Publius: Ghosts of 2002

Obsidian Wings: Ghosts of 2002: It%u2019s hard to express how happy %u2013 nay, gleeful %u2013 I was to see the House recess without caving on FISA. The outburst of backbone literally brought tears of joy to my eyes. At last, I thought, Congressional Dems have exorcised the ghosts of 2002 and that most wretched of midterms %u2013 the winter of Dems%u2019 discontent.

Looking back with some perspective, though, I think the 2002 election actually scarred Republicans far more than it did the Democrats. If there%u2019s a party that needs to do some 2002 ghost-exorcisin%u2019, it%u2019s the GOP.

The story of how the 2002 election scarred the Dems is of course quite familiar. It%u2019s not so much the thrashing itself, but the manner of the thrashing that scarred them. Remember that the GOP%u2019s campaign strategy didn%u2019t just beat them, it reduced them to shivering petrified little cowards who spoke of prescription drug benefits on the eve of war. (To this day, the image of Gephardt in the Rose Garden makes my blood boil - and isn't that Edwards back there too?).

The abject humiliation is what traumatized the Congressional caucus %u2013 and that same fear resurfaces during the endgame of each national security debate. Nobody wants to risk that again.

At the same time this fiasco played out, the liberal base%u2019s anger grew in direct proportion to its elected leaders%u2019 cowardice (it even drove some to start blogging). This anger hasn%u2019t really gone away %u2013 it%u2019s been repressed, but it still lurks beneath. And that%u2019s why the base pushes Congress so passionately when these issues come up. It%u2019s 2002 all over again in their heads. Neither Congress nor the base wants another 2002 %u2013 it%u2019s just that they have very different ideas about how to avoid it. (On an aside, this is more than a subtext of the opposition to Hillary Clinton %u2013 too many images of Gephardt float around her candidacy).

So that%u2019s the Dem side of 2002 %u2013 but all that%u2019s been said. What%u2019s more interesting, then, is the negative effect of 2002 on the Republicans.

In short, the GOP learned too much from its 2002 victory. Rather than seeing 2002 as a one-time victory based on unique historical circumstances, they%u2019ve come to see it as a universal recipe for electoral success. In their minds, they can win by taking any national security issue on which the Dems are divided and embrace the policy that maximizes executive authority (or more precisely, Bush%u2019s authority %u2013 I%u2019m sure they%u2019ll all transform into squawking Hayeks if Obama or Clinton win).

The reason the GOP embraces 2002 so completely is essentially the flipside of why the Dems avoid it %u2013 they were, shall we say, deeply satisfied by the results. Winning elections is nice and all. But what made 2002 so orgasmically stimulating was the utter decimation of their opponents%u2019 spirit. It%u2019s fun, I hear, to see groups of people you despise so utterly demoralized and shamed. (I feel that way when the Duke basketball team loses). For them, 2002 was like a first-time heroin rush %u2013 and now they keep trying to recapture that lovin%u2019 feeling. (ed. They should watch more than the first 5 minutes of Trainspotting. Agreed.).

What the GOP doesn%u2019t realize, however, is how unique and historically contingent the 2002 victories were. The country was still in a state of shock and semi-lunacy following 9/11. And the public was %u2013 understandably %u2013 frightened when the President of the United States of America got on TV and repeatedly warned that war was necessary to avoid nuclear attack. That kind of threat gets your attention.

Same deal for the 2004 election %u2013 it too was unique in some respects. For one, the Dems had a meandering nominee who decided far too late to come out strongly against the war (it didn%u2019t help that he said the 2002 authorization was a good idea a few weeks earlier in front of the Grand Canyon). But more importantly, the lopsided Senate victories were the product of Southern realignment. It just so happened that a lot of old Southern Dems retired in 2004 %u2013 and the GOP inevitably picked them up.

These historical subtleties were lost on the GOP though. The lessons they took from the 2002 and 2004 elections were to double down on terrorist demagoguery. My ideological comradskies tend to view this GOP strategy through moral lenses %u2013 but the party was simply acting rationally. GOP officials thought fear and demagoguery won them elections, so it%u2019s a strategy they returned to.

And to an extent, they were right %u2013 these things did win them elections. The problem, though, was not seeing that the strategies would ultimately lose their punch. And so, rather than using their political power to %u201Cthink big%u201D about the problems of the day, conservative leaders (and certain strains of conservative ideology) decided just to keep shooting up, hoping for that sweet 2002 high. The GOP never pivoted into the type of %u201Cthinking man%u2019s conservatism%u201D that could have consolidated their victories. Instead, allured by the false temptress of past success, they kept aiming for the lowest common denominator. Rather than challenging themselves to aim higher, they opted for all stupid, all the time.

Today, the long-term costs of that short-sightedness are becoming clear. The 2006 election was the first clue, but it won%u2019t be the last. Remember that, in the run-up to 2006, the congressional GOP had fallen in line behind a %u201Cstay the course%u201D strategy. They didn%u2019t care that Iraq wasn%u2019t working. What mattered is that it kept their handy %u201Cyou hate the troops/love the terrorists%u201D strategy intact. But then, miracle of miracles, the Dems turned the tables and used %u201Cstay the course%u201D as an offensive attack [cue 2001 Space Odyssey drums]. Because so many GOP candidates (e.g., the odious George Allen) had advocated that very policy from the get-go, the Dem strategy tied the entire party to the war, which made the candidates politically vulnerable.

The 2008 election is shaping up to be an extension of the 2006 wave %u2013 and for similar reasons. It%u2019s no accident that the parties%u2019 enthusiasm is so asymmetrical right now. For one, contrary to what its elected leaders think, the Republican rank-and-file aren%u2019t idiots. They are profoundly demoralized by recent failures %u2013 and, frankly, by the second-grade level emotional appeals.

The Dems, on the other side, are simply reconfirming Newton%u2019s Third -- for every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction. When your electoral strategy is based on demonizing 45% of the country, that 45% is going to get pissed off and become more politically active. In this respect, the Dean campaign was essentially the first tremor of what could become an Obama earthquake.

Another important sign of the Republicans%u2019 myopic focus on 2002 is the youth vote. Think about it %u2013 if you are 25, then you were 17 years old when Bush took office. That means there%u2019s a large and increasingly politically-active segment of the population that has only known Bush. To them, conservatism is not Bill Buckley or Russell Kirk or Edmund Burke. It%u2019s George Bush, John Yoo, and Tom DeLay. It%u2019s a party that has (institutionally) appealed to humans%u2019 most base instincts throughout their political lives. And it%u2019s a party that has no serious answer to the big issues of our day %u2013 particularly health care and energy. I mean, good lord, if you want some welcome relief from the Obama/Clinton wars, just peek over at John McCain and Mike Huckabee%u2019s policy shops.

I assumed that 2006 would get the GOP%u2019s attention, but apparently I was wrong. They%u2019re still Toomey-ing incumbents who aren%u2019t pro-Iraq, and they're still requiring their presidential candidates to fall in line behind Bush on Iraq. Ironically, a loss on FISA might actually help them by illustrating that 2002 is finally over.

But I wouldn%u2019t bet the ranch.