Why Oh Why Can't We Have a Better Press Corps? (David Ignatius Edition)

The Washington Post does realize that it would be better off publishing white space instead of David Ignatius, doesn't it?

Spencer Ackerman and Jim Henley write about:

Jim Henley: David Ignatius's insouciance on the prospect of civil war in Iraq.... One line in particular rankles:

But Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's trip to Iraq this week carried the implicit message that America's time, money and patience in Iraq are not endless.

The unmitigated gall. It stupefies.

Comments

[Steve]

I think that supporters of the war in Iraq need a reality check of whose to blame for the violence in Iraq, and whether or not people have to learn to get along "or we just might leave."

However, I think the argument of Mr. Ignatius at least reveals that conservatives are beginning to admit that the war has not gone as they had planned, and a Civil War is possible.

The irony of all this, in my mind, is that the war was eventually articulated (after the fact) on humanitarian grounds that are essentially liberal in origin: women's rights, religous rights, political rights, and regional stability.

Like all powerful people, conservatives have gained so much power I dont think they know what they are or what they want anymore. Let us hope the Democrats re-tool and refashion themselves while being the political opposition for the three branches of government.

[Ari]

http://www.juancole.com/2005/07/constitution-unfinished-as-deadline.html

I reported a few days ago that a US military base near Fallujah had taken mortar fire. Aljazeerah even had film showing damage to a building as US troops standing around. I noted that the wire services and other reporters appeared to have ignored the story. I heard from a relative of someone serving in Fallujah, who said that all the bases around there take mortar fire so frequently that it has become a big yawn for the troops. Now, since march the US military has conducted a vigorous propaganda campaign proclaiming how nice post-invasion Fallujah is, how life has returned to normal, with bustling traffic and trade, and how it is the safest city in Iraq. While some quarters may in fact have gotten back to a semblance of normality, not all the city has, and the area isn't safe, just as Anbar province in general is not. The reason we don't know more about the real situation is that the troops are being forbidden to tell us about it.

[Ari]

Juan Cole's survey of news on Iraq is invaluable but heartbreaking.

[ken melvin]

Probably never be invited again.

[Ralph]

Does the US actually want the insurgency to end. Wouldn't we then be kicked out by the new Islamic Republic of Iraq. What about our new bases to replace the Saudi bases, what about the oil? We have to be there, one way or another.

[Steve]

Well the implicit assumption of your comment is that the US wants to expand its hegemony into the Middle East via its new military bases.

First, CENTCOM is based in Qatar, and secondly, we live in an age of aircraft carriers. The necessity of land bases has greatly diminished since WWII. A single B2 bomber can fly to any point in the world without permission within 24 hours and perform the role of 3 or 4 conventional bombers through smarter weapons and a larger payload (not compared to B24s, but then again, they weren't as effective either).

[Jim]

The Thucydides quoted in comments is even more on the money:

The meaning of words had no longer the same relation to things, but was changed by them as they thought proper. Reckless daring was held to be loyal courage; prudent delay was the excuse of a coward; moderation was the disguise of unmanly weakness; to know everything was to do nothing. Frantic energy was the true quality of a man.

[Ralph]

Steve - I don't know either why we seem to need bases everywhere. Why are we so concerned about being booted out of Uzbekistan, and why do we have bases in the other stans rather than in Afghanistan where the need seems more obvious. We have bases in Holland for heaven's sake and something like 100 installations of some sort in Germany.

This is from over a year ago, in an article about us building 14 "enduring bases" designed to last at least 2 years. "Is this a swap for the Saudi bases?" asked Army Brig. Gen. Robert Pollman, chief engineer for base construction in Iraq. "I don't know. ... When we talk about enduring bases here, we're talking about the present operation, not in terms of America's global strategic base. But this makes sense. It makes a lot of logical sense."

If we leave entirely what chance is there that we'll get dibs on the oil. We may have to support the insurgency at some point via SA. Rumsfeld has admitted we're talking to the insurgents - maybe we're telling them to lay off the Americans and focus on the Shia. (I realize, of course, that I've descended into complete paranoia here)

[Carl]

For Steve's edification:

..."We will probably need a major concentration of forces in the Middle East over a long period of time. That will come at a price, but think of the price of not having it. When we have economic problems, it's been caused by disruptions in our oil supply. If we have a force in Iraq, there will be no disruption in oil supplies."...

---Donald Kagan, co-chairman of the 2000 report, "Rebuilding America's Defenses"

..."From an American perspective, the value of such bases [in Saudi Arabia] would endure even should Saddam pass from the scene. Over the long term, Iran may well prove as large a threat to U.S. interests in the Gulf as Iraq has. And even should U.S.-Iranian relations improve, retaining forward-based forces in the region would still be an essential element in U.S. security strategy given the longstanding American interests in the region."...

---Project for a New American Century's 2000 report, "Rebuilding America's Defenses." Contributors to the report include: Paul Wolfowitz (deputy defense secretary), John Bolton (undersecretary of state), Stephen Cambone (head of the Pentagon's Office of Program, Analysis and Evaluation), Eliot Cohen and Devon Cross (board members of the Defense Policy Board, which advises Sec. of Def. Donald Rumsfeld), I. Lewis Libby (chief of staff to Vice President Dick Cheney), and Dov Zakheim (comptroller for the Defense Department)

[Barry]

BTW, James Joyner had an extremely dishonest post about this (http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/archives/11490).
No mention of the WMD's, no mention of the ties to Al Qaida, no mention of setting up a democracy, just 'regime change'.

[Bruce Webb]

Steve you need to look up the word "logistics". The reason we are worried about our base in Uzbekistan is that without it we lose our land route into Afghanistan. It is horribly expensive to transfer supplies by air, particularly things like tanks and diesel fuel for trucks. A B-2 can deliver a bomb from around the globe but it can't deliver the other two of the proverbial 'b's bullets and beans. You can get the supplies to your rear supply base by air, and we do. But landing C-5's in Afghanistan is a sure path to disaster.

[dilbert dogbert]

As I read these comments what came to mind was that statement by some admin functionary about creation of "reality". The admin functionaries rich fantasy life has lead to a "reality" that we can either discuss ad nausium, or we can create our own "reality". Not much chance of that(creation of our own, that is). I think their "reality" is now our "reality" and it will play out to our detriment no matter our discussions or actions. Historical forces once set in motion have a life of their own. What is that called; tipping points? inflection points?
Enjoy

[johne]

"But landing C-5's in Afghanistan is a sure path to disaster."
Why? And could someone explain or link to a general explanation of Afghanistan logistics? My understanding is that Uzbekistan provides road access to a part of Afghanistan that is otherwise difficult to get to, and essentially impossible in winter. A layman like myself wonders why the expense of building and maintaining an all-weather airstrip at the Afghanistan destination would be so much more than paying for the road-bridge from the airbase in Uzbekistan. Do altitude and weather characteristics play a part?

[Paul E. Tickle]

As a former carrier strike planner and combat air operations planner, let me address a couple of Steve's statements.

"... we live in an age of aircraft carriers."

We have 12 carriers, 11 operational active duty, 1 operational reserve, allowing us to maintain 3 carriers deployed most of the time. Certain facts about carrier operations: first, carrier aircraft are all "small" - no B-1s, B-2s, B-52s, C-130's, etc. As a result, their payloads are smaller. Second, strike operations longer than about 350 nm require tanker support. Carrier aircraft can be used as tankers, but doing so may reduce the number of strike aircraft. Third, carriers have large and long logistical tails. Bombs, bullets, jet fuel, food for the crew, etc. have to be periodically resupplied. We used to take on jet fuel and other supplies every three to four days, depending on our tempo of operations. Fifth, if a carrier is not where we need it, it can take hours or days to get it there. Finally, the small number of carriers we have means that the unexpected unavailability of even one of them can adversely affect carriert-based strike operations for extended periods of time.

"A single B2 bomber can fly to any point in the world without permission within 24 hours ..."

True, but not as useful against pop-up or mobile targets. If I get intel that a target will be briefly exposed in 4 hours it does me no good to have a B-2 arrive in the target area 20 hours after that.

Logistical issues also affect bomber ops. For a mission that long the B-2 is going to have to refuel inflight, meaning tankers are needed somewhere along the route or over the target area or both. Tankers themselves burn a lot of fuel and due to limited numbers and aging airframes, their use must be carefully coordinated. If sometime after requesting a B-2 with a specific weapons loadout I discover that our intel is slightly flawed and that the weapons load is inappropriate for the target, I must then either accept an even longer delay getting the right weapons on the target or conduct the strike with sub-optimum weapons. Finally, like carriers, there are only a limited number of B-2's and crews, greatly limiting the duration of operations in which they can be used.

With our current weapons systems and platforms land bases still have a role to play in military operations. It is a two edged sword, however. On the one hand, lack of available land bases may preclude military adventurism. On the other, desire for those bases may encourage it.

[J Thomas]

"Second, strike operations longer than about 350 nm require tanker support."

I looked at that line and thought three hundred fifty nanometers?! That's some powerful sarcasm.

Then I realised you meant nautical miles.

The one that really concerned me was this:

"Finally, the small number of carriers we have means that the unexpected unavailability of even one of them can adversely affect carriert-based strike operations for extended periods of time."

Is there any reasonable chance that our carriers will become more vulnerable? If getting *one* of them temporarily damaged will cause trouble for extended periods, then the stakes are higher for attacks on them.

[Vogel Frei]

I like this Washington Post story better:

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/style/longterm/books/chap1/deathofhitler.htm

[Paul E. Tickle]

The reserve carrier, the USS John F. Kennedy, was originally intended to provide a training platform for carrier pilots and a "surge" capability, filling in when demand exceeded the capability of the three normally deployed carriers or one of the scheduled deployers ran into delays. That left 11 carriers to provide three deployed carriers at a time. Well, actually not quite three fully deployed carriers because the plans included transit time to/from the forward operating areas. As the need for three fully deployed carriers continued, the "surge" carrier was included in regularly scheduled carrier rotation schedules.

Are carriers vulnerable? Yes, but not alarmingly so. In the days of the bad old Soviet Union the big threats were wings of Backfire and Badger bombers firing long range antiship cruise missiles and nuclear subs with their intermediate and shorter range antiship cruise missiles. Some scenarios we practiced against pretty much guaranteed at least some serious damage or losses to the carriers.

Today's big threats are older standbys like diesel subs (albeit with much improved capabilities), mines and suicide plane and boat attacks. Oh, and terrorist threats in US and foreign ports. The attackers are more likely to be singular or in small numbers, and the likely weapons are typically less capable and less deadly. However, the threats and threat vectors are not as likely to be as predictable or be preceded by the same kinds of indicators and warnings. And, the attackers may very well be less tightly controlled as the old Soviet military. On the whole, the vulnerability is probably less, but so is the ability to take losses and keep up operational requirements.

Since this is an economics site there is no reason to go into more about carriers vs. land bases, weapons platform capabilites, etc. Personally, I would love to never have to think, or have anyone else think, about it again.

[Bruce Webb]

I am kind of embarassed to make a comment after people with real expertise weigh in. Thanks to Paul E. Tickle. But he didn't make a direct answer to johne's question so let me make an attempt.

Cargo planes by nature are fat and slow. Just like naval freighters they either need the active protection of combat units or some assurance that they are operating behind friendly lines. It is not so much weather or altitude but making sure that every bit of territory within a Stinger missile's range of the flight path of a landing C-5 is reasonably secure. Pretty hard to do within Afghanistan. Particularly when we sent them so many Stingers in the 80's to start with.

[Steve]

I dont mean to dispute any of the experts on this blog at all.

Airpower, in my opinion, is not enough to win wars, but it does project a lot of power. There's a reason we pulled out of a lot of island bases since WW2, its because we really didn't need them in the Pacific, and there's a reason we only have 35,000 troops in South Korea (not enough to defend against 1,000,000 North Koreans and nuclear weapons) its because America's foreign policy relies on symbols of power today, and doesn't physically need to be present in a lot of places to project its foreign policy.

What we our disagreement centers around is not facts, but the analysis. I dont think America can win a war with F-18s, F-22s or whatever, but I think that within a short period of time a carrier, marines, and special forces, can do a lot of damage and establish a beachhead in a relatively short period of time. The infrastructure of war takes about 4 months-1 year to be in place for a full-scale invasion, i dont dispute that.

And I dont dispute the logistical problems of relying on airpower to control the battlefield. However, looking at the broad theme of history, i think im very justified in saying that land bases are less relevant today given advances in technology. The worlds different today, a JSTAR can observe an entire theater of war where in the past a much larger netework was needed to get the kind of radar coverage and battlefield analysis that we have today. Similarly, you needed a lot more "physically present" troops to control war in the past... and thats less true today.

[Paul E. Tickle]

I think the current operations in Iraq cast doubt on the assumption of the universal efficacy of trading physical presence for standoff weapons and remote C4I.

Long range and stand-off aviation (LRSA) certainly has a role to play in certain types of combat operations, in particular the nation-state vs nation-state wars anticipated during the Cold War era. But, with its long lead time, relatively low loiter times and relatively inflexible weapons availability options, LRSA is generally not seen as the best tool for the low intensity (relative to a traditional conventional war) counter-insurgency operations that can be expected in the continuing so-called global war on terror.

Increased reliance on, and use of, LRSA certainly has benefits: it reduces the need for overseas bases and the expenses associated with them; it cuts our dependence on unsavory regimes and it lowers our exposure to terrorism and tyranny overseas.

Just as there are no economic free lunches, there are no military free lunches either. LRSA platforms have become enormously expensive, reducing the numbers we can procure and, at least in my experience, making planners less willing to risk their use. Using them takes extensive and expensive planning and support, with long lead times. Once LRSA assets are launched, flexibility of response is limited, often to the point of "use it or lose it."

A big concern of mine is that the high costs of LRSA platforms has tended to be dealt with by reducing the procurement of lower cost, less glamourous alternatives. There is a tendency among operations planners, when limited to one or two weapons platforms or weapons systems, to adopt the old "when all you have is a hammer, everything begins to look like a nail" approach to problem solving.

Good exchange of ideas though, definitely highlighting some of the thinking that has gone on in DC and at operational headquarters regarding the structure, distribution and use of US military forces.

With regard to the US troops in Korea, absent the use of WMDs on our part, there is considerable doubt that those troops could do much, along with their S. Korean counterparts, to keep determined N. Korean forces from overrunning the whole pennisula. Our LRSA assets could slow the advance, but would not likely stop it. Thus, those troops are really there for two purposes. First, they are a visible symbol of our support for that country. Second, they are a means of ensuring US public support for military action should the North attack. Any N. Korean attack would inflict significant casualties among US personnel. Such casualties, it is believed, would outrage the US public and put them fully behind a US military response, even if that response might take a while to become organized, could require extensive mobilization and would likely lead to extensive further casualties.