Calculated Risk writes:
Calculated Risk: Housing Starts and Completions: As expected, Completions are now following Starts "off the cliff". Completions are the key number in this release, since employment follows completions.... Based on historical correlations, it is reasonable to expect residential construction employment to follow Starts and Completions "off the cliff"... expect significant residential construction job losses over the next several months...
No money down!
Steven Pearlstein - 'No Money Down' Falls Flat - washingtonpost.com: Which of these products do you think makes sense? (a) The "balloon mortgage," in which the borrower pays only interest for 10 years before a big lump-sum payment is due. (b) The "liar loan," in which the borrower is asked merely to state his annual income, without presenting any documentation. The "option ARM" loan, in which the borrower can pay less than the agreed-upon interest and principal payment, simply by adding to the outstanding balance of the loan. (d) The "piggyback loan," in which a combination of a first and second mortgage eliminates the need for any down payment. (e) The "teaser loan," which qualifies a borrower for a loan based on an artificially low initial interest rate, even though he or she doesn't have sufficient income to make the monthly payments when the interest rate is reset in two years. (f) The "stretch loan," in which the borrower has to commit more than 50 percent of gross income to make the monthly payments. (g) All of the above.
If you answered (g), congratulations! Not only do you qualify for a job as a mortgage banker, but you may also have a future as a Wall Street investment banker and a bank regulator.
No, folks, I'm not making this up. Not only has the industry embraced these "innovations," but it has also begun to combine various features into a single loan and offer it to high-risk borrowers. One cheeky lender went so far as to advertise what it dubbed its "NINJA" loan -- NINJA standing for "No Income, No Job and No Assets." In fact, these innovative products are now so commonplace, they have been the driving force in the boom in the housing industry at least since 2005. They are a big reason why homeownership has increased from 65 percent of households to a record 69 percent. They help explain why outstanding mortgage debt has increased by $9.5 trillion in the past four years. And they are, unquestionably, a big factor behind the incredible run-up in home prices.
Now they are also a major reason the subprime mortgage market is melting down, why 1.5 million Americans may lose their homes to foreclosure and why hundreds of thousands of homes could be dumped on an already glutted market. They also represent a huge cloud hanging over Wall Street investment houses, which packaged and sold these mortgages to investors around the world....
Instead of packaging entire mortgages, Wall Street came up with the idea of dividing them into "tranches." The safest tranche, which offers investors a relatively low interest rate, will be the first to be paid off if too many borrowers default and their houses are sold at foreclosure auction. The owners of the riskiest tranche, in contrast, will be the last to be paid, and thus have the biggest risk if too many houses are auctioned for less than the value of their loans. In return for this risk, their bonds offer the highest yield.It was this ability to chop packages of mortgages into different risk tranches that really enabled the mortgage industry to rush headlong into all those new products and new markets -- in particular, the subprime market for borrowers with sketchy credit histories.
Selling the safe tranches was easy, while the riskiest tranches appealed to the booming hedge-fund industry and other investors like pension funds desperate for anything offering a higher yield. So eager were global investors for these securities that when the housing market began to slow, they practically invited the mortgage bankers to keep generating new loans even if it meant they were riskier. The mortgage bankers were only too happy to oblige.
By the spring of 2005, the deterioration of lending standards was pretty clear. They were the subject of numerous eye-popping articles in The Post by my colleague Kirstin Downey.... But it wasn't until December 2005 that the four bank regulatory agencies were able to hash out their differences and offer for public comment some "guidance" for what they politely called "nontraditional mortgages." Months ensued as the mortgage bankers fought the proposed rules with all the usual bogus arguments, accusing the agencies of "regulatory overreach," "stifling innovation" and substituting the judgment of bureaucrats for the collective wisdom of thousands of experienced lenders and millions of sophisticated investors. And they warned that any tightening of standards would trigger a credit crunch and burst the housing bubble that their loosey-goosey lending had helped spawn.
The industry campaign... did delay final implementation of the guidance until September 2006, both by federal and many state regulators. And even now, with the market for subprime mortgages collapsing around them, the mortgage bankers and their highly paid enablers on Wall Street continue to deny there is a serious problem.... What we have here is a failure of common sense. With occasional exceptions, bankers shouldn't make -- or be allowed to make -- mortgage loans that require no money down and no documentation of income to people who won't be able to afford the monthly payments if interest rates rise, house prices fall or the roof springs a leak. It's not a whole lot more complicated than that.
The horse is out of the barn, and Steve's true point that the door should not have been left open is not enough to deal with the current situation. In those states of the world in which the economy slows and interest rates rise and millions of homeowners begin missing their payments, what should be done? I can see one constructive thing that bank regulators can do: they can publicly note that foreclosure is an appropriate response to individual cases in which payments are not being made because idiosyncratic things have gone wrong with individual household's finances, but that foreclosure is not an appropriate response to a systemic problem triggered by macroeconomic risks that have come calling. The appropriate response when it is an aggregate rather than an idiosyncratic shock is to renegotiate the loan--not to foreclose on a homeowner. And banks that do the second rather than the first are not fulfilling their responsibility to the system of which they are a part.
Robert Barro should have called his 2005 "Rare Events and the Equity Premium" paper something like "Rare Events and the Low Riskfree Rate" instead...
http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11310.pdf
Barro's paper follows Rietz (1988) and uses the possibility of future disastrous falls in economy-wide consumption and in payouts on equities to explain the high premium equity return relative to bonds, and the low real return on bonds as well.
The primary channel is not what you probably think: it is not that the fear of future catastrophe depresses the price and hence raise the in-sample--we here in the United States haven't seen the real catastrophes the lurk out there--average return to equities.
The primary channel is that fear of future catastrophe raises desired savings to carry purchasing power forward in time in case of need. But, since assets are in fixed supply in the Lucas-tree model Barro uses, this outward shift in savings demand drives the prices of real bonds up and the returns on real bonds down. It also--for risk-aversion parameters greater than one--drives the prices up and the returns down on equities as well (but not as much). A greater fear of future catastrophe is a source of high, not low, price-dividend and price-earnings ratios.
Hence the story implicit in Barro (2005): the implicit story is that stock market multiples were much higher in 1999 and 1929 than they were in 1982 and 1922 because the likelihood of a macroeconomic catastrophe greater than the Great Depression was much higher in 1999 and 1929 than it was in 1982 and 1922. Hence people were desperate to save for the future to insure against the greater likelihood of macroeconomic catastrophe. And that was the force underpinning the 1990s stock market boom.
This is, I think, a trap set for us by using the Lucas-tree model as a workhorse. Its lack of production and accumulation is, I think, a much bigger drawback than is sometimes recognized...
For more, see:
http://delong.typepad.com/print/20070213_note_barro_rietz.pdf
http://spreadsheets.google.com/pub?key=p_zylRhg4towFfq53r00UBA
http://spreadsheets.google.com/ccc?key=p_zylRhg4tow3sK3GKkYrKg
Robert Barro should have called his 2005 "Rare Events and the Equity Premium" paper something like "Rare Events and the Low Riskfree Rate" instead...
http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11310.pdf
The paper uses the possibility of future disastrous falls in economy-wide consumption and in payouts on equities to explain the high equity premium. The primary channel is not that fear of future catastrophe depresses the price and hence raise the in-sample average return to equities (for we don't observe many such disastrous falls in our sample). The primary channel is that fear of future catastrophe raises desired savings to carry purchasing power forward in time in case of need. But since assets are in fixed supply in the Lucas-tree model Barro uses, this outward shift in savings demand drives the prices of real bonds up and the returns on real bonds down. It also--for CRRA greater than one--drives the prices up and the returns down on equities as well. A greater fear of future catastrophe is a source of high, not low, price-dividend and price-earnings ratios.
Hence the story implicit in Barro (2005): the implicit story is that stock market multiples were much higher in 1999 and 1929 than they were in 1982 and 1922 because the likelihood of a macroeconomic catastrophe greater than the Great Depression was much higher in 1999 and 1929 than it was in 1982 and 1922. Hence people were desperate to save for the future to insure against the greater likelihood of macroeconomic catastrophe. And that was the force underpinning the 1990s stock market boom.
This is, I think, a trap set for us by using the Lucas-tree model as a workhorse. Its lack of production and accumulation is, I think, a much bigger drawback than is sometimes recognized...
For more, see:
http://delong.typepad.com/print/20070213_note_barro_rietz.pdf
http://spreadsheets.google.com/pub?key=p_zylRhg4towFfq53r00UBA
Just a thought...
Robert Barro should have called his 2005 "Rare Events and the Equity Premium" paper something like "Rare Events and the Low Riskfree Rate" instead...
http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11310.pdf
The paper uses the possibility of future disastrous falls in economy-wide consumption and in payouts on equities to explain the high equity premium. The primary channel is not that fear of future catastrophe depresses the price and hence raise the in-sample average return to equities (for we don't observe many such disastrous falls in our sample). The primary channel is that fear of future catastrophe raises desired savings to carry purchasing power forward in time in case of need. But since assets are in fixed supply in the Lucas-tree model Barro uses, this outward shift in savings demand drives the prices of real bonds up and the returns on real bonds down. It also--for CRRA greater than one--drives the prices up and the returns down on equities as well. A greater fear of future catastrophe is a source of high, not low, price-dividend and price-earnings ratios.
Hence the story implicit in Barro (2005): the implicit story is that stock market multiples were much higher in 2000 than they were in 1982 because the likelihood of a macroeconomic catastrophe greater than the Great Depression was much higher in 2000 than it was in 1982. Hence people were desperate to save for the future to insure against the greater likelihood of macroeconomic catastrophe. And that was the force underpinning the 1990s stock market boom.
This is, I think, a trap set for us by using the Lucas-tree model as a workhorse. Its lack of production and accumulation is, I think, a much bigger drawback than is sometimes recognized...
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