Thomas P.M. Barnett Is Unhappy with the Fearmongers

He writes, apropos of those who seek to embroil the United States in a new Cold War with China:

An overwrought, ideologically myopic argument (Thomas P.M. Barnett :: Weblog): "THE CHINA CHALLENGE: A Shining Model of Wealth Without Liberty," By James Mann.... An overwrought argument from Mann, who specializes in them. China is no "new" model or threat. It follows the model of Singapore, and before that South Korea, and before that Japan: a single-party state that bases almost all of its legitimacy on rising income and development through export-driven growth. It is a self-liquidating model: eventually the society wants more political freedom to go with that wealth. China's just so fricking huge and so poor that this process isn't going fast enough for Mann--hence the inevitable "threat."

Mann recognizes neither those past examples nor the significant economic and personal freedoms unleashed inside China over the past quarter century. His Z not having been reached fast enough, he discounts all movement from A since the bizarre depths of Mao's cultural revolution, which is no more distant politically than our Vietnam.... As for our take on it, we should logically welcome any so-called model that promotes external economic connectivity, because we know where that goes historically (i.e., where Japan and South Korea finally ended up: creating political freedoms that match their system's potential--something that took us a while to achieve as well).... China's path is but a steppingstone to outcomes we naturally seek. I mean, crawling might be described as an alternative to walking, but only until you're able to walk, then it suddenly seems like a passing phase.

China's "model"... is about transforming a hugely rural, impoverished, disconnected society (one-sixth of humanity) into an urban, consumeristic, connected one. Once achieved, and China is nowhere near that at this time, with well over half its population still living in very Gap-like conditions, then its model self-liquidates that all before it. China's future leaders know this, so do our smart observers. Mann ain't one of the them...

Comments

[Carlos]

"It follows the model of Singapore". Well, that's good news, since Singapore has had only three prime ministers (all of the same party) since 1959. Now, exclude South Korea and Japan from the sample (for diverse reasons, they are kind of a fluke), prove that the model is self-liquidating and then we'll talk.

[anne]

Wonderful post by P. M. Barnett and Brad Delong. Thank you.

[Piaw Na]

I grew up in Singapore. There's no sign that political freedom will exist there any time soon. I'll be surprised if China is any different.

[Doctor Memory]

Ah, so the state fades away at the end?

Good luck with that.

[MICHAEL]

all fear mongers in amerika need to be sent to prison..we dont need anymore fake wars...

[James Killus]

Well, I certainly prefer Barnett's take over Mann's, but if I had to bet, I'd bet on "None of the above" because that's always my go-to answer when confronted with things about which I know practically nothing. And "China" and "future" both fit into that category.

[Richard Green]

I don't know. I have had the privilege of teaching students from China for 17 years. There is no question that things have improved politically as well as economically, but...were human rights conditions in post World War II Japan and post Korean Conflict South Korea ever as bad as they are in China now?

[andres]

Fearmongering against China is almost always a bad bet, but if it is to be relevant it should be based not on the characteristics of the Chinese people or culture and not even on the characteristics of their government, but on the nature of the individuals who run China's government and their long-term objectives. No one in China's government for the moment seems to have bad brain chemicals in the manner of Kim Jong Il or Mahmud Ahmadinejad. And even someone like Mao Zedong, who did suffer from bad brain chemicals, did not have a hyperaggressive foreign policy. It is only if a Chinese George W. Bush or Saddam Hussein comes to rule the PRC government apparatus that we should start to worry.

[Anonymous]

Set aside the petty, misleading argument that Japan's one party nationalist regime, built foursquare on the ideal of "defensive modernization," required four years and two atomic bombs to liquidate. Indeed, why be orientalist and just use Asian examples of this wonderful Panglossian convergence between wealth and freedom? I do believe that one could make the argument that Wilhelmine Germany was another beautiful example of a defensive modernization undertaken in a large, diverse empire with extreme nationalism as it primary claim to political legitimacy. Heck, it even showed real progress toward democratization and the provision of social welfare. Good job that it was so wonderfully self-liquidating. You can bet that the Junkers were surprised on the day that the German middle classes inevitably demanded political rights and freedoms to match their newfound material prosperity because that's somehow written in the genetic code of homo economicus. Yup, the marriage of iron and rye was granted an anullment, the bloated military that dominated foreign policy-making since 1871 handed off their control over the choke points of political institutions and took up competitive mustache-waxing, liberal attitudes toward Catholics and Jews sprouted like the very tree of liberty on the soil blasted by Bismarck's Kulturkampf only two decades before, and the autocratic constitution was peacefully reformed along Westminster lines by dedicated reformers who held an unshakable faith in democracy.

Oh, sorry. My mistake; that's what happened when I dropped acid after reading Arendt, Tocqueville, and Gerschenkron. There was actually the rabid nationalism of the Navy Leagues, increasing social division along class lines, the ruinous naval arms race, the insane enshrinement of the Schlieffen Plan and preventive war against France as the centerpieces of national policy, a series of comic-opera imperialist adventures like Agadir Crisis, and that World War I thing.

But I'm sure that China will self-liquidate its authoritarian regime just like South Korea, despite the tiny, cosmetic differences in every aspect of the institutional organization adn political history of the two countries. Should be fun to watch.

[Ralph]

What is James Mann proposing for the solution to the "China problem"? Why doesn't someone bring up the case of the pursuit of democracy in Russia under Boris Yeltsin that led first to a kleptocracy and now to a state hovering between its recent failed state condition and a return to autocracy under Vladimir Putin? The recent oped by Sebastian Malaby on the travails faced by the World Bank after Paul Wolfowitz strikes me as a warning to the unwary about the confusion caused by the flip flopping over how to proceed in the pursuit of good governance in the third world. Malaby says the Bank first embraced the time honored "Washington consensus" in the early nineties in Russia after the Soviet collapse. The Bank pushed a pro-market approach to transform Russia away from its centralized planning to a market orientation. When this approach collapsed under the mismanagement of an inebriated Yeltsin, the Bank under the spell of the mixed Chinese approach of a strong central government and market reforms decided that it wasn't so much the particular institutions that were the problem but the skill with which the reforms were implemented that mattered. This requires that the third world set its own priorities but buy into the need for skillful "good governance". "Aid must be targeted at developing nations that are driving in a smart direction." This is the idea behind the Millenium Challenge Account unveiled by President Bush "which reserved all its cash for a handful of countries with good policies." "But what about the billion or so poor people who live in countries with bad drivers[rulers]?" And so we come full circle. "If good implementation is essential to development, the aid business has to strengthen the institutions in poor states that make good implementation possible." But with the failure to build a viable democracy in Iraq, "the enthusiasm for creating institutions is gone." Wolfowitz arrived at the Bank with a mandate to make anti-corruption and good governance a priority for the Bank. With his departure under a cloud, the Bank is in a quandary about what path it will take in the future.

[Emma Anne]

Well, I hope constructive engagement works out as planned, because what the hell else are we going to do about it?

[Theobald Smith]

...but...were human rights conditions in post World War II Japan and post Korean Conflict South Korea ever as bad as they are in China now?

Things were pretty bad in Korea.

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Park_Chung_Hee
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/KCIA

[leo]

Doctor Memory: "Ah, so the state fades away at the end?"

QOTD!

[nemo]

I know nothing about Thomas P.M. Barnett. He does make some interesting points about China, though he makes some questionable assertions already addressed by other commenters.

What really disturbs me is that when I go to his weblog, I find he seems to be a big fan of people whose work I am familiar with: people like Jim Hoagland, Thomas Friedman, and Mark Steyn.

Hoagland, Friedman, and Steyn have, each in his own way, been horribly wrong-headed on almost every subject throughout the Bush administration, most especially the Iraq war. But Barnett thinks that Hoagland and Friedman are hot contenders for Pulitzer Prizes. I don't know anything about Barnett, but if his judgment is this bad w.r.t. to Hoagland, Friedman, and Steyn, it makes me question his judgment in all other areas.

[Kevin Rooney]

Consider two scenarios for the year 2050:
Scenario I: US GDP is substantially higher than now. Poverty has been all but eliminated. There is a reliable social contract covering education, pensions, and health care. China has continued to develop rapidly and is now economically substantially larger than the US. Although the world is even more integrated than in 2007, clearly China is the leading nation.

Scenario II: The United States remains the unquestionable leader of the world. Our economy is a bit larger than in 2007, but not by all that much and the social issues of 2007 remain unsolved. The gap between those who have benefitted from ongoing global integration and those who have been sacrificed to it has become much larger. Education is both expensive and absolutely essential. Truly reliable pensions require enormous wealth and health care is god help you. Working class life has moved closer to third world standards. China has fallen (or been cast) by the wayside and poses no conceivable threat to US dominance.
I prefer Scenario I. I think the future of the human race is far brighter under Scenario I. I think most of the elites of the United States now would prefer Scenario II. However, their greed (as demonstrated by the willingness to allow the US food supply to be poisoned) ironically raises the chances of Scenario I.

[banana]

Well, and who said US goverment wants china democratic ? China as a labor pull to lower the cost of consumer goods, yes. China as a clueless investor (like Japan - remember California commercial real estate boom), yes. China as an example of some yellow people achieving the goals US declares ? Forget it

[jonfernquest]

Thanks. Excellent post.

"...we should logically welcome any so-called model that promotes external economic connectivity, because we know where that goes historically ...China's path is but a steppingstone to outcomes we naturally seek."

Why couldn't American public opinion be a robot with consistent follow through that applies this policy to every state?

The world would be a much better place

[TomH]

"It is a self-liquidating model: eventually the society wants more political freedom to go with that wealth."

Note to diary: Lunched with Chinese Society today. She had the noodle soup. I ate a hamburger. Things are going well for Society. Thriving factories, rising middle class, new roads going everywhere. But I could tell she was secretly unhappy. I urged her to confide. She looked around for eavesdroppers, and then leaned close to whisper: "I want more political freedom. I mean, not yet exactly, but when I get a little wealthier." She urged me to get the message out as soon as I returned to the States.

I explained to Society that I have my own blog, and I'm often quoted by others as an authority. I promised to pass along her important message to the American people. Then she paid the check - so liberated!

[John Emerson]

Using Singapore as an example of democratization strikes me as delusory. The democratization of South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan had a lot to do with direct and massive American influence, and the in S.K. and Taiwan the process only really got started after about 35-40 years of dictatorship (dissidents were still being murdered when I was in Taiwan in 1983).

I really think that Brad is all wrong about China, and I don't know what to expect from the future. I've never seen any sign that anyone in the Chinese government was open to democratization, and as far as foreign policy goes, I expect nothing but the most coldblooded Realpolitik.

[Steven Rogers]

It seems to be a given among futurologists that China will be the new Number One, but what about India? India's reported growth numbers seem to be lower, but are they more accurate?

[nykrindc]

What many of the detractors are missing is the underlying thesis with regard to China. For Barnett, the more connected a country is to the global economy, the less we have to worry about it in the long-term. Why? Because that connectivity comes with new rule-sets that these countries must adopt and adapt to their own situation. For example, China figured out that being a source of disease or being perceived as not addressing a real concern internationally (SARS) was a sure way to slow investment in the country so it moved after an initially tepid response to address the issue and provide more transparency. Similarly with its push to have bloggers register using their real names, the tech industry balked stating that more regulations would hamper the growth of the market and the Chinese government backed down. There are many other examples of market forces, or rules affecting the manner in which the Chinese government addresses a particular situation. So far, it has had some positive effects. It's going to take time, as many of you note as late as 1983 people were still dissappearing in Taiwan, but ultimately a country's political rule-sets will have to match its economic ones. Even so, as many of you point out, Singapore is the exception to this, but what is important to notice in that case, is that far from being a threat to the world system, Singapore is actually a big part of it. Despite its lagging on political freedom, we don't worry about Singapore trying to subvert the international order, or engaging in nuclear proliferation. If anything, it is a pillar of globalization. As such, and this tracks closely with Barnett's argument, continued engagement with China along with the integration of China as a pillar of the international system is the best course to ensure that we don't end up in a futile and destructive great power struggle that will only stifle globalization and the promotion of the political rule-sets that must invariably come with it. This, as Barnett is also an economic determinist, as he freely admits.

[Barkley Rosser]

China is likely to become Number One in aggregate GDP, but I do not see it surpassing the US in per capita for at least a century, if ever. Probably China Number One in 2050, but quite possibly India Number One in 2100, again in aggregate GDP.

As for Kevin Rooney's scenarios, why not an unpleasant combo of the two, the bad one for the US with the better one for China?

[Barkley Rosser]

China is likely to become Number One in aggregate GDP, but I do not see it surpassing the US in per capita for at least a century, if ever. Probably China Number One in 2050, but quite possibly India Number One in 2100, again in aggregate GDP.

As for Kevin Rooney's scenarios, why not an unpleasant combo of the two, the bad one for the US with the better one for China?

[Barkley Rosser]

China is likely to become Number One in aggregate GDP, but I do not see it surpassing the US in per capita for at least a century, if ever. Probably China Number One in 2050, but quite possibly India Number One in 2100, again in aggregate GDP.

As for Kevin Rooney's scenarios, why not an unpleasant combo of the two, the bad one for the US with the better one for China?

[bigTom]

I'm not convinced of the sustainability of China's growth. The main reason, the coming demographic transition. The one child policy is soon going to afflict the Chinese economy with an unprecendented ratio of old to young. Time will tell how well they are able to handle this.

[Mr. Noah]

Since when did Japan and Singapore turn into pluralistic, free societies?

Japan has been ruled by an opposition party for a grand total of 1 year since World War 2. Houses of dissidents are routinely firebombed by "rightist" groups connected to the ruling party. Criminal trials have conviction rates of 98%, and torture is frequently alleged. The constitution is now being amended to guarantee the people's rights only when those rights "do not interfere with the interests of the nation."

As for Sinapore, it rates "Partly Free" in Freedom House's ratings only by the barest of margins, rating somewhere between Yemen, Ethiopia, and Nigeria.

So when, exactly, did the people of Japan and Singapore rise up and demand greater political liberty?

[demisod]

Think it's possible that resource constraints like oil and issues like carbon emissions will interfer in the massive populations of China and India achieving Western middle-class prosperity?

[Anderson]

Is Mann a "fearmongerer," or does he just think we're selling out the Chinese people by giving their masters a pass?

[anne]

Ah, but there is the point. China is not America and not even France, while Japan is not America either, nor is Singapore. Japan is different, a pleasing sort of different to me, being so well treated in Japan, but different nonetheless, and in being different we can still appreciate Japan as we should appeciate China. The idea that Japan or Singapore or especially China cannot be appreciated and worked with to mutual satisfaction is absurd and pernicious. The time for being merely belligerent in foreign affairs must be gone.

[anne]

"Is Mann a 'fearmongerer,' or does he just think we're selling out the Chinese people by giving their masters a pass?"

Imagine the lunacy that we will determine who will govern 1.3 billion Chinese and how 1.3 billion Chinese are to be governed. I wonder, should be pass the Chinese government? "Pass," an interesting term. Who among us will pass the Chinese leadership?

[anne]

Interesting term "masters." Master and pass. Will we pass or fail the masters or mistresses of China? Who are the China masters, I wonder?

Notice how even our very language makes us antagonistic.

[Barkley Rosser]

The bad old joke about Japan's longtime ruling party, the Liberal Democratic Party, taking off on Voltaire's line (repeated endlessly by Mike Meyers on SNL) about the Holy Roman Empire, is that it is not liberal, nor democratic, nor a party.

[anne]

Interesting that no one was asking whether the master of Iraq was passing or failing when the master of Iraq was actually an American Viceroy. (When did America inherit a line of Viceroys?) Should we give the American masters of iraq a pass? Say what? Suppose China were to fail the American masters of Iraq. I have already failed us, long ago at the mention of an American Viceroy I failed us.

[David]

We don't need a Cold War with China. We need to get together with our other major trading partners and put a 70% tariff on all Chinese goods until they pull out of Tibet and/or their economy and regime collapse.

If that doesn't happen, I'm sure plenty of other countries can make cheap crap for Walmart, too.

[Ralph]

"Since when did Japan or Singapore turn into pluralistic free societies?" Not sure when this discussion turned into a judgment on the politics of Japan (or Singapore) but it should be noted that during the heated discussions (at the national level) over the goals of US occupation of Iraq, Condi Rice often cited the successful occupation of Japan (and Germany) as an example to emulate when discussing the wisdom or folly of the Iraq occupation. With regard to the LDP I would argue that there was a mini-coup in 2001, when the previous prime minister Koizumi Junichiro seized the reins of the party and purged several old time members like the MP from Hiroshima Kamei Shizuka. Koizumi did this in reprisal for their opposition to his postal privatization bill which he finally rammed through the lower house after a special election held just for this purpose. Koizumi and his selected successor current PM Abe Shinzo can be considered to be agents of the right wing of the party and strong nationalists to boot but it is not clear that the political culture is ready to completely submit to this looming authoritative imposition yet. The struggle over the revision of the constitution (article 9) initiated under Koizumi and expected to be carried out under Abe is by no means a "slam dunk". The weak opposition party, the DPJ, will support some aspects of the revision agenda but they can be expected to challenge some aspects of the revision desired by Abe. There is considerable opposition in the minor parties like the Communist and Socialist parties. Though the public has said little thus far, as the revision bill proceeds in the lower house, a movement to limit the weakening of the peace clause (article 9) can be expected to make its voice heard. For anyone interested in Japan, it will be worth following. Insofar as the powerful business community in Japan is concerned, there is some opposition to Koizumi and Abe's current nationalistic policies especially the controversy over the visits of the PM to the Yasukuni Shrine which houses several convicted war criminals and has angered the Chinese and S Korean governments. Abe has modulated this somewhat by so far not making any visits since becoming PM, which is diplomatic compared to the behavior of Koizumi. The business community is worried about this because of their growing committments to the Chinese economy. It is something of a relief to note that the Japanese economy is not as dependent on the military-industrial complex as it was before WW II. The old zaibatsu conglomerates which were partly disbanded by MacArthur during the occupation play a much smaller part in the economy than before WW II.

[nykrindc]

Mr. Noah,

Since when did Japan and Singapore turn into pluralistic, free societies?

You are missing the point. As I stated earlier:

Even so, as many of you point out, Singapore is the exception to this, but what is important to notice in that case, is that far from being a threat to the world system, Singapore is actually a big part of it. Despite its lagging on political freedom, we don't worry about Singapore trying to subvert the international order, or engaging in nuclear proliferation. If anything, it is a pillar of globalization. As such, and this tracks closely with Barnett's argument, continued engagement with China along with the integration of China as a pillar of the international system is the best course to ensure that we don't end up in a futile and destructive great power struggle that will only stifle globalization and the promotion of the political rule-sets that must invariably come with it.

[Ralph]

"...continued engagement with China along with integration of China...." As a comment on this visionary thought, it was reported in the weekend Financial Times that China is investing $3 billion in the coming IPO of private equity house Blackstone Group. This is less than 1% to be sure of their $1.2 trillion hoard of US dollar reserves but it is an unusual way to diversify their US Treasury holdings.

[anne]

"We don't need a Cold War with China. We need to get together with our other major trading partners and put a 70% tariff on all Chinese goods until they pull out of Tibet and/or their economy and regime collapse."

"We don't need a Cold War with America. We need to get together with our other major trading partners and put a 70% tariff on all American goods until they pull out of Iraq and/or their economy and regime collapse."

[Anthony Damiani]

Ludicrous economic determinism. While South Korea and Taiwan and Japan showed examples of democratization tied to a rising middle class, it would be wrong to overlook the role played by those nations historic ties to the United States (see: postwar occupation, Korean War, and cold war respectively), the broader arc of geopolitcs (see: fall of communism) as well as events and conditions particular to those nations. Trying to extrapolate from this tiny and manifestly nonrandom sample the lesson that capitalism will inevitably lead to the triumph of liberty over autocracy is gross reductionism, and indeed a teleology worthy of Marx.