Why Oh Why Can't We Have a Better Press Corps? (Economist-on-Wolfowitz Edition)

Simply bizarre:

Economist.com | The World Bank: But [Wolfowitz's] lack of experience in the development community does not necessarily make him a bad candidate. Having served under Donald Rumsfeld during the controversial ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’, Mr Wolfowitz might, some argue, be well placed to bring radical change to an organisation sorely in need of it...

Should one say that this Rumsfeldian "Revolution in Military Affairs" simply has not happened? That with the exception of the 3rd ID's masterful outflanking march on Baghdad, Rumsfeld's tenure at the Pentagon has not seen a revolutionary modernization of the U.S. military but (a) attrition as too-few soldiers are tied down in Iraq on military police missions they are not organized for, (b) waste of money on missile defense systems that do not work, and (c) Abu Ghraib? That "radical change" is not good in itself if the people undertaking it have no clue what kind of change is desirable?

The Economist needs to shape up quickly if it wants to keep its reputation.

Comments

[PW]

I have the impression that the Pentagon has never been more poorly managed, that ideologues are responsible for uneasy relations between civilian leadership and military leaders, that of course the Iraq invasion was very badly done, and on and on.

Like hiring the cleaning service which broke all the china, alienated the neighbors, inflated the phone bill by calling all their friends in foreign countries, killed the cat, etc... because "they got the house pretty clean."

[shah8]

The thing I never got is that a lot of commentators have called the 3rd Infantry marsh, masterful. What in particular was masterful about it? Does anyone know? Same for the plans in GWI. I just have a dubious time accepting such statements against such weak opponents when we had indisputed control of the sky and sea...

[ogmb]

The Economist outpoodles Tony Blair? This should come as no surprise to anyone.

I wonder how long it will take the Economist to realize that the worst thing that could happen to an organization badly in need of change is the wrong kind of change? Change, dear editors, does not equal progress.

[Richard Cownie]

The "revolution in military affairs" is happening right now,
as the poor countries of the world observe that all you need
is plastic explosives, old cars, garage door openers, and
cellphones to tie down and grind up the best (or at least the
most expensive) high-tech military in history.

Add in cheap GPS's, $10 microcontrollers, and sub-$500
autonomous guidance systems, and suddenly anybody can defend
their own territory cheaply and effectively.

Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz are on the wrong side of all this.
Of course.

[David Margolies]

"Keep its reputation?" That train has long left the station.

[Ralph]

Paul Wolfowitz will be tragic choice for World Bank president. Robert McNamara, guilty of war crimes for expanding the Vietnam war, was bad enough. The WB needed someone better than Jim Wolfensohn at this point in history but we got someone much worse instead. One fear I have is that WB policies will now be folded into the so-called democracy crusade that Wolfowitz has been waging with the other neo-conservatives in the Middle East. Wolfie will be circumspect about doing anything that presumably violates the WB's independence so we will have to watch what he does closely. There are numerous other problems associated with this choice but this is one of them.

[William Kaminsky]

Call me too forgiving or, more precisely, too inclined to put the best spin on somebody's ill-thought-out remarks, but I wouldn't be suprised if the Economist staff writer responsible for the excerpt Brad highlights is one of those people who believes there is a skill of "management" separate from the policy ends for which said management is a means, a type inclined to venerate those managers with an ability to "shake things up" separate from the final results of said shaking. Put another way, I wouldn't be surprised that the writer is one of those people often found in political and financial oriented press who feels it necessary to be tremendously impressed by Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz's ability to overcome incredible bureaucratic inertia of the Pentagon (even if they personally believe the end effect of Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz's forceful pushes to the Pentagon is merely to push it over the edge into an abyss) since, after all, a mere mortal wouldn't have even gotten the Pentagon to change its standard operating procedures one iota.

Aw heck, on second thought... some editor at the Economist should really slap some sense into that staff writer.

[Richard Cownie]

The invasion and advance to Baghdad was an impressive feat -
mostly a feat of logistics. Heavy armor on the move needs
a lot of fuel. Heavy armor on the move against opposition
needs a lot of fuel *and* ammunition. In the desert, add
water supply to the logistical problem.

Typically in WW2 and since, an armored attack would stall
within 48 hours as fuel ran short. Keeping everything moving
and getting all the way to Baghdad was an impressive
achievement.

Of course, this was achieved entirely with the army created
and maintained by Clinton, and mostly with military leaders
who rose to the top under Clinton. As far as we know, Rumsfeld
and the neocons were arguing for a much lighter 50K-man
lightly-armored airborne force to land near Baghdad and
decapitate the regime. Most military experts considered that
scheme to be at best risky, at worst suicidal.

[michael]

[Pray] is what you eat and to say your [Prayers] is to make a [hail marry] [hail storm] [number one] or a [our father] [they staff] [number two] what is a Word but the name of a person, place or thing and no matter how you brake it up water is water dust is dust so the dust we walk on and the we wash with need only God to make Flesh there is no more that is it [SOUL] the inside underneath or unseen portion of. [SPIRIT] water that carries any other properties. Now that you see what they did to the ward and the word is God and God is this ward [Bacterium] the only thing that can take water and dust and make Flesh just a small [Bacteria] that multiplies 10 times over at 98.6 and when it fall to the water and everything was just right it Fermented and from that Ferment did God put air and in that air so did the mist of Gods spirit rise and come back to the dust and bring Life to everything for his small movement in the dust did make a void and fill it with love and Spirit.posted by Michael

[Ginger Yellow]

What I always found amusing about Rumsfeld's Revolution was how it was predicated on getting rid of outmoded, unproven, expensive cold war procurement programmes and retooling the military for a future of asymmetric threats. And yet its centrepiece was a $60bn plus ICBM shield that had failed every single test it had ever undergone and would do absolutely nothing to prevent a suitcase or shipborne nuke.

I find it slightly less amusing four years later with Rumsfeld still in charge.

[KevinNYC]

The transformation of the Army did not start with Rumsfeld. It started with Gen. Eric Shinseki in 1999. Remember him? The guy that Wolfowitz publically embarrassed? This frontline site is a good background.

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/future/

But Shinseki was not an idiot like Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz and knew that having a fast, light attack force doesn't mean you don't have to have a big, heavy force for occupation/peacekeeping.

[rod]

as with Bolton at UN, or Spelling at Dept of Education, or innumerable others, this nominee is picked in order to destroy the mission of the institution, not to reform it so as to accomplish that mission.

[Brian]

This magazine apparently assumes that there are no people in the world who can hold both the right econonomic and other policy qualifications and the ability to shake up an organizaton. And hell, if the World Bank is in need of a shake up (I am not sure, and giving an opinion would be disengenuous), what should change? If it's something with the way the place is run, as in a style of management, the case can be made for someone who can effect such change. But if it's policy that needs changing, it's even more important, I would imagine, that the person is well versed in policy matters in this area.

[weinerdog43]

My subscription expires in less than 1 month. It will not be renewed.

[Ken Melvin]

Rumsfield and Wolfowitz have succeeded in showing China (and Russia) that she has nothing to fear.

[praktike]

Having served?

Whiskey Tango Foxtrot?

[Tom DC/VA]

"The Economist needs to shape up quickly if it wants to keep its reputation."

It has a reputation, that of a formerly intelligent magazine that has decided to cater to its core market (rich, right-leaning Americans) instead of staying true to its principles. The article you cite goes a long way towards maintaining its current reputation.

[David Lloyd-Jones]

Wolfie at the World Bank? Why not? Governor Connally is no longer available, and Wolfensohn's first act was to fire my girl-friend's husband out of his job as a vice-president. Could things get worse?

.

On the other hand, who is waiting in the wings to take over Wolfie's AEI role in Iraq?

.
-dlj.

[Movie Guy]

Brad

Do you have any fundamental knowledge of the forces and equipment transitions ongoing within DoD?

There is quite a bit going on.

You and others can scoff at the multiple transitions, but it's apparent that you don't know what you're talking about.

Frankly, posts like this one cause more harm to the governance potential of the Democrat Party than you realize.

If many of the unneeded system platforms hadn't been cancelled, and if the force realignments weren't underway, you and others would likely be complaining about that. I know that I would.

The cost savings of the ongoing moves are significant. And the transitions are, by far, more correct than wrong.

For those of you who will disagree with this post, kindly name the cancelled weapons systems you would have kept, justify their retention, identify the procurement costs involved, and explain what force structure you would need for such equipment. Then explain how the force structure would be employed in a combat theater.

Sure, disagree. But kindly back it up with something other than the puppy on the porch badmouthing I have read thus far.

Brad, you're way out of your league on this one unless you were clowning around.

[Darth Vader]

" I wouldn't be suprised if the Economist staff writer responsible for the excerpt Brad highlights is one of those people who believes there is a skill of "management"..."

The emperor is not as forgiving as I am.

[ogmb]

Shorter Movie Guy: Bluster bluster bluster bluster.

[Unstable Isotope]

Bush's nomination of Wolfowitz is a finger in the eye in world. He wants to make sure the world "gets it" in case they couldn't tell by nomination of UN-hater Bolton to be UN ambassador.

[Movie Guy]

ogmb

Force realignment isn't a little league issue to be kicked around like a can for political purposes.

I like Brad a lot, but let's not push all of the facts off of the table. That's a Republican move...

[S.weil]

Movie Guy

First thing - the ideas and early actions WRT to the RMA were around long before 2001. Admiral Owens in the Joint Staff was one of the early theorists/promoters in the early-mid 90s. It took a substantial amount of chutzpah for the Bush bunch to claim some sort of ownership of the ideas. Rumsfeld came at transformation like a bull in a china shop, alienating much of the institutional DoD/military in the process. He ended-up having to bribe the establishment by fully funding almost all of their existing projects in order to get more movement on the RMA agenda. For example the JUCAS unmanned attack aircraft is not being proposed to replace any of the manned aircraft inventory, but is being sold as only a complement. Only now with budget pressure are some of the older programs being cut. The signature program - missile defense - cannot be called transformational in any sense. We are still struggling to do what the old Safeguard system could do in late 1960s. So Rumsfeld’s record on transformation is at best mixed. Wolfie had almost nothing to do with it – he was too busy not planning for post-war Iraq.

[Movie Guy]

S. weil

Good post.

Let's clear up a few things that you said for the benefit of others who may not know what you're talking about. Thereafter, I'll address a few points.

RMA stands for "revolution in military affairs" and after some difficulty with various interpretations of what the term meant, it was replaced by DoD with the word, "Transformation". Loosely, DoD transformation means "innovation on a grand scale . . . undertaken by a military that believes major changes are occurring in the character of conflict."

Good reference for clarification:

Transforming Debate
August 29, 2002
The opportunity and risk for the military
by Mackubin Thomas Owens, professor of strategy and force planning at the Naval War College
http://www.nationalreview.com/owens/owens082902.asp

Admiral William Owens became the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1994, a position from which he attempted and succeeded in part to generate unified command thinking and technology application for battlefield needs.

Admiral Owens was able to move his concept of centralized DoD/JCS planning forward because of the Goldwater Nichols reform act of 1986. The Congressional Act gave more power to unified commands and the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the expense of the separate service chiefs. Owens principal thrust was to advocate the advantage of information technologies in the areas of "longrange precision strike, communications, and sensors", thereby creating a "system of systems". His goal was to create a system of systems which would allow the U.S. "to dominate at will 200 mile by 200 mile segments of the earth's surface". His most notable effort in bringing forth change may have been the creation of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC).

Admiral Owens faced many of the obstacles that Rumsfeld encountered within the DoD bureaucracy, and only served a brief period as Vice Chairman, JCS. "Indeed, Owens himself was in many respects thwarted by the bureaucracies he attempted to subdue, and retired after only one two year term as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, when he might reasonably have been expected to serve for longer". He encountered resistance from the officer corps and civilians of DoD.

Owen reference:

American Views of the Revolution in Military Affairs
April 1997
by Eliot Cohen
http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/books/28book1.html#hnote3

----

While it is certainly true that initiatives related to organizational and equipment transition (transformation) existed prior to 2001, such efforts extend much further back than to Admiral Owens and the mid-90s. Try 1980 for the foundation of what is being developed today within DoD.

Post-Vietnam DoD transformation initially came from the Carter Doctrine with the tasking to prevent or defeat a Soviet invasion of Iran. General "Shy" Meyer, Chief of Staff of the Army, addressed this problem by creating the prototype light division, later called the High-Technology Light Division (HTLD). But General Meyer encountered similar bureaucracy obstacles later faced by Admiral Owen and SecDEF Rumsfeld. Similarly, General Meyer authorized a major I knew in Germany to develop prototype vehicles at a maintenance facility. When first told of the operation I laughed, having met General Meyer when he was a one-star general. Always the innovator and sharp as a tack. Clearly, Meyer's innovations in 1980 are finally being realized two decades or so later as evidenced by the ongoing force and equipment transitions. Largely overlooked was his initiative to transform the entire U.S. Army into a force not so dissimilar from Rumsfeld's vision. Whether Gen Meyer and Rumsfeld are correct is a different matter.

An excellent "Shy" Meyer reference with interesting details of the above:

Transformation: Let's Get it Right this Time
2001
by RICHARD J. DUNN III
http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/01spring/dunn.htm

Shifting forward past the collapse of the Soviet Union, Admiral Owens limited initiatives and Gulf War I, the operational foundation for the current DoD transformation is tied to the 1997 DoD Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). And the QDRs since that time. Such initiatives are focused on operational goals outlined in DoD's Joint Vision 2010.

Rumsfeld has encountered the same obstacles in mentality that others have run up against when trying to bring DoD forward. He is operating under a specific mandate to force critical rethinking of missions, architecture, and strategies. The task isn't easy, and wouldn't be for any SecDEF innovator.

S. weil stated that Rumsfeld "ended-up having to bribe the establishment by fully funding almost all of their existing projects in order to get more movement on the RMA agenda." I disagree with this statement, as a number of weapon systems were put on the block when Rumsfeld arrived on the scene. And they're gone. Others are going to be eliminated or have their procurement contracts reduced in quantity of purchase.

The matter of curtailing such procurements will open the door for other acquisitions down the road as necessary to replace other aging systems and platforms which will be retained or upgraded. But the doctrine shifts are allowing for elimination of some systems that would not be needed in a different architecture environment. Whether such decisions are correct remains to be seen.

Excellent background information sources:

RMA Overview - Transformation articles
http://www.comw.org/rma/fulltext/overview.html

Information Warfare - collection of articles
http://www.comw.org/rma/fulltext/infowar.html

Future Studies & Future Conflict Studies
Air War College
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-futr.htm

Rumsfeld's Reformation: The New Defense Secretary Faces Tough Choices
May 30, 2001
By Loren B. Thompson
http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/defense/rumsfeld.html

QDR FRAMEWORK RESTATES ADMINISTRATION BIASES
Loren B. Thompson, Ph.D.
Issue Brief
14 March 2005
http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/defense/050314.asp

Lexington Institute - Collection of Defense Papers
http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/defense/default.asp
* Considerable critical analysis.

DoD QDR Information
http://www.defense.gov/search/

At issue is whether Rumsfeld as SecDEF and the Joint Chiefs are going too far with their Transformation strategy.

The 2005 QDR will offer more clues.

[MTC]

- Movie Guy

S. Weil is correct. The move to Strykers, UAVs, UCAVs and Future Combat Systems (FCS) began a long time ago within the Pentagon. And KevinNYC is right in noting that Shinseki was an enthusiastic (some even said too enthusiastic) backer of the new paradigm.

Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz are recent converts. Their continued adherence to NMD rather than to TMD indicates they have only a weak appreciation of the philosophical underpinnings of RMA.

[ChrisB]

“with the exception of the 3rd ID's masterful outflanking march on Baghdad”

Masterful outflanking? I believe your analysis to be incorrect. It seems to me that Saddam outsmarted the US military but recognizing that his forces would be no match for the invading forces, instructed his troops to stash arms and explosives, meld into the Iraqi population, and launch an insurrection.

[Lane Greene]

Brad, what about the other 95% of the article? I would describe it (I co-wrote it, though not the excerpt in question) as circumspect-to-critical of the Wolfowitz nomination. You cite one of about three positive sentences in the piece, all of which have the same drift: that the development community needs tough-minded leaders who aren't afraid of change and unpopularity. I stand by that assertion, but you'll notice it's ringed with qualifications. You've missed the forest for one tree.

Yes, obviously, bad change is bad. We have criticised the handling of the Iraq war over and over in the pages of the Economist and we do so in this piece. We're far from certain Wolfowitz is the man for the job. Disagree with our views, by all means, but make sure you know what they are, and please represent them as accurately as you can.

[Movie Guy]

MTC

"S. Weil is correct. The move to Strykers, UAVs, UCAVs and Future Combat Systems (FCS) began a long time ago within the Pentagon."

Of course those platforms were being developed more than four years ago.

Who said that Rumsfeld is being credited with the creation of any specific weapon systems? But Rumsfeld is pushing Transformation along. That's his mandate.

It is Rumsfeld, not SecDEF Cohen, who is pushing other weapons systems off the table. Old and new.

While Rumsfeld clashed with General Shinseki and SecARMY White over the new artillery platform, Rumsfeld is moving forward the Stryker brigade concept that General Shinseki embraced. Personally, I would have killed the Stryker vehicle and replaced it with a tracked platform.

"Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz are recent converts. Their continued adherence to NMD rather than to TMD indicates they have only a weak appreciation of the philosophical underpinnings of RMA."

I don't know that your last statement is valid. Support for the National Missile Defense system doesn't mean that Rumsfeld only has a weak appreciation for Transformation. Transformation is flying in many different directions. All of the DoD web sites are loaded with Transformation links.

But, let's turn the situation. What would you be saying if Rumsfeld had killed all Transformation initiatives in 2001? Killed all modernization thinking, weapon systems on the drawing board, and dragged us back to a cold war model, architecture, and build up. What would you say then?

I am not pleased with some of Rumsfeld's moves, but I recognize that any effort to move forward within DoD is not easy.

Liking or disliking Rumsfeld for a multitude of reasons is fine. But which way is he taking Transformation?

[matt]

I'm with hj.

I stopped reading the Economist when it began to sound like Ari Fleischer was writing the reviews of Bush's fiscal policies.

It started when the paper began to fall in line with the rah-rah-rah to war crowd.

How come the editors of the Economist can find so much wrong in Darfur, but they couldn't see the illegality of targetting a restaurant in a residential area of Baghdad on the off-chance that Saddam Hussein might be eating there. Still no condemnation of the illegal war of aggression.

Nor did the editors ask why the major crime listed at the Nuremberg Tribunals was left out of the crimes prosecuted against Milosevic, namely, the crime against peace, making war, wars of aggression.

It's ok for the US and Israel to continue their development of nuclear weapons while the US bangs the drums trying to get public opinion in an uproar over the nuclear program of Iran. You won't hear the Economist crying foul over that, now will you?

[matrt]

as an addendum to my previous post:

The crime against peace and making war were left out of the statute for the ICTY and subsequent statutes so that NATO and other US cronies could carry out their illegalities without having to worry about finding themselves in the dock alongside whomever they had designated as the war criminal du jour.

[Sean Matthews]

One of the interesting things about Brad's blog is that you occasionally get Economist writers, like Lane Greene, turning up to defend their corner. I'm not an Economist writer, merely an Economist reader, who is increasingly likely to be an ex-Economist reader in the near future. The reason is not any one piece like this, which can always be explained away; it is rather the continuing slow drip of articles like this that is gradually replacing my respect for the Economist with what can only be described as saddened contempt. The Economist is/was one of the world's great newspapers, but it is gradually sliding (being slid by Bill Emmott?) into partisan hackery. I have never particularly agreed with it, but I have always enjoyed disagreeing with it. Now, more and more, I find that I don't disagree with it; I just dismiss it (and wonder why I still pay for it).

So what is wrong with the article about Wolfowitz (other than being a bit inane, which isn't a capitial offense for a journalist - prose after all has to be generated)? Simply that it does not adequately discuss the fact that nominating him can only be interpreted as a deliberate attempt to offend Europe; it mentions that Europeans were canvassed beforehand and were not enthusiastic, but goes no further. Most inadequately of all though it does not discuss the nomination in the light of the recent nomination of John Boulton, which was the first thing I thought of; grownup political analysis would have explored the implications of two such appointments in such a short time.

Actually, this is not the worst thing I have seen in the Economist recently. The most offensive thing I have seen recently is the recent statement to be found in Lexington:

Lynne Stewart, a well-known radical lawyer, has just been convicted of helping one of her clients, Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, to contact his supporters—an action that could put her in prison for around 20 years.

This is somewhat of a simplification, to say the least, of what actually happened to Ms. Stewart, as I am sure Lexington is aware. I read this and I almost cancelled my subscription on the spot.

[Jane Galt]

Sean, did you actually read the article? It specifically discusses the nomination in light of John Bolton, near the top and again at the end. It also addresses the claim that the nomination is a deliberate poke at Europe.

[Sean Matthews]

Hmm...

Mea culpa. I was writing from memory, so I slipped up on the details (it was late at night!) Nevertheless my point stands. The 'poke in Europe's eye' aspect of the nomination is not given remotely the weight it should be - it is mentioned, dismissed with a shrug, and we move on to Wolfowitz the shaker upper. The 'poke in Europe's eye' dimension is the political story though.

Sean