmen whose skill, integrity, and tenacity helped suppress the rebellions... showed how imaginatively the Chinese could respond to new challenges... managed to develop new structures to handle foreign relations and collect customs dues, to build modern ships and weapons, and to start teaching international law and the rudiments of modern science.... It was true that there remained complex problems... rural militarization... local autonomy over taxation... landlord abuses... bureaucratic corruption... bellicose foreign powers.... But with forceful imperial leadership and a resolute Grand Council, it appeared that the Qing Dynasty might regain some of its former strength...

And Spence laments that:

forceful leadership was not forthcoming... the empress dowager Cixi... coregent for her son Tongzhi from 1861-73... coregent for her nephew Guangxu from 1875-89.... [A]bsolute political authority... while Guangxu [was imprisoned in the palace]... on her orders from 1898-1908.... Cixi had clashed badly in 1869 with Prince Gong.... Zeng Guofan died in 1872... Wenxiang died in 1876... Zuo Zongtang remained preoccupied with the pacification of the Muslims in [Xinjiang].... The grand councilors... worthy... with distinguished careers... lacked the skill or initiative to direct China on a new course. Although self-strengthening programs continued to be implemented... a disproportionate number of them were initiated by one man, Li Hongzhang... governor-general of Hebei... commissioner of trade for the northern ports...

Li Hongzhang's achievements were indeed impressive: the 1872 China Merchant Steamship Navigation Company, the 1877 Kaiping coals mines, in 1878 cotton mills in Shanghai, the Tianjin arsenal, the telegraph between Tianjin and Peking, a seven-mile railroad to ship from Kaiping to the river and then downriver to Tianjin, and so forth. What was not undertaken by Li Hongzhang appears likely to have been undertaken by Zhang Zhidong, eighteen years governor-general of Hunan-Hubei: the railroad from Hankou to Beijing, the Han-Ye-Ping heavy industrial complex, and so forth. But what impresses me most is how little even the most active, energetic, and skillful of statesmen could accomplish in the prevailing institutional and political climate--how those attempting to modernize China in the late nineteenth century were trying to roll boulders uphill.

And so I find it interesting to note:

Albert Feuerwerker, Review of Ellsworth Carlson (1957), The Kaiping Mines 1877-1912 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press), in the 1959 Journal of Asian Studies: Professor Carlson's monograph is a welcome addition to the all too sparse literature on the problem of China's economic development. His subject, China's first modern coal-mining enterprise, is a particularly good one for the study of the format in which Western-style enterprises were introduced into China at the end of the Ch'ing dynasty. Thus the discussion of the characteristics of the system of "official supervision and merchant management" (kuan-tu shang-pan) in Chapter 2, while necessarily brief, is to the point and illuminating.

The Kaiping Mines, like a good many others of China's first modern industries, were inaugurated under the aegis of the Chihli governor-general, Li Hung-chang. The enterprise formed a part of Li's satrapy, and probably owed its origin to a desire to furnish bunker coal and return cargo from Tientsin for the steamers of the China Merchants' Steam Navigation Company, which Li also controlled. Its first manager, T'ang Ching-hsing (Tong King-sing), was also until 1884 an official of the shipping company. Under T'ang's direction, capital was raised from Chinese sources including the C.M.S.N Co., and digging begun: production averaged approximately 250,000 tons annually in the early 1890's. But under Chang Yen-mao, who headed the company from 1892 to 1900, heavy borrowing in order to expand production gradually brought Kaiping under the control of its foreign creditors--interestingly enough, a process in which Herbert Hoover, then a young mining engineer, played an important role. Carlson describes these developments in detail and concludes with an account of Chinese efforts to recover the mines, which resulted in the formation of the Sino-British Kailan Mining Administration in 1912.

Despite its pioneering achievements, Kaiping faltered in the face of two obstacles which it confronted in common with other kuan-tu shang-pan enterprises in the late nineteenth century. The first was the lack of sufficient capital and the inability to raise more from domestic sources. The second was the unpropitious political environment into which it was born. Little aid could be expected from the tottering Manchu regime either in the form of financial assistance to compensate for the reluctance of private investors, or protection from foreign encroachment such as eventuated in British domination of this enterprise. While Carlson does not explicitly make the comparison, the contrast with the history of early industrial efforts in Meiji Japan is a striking one, and invites us to examine more closely the bases of the widely differing experiences of China and Japan in the process of economic modernization.

This is not business history, strictly speaking, although some attention is given to the technical achievements of the Kaiping Mines. It is unfortunate that the available source materials did not permit the author to examine Kaiping more closely as a business enterprise per se. But this is not a shortcoming peculiar to Carlson's study alone; it is a problem that everyone dealing with China's economic history faces.

Herbert Hoover in China: A Story I Had Never Heard Before

Now to figure out how much of it is true:

China Matters: Herbert Hoover: Made in China: China Matters jumps into the wayback machine, sets the controls for Tianjin 1900—-the Boxer Rebellion--and revisits one of the great political coverups in 20th century US political history: Herbert Hoover’s suppression of his pivotal and deplorable role in the alienation of China’s Kaiping Coal Mines from Chinese ownership.... To the general public, Hoover is a punchline in jokes about the Great Depression. But for serious students of Hoover, the emphasis has always been on taking the moral measure of the financier and humanitarian who achieved remarkable wealth, power, and worldwide recognition long before he ascended to the Presidency. Was he a ruthless, unscrupulous profiteer or a misunderstood apostle of rational business administration, economic efficiency, and benevolent progressivism?

Remarkably, the best documented and most accurate picture of Hoover can be found at the beginning of his career, in China, in the case of the alienation of the vast Kaiping Coal Mines from Chinese control. Thanks to a notorious court case-—and Hoover’s determined attempts to obscure and distort revelations that reflected badly upon him-—we can form a relatively unambiguous judgment of the man and his methods. The story, briefly, is this:

Herbert Hoover came to China in 1899, a young man of 24, with a reputation earned in the Australian gold fields as a shrewd, capable, and energetic mine manager—-and as an ambitious, Machiavellian manipulator who had schemed unsuccessfully to supplant his boss. He was sent to China by the London mine management firm of Bewick, Moreing & Company, to expand a relationship it had developed with the Kaiping Coal Mines and their manager, Chang Yan-mao. Kaiping was one of the crown jewels of Li Hung-chang’s self-strengthening movement. Located above an immense coal reserve near the present-day city of Tangshan, the mines had flourished under the administration and financial management of Tang Ting-shu, an able comprador, and were producing almost 500,000 tons per annum by the turn of the century.

However, the general manager position passed to an apparently less capable individual: Manchu bannerman and court insider Chang Yan-mao, who was unable to introduce needed capital for the mine from either domestic private or government sources....[After] 1895... Chang began an awkward flirtation with Bewick, Moreing to gain capital and some measure of security for the enterprise.... Hoover was dispatched to China in furtherance of this strategy.... [T]he Boxer Rebellion in 1900. Chang Yan-mao and Hoover were both in Tianjin during the siege.... Russian troops occupied the Kaiping fields, creating anxiety in Chang’s mind that the mines might be confiscated without compensation as a war reparation.

Chang decided that the enterprise had to be placed under the protection of a benign foreign power, namely Great Britain... Bewick, Moreing & Co.... would ensure that the interests of the existing stockholders and, not least of all, Chang Yan-mao himself, would be protected. Therefore, Chang hurriedly deeded over the entire enterprise to Hoover as trustee, contingent that the enterprise be recapitalized with an additional 1,000,000 pounds and reconstituted as a joint Sino-British enterprise.

If the story ended here, Hoover would have probably received a well-earned attaboy from history for realizing this once-in-a-lifetime opportunity so perspicaciously and resolutely.... The agreement that Hoover took to London defined him as trustee for a Kaiping enterprise whose assets and ownership should be converted directly into the new Sino-British company. This left no provision for “promotional fees”, the distribution of shares without compensation to middlemen such as the Bewick, Moreing partners, their friends, and associates in return for their efforts in midwifing the new corporation.

Hoover was thereupon sent back to obtain a revised agreement which listed Hoover as the agent of Bewick, Moreing lead principal C.A. Moreing, thereby freeing Hoover from sole and explicit duty as trustee to protect the interests of Kaiping, and allowing the transaction to be structured to include benefits for Moreing and other promoters. To obtain Chang’s agreement to this significant revision, Hoover concluded a side agreement with Chang defining the new company as a joint Sino-British enterprise with equal say in management, a China board and a London board. Again, this could be regarded as an understandable, if awkward measure to ensure that Bewick, Moreing (or at least its partners) received the incentive and reward necessary for lining up the financing for this new venture.

However, Hoover spent the next seven months in China... placing his people in key positions inside the enterprise and... consolidating foreign control of Kaiping in violation of the agreement. The fatal piece of overreach by Bewick, Moreing, however, was its disregard of the requirement that the enterprise be recapitalized.... Bewick, Moreing did not arrange any significant new equity for Kaiping. Instead, it burdened the new enterprise with new debt, in the form of 500,000 pounds of debentures bearing 6% interest. By 1902, widespread dissatisfaction among the original shareholders of Kaiping (who now included many foreigners) was reported.

Then... in November 1902, local Chinese managers raised the dragon flag... to honor the empress dowager’s birthday... foreign management... took down the Chinese flag.... This incident concentrated the baleful attention of Yuan Shih-kai, the major power not only in North China but in the empire by virtue of his command of the Beiyang Army and his position as commissioner for Chihli and Jehol.... Chang Yan-mao had tardily and incompletely memorialized the throne on the deal, the details of which, when they became known to Yuan Shih-kai, incensed him. Yuan demanded that Chang recover the properties for the empire. Remarkably, the throne accepted that the case be argued in the British courts.

The case went to trial in London in 1905 and apparently caused quite a sensation.... The trial revealed that the reconstitution of the company had left it gutted. Only 375,000 shares remained in the hands of the original shareholders. Most if not all of the balance of 625,000 shares had been distributed without compensation as promotional fees or as bonuses for the buyers of the new debentures.... The corporation, instead of being recapitalized, was encumbered with new debt. Little if any of the money from the debenture issue had actually reached Kaiping. On top of this, Hoover’s activities in violation of the joint management agreement he had concluded were fully aired, including some indiscreet remarks denigrating the China board.

Bewick, Moreing lost the case and was subjected to some pointed words from the bench. Hoover, both as partner in Bewick, Moreing and as the individual executing the skullduggery firsthand, was undeniably culpable.... Although the judge felt there were clear grounds for pursuing a criminal case against the individuals involved, in a piece of good news for Bewick, Moreing and Hoover, the Chinese government apparently had had enough of Western litigation....

For Hoover and Bewick, Moreing, the deleterious effects of the Kaiping debacle were minimal. Hoover left China, aged 27, as a partner in Bewick, Moreing, purportedly already wealthy, with a pocketful of Kaiping shares, and his career launched as a global financier involved in virtually every resource industry from tin to gold to petroleum. During the First World War he burnished his image as a benevolent, progressive, and supremely capable and honest captain of industry by orchestrating Belgian relief and the postwar food program....

When he entered political life, he employed sophisticated public relations efforts to achieve favorable coverage in the press. When he learned that anti-Hoover books were in preparation, Hoover did not limit himself to outraged rebuttals. He unleashed the FBI to perform background checks on the authors. His secretary, Lewis Strauss (later the spearhead in efforts to revoke Robert Oppenheimer’s security clearance) organized a burglary of one author’s office.... [Hoover's] agent went to England to secure all copies of the trial transcript to deny its contents to his enemies (at least one copy survives, in the library at Oxford). He concocted a story in which he himself was the protector of Chang Yanmao and Kaiping appearing in the case as a neutral witness, while in truth he had been instrumental in efforts to sideline Chang and the Chinese management, and had provided information useful to the prosecution only under cross-examination....

Last but not least, a campaign of denigration was launched against the spate of anti-Hoover books published in the early 1930s, which included The Rise of Herbert Hoover by Walter Liggett and The Strange Career of Mr. Hoover by John Hamill. These books are significant for how much they got right in the Kaiping case.... The case itself was mindnumbingly complex... addressed commercial matters and corporate obligations more than individual liability, [and] did not provide an easily identifiable "smoking gun"....

I came across The Rise of Herbert Hoover, by pioneering muckraker Walter Liggett, in a New England inn, courtesy of an interior decorator who bought used books by the case in order to give the lobby the look of a cozy library.... [Ellsworth] Carlson’s Harvard monograph, The Kaiping Mines (1877-1912), describes the events in detail, unravels the twisted financial machinations as much as possible, and concludes that “the greed and bad faith of Moreing and his associates in 1901 and 1902 [were] indisputable”. Nash... was recruited by the Herbert Hoover Presidential Library.... In a four-page footnote(pp. 656-9) in his “The Life of Herbert Hoover: The Engineer 1874-1914, Nash details Hoover’s efforts to secure all copies of the trial transcript and elicit testimonials.... Nash remarks that:

Hoover’s later explanations of his conduct in China often diverged from the account provided by the trial transcript and by documents entered in evidence at the trial.... Hoover’s role... was scarcely a peripheral or ‘accidental’ one.... As a key participant in the 1900-1901 transfer negotiations, his conduct was under severe scrutiny at the trial.... Nor did Hoover’s testimony really win the case for Chang Yen-mao.... Hoover’s later defenses also contained significant omissions.... In the 1920s... [t]he effort to block [Hoover's presidential] aspirations by ‘exposing’ his past is a largely untold story that came to involve some prominent members of both political parties. Under the circumstances it is not surprising that Hoover and his associates devised a defense that fit the requirements of political survival...

To the library!

Empirical Evidence of Multiple Equilibria in International Finance

Brad Setser is amazed by the Brazilians he sees:

RGE - Two things I never expected to see: 1. The spread (over Treasuries) on Brazil’s dollar bonds is now 120 bp. I remember when... 2. Brazil added close to $25b to its reserves in a single quarter ($23.7b if you want to be precise). Reserves rose from a tad over $85b to just under $110b. Back during Brazil's most recent crisis, it often had -- after netting out IMF borrowing -- less than $20b in the bank. At the end of 2004, a little more than than two years ago, Brazil only had $27.5b or so net of its IMF loan.

The IMF’s total commitment to Brazil back in 2002 chalked in at a bit over $30b. It was considered huge at the time. And it wasn’t all disbursed in a quarter either. The biggest quarterly disbursement was “only” $6.3b. Yet without the IMF loan, Brazil would have almost certainly defaulted on its external debt. The big “China” surge in commodity prices wouldn’t have come along quickly enough to save Brazil from default.

A country that needed a huge credit line from the IMF to avoid default five years ago now borrows in US dollars for only a bit more than the US Treasury. Talk about multiple equilibria....

Brazil used to have far more dollar debt than dollar reserves, and, to top it off, Brazil’s central bank sold a lot of insurance against further falls in the real when the real was under pressure. The government was effectively short dollars and long real -- its balance sheet deteriorated when the real fell. Now Brazil's government is long dollars. It borrows from the world in real to buy dollar reserves...

The carry trade, you know. It hasn’t gone away. Who doesn’t want to borrow yen to buy real?... There is nothing like getting a 12% or so spread (see Truman's slide 15) lending to a country that doesn’t need the money. Brazil, remember, runs a current account surplus. It doesn’t need to borrow Japan’s savings...

I would say that this scares me. Brazil's central bank doesn't need to borrow Japan's savings, and it really doesn't need to borrow Japan's savings to invest them in dollar-denominated U.S.-located debt. The longer the Brazilian government tries to keep the real from appreciating, et cetera. I don't see how the world's central banks being so far long dollar-denominated debt can end without tears.

Dani Rodrik Thinks About Teaching

Dani Rodrik writes:

Dani Rodrik's weblog: If it is July, it must be time to think about teaching...: This gives me occasion to meditate about the nature of teaching economics in a public policy school. There is a standard mold for teaching economics to undergraduates and to doctoral students.... But how do you teach international trade and trade policy to a group of students who will be policy makers and professionals in the real world--who are too sophisticated and well informed to treat as undergraduates, but for whom the typical doctoral course is useless because it covers the research frontier and not the tools for thinking about policy?...

[I]t is a question that still baffles me.... [T]he students who take my course have invested in heavy duty economics for a whole year.... My hope is to train them beyond simply being able to understand what is in the WSJ, FT, or The Economist. They need to be able to evaluate critically what is in the policy-relevant academic literature and think creatively about policy options in light of that literature.

This is a lot more difficult than it may appear. The last few times I have tried to do this, I found myself teaching too much of a conventional doctoral economics type course.... Students (rightly) complained.... So this time around... I am organizing the syllabus around policy issues.... [T]he relevant headings become "why do countries trade what they do," and "does it matter?" Globalization strategies, China, WTO, and regional trade agreements get their own sections.... [T]he challenge is to teach an issues-oriented course while avoiding superficiality.... I do not know if I will pull it off. Check back at the end of the Fall term...

Well, it looks like Economics 113, "American Economic History," has just been added to my fall teaching plate. And I haven't even begun to think about how to teach it this time.

Immigrants and Unskilled Workers: Complements or Substitutes?

Ezra Klein writes:

Ezra Klein: The Minimum Wage vs. Immigration: Giovanni Peri, who's actually conducted some of the research showing immigration has low wage suppression effects, explains his results this way:

On first thought, it might seem that the simple economics of supply and demand would answer the question: What is the effect of immigrants on wages? Immigrants increase the supply of labor. Hence, they should decrease the wages of native workers, reduce their employment opportunities, or push them to other states. The question, however, is more subtle than this, because all workers are not the same: They differ by education, skills, and occupation and perform jobs and productive tasks different from and complementary....

In nontechnical terms, the wages of native workers could increase because the increased supply of migrants is likely to put native workers in jobs where they perform supervisory, managerial, training, and in general interactive and coordinating tasks, which makes them more productive. Moreover, the presence of new workers also implies higher demand for consumption, so that immigration might simply increase total production and demand without depressing wages...

Giovanni's arguments do seem to make sense of the data from immigrant-rich California. My guess is that complement and substitute effects more-or-less cancel each other out, but it's only a guess.

Carbon Emissions Blogging: "In That Case, We Have No Time to Lose. Plant [the Trees] This Afternoon!" (Why Oh Why Can't We Have a Better Press Corps?/Robert J. Samuelson Is a Bad Person/Washington Post Edition)

Mark Thoma does an evil deed by telling me that somebody should take note of Robert Samuelson. And he's right: somebody should. But why does it have to be me?

First, some history: The last time we tried to put a "Pigou tax" on carbon emissions--back in 1993 with the Gore BTU tax proposal--Robert Samuelson opposed it: "Congress," he said, "should... deliver a firm message: We won't pass this [energy] tax... [without] more spending cuts. This would give Congress more time to evaluate the energy tax and put more pressure on the White House to cut spending.... Congress... [should not] be stampeded."

Remember that: Robert Samuelson did not want Congress to be "stampeded" into including a carbon tax in the 1993 reconciliation bill.

Economists believe that things work well when the incentives individuals face--the good or ill that their actions cause for themselves--match up to the good or ill of the impact that their actions have on society as a whole. Thus our liking for energy taxes as the best way to start controlling global warming: individuals don't feel the harm that their greenhouse gas emissions do to other people via their effect on the climate, but a tax on carbon makes them feel that harm in their pocketbook and so matches up individual incentives with social outcomes. That's what the Gore BTU tax proposal was trying to do.

There are in general two ways that you can match private incentives with social outcomes. The first is to take individuals' preferences over material goods as given, and use taxes and subsidies to raise the prices of goods that have negative and lower the prices of goods that have positive "externalities," as economists call them. The second is to try to shift individuals' preferences: appeal to altruism, or to the moral sense, or to the mirror neurons to get people to feel good about doing deeds that have positive externalities, and rearrange social markers of status and approval to shift people's preferences over goods without changing their material characteristics or prices. Economists generally prefer to work on the tax-and-subsidy side rather than on the preferences side, out of a disciplinary commitment to the idea that cash-on-the-barrelhead is strong and pats-on-the-back are weak. But we do what we can: if we cannot pass a BTU tax, telling people who fund carbon offsets or drive fuel-efficient cars that they are good, responsible, moral people is a perfectly orthodox and constructive thing to do.

But somehow Robert Samuelson doesn't think so today. Attempts to work on the preferences side by saying "good for you!" to Prius drivers get him really, really angry:

Robert J. Samuelson: Prius Politics: My younger son calls the Toyota Prius a "hippie car."... [L]ike hippies, [Prius drivers] are making a loud lifestyle statement: We're saving the planet; what are you doing?... Prius politics is... showing off, not curbing greenhouse gas emissions. Politicians pander to "green" constituents who want to feel good....

California Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger is the champ of Prius politics, having declared that his state will cut greenhouse emissions to 1990 levels by 2020.... However, the policies to reach these goals haven't yet been formulated; that task has been left to the California Air Resources Board. Many mandates wouldn't take effect until 2012, presumably after Schwarzenegger has left office. As for the 2050 goal, it's like his movies: make-believe. Barring big technological breakthroughs, the chances of reaching it are zero.

But it's respectable make-believe. Schwarzenegger made the covers of Time and Newsweek. The press laps this up; "green" is the new "yellow journalism."... Even if California achieved its 2020 goal (dubious) and the United States followed (more dubious), population and economic growth elsewhere would overwhelm any emission cuts. In 2050, global population is expected to hit 9.4 billion....

[H]ere's what Congress should do... gradually increase fuel economy standards for new vehicles... raise the gasoline tax over the same period by $1 to $2 a gallon... eliminate tax subsidies... for housing.... But practical politicians won't enact these policies, except perhaps for higher fuel economy standards. They'd be too unpopular.

Prius politics promises to conquer global warming without public displeasure.... Deep reductions in emissions... might someday occur if both plug-in hybrid vehicles and underground storage of carbon dioxide from coal-fired power plants become commercially viable.... Prius politics is a delusional exercise in public relations that... [is] not helping the environment [and] might hurt the economy.

In my view, Robert Samuelson is a bad person: when a carbon tax was on the agenda and we had a real window of opportunity, he fought it; now when the only things on the agenda are preference-shaping tools that I regard as very weak compared to a carbon tax, he's against them as well on the grounds that "hippie... Prius politics is... showing off" and that a carbon tax would be good. A little intellectual three-card-monte here, doncha think?

Let me contrast Robert Samuelson's sneering at the "hippies" who want to take the weak "Prius politics" steps at fighting global warming we can take now with one of the favorite stories of somebody I once knew--somebody whose place on the ideological spectrum was the same as Robert Samuelson, but who I think was a good person--the late Lloyd Bentsen, who liked to tell this story and claimed he'd gotten it from John F. Kennedy when they were freshmen in the House of Representatives together:

If you travel through Lorraine, between Neufchateau, Toul, Epinal, and Nancy you find the Chateau de Thorey-Lyautey, retirement home of the French Marshal Louis Hubert Gonzalve Lyautey. Around 1930 the nearly eighty year-old Marshal had a conversation with his landscaper:

Lyautey asked his landscaper if he would on the next day start planting a row of oaks to line the road up to the chateau.

"But Mon Marechal," said the gardener, looking at the aged Lyautey. "The trees will take more than fifty years to grow."

"Oh," said the Marshal. "In that case, we have no time to lose. Plant them this afternoon!"


Notes: Here's the tape from 1993:

Robert Samuelson, Washington Post: March 25, 1993: The Clinton... BTU tax would increase the price of oil by $3.50 a barrel, or about 18 percent of today's price. A ton of coal would increase $5.60, a 26 percent jump. A thousand cubic feet of natural gas would rise about 13 percent.... Yes, it would depress oil imports - but not by much.... Likewise, the tax wouldn't reduce pollution or greenhouse gases because it doesn't cut overall energy use. Economic and population growth will raise energy consumption an estimated 15 percent in the 1990s; the tax might shave the total by 2 percent, says the administration.... The CBO has estimated how big a tax would be required to stabilize emissions of carbon dioxide, the main greenhouse gas and a byproduct of fossil fuels. Compared with the Clinton proposal, the overall tax would have to be twice as high and the tax on coal three times as high....

Clinton... is simply trying to stampede his program through Congress. He envisions a one-time spasm of deficit reduction. By fall, all the political dirty work would be done. This means... accepting a Clinton package that has too many taxes and too few spending cuts....

Congress should separate the energy tax from the Clinton package and deliver a firm message: We won't pass this tax - or its equivalent - until you propose more spending cuts. This would give Congress more time to evaluate the energy tax and put more pressure on the White House to cut spending. Unfortunately, Congress shows no interest in asserting itself. It prefers to be stampeded.

As Robert Samuelson knew back then--and as we all know now--there were no Republican votes for deficit reduction in 1993, no matter what program Clinton proposed. The Republican leadership had decided that they were going to make Clinton's presidency a failure, and would oppose the 1993 budget no matter how many spending cuts were included. Additional spending cuts would have lost left-wing Democratic votes for the reconciliation package. As it was, the reconciliation bill passed by a single vote in each of the houses. Thus a call for Congress to refuse to be "stampeded" was a call for no budget reconciliation bill at all, and thus a call for no increases in taxes--not even on carbon.

Peter Orszag and Company on SCHIP and PAYGO

Peter Orszag of the Congressional Budget Office weighs in:

Yesterday, CBO released a letter to Senator Baucus on the number of uninsured children who are eligible for Medicaid or SCHIP. Some empirical studies have found that there are between 5 million and 6 million such children. In contrast to those studies, a recent estimate suggests a much smaller number, 1.1 million children, lack health insurance but are eligible for Medicaid or SCHIP. The CBO letter notes:

In summary, CBO regards the estimates of between 5 million and 6 million children who are uninsured and eligible for Medicaid or SCHIP as more appropriate for considering policies aimed at enrolling more eligible children in those programs...

This morning, CBO testified before the House Budget Committee on PAYGO issues. My testimony... made the following points:

  • The Budget Enforcement Act's PAYGO requirement, as well as the law’s discretionary spending limits, helped to enforce multiyear fiscal goals and prevent fiscal deterioration. When the budgetary situation and policy priorities changed, however, the PAYGO requirement and discretionary spending caps were often superseded or ignored.

  • Although PAYGO may help to prevent a deterioration in the fiscal picture, it only applies to new policy changes rather than the effects of existing policy. Consequently, PAYGO by itself does not address the nation’s long-term fiscal imbalance, which is driven mostly by growth in the cost of health care.

  • Any PAYGO system requires a set of scoring rules, concepts, and baseline requirements. One key question is whether a statutory PAYGO requirement should apply to both mandatory spending and revenue legislation. If the primary objective of a PAYGO requirement is to avoid deterioration in the fiscaloutlook, no differential treatment between mandatory spending and revenue changes would seem to be warranted. Including changes in revenue legislation within the PAYGO requirement, however, might impede other policy objectives. (A related issue involves the treatment of expiring spending and revenue provisions. The existing approach generally ensures that the cost of extending a temporary policy past its initial expiration manifests itself either when the policy is initially adopted or when it is extended. That objective is crucial to the integrity of the process but can be achieved in a variety of ways.)

  • Both the House and the Senate already have nonstatutory PAYGO rules in place. Those rules generally are enforced against individual bills or amendments as they are considered. A different approach to PAYGO could provide a mechanism for enforcing overall budget totals at the end of the Congressional session. A statutory PAYGO requirement could establish additional enforcement mechanisms, like sequestration, that cannot be embodied in House or Senate rules...

http://cbo.gov/ftpdoc.cfm?index=8385&type=1
http://cbo.gov/ftpdoc.cfm?index=8357&type=1

July 24, 2007

Regulating Hedge Funds

A piece from last January that I wanted to remember to file:

No Consensus On Regulating Hedge Funds: By Kara Scannell, Joellen Perry, and Alistair Macdonald: European officials are pushing for more disclosure of hedge-fund portfolios or a ratings system like that for corporate debt. German officials, using their chairmanship of the Group of Eight leading nations this year, are particularly aggressive. But U.S. and British officials are taking a more hands-off approach, advocating additional study and, at least in the U.S., focusing on making sure hedge funds take money only from the wealthy and sophisticated rather than on changing hedge-fund behavior to minimize risks to the global financial system....

There is a nagging worry among many regulators and central banks that hedge funds may pose a significant risk to the global financial system and could precipitate or exacerbate a monetary crisis. They have expressed a desire for a borderless solution.... Today, hedge funds are mainly regulated indirectly through the rules governing the banks and brokerage houses that they trade with and borrow from. In the United Kingdom, hedge-fund managers are required to register with the Financial Services Authority, making them subject to random inspections and examinations....

SEC Chairman Christopher Cox testified in July that "to the maximum extent possible, our actions should be nonintrusive." Timothy Geithner, president of the New York Federal Reserve, has said that it is important to monitor hedge funds but that it isn't desirable to regulate them for now. In Continental Europe, skepticism of hedge funds is greater....

In the U.S. lawmakers have turned their attention away from how funds invest toward who is investing in the funds as a way to protect vulnerable investors. Members of Congress have said they are concerned with pension investments in hedge funds, and the SEC last month proposed a rule that would limit the number of individual investors who qualify to invest in hedge funds by raising the minimum threshold of investment acumen they must meet.

There is the "guard against hedge fund-created systematic risk" point, which is a valid one. There is also the "protect vulnerable investors" point, which seems strangely misdirected: regulating hedge funds ranks perhaps 50th on the liast of steps one ought to take to protect vulnerable investors.

Ezra Klein: Health Insurance Matters

A nice point:

Ezra Klein: Insurance Matters: One of the common objections to universal coverage is that insurance coverage doesn't actually improve health outcomes all that much. This objection, unsurprisingly, is generally made by people with health coverage. It's also not very true.

More evidence for the importance of health coverage comes from a study in The New England Journal of Medicine this month, which tracks what happens when the previously uninsured become eligible for Medicare. It turns out that they -- surprise! -- need a whole lot more care than their demographically similar, but previously insured, brethren!

They have conditions that need to be treated and managed, exhibit higher rates of hospitalization and doctor's visits, and generally cost a whole bunch more money than those who've been availing themselves of the health care system for years. As the NEJM dryly concludes, "The costs of expanding health insurance coverage for uninsured adults before they reach the age of 65 years may be partially offset by subsequent reductions in health care use and spending for these adults after the age of 65." Add in what they cost the system in catastrophic health incidents before they become eligible for Medicare, and it begins to look like keeping the uninsured population uninsured is a much better deal for the insurers than it is for taxpayers, hospitals, or just about anyone else.

Ezra Klein Is Naive About Brooks and Income Inequality

He is still outraged by David Brooks:

Ezra Klein: And One Last on Brooks: Before the day ends. A smart and handsome correspondent e-mails:

Three more points that I think you should make.

(1) The modest real wage increase last year wasn't the start of a trend - it was a blip because gas prices fell. When they popped up again this year, real wages fell again, visible in your first chart.

(2) Notice that the gains in total income for the bottom fifth were much less than the gains in earnings, mainly because of reduced benefits. Part of the story here is that welfare reform forced a lot of mothers into the work force. That increases earnings, but it means that the earning increase is quite misleading as a measure of how people were doing. It's also true that the Clinton boom allowed some people to get off welfare and into work, but again just looking at earnings is a deliberately misleading way to look at things.

(3) The result that very high incomes are predominantly on Wall Street is interesting. But since when is "It's not CEOs paying 35 percent taxes, it's hedge fund managers paying 15 percent - less than secretaries!" an ANTI-populist observation?

Agreed. I want to emphasize, again, that this article is dishonest and misleading, in effect if not intent. I'm perfectly willing to believe some rightwing Heritage type impressed a perfectly well-intentioned David Brooks with these points at a party, but either way, the resulting article served to deceive readers of the New York Times op-ed page as to the state of the economy.

This strikes me as a rather big deal.

The honchos of the New York Times don't think this is a big deal. You see, in their minds Brooks is not there to inform people but to "balance" Paul Krugman. He performs that task admirably.

The Minimum Wage: Looking Across the Washington-Idaho State Line

Jared Bernstein pointed this out to me six months ago:

For $7.93 an Hour, It's Worth A Trip Across the State Line By TIMOTHY EGAN: Just eight miles separate this town on the Washington side of the state border from Post Falls on the Idaho side. But the towns are nearly $3 an hour apart in the required minimum wage. Washington pays the highest in the nation, just under $8 an hour, and Idaho has among the lowest, matching 21 states that have not raised the hourly wage beyond the federal minimum of $5.15.

Nearly a decade ago, when voters in Washington approved a measure that would give the state's lowest-paid workers a raise nearly every year, many business leaders predicted that small towns on this side of the state line would suffer. But instead of shriveling up, small-business owners in Washington say they have prospered far beyond their expectations. In fact, as a significant increase in the national minimum wage heads toward law, businesses here at the dividing line between two economies -- a real-life laboratory for the debate -- have found that raising prices to compensate for higher wages does not necessarily lead to losses in jobs and profits. Idaho teenagers cross the state line to work in fast-food restaurants in Washington, where the minimum wage is 54 percent higher. That has forced businesses in Idaho to raise their wages to compete.

Business owners say they have had to increase prices somewhat to keep up. But both states are among the nation's leaders in the growth of jobs and personal income, suggesting that an increase in the minimum wage has not hurt the overall economy. ''We're paying the highest wage we've ever had to pay, and our business is still up more than 11 percent over last year,'' said Tom Singleton, who manages a Papa Murphy's takeout pizza store here, with 13 employees. His store is flooded with job applicants from Idaho, Mr. Singleton said. Like other business managers in Washington, he said he had less turnover because the jobs paid more.

By contrast, an Idaho restaurant owner, Rob Elder, said he paid more than the minimum wage because he could not find anyone to work for the Idaho minimum at his Post Falls restaurant, the Hot Rod Cafe. ''At $5.15 an hour, I get zero applicants -- or maybe a guy with one leg who wouldn't pass a drug test and wouldn't show up on Saturday night because he wants to get drunk with his buddies,'' Mr. Elder said...

Why Oh Why Can't We Have a Better Press Corps? (David Brooks of the New York Times Edition)

I don't know why some New York Times editor didn't call David Brooks after reading the third paragraph of his column this morning and tell him that this was too stupid to print:

A Reality-Based Econom: If you’ve paid attention to the presidential campaign, you’ve heard the neopopulist story line. C.E.O.’s are seeing their incomes skyrocket while the middle class gets squeezed. The tides of globalization work against average Americans while most of the benefits go to the top 1 percent.

This story is not entirely wrong, but it is incredibly simple-minded. To believe it, you have to suppress a whole string of complicating facts.

The first complicating fact is that after a lag, average wages are rising sharply. Real average wages rose by 2 percent in 2006, the second fastest rise in 30 years...

Helloooo? Anybody in there? If you want to talk about the middle class, you talk about medians rather than averages because averages include--and give high weight to--what is going on at the top of the income distribution.

In fact, Dan Gross--who supposedly is going to surface at Newsweek any moment now--had an anticipatory rebuttal to the likes of David Brooks a few months ago:

Daniel Gross: December 24, 2006 - December 30, 2006 Archives: If Goldman, Sachs CEO Lloyd Blankfein gets a $54 million bonus, and 53,999,999 other workers get nothing, then on average, 54 million people have received a $1 bonus. In reality, however, only one person has more money in his pocket. Crudely speaking, that's what has been happening in the U.S. economy. The Journal's editorial page would like us to think otherwise. Some key snippets:

Over the past year, the real average wage for non-supervisory employees has risen 2.8%. That equates to about a $1,200 increase in purchasing power for the typical household this year. Last year, real median household income was also up 1.1% after inflation. This rise in take-home pay helps to explain how Americans have had the disposable income this Christmas shopping season to pay $600 for Play Station 3 computer games and $150 for the Kid-Tough Digital Camera for three-year-olds.

Got that? Average real wages rose 2.8 percent over the past year, while real median household income, which more accurately captures the experience of typical Americans, rose 1.1 percent...

The post-Judy Miller New York Times doesn't have the credibility to survive putting things like David Brooks on the American economy on its editorial page.

July 23, 2007

Meanwhile, Brian Beutler Is Unhappy with Robert Pear (Why Oh Why Can't We Have a Better Press Corps? New York Times Edition)

Brian writes, about Robert Pear's article on SCHIP:

Brian Beutler: Policy reporting, a how to guide:

Step 1: Have a high tolerance for boredom.

Step 2: Obtain remedial knowledge of specific policy landscape.

Step 3: Know how to write a paragraph like this one:

House Democrats hope to portray the [SCHIP] issue as a fight pitting the interests of children and older Americans against tobacco and insurance companies. The White House says the Democratic proposals would distort the original intent of the children’s program, cause a big increase in federal spending and adversely affect older Americans who are happy with the extra benefits they receive from private health plans.

What mustn't be written explicitly (both in this case and more generally) is that the weight of all evidence and argument suggests strongly that the Democrats portray the issue basically correctly while Republicans are completely full of s---.

Yes, It's the Washington Post Once Again...

Dean Baker spoils my day by telling me to go read David Broder.

David Broder is physically incapable of ever telling it straight:

Governors Call On Congress to Widen Insurance for Poor - washingtonpost.com: Bush has made the State Children's Health Insurance Program, known as SCHIP, the center of his campaign against "excessive" domestic spending. His budget allocates only $5 billion in additional money for the program in the next five years -- a sum that supporters of the program say is too small to cover even the 6.6 million children who are currently receiving help...

As Dean points out, it's not just "supporters": it's also