Hegemonic Stability Theory at the Council on Foreign Relations

Doug Henwood files from the Upper East Side:

Doug Henwood Talks » Blog Archive » missing hegemon at the CFR: I was at one of those Council on Foreign Relations public events this morning - Larry Summers and Paul Volcker on a successor to the Bretton Woods system, moderated by James Grant.

Coupla things:

1) Summers pronounced himself a “chastened prophet” for saying that the U.S. current account deficit was unsustainable since it has gone on for so long. Volcker agreed. Summers added that it’s interesting that there were more people worried about the U.S. stock market when the Nasdaq was at 2500 than there were at 3500, and quoted his “good friend” Rudi Dornbusch as saying things always go on longer than you expect, and then when they go bad, it all happens much more quickly than you’d expect.

2) From the questions, the CFR audience was seriously concerned about the c/a deficit and the weakening of U.S. power in the world. They’re all very polite, but it sounded like they don’t think Bush has been good for the imperium. One questioner noted that today’s world looks like one without a hegemon, and when that’s happened in the past, bad things ensued (e.g., Depression and world war). He noted that since both Summers and Volcker occupied seats of power when the U.S. was an unchallenged hegemon, how different do they think things would be now were there some sort of financial crisis, esp one featuring the U.S.

Both Summers and Volcker looked stunned into silence for a while, and then Summers said that that was a “powerful” observation couched as a question. And Volcker expressed concern that managing a crisis would be much more difficult now with the U.S. “politically weakened” and the target of so much “antagonism” around the world. He worried that Europe and the Asia might go off on their own. Someone else asked who out there might “lend a hand” if the U.S. hit a wall. Another long pause, and then Volcker doubted anyone would raise his hand as volunteer, which prompted nervous chuckles.

The view that the Great Depression happened because Britain was no longer strong enough to manage the international monetary system and the United States had not--as it ought to have--stepped into the role was the view of my old teacher Charlie Kindleberger. I tend to place more weight on ideology: even had Britain possessed much greater economic strength in the late 1920s and early 1930s, I don't think they would have used it constructively. On the security side, Britain and France ought to have deterred Nazi Germany from launching its invasion of Poland. Their error was in not understanding that Hitler was crazy early enough, and not having taken steps to remove him from power earlier in the 1930s. And World War I... I still don't understand the origins of World War I.

So I don't agree with the premise of the question. But the question is, as Summers said, a powerful observation. Hegemonic stability theory might be true. Certainly Charlie Kindleberger thought that it was.

Comments

[Dave]

World War I is easy. Looked at statistically (like mortality rates) wars, and the causes assigned to them, seem to occur fairly randomly.

The basic question seems to be: of the events which have the potential to initiate a war, what fraction of them actually do.

The population of the countries that started WWI were rather eager to do so, as they were apparently under the illusion that war could somehow be played as a zero-sum, not a negative-sum, game.

Recalling the position of the British Empire after "winning" two such world wars, one might think it difficult to hold such illusions, but the checkered history of the XXth century doesn't seem to have put much of a brake on jingoism in the XXIst.

[John Emerson]

Civilization as we wished we knew it came to an end in 1914, not 1932 or 1939. Hitler was a late effect.

[Dave]

To more directly address the post: if global power is largely set up on winner-take-all lines, then lack of an established hegemon would certainly be dangerous.

What about the opposite, though? If states don't have much to gain or lose by switching ranks in the league table, they're much more likely to invest in technology and trade and let their power fluctuate with their economic fortunes, rather than betting the farm on playing king-of-the-hill. In this case, lack of an established hegemon would be stabilizing instead.

(if we tend to prefer competition to monopoly in the economic realm, why would we not prefer it in the geopolitical realm as well?)

[STS]

Brad,

This remark:

"error was in not understanding that Hitler was crazy early enough, and not having taken steps to remove him from power earlier in the 1930s"

sounds like a right-wing talking point. If *only* we had stopped Hitler! Now we have to take out (enemy-of-the-week) before he becomes Hitler! As if it was a mere matter of a hasty cabinet meeting or two among a dozen Etonians to dispose of that inconvenient mustachioed character strutting about Germany ranting about the Fatherland.

The right seems to have everyone conditioned to assume that preemptive warfare is both moral and practical. I would argue that in most circumstances it is neither. Even in the 1930's it is far from clear what would have resulted from an attempt at "regime change" in Germany. Churchill was correct (in writing years later) about the "unwisdom" of allowing the "wicked to rearm", but the policy he was recommending in the 1930s was British rearmament, not "regime change".

[Denis Drew]

Origins of WWI: First, in the nineteenth century, Bismark made life's work out of keeping the military and foreign affairs of Germany exclusively in the hands of the king: weak democracy; war on tap at the unchecked whim of possibly impulsive, over-aggressive males.

The second, is explained by Barbara Tuchman in her book The Guns of August. Germany's sole mobilization plan happened to be an attack on France through the Benelux countries. As Tuchman pointed out, in a day when mobilization depended on railroad time tables, once a mobilization plan was initiated, there was no way to stop in the middle without throwing the whole thing into permanent disarray.

When caught up in the round of mobilizations after the assassination of the Arch Duke, the Kaiser faced the choice of not mobilizing as treaty required (if I remember correctly after 40 years) or attacking France -- so what the hell. A fully functional democracy may have been much more reluctant to go to war under the same circumstances.

How wars and sausages are made.

[bigTom]

WWI:

I think a lot of human errors come from planners not considering the overall system-dynamics, and how various policies can effect them. An example would be disporortionate retaliation. For an individdual it may be an effective strategy, as others will be very careful not to give cause. But if too many players use that strategy, then the system is unstable, in the sense that a small incident can snowball into a major conflict.

So in WWI various, treaties, and public/political attitudes towards war had been adopted. This likely made the outbreak of hostilities somewhat less likely, but allowed the conflict to rapidly escalate completely out of proportion to the original insult.

[anonymous]

You kind of blame the US for the Great Depression, for not stepping into the hegemon role it should have assumed... but then on WWII why would you leave the US off the hook saying deterring Germany was all France and the UK's job? After all, they did declare war over the invasion, while the American reaction was what? Tut-tut? Tsk-tsk?

[David]

This is really a thought provoking point, about the lack of a possible hegemon in the world and its likely repercussions. But I am thinking, even if America was still the financial hegemon of the world would the present administration act on it, given its ideology for not getting involved and helping out in a crisis. For instance, the ideologues of this administration definitely thought the Clinton administration was wrong to bail out Mexico - it should have been left to dangle in the wind. Moreover, for argument’s sake, if the U.S. was still a hegemony would this administration have the wherewithal and the competence to act as one in a financial crisis?

[Dave]

Bismarck at least understood the need for the velvet glove, which his successors (either immediately in germany or recently in the states) seem to have forgotten despite their desire to emulate his successes.

Tuchman's explanation would be stronger if the fellow in charge of german logistics hadn't written a book after the war going into great detail (complete with timetables, etc.) about how the mobilization could have easily been undone had the order been given.

With that example in mind, I'd tried coming up with the following ranking in late-2002 early-2003:

> 0]. Countries should go to war if:
>
> a. they have been attacked
> b. they know an attack is imminent
> c. the balance of power is threatened
> d. the balance of power appears to be threatened
> e. the ends justify the means
> f. possible gains outweigh possible losses
> g. honor demands it
> h. their military has a plan, and their diplomats do not
> i. the logistics of mobilization demand it
> j. at all possible

At the time, we had a great deal of insinuation that the war-du-jour was all about case (b), but with hindsight, it's looking like somewhere between (h) and (j).

(I used to find it strange that about the only thing people seemed to be able to agree on about the causes of the Great War was that none of the possibilities, in the light of 1918, or even 1989, were worth any of the trouble. Recent history shows that it's not so uncommon, several years after a war has been started, for no one to be able to do more than offer a grab-bag of conspiracy theories, geopolitical considerations, and gross failures of judgement as "causes")

[David]

brad,

You're right about World War I. What a horrible war and what a horrible chain of events it seemed to start.

Perhaps it is an example of how world politics is such a complex system that it can get chaotic, and very hard to predict.

If the people starting World War I could predict the outcome, it never would have started. The only country that really won was the one that stayed out of it until near the very end: the U.S.

The huge losses made the Brits and French (1.5 million men lost) risk averse, and the "stabbed in the back myth" and the Versailles Treaty, which was either too harsh (Keynes) or not harsh enough (Foch), was one of the factors that led to enough Germans supporting Hitler to give him a shot at being Chancellor.

Thankfully, we live in better times; but who knows what is in store for us.

[ajay]

Baldrick: The way I see it, these days there's a war on, right? and, ages ago, there wasn't a war on, right? So, there must have been a moment when there not being a war on went away, right? and there being a war on came along. So, what I want to know is: How did we get from the one case of affairs to the other case of affairs?

Edmund: Do you mean "How did the war start?"

Baldrick: Yeah.

George: The war started because of the vile Hun and his villainous empire- building.

Edmund: George, the British Empire at present covers a quarter of the globe, while the German Empire consists of a small sausage factory in Tanganyika. I hardly think that we can be entirely absolved of blame on the imperialistic front... the real reason for the whole thing was that it was too much effort *not* to have a war. You see, Baldrick, in order to prevent war in Europe, two superblocs developed: us, the French and the Russians on one side, and the Germans and Austro-Hungary on the other. The idea was to have two vast opposing armies, each acting as the other's deterrent. That way there could never be a war.

Baldrick: But this is a sort of a war, isn't it, sir?

Edmund: Yes, that's right. You see, there was a tiny flaw in the plan.

George: What was that, sir?

Edmund: It was bollocks.

[glenn]

Speaking of Hegemon ... what about pure financial hegemon, not political, not militaristic? Isn't this where real power seems to be going?

Could a hedge fund, one hedge fund, obviously a very large and very secretive hedge fund, sink economies if it so wanted? How about a group of hedge funds working together? They can certainly cause alot of damage when they makemistakes, but what if they work in tendem to sink a currency, or blow up the yield curve, or create an asset bubble and then cause it to pop ...

[Randolph Fritz]

Newsflash! Brad Delong speculates about the need for government in the global economy. Told ya. I (still) predict the rise of global regional superpowers, which will each have their own reserve currencies. We can, at this point, name most of them: the USA (the first), the EU, Arab/Islamic eastern and central Asia, South Asia, East Asia, Latin America.

[Hans Suter]

"And World War I... I still don't understand the origins of World War I."
"...the shifting tectonic plates in the Balkans had now triggered a global earthquake that would shake all the great European empires to their foundations...."
Niall Ferguson explains it nicely in "The War of the World"

[Hans Suter]

.

[Tim A.]

Why Oh Why Won't Doug Henwood Blog?

[Barkley Rosser]

On World War I. Austria got Hungary, went for Turkey, while climbing up a Pole and Czeching things out while Russian on the way to Serb its allies, but slipped on Greece and broke China.

[John Emerson]

The thing that amazes me when I read about it is the widespread popular enthusiasm for WWI at the time. This was after decades of very effective pacifist and leftist anti-war agitation. The State conquers all; public opinion follows behind. And it's only gotten worse.

[David Lloyd-Jones]

I's appreciate it if somebody could tell me with certain knowledge, not you read it in a book someplace, where the Bretton Woods Conference of 1945 took place.

Was it in a town called Bretton Woods in New England, or at the estate called Bretton Woods in Washington, D.C.?

[Barkley Rosser]

David Lloyd-Jones,

The Bretton Woods conference took place between July 1 and 22, 1944 at the Mount Washington Hotel in the town of Bretton Woods, New Hampshire. Of course, most of the important decisions had been made ahead of time, largely in one on one negotiations between John Maynard Keynes, representing the UK and Harry Dexter White, representing the US, who got most of his way.

[MQ]

Dave's point at 4:59 is very powerful, and few IR academics pick up on it. Because to-level American policy types and academics have such a strong personal vested interest in the U.S. remaining a hegemon, theories that point out the ways in which hegemony is destabilizing tend not to get much traction.

It seems fairly obvious to me that clumsy U.S. attempts to assert international dominance and power are a major destabilizing force right now. A more genuinely modest U.S. would probably on net be stabilizing.

[anne]

John Emerson:

"The thing that amazes me when I read about it is the widespread popular enthusiasm for WWI at the time. This was after decades of very effective pacifist and leftist anti-war agitation."

Quite an important comment, which we need to consider carefully.

[anne]

http://www.nytimes.com/books/99/05/09/reviews/990509.09berghat.html

May 9, 1999

No Man's Land
By V. R. BERGHAHN

THE PITY OF WAR
By Niall Ferguson.

World WAR I was not only the first of the major catastrophes disrupting this century, but perhaps the worst, especially in its long-term impact. Even in an era when we have learned to count the dead in millions, some casualty figures for the Great War are still difficult to grasp. In one attack at Ypres in Belgium the British lost a staggering 13,000 men in a mere three hours, while gaining no more than 100 yards for the sacrifice. On July 1, 1916, the first day of the Battle of the Somme, the British suffered 60,000 casualties in an assault preceded by a six-day artillery bombardment of German lines. Although the Germans had been hit by three million shells along a 12-mile stretch, enough survived to offer fierce resistance. When this battle ended, total casualties amounted to over 1.1 million men. By 1918, the Allies counted 5.4 million dead and 7 million wounded; the two Central Powers suffered 4 million deaths and 8.3 million wounded.

Over the past two decades, excellent books have been published on how the troops experienced the ordeal, and valuable work has been done on the trauma the war inflicted on the home fronts. Drawing on this rich scholarship, Niall Ferguson, a fellow of Jesus College, Oxford, has produced an illuminating synthesis of current knowledge on the war. ''The Pity of War'' may not be a total history, but the reader will find plenty of fresh information and challenging ideas on the conflict's most important aspects.

For example, in his chapter titled ''The Myth of War Enthusiasm,'' the author demonstrates how familiar images of men and women cheering leaders on mobilization day require qualification. There were countless nave volunteers; but there was also much anxiety and consternation. People cleared savings accounts, and in Hamburg a German trade unionist, witnessing the joy at a public rally, wondered in his diary: ''Am I mad or is it the others?'' Ferguson also investigates why men continued to fight long after it had dawned on them that this was not a conventional 19th-century war to be won in three months.

Later, he transforms himself into a rigorous economic historian to remind us of how the war destroyed the material well-being of millions. Here he is arguably at his most original, and most willing to challenge received views. He finds it remarkable that ''unprecedented though the costs of the war were in nominal terms, European taxpayers and, more importantly, international capital and money markets were well able to sustain some three years of slaughter'' before national economies began to collapse, and he wonders whether scholars exaggerate ''the economic importance of American money to the Allied war effort.'' He stresses the ''immense economic superiority'' of the Allies over the Central Powers, but takes the view that Germany was, in terms of financing the war, ''hardly as 'disastrous' or 'pathetic' as has often been claimed.'' Indeed, he marvels that ''Germany was able to sustain its war effort for as long as it did when its financial resources were so much more limited than those of its enemies.'' ...

[anne]

Somewhere I have come on a letter from Sigmund Freud, seemingly welcoming what would be the World War. (Possibly at the Houghton Library.) I simply remember being confused by the letter.

[anne]

The World War for me has been Remarque's "All Quiet On the Western Front." Mere boys smilingly off to a mad war with "Zarathustra" in packs.

[anne]

http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=EE05E7DF1730E762BC4850DFB266838B629EDE

April 30, 1930

All Quiet On the Western Front
By MORDAUNT HALL

From the pages of Erich Maria Remarque's widely read book of young Germany in the World War, All Quiet on the Western Front, Carl Laemmle's Universal Pictures Corporation has produced a trenchant and imaginative audible picture, in which the producers adhere with remarkable fidelity to the spirit and events of the original stirring novel. It was presented last night at the Central Theatre before an audience that most of the time was held to silence by its realistic scenes. It is a notable achievement, sincere and earnest, with glimpses that are vivid and graphic. Like the original, it does not mince matters concerning the horrors of battle. It is a vocalized screen offering that is pulsating and harrowing, one in which the fighting flashes are photographed in an amazingly effective fashion.

Lewis Milestone, who has several good films to his credit, was entrusted with the direction of this production. And Mr. Laemmle had the foresight to employ those well-known playwrights, George Abbott and Maxwell Anderson, to make the adaptation and write the dialogue. Some of the scenes are not a little too long, and one might also say that a few members of the cast are not Teutonic in appearance; but this means but little when one considers the picture as a whole, for wherever possible, Mr. Milestone has used his fecund imagination, still clinging loyally to the incidents of the book. In fact, one is just as gripped by witnessing the picture as one was by reading the printed pages, and in most instances it seems as though the very impressions written in ink by Herr Remarque had become animated on the screen.

In nearly all the sequences, fulsomeness is avoided. Truth comes to the fore, when the young soldiers are elated at the idea of joining up, when they are disillusioned, when they are hungry, when they are killing rats in a dugout, when they are shaken with fear, and when they, or one of them, becomes fed up with the conception of war held by the elderly man back home.

Often the scenes are of such excellence that if they were not audible one might believe that they were actual motion pictures of activities behind the lines, in the trenches, and in No Man's Land. It is an expansive production with views that never appear to be cramped. In looking at a dugout one readily imagines a long line of such earthy abodes. When shells demolish these underground quarters, the shrieks of fear, coupled with the rat-tat-tat of machine guns, the bang-ziz of the trench mortars, and the whining of shells, it tells the story of the terrors of fighting better than anything so far has done in animated photography coupled with the microphone.

There are heartrending glimpses in a hospital, where one youngster has had his leg amputated and still believes that he has a pain in his toes. Just as he complains of this, he remembers another soldier who had complained of the same pain in the identical words. He then realizes what has happened to him, and he shrieks and cries out that he does not want to go through life a cripple....

[anne]

http://www.calvorn.com/gallery/photo.php?photo=3317&u=62|67|...

Robin and Chicks Contemplate Statue of Romeo and Juliet
New York City--Central Park, Great Lawn.

David Lloyd-Jones and chicks.

[anne]

David's chicks....

http://shakespeare.mit.edu/Tragedy/romeoandjuliet/romeoandjuliet.2.0.html

1595

Romeo and Juliet
By William Shakespeare

Act II.

PROLOGUE

Enter Chorus

Chorus

Now old desire doth in his death-bed lie,
And young affection gapes to be his heir;
That fair for which love groan'd for and would die,
With tender Juliet match'd, is now not fair.
Now Romeo is beloved and loves again,
Alike betwitched by the charm of looks,
But to his foe supposed he must complain,
And she steal love's sweet bait from fearful hooks:
Being held a foe, he may not have access
To breathe such vows as lovers use to swear;
And she as much in love, her means much less
To meet her new-beloved any where:
But passion lends them power, time means, to meet
Tempering extremities with extreme sweet.

Exit

[wkwillis]

Britain and France did every possible and many impossible things to aid Germany in rearming from Hitler's accession in 1933 to his signing a treaty with Russia in 1939, and then went to war with him four days after he signed the treaty. My god, after he attacked Czechoslovakia in March of 1939, months after the Munich pact gave him the Sudetenland, the British even gave him the Czech gold reserves!
This policy of supporting German rearmament was correct, because otherwise the Russians would easily have conquered Europe. Russia begain rearming the year before France and Britain installed Hitler in power in Germany, and had a dictator with the support capability to build a giant military industrial complex, who proceded to do just that. Stopping Stalin was necessary.
Judging by the results of WWII, it was clearly the French who won that war. They achieved every prewar goal, from destroying the demographic and industrial strength of Germany and Russia, to bankrupting the entire British Empire. Then they seized control of the European Economic Community afterwards.

[Kevin Carson]

"I still don't understand the origins of World War I."

It probably had something to do with policy intellectuals thinking there was an international political and economic "system" that had to be "managed" by some hegemonic power, instead of everybody just staying home and minding their own fucking business.

[Don]

Most wars we have been involved in have not had escpecially satisfactory outcomes.

The Revolutionary war came out alright for the colonists, of course the British did not leave the forts on the frontier, which along with other tensions, led to....
the war of 1812, which we managed to fight to a draw against a distracted foe. Most of the original goals are abandoned just to make it stop. The damage was by and large confined to our soil.

The Civil War devastates a generation and much of the country, only to see many of the same crowd that started the war outlast the winning side and reassert political control and resume racial oppression in the South.

World War I leads to World War II which ends with half of Europe conquered by one of the Invaders of Poland. China is mortally wounded and falls under Russian Infleunce in short order. Half a Century of Hot and Cold Running War around the globe ensues. Two of the big hits:

Korea, where we fight back and Forth up and down the Korean Peninsula at a tremendous cost only to end right back where we started. Still working on the aftermath of that one.

Vietnam, the sterotype of a little war gone big and bad. We flee with our tail between our legs.

Iraq Mark 1, where we do for the Shia and Kurds what we did for Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Also eventually leads to....

Iraq Mark 2, tale of woe still being written

I hate 60s music, but you have to ask "War, what is it good for?"

[David]

World War I had four causes:

Austrian stupidity: they shouldn't have gone to war against Serbia, since Serbia was willing to help Austria punish the killers of the archduke. Austria wasn't willing to have anything short of war. Their war against Serbia was a war of choice, like our war with Iraq. Also, Austria shouldn't have tempted fate by assuming Russia wouldn't come to the aid of Austria, and assuming the Germans could take care of the Russians if they did.

Russian stupidity: Pan-slavism, in Russian eyes, was the view that Russia was the leader of all slavic peoples, particularly the orthodox ones, and that Russia would defend any of them from attack. Russia shouldn't have risked going to war over Serbia at that time because they were not ready for war. They were still in the process of catching up economically to the other European nations.

German stupidity: Germany should have made it very clear to Austria that it wouldn't go to war to bail them out if Russia attacked. It should have encouraged Russia, Austria and Serbia to come to terms with each other peacefully. Germany had very little to gain from war and a lot to lose.

French desire for revenge: France was still upset about losing that war with Germany and losing Alsace. They wanted it back, and were willing to go to war to get it. They thought they'd win the war quickly. If they had realized it would cost them 1.5 million lives, they wouldn't have gone to war.

[David]

correction:

when I said "Russia wouldn't come to the aid of Austria" I meant "Russia wouldn't come to the aid of Serbia".

Also, by "Austria" I mean "Austria-Hungary".

[anon]

The most alarming thing in this whole discussion is that so few people--especially Summers and Volcker--seem to have heard of hegemonic stability theory before. HST just happens to be one of the major theoretical viewpoints in political economy.