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Posts from December 2007

December 31, 2007

Auld Lang Syne Blogging

From the archives: What Orpington High Street has to say to Berkeley. Perhaps the funniest message ever to arrive in my email inbox.

| hello
|
| i would add exclamation marks but i cant find them
|
| anyway....
|
| i am drunk and in orpington high stteet.
|
| theres a pubkic email booth thing herre and i thoigh id send u all a msg
|
| ooooo touchscreentastic.
|
| will write again when at
| a proper xompitor
|
| eloo yis is pete a mate fpof chtis cant see f* THINK I BRKE THE
| KYBOARD TE E DONT WORK

20071208_delong_micro.jpg This I think, te definitive answer to Thoreau's question:

It is alleged that upon being told that through the telegraph a man in Maine could instantly send a message to a man in Texas, Thoreau asked, "But what do they have to say to each other?"

links for 2008-01-01

New York Times Death Spiral Watch

Why oh why can't we have a better press corps? Matthew Yglesias watches Sam Tanenhaus's book review on Jonah Goldberg:

Matthew Yglesias: If You've Got Nothing Nice to Say: 31 Dec 2007 09:04 a: I just hope The New York Times Book Review is as kind to my book when the time comes as they were to Jonah Goldberg (of course, realistically we're all just desperately hoping to be reviewed at all): "Yet the title of his book aside, what distinguishes Goldberg from the Sean Hannitys and Michael Savages is a witty intelligence that deals in ideas as well as insults — no mean feat in the nasty world of the culture wars." Yes, that's right, Liberal Fascism is a step away from the nastiness of the culture wars. The reviewer, David Oshinsky, does concede that Goldberg's main thesis is false but that didn't seem to bother him....

Swordsmith writes:

I TA'd for David Oshinsky while doing my grad work at Rutgers, so I may be a little biased (he and I were probably the only two Red Sox fans on campus at the time), but I think MY misses the point a little here. It's pretty standard in writing critiques to point out the things you like about the book first before proceeding on to the problems, and Oshinsky spanks the content of the book pretty thoroughly - basically he says that it's cleverly written and fun to read but completely worthless intellectually.

The ending of the review was puzzling and abruptly shifted tone in a way that was un-Oshinsky-like, though; I suspect it was clumsily edited to soften his ending a bit. Oshinsky himself was an interesting choice for the review, since he's an expert on McCarthyism, and has built a career on the study of people who use terror and bullshit to scare their way into power.

Liquidity vs. Minor-Solvency vs. Major Solvency Crises--No--Panic vs. Interest-Rates-Are-too-High vs. The-Financial System-Is-Totally-B***ered Crises--No--I Need Better Names!

Calculated Risk has insightful comments on my Project Syndicate article. Here is one:

Calculated Risk: Delong: Three cures for three crises: I don't think it's quite that bad. Even if the losses for investors and lenders reach $1 trillion (a possibility), I think the financial system can absorb those losses. Sure, some players might disappear, and others might have to sell significant assets (or dilute their shareholders), but I don't think the choice is between serious inflation and depression.

Still, I think the "Yikes" tag fits...

And CR points us to Mark Thoma, who points us to an even-more-insightful than usual piece by the brilliant and hard-working Greg Ip:

Economics Blog : Liquidity Threat Eases; Solvency Threat Still Looms: As 2007 winds down, the much-feared year-end liquidity crisis appears to have been averted thanks to aggressive action by central banks.... Libor rates have dropped sharply since Thursday... [but] are still high relative to the expected federal funds rate because banks still have an ongoing demand for cash to fund new obligations and residual concerns about each others’ creditworthiness.

Nonetheless, as Lou Crandall, chief economist at Wrightson ICAP LLC said today, “Things are unfolding smoothly.” The first quarter is likely to start much as the fourth quarter did, with reduced concerns now that the statement date has passed. Balance-sheet strains will continue to create concerns about the price and availability of short-term funds, Mr. Crandall said. But for the most part, “We’ve moved beyond... liquidity concerns. The focus has moved to that part of the financial fallout that central banks can’t address through technical operations.”

In other words, as 2008 begins, it’s solvency, not liquidity, that threatens the economy... a likely decline in housing prices that will further undermine credit quality. Making banks more confident of their own ability to raise funds is not going to resolve a generalized shrinkage of lending driven by declining collateral values.

looming threat is an expected hit to housing demand as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac impose new fees to buy or guarantee mortgages once considered prime... customers putting down less than 30% on a home and with credit scores below 680. Bianco Research... estimates “over one-third of prime] home buyers are going to get ‘crunched’ by tougher standards, much bigger downpayments and interest rate ’surcharges.’” The fees apply to mortgages the companies buy after March 8....

“We believe home prices will continue to fall,” Bianco wrote. “This is the cause of the credit crisis.” The collapse in issuance of mortgage-backed collateralized debt obligations is itself merely a result of falling home prices.

On the other hand, maybe home prices don’t have much further to fall.

20071208_delong_micro.jpg I do badly need better names for my three-part classification of financial crises:

  • Liquidity crises
  • Solvency crises that are easily cured by easier monetary policy that boosts asset values
  • Solvency crises that aren't easily cured by easier monetary policy

I also need to figure out what kind of crisis we are having. Let's get out the envelope and start scribbling...

Since 2000, roughly 3 million extra new homes have been built over and above those that would have been built if things had followed long-run trends. Figure $300K per extra home. That's an extra $900 billion of investment in housing that's 100% leveraged and currently occupied by the 3M American households that were priced out of the pre-bubble housing market. If the lenders foreclose on those 3M, they then will find themselves trying to sell the 3M houses to 3M other households that are even less-rich and less-credit worthy. So the best strategy is for the lenders to sit down and negotiate. Maybe the Fed can help more by lowering interest rates further. But some chunk of that $900B is going up in smoke.

Then there are all those who saw their houses rise in value and took out home-equity loans. We know there are a lot of them--household savings rates did not get driven to zero by accident. But how many of them are going to default on their home equity loans, and how big will the losses the lenders eat going to be?

My guess right now is $500B in total loan losses for both tranches of the crisis. But that's just a guess, and an unbacked guess at that...

Three Different Cures for Three Types of Financial Crises

From the Taipei Times -- Project Syndicate:

20071208_delong_micro.jpg Three cures for three crises by J. Bradford Delong: Tuesday, Jan 01, 2008, Page 9:

A full-scale financial crisis is triggered by a sharp fall in the prices of a large set of assets that banks and other financial institutions own, or that make up their borrowers' financial reserves. The cure depends on which of three modes define the fall in asset prices.

The first -- and easiest to handle -- mode is when investors refuse to buy at normal prices not because they know that economic fundamentals are suspect, but because they fear that others will panic, forcing everybody to sell at fire-sale prices.

The cure for this mode -- a liquidity crisis caused by declining confidence in the financial system -- is to ensure that banks and other financial institutions with cash liabilities can raise what they need by borrowing from others or from central banks.

This is the rule set out by Walter Bagehot more than a century ago: Calming the markets requires central banks to lend at a penalty rate to every distressed institution that would be able to put up reasonable collateral in normal times.

Once everybody is sure that, no matter how much others panic, financial institutions won't have to dump illiquid assets at a loss, the panic will subside. And the penalty rate means that financial institutions can't profit from the investment behavior that left them illiquid -- and creates an incentive to take due care to guard against such contingencies in the future.

In the second mode, asset prices fall because investors recognize that they should never have been as high as they were, or that future productivity growth is likely to be lower and interest rates higher. Either way, current asset prices are no longer warranted.

This kind of crisis cannot be solved simply by ensuring that solvent borrowers can borrow, because the problem is that banks aren't solvent at prevailing interest rates. Banks are highly leveraged institutions with relatively small capital bases, so even a relatively small decline in the prices of assets that they or their borrowers hold can leave them unable to pay off depositors, no matter how long the liquidation process.

In this case, applying the Bagehot rule would be wrong.

The problem is not illiquidity but insolvency at prevailing interest rates. But if the central bank reduces interest rates -- and credibly commits to keeping them low in the future -- asset prices will rise. Thus, low interest rates can make the problem go away, while the Bagehot rule -- with its high lending rate for banks -- would make matters worse.

Of course, easy monetary policy causes inflation, and the failure to "punish" financial institutions that exercised poor judgment in the past may lead to more of the same in the future. But as long as the degree of insolvency is small enough that a relatively minor degree of monetary easing can prevent a major depression and mass unemployment, this is a good option in an imperfect world.

The third mode is like the second: A bursting bubble or bad news about future productivity or interest rates drives the fall in asset prices. But the fall in values is larger. Thus easing monetary policy won't solve this kind of crisis, because even moderately lower interest rates cannot boost asset prices enough to restore the financial system to solvency.

When this happens, governments have two options. First, they can simply nationalize the broken financial system and have the Treasury sort things out -- and ideally reprivatize the functioning and solvent parts as rapidly as possible. Government is not the best form of organization for financial intermediation in the long term, and even in the short term it is not very good. It is merely the best organization available.

The second option is simply inflation. Yes, the financial system is insolvent, but it has nominal liabilities and either it or its borrowers have some real assets. Print enough money and boost the price level enough, and the insolvency problem goes away without the risks entailed by putting the government in the investment and commercial banking business.

The inflation may be severe, implying massive unjust redistributions and at least a temporary grave degradation in the price system's capacity to guide resource allocation. But even this is almost surely better than a depression.

Since late summer, the US Federal Reserve has been attempting to manage the slow-moving financial crisis triggered by the collapse of the US housing bubble.

At the start, the Fed assumed that it was facing a first-mode crisis -- a mere liquidity crisis -- and that the principal cure would be to ensure the liquidity of fundamentally solvent institutions.

But the Fed has shifted over the past two months toward policies aimed at a second-mode crisis -- more significant monetary loosening, despite the risks of higher inflation, extra moral hazard and unjust redistribution.

As Fed Vice Chair Don Kohn recently put it: "We should not hold the economy hostage to teach a small segment of the population a lesson."

No policymakers are yet considering the possibility that the financial crisis might turn out to be in the third mode.

December 30, 2007

links for 2007-12-31

The New York Times Hires Lord Haw-Haw--Excuse Me, William Kristol

The death spiral of the New York Times begins:

Kristol Clear: Times' editorial page editor Andy Rosenthal defended the [hiring of William Kristol]. Rosenthal told Politico.com.... “The idea that The New York Times is giving voice to a guy who is a serious, respected conservative intellectual — and somehow that’s a bad thing,” Rosenthal added. “How intolerant is that?”...

20071208_delong_micro.jpg Many people would be interested in reading a newspaper that publishes the writings of a serious, respected conservative intellectual. But how many people oughty to read a newspaper that regards its mission as giving platforms to lying propagandists? The clueless Mr. Rosenthal and his equally clueless bosses have a problem: they cannot tell one from another. And this makes one wonder why anybody thinks they have any business running a newspaper.

Let's give the mike to Kristol himself, via Anonymous Liberal:

Kristol in March 2003: We are tempted to comment, in these last days before the war, on the U.N., and the French, and the Democrats. But the war itself will clarify who was right and who was wrong about weapons of mass destruction. It will reveal the aspirations of the people of Iraq, and expose the truth about Saddam's regime. It will produce whatever effects it will produce on neighboring countries and on the broader war on terror. We would note now that even the threat of war against Saddam seems to be encouraging stirrings toward political reform in Iran and Saudi Arabia, and a measure of cooperation in the war against al Qaeda from other governments in the region. It turns out it really is better to be respected and feared than to be thought to share, with exquisite sensitivity, other people's pain. History and reality are about to weigh in, and we are inclined simply to let them render their verdicts...

I suppose the Times could still recover if it broke its contract with Kristol and fired Andy Rosenthal in the next week. Otherwise... let's start the countdown: I say ten years before the Times as we knew it is gone.


But let's go visit Anonymous Liberal some more:

Bill Kristol: Pundit Superstar: Here's a sampling of some of Kristol's most impressive contributions to our political discourse....

August 26, 2002: Reading the Scowcroft/New York Times "arguments" against war, one is struck by how laughably weak they are. European international-law wishfulness and full-blown Pat Buchanan isolationism are the two intellectually honest alternatives to the Bush Doctrine. Scowcroft and the Times wish to embrace neither, so they pretend instead to be terribly "concerned" with the administration's alleged failure to "make the case"...

April 4, 2003: There's been a certain amount of pop sociology in America ... that the Shia can't get along with the Sunni and the Shia in Iraq just want to establish some kind of Islamic fundamentalist regime. There's almost no evidence of that at all. Iraq's always been very secular...

April 28, 2003: The United States committed itself to defeating terror around the world. We committed ourselves to reshaping the Middle East, so the region would no longer be a hotbed of terrorism, extremism, anti-Americanism, and weapons of mass destruction. The first two battles of this new era are now over. The battles of Afghanistan and Iraq have been won decisively and honorably. But these are only two battles. We are only at the end of the beginning in the war on terror and terrorist states...

March 22, 2004: [T]here are hopeful signs that Iraqis of differing religious, ethnic, and political persuasions can work together. This is a far cry from the predictions made before the war by many, both here and in Europe, that a liberated Iraq would fracture into feuding clans and unleash a bloodbath. The perpetually sour American media focus on the tensions between Shiites and Kurds that delayed the signing by three whole days. But the difficult negotiations leading up to the signing, and the continuing debates over the terms of a final constitution, have in fact demonstrated something remarkable in Iraq: a willingness on the part of the diverse ethnic and religious groups to disagree--peacefully--and then to compromise. This willingness is the product of what appears to be a broad Iraqi consensus favoring the idea of pluralism...

July 26, 2004: What the Bush administration did say--and what so many reporters seem to have trouble understanding--is that Iraq and al Qaeda had a relationship that, by its very existence, posed a potential threat to the United States...

March 7, 2005: Just four weeks after the Iraqi election of January 30, 2005, it seems increasingly likely that that date will turn out to have been a genuine turning point. The fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, ended an era. September 11, 2001, ended an interregnum. In the new era in which we now live, 1/30/05 could be a key moment--perhaps the key moment so far--in vindicating the Bush Doctrine as the right response to 9/11. And now there is the prospect of further and accelerating progress...

April 4, 2005 (re: Terri Schiavo) After all, we are a "maturing society," as the Supreme Court has told us. Perhaps it is time, in mature reaction to this latest installment of what Hugh Hewitt has called a "robed charade," to rise up against our robed masters, and choose to govern ourselves. Call it Terri's revolution...

November 7, 2005: Last week the Bush Administration's second-term bear market bottomed out...

November 30, 2005 (column titled "Pelosi's Disastrous Miscalculation"): All this made me think the 2006 elections could result in a Speaker Pelosi. I now think that unlikely. Pelosi's endorsement today of the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq makes the House Democrats the party of defeat, the party of surrender. Bush's strong speech today means the GOP is likely to be--if Republican Congressmen just keep their nerve--the party of victory. Now it is possible that the situation in Iraq will worsen over the next year. If that happens, Bush and the GOP are in deep trouble. They would have been if Pelosi had said nothing. But it is much more likely that the situation in Iraq will stay more or less the same, or improve. In either case, Republicans will benefit from being the party of victory...

April 4, 2006: What was striking, following the mosque bombing, was the evidence of Iraq's underlying stability in the face of attempts to undermine it. The country's vital institutions seem to have grown strong enough to withstand even the provocation of the bombing of the golden mosque..

December 29, 2007

links for 2007-12-30

DeLong Smackdown Watch Update: Henry Farrell

Henry Farrell on Brad DeLong, Friedrich Hayek, Ludwig von Mises, James Scott, High Modernism, Jane Jacobs, the collectivization of agriculture, Karl Polanyi, rubber tomatos, the despised medieval Jewish Maghribi traders, and the cheap restaurants of Florence, Italy:

Crooked Timber » » DeLong, Scott and Hayek: I think that [DeLong] is fair up to a point – [James] Scott should develop his critique of bureaucratic capitalism in [Seeing Like a State] much more explicitly than he does. But I also think that doing what Brad wants him to do would have led him to write a very different book. Seeing Like a State is in large part an intervention in an internal argument within the left, arguing against the grand planners and for the Jane Jacobs types and the anarchists. Introducing a proper critique of Hayek, Mises and the rest would have greatly lessened its impact within that debate, by allowing the targets of Scott’s critique to focus on the mean things Scott would have probably said about pro-market types who they dislike, while ignoring the flights of arrows intended to pierce their own hides. I should note that I’m an unimportant member of one of the broad groups that Scott is attacking (I like and use rational choice theory; this doesn’t change the fact that Seeing Like a State is the only book in the social sciences I have read in the last ten years that made me want to write a fan letter to the author after reading it).

What Scott argues, as I understand it, is as follows: First – that processes of rationalization lead to the destruction of metis, or local knowledge if you would prefer, and the prioritization of codifiable, quantifiable, epistemic knowledge. Second, that this process involves obvious and (sometimes quite important) trade-offs, but may often be worth it – e.g. there is no point in idealizing serf-like conditions that preserve local knowledge at the expense of human freedom. Third, that the real problem is when the creation of epistemic knowledge is combined with high modernist attempts to engage in social engineering. This arrives at similar conclusions to Hayek etc about how terrible collectivization processes are, but from different premises. Specifically, what Hayek etc would see as the result of state planning, Scott sees as the result of broader forms of rationalization (hence, perhaps, the linkages to Foucault that Brad worries about) when they coincide with a certain kind of state hubris (the hubris doesn’t necessarily follow from the creation of codifiable knowledge).

Thus, I think there is a argument against the Hayekians which is not very far from the surface of Seeing Like a State and which can be drawn out quite easily. First – Scott makes it clear that the processes of market development and of state imposition of standards goes hand in hand. Brad talks about how the very first example that Scott draws on – German scientific forestry in the nineteenth century – is intended to show the failures of state planning. But as Scott makes clear, the relevant failures are driven as much by the market as by the state – Scott writes about how the “utilitarian state could not see the real, existing forest for the (commercial trees)” and about how the

forest as a habitat disappears and is replaced by the forest as an economic resource to be managed efficiently and profitably. Here, fiscal and commercial logics coincide; they are both resolutely fixed on the bottom line.

This is an important sub-theme of the book, and indeed of our understanding of how states and markets have developed hand-in-hand. Sometimes, the state has sought to impose its view for reasons of its own interest and survival (whether this be the promotion of ‘public order,’ the increase of fiscal revenues or whatever), sometimes at the behest of market actors who are interested in standardization, and sometimes for rationales that blur these two together.

Scott doesn’t draw this out as a critique of the Austrians, but it is still clear evidence of his profound difference from them. He is much more interested than they are in the actual political processes through which markets come into being. To misquote Tilly, markets make the state and the state makes markets. This is something that is touched on by the new institutional economics in its own way (cf. Doug North) but that doesn’t, to my knowledge, get any proper attention in the Hayekian or von Misean corpus. I stress the words “to my knowledge” since Hayek’s arguments on this theme are scattered across various books – but I strongly suspect that there isn’t anything that is really germane to this. More generally, I think that there’s a kind of selective blindness in the Austrian corpus to the question of exactly how active states are in constituting markets, because this would raise all sorts of awkward theoretical and political problems. Markets – even and perhaps especially Hayekian markets – don’t exist in an institutional vacuum – and the institutions on which they rely are going to shape the extent to which they succeed or fail in making use of local knowledge. In particular, markets that involve interaction between people who don’t know each other (impersonal exchange) require substitutes for personal knowledge and relationships(in the form of mutually understood standards and enforcement mechanisms).

This leads on to the second point – that a lot of what Scott argues is correct. His claim, as I read it is less about the specific problems of state-created institutions, than the ways in which a large variety of abstracting institutions or standards miss out on, and perhaps undermine important forms of local knowledge. As I understand him, any standards sufficient for impersonal exchange are likely to abstract away the actual relationships that people have with their environment. Here, Scott is less a closet-Hayekian than a more-or-less-overt Polanyian, who develops some of Polanyi’s arguments (especially his claims about the institutional consequences of long distance trade, and the economy as an instituted process) to make them sharper and more interesting.

I think that Scott’s claims are more credible than Brad suggests. Again, modern markets require long distance exchange between people who don’t know each other, and hence require impersonal forms of knowledge that are instantiated in commonly held standards of one sort or another. My favourite example of this is the Codex Alimentarius’s standard lexicon describing different stages of putrescence in fish. These standards have to substitute for more intimate and more direct forms of knowledge – large scale markets typically can’t work without them.

A good example of this is credit markets. It used to be that they depended primarily on personal knowledge of the borrower and his character (here, I’m borrowing from the work of Bruce Carruthers). Now, they depend on a variety of formal metrics, risk scores and pseudo-quantified assessments by credit rating agencies and the like. This is by no means necessarily a bad thing – it has resulted in a vast expansion of credit, and allowed many people to borrow money who couldn’t previously. But it does mean that some forms of knowledge that may have been valuable, and that were available in an era when bank managers knew all their customers personally, have been lost. It also may result in a fetishization of the quantifiable and a lack of attention to the realities underlying abstract metrics (which is arguably part of the reason for the recent crash in mortgage lending markets – the metrics that markets used were palpably insufficient to describe the underlying risks of particular complex financial instruments).

Another, more homely example is food. Brad criticizes Scott’s discussion of the much-cited tasteless tomato arguing that it are an example of market success rather than failure – people bought tasteless tomatoes because they were cheap. This seems to me to have a bit of a flavor of a revealed preferences argument, and also to miss the point. I lived in Florence for three years, a city which has cheap and delicious tomatoes, despite being some distance from the parts of Italy where tomatoes are grown. While I can’t prove it, I strongly suspect that the deliciousness of the tomatoes had a lot to do with informal relationships between the small shops where you bought the tomatoes, the small companies that delivered them, and the small farms from where they were bought. Certainly, this would be consonant with the research that I and many others have done on the Italian political economy and how it works. Italy protects small businesses and local communities in a lot of ways. This means that it misses out badly on certain economies of scale. It also means that certain kinds of high quality production are possible in Italy that are difficult or impossible to replicate elsewhere – a myriad of small firms cooperating to produce final goods through purely informal means. Hence the success, for example, of Italian sunglasses, shoes, and (the rather unglamorous topic of my own research) packaging machinery. All of these build on forms of informal knowledge that would likely be damaged in a more standard market economy, where collaboration happened (to the extent that it did), within the hierarchy of the firm, or through arms-length contracts.

Thus, there are trade-offs. Italian firms in small-firm districts are excellent at gradual innovation and refinement of knowledge – in part because of their reliance on metis. They are not so good at producing profound, industry-changing forms of innovation. They also tend to stick closer to home than their equivalents in other countries (somewhat ironically, they replicate the logic of Avner Greif’s mediaeval Maghribi merchants far more than the behaviour of his Genoese traders).

To return to the more homely example of food, Florence has an excellent restaurant culture, where you can eat out cheaply and incredibly well if you avoid the tourist traps.(1) But it systematically emphasizes local cuisine, along with a few imports from the South (pizza and pasta) and the north (some Bolognese and Milanese dishes). Chinese food in Florence is (or was when I was there) terrible, and Indian food was relatively very expensive and no better than mediocre in quality. In contrast, most US cities of my experience have a lower overall standard of food, but a much greater variety of restaurants producing different cuisines, sometimes at a quite high standard of quality (if rarely as high as in the cuisine’s home countries or regions). US cities are far more open to different kinds of food than Italian cities. I suspect that much of this can be attributed to the dominance of particular forms of local knowledge in Italy, which on the one hand preserve certain traditions of quality that would be infeasible to preserve in the US, but on the other hand make people less likely to branch out into new forms of production and consumption that don’t fit with their prior experience.

This allows me to come back to the roots of my disagreement with Brad. Brad is a fan of markets, and believes that they contribute in very important ways to human freedom. I agree with him on this. But I think that Brad sometimes underemphasizes the real trade-offs that markets may involve, and overstates his criticisms of people who are concerned with these trade-offs. Sometimes, perhaps often, these trade-offs are relatively slight – as Brad says, many forms of redundant local knowledge can be discarded without compunction. Sometimes, these trade-offs are real, but still worthwhile – while we should acknowledge the costs of markets, we should acknowledge that the benefits of introducing them are higher. And sometimes they are not worth paying – there are areas of social life where marketization has more downsides than advantages. (the question of which areas of social life fall under which category is obviously important, but this post is much too long already).


(1) I seem to remember (although I can’t find the post) Brad rudely disagreeing a couple of years ago with someone who suggested that delicious cheap food was available in European cities in a way that it wasn’t in the US, and claiming that this was an illusion of the upper middle classes who could afford to eat well anywhere, or words to that effect (my memory could be flawed, in which case I apologize in advance). For what it’s worth, as a grad student with a relatively meagre stipend in Florence, I could afford to eat out three nights a week in good restaurants.

*Blush*: David Brooks Gives Me too Much Credit

David Brooks writes:

The Sidney Awards II - New York Times: Three other essays are worth your time.... In the Chronicle of Higher Education, J. Bradford DeLong wrote “Creative Destruction’s Reconstruction” on why Joseph Schumpeter matters to the 21st century...

20071208_delong_micro.jpg Blush.

Don't get me wrong--I like the essay I wrote a lot, and Tom McGraw's Schumpeter biography is excellent. But even I don't think it's in the world's top 20 essays for 2007...

And what credit there is should be shared with Alex Kafka, the editor on the piece, who did do a bang-up job, I thought.

Note to Self: John Kenneth Galbraith: Sisyphus as Social Democrat

20071208_delong_micro.jpg Note to self: I really need to rethink and expand this. I have the sense that there are absolutely dazzling and important insights back there somewhere that did not make it out of my brain when I wrote:

J. Bradford DeLong (2005), "Sisyphus as Social Democrat," _ From Foreign Affairs, _ (May/June): Review of Richard Parker (2005), John Kenneth Galbraith: His Life, His Politics, His Economics. Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2005, 820 pp. $35.00.

Summary:  John Kenneth Galbraith's dazzling career as an economist and public intellectual has left an oddly thin legacy. A new biography sets out to explain why -- tracing, in the process, the rise and fall of twentieth-century American liberalism.

J. Bradford DeLong is Professor of Economics at the University of California at Berkeley.

If there were justice in the world, John Kenneth Galbraith would rank as the twentieth century's most influential American economist. He has published several books that are among the best analyses of modern U.S. history, played a key role in midcentury policymaking, and advised more presidents and senators than would seem possible in three lifetimes. Yet today, Galbraith's influence on economics is small, and his influence on U.S. politics is receding by the year.

In this lively and thoughtful biography, Richard Parker sets himself the task of explaining Galbraith's career: why it was so dazzling, and why its long-term impact has turned out to be so much less than expected. The result is not only the story of a smart, witty, and important man, but also a fascinating meditation on the rise and fall of twentieth-century American liberalism...

The Housing and Exports Do-Si-Do

From Paul Krugman:

Why we havent had a recession (so far) - Paul Krugman - Op-Ed Columnist - New York Times Blog: Why we haven’t had a recession (so far) The housing bust has lived up fully to my expectations. So far, however, the economy has held up surprisingly well (ask me again in a few months). How come?

It’s the exports, stupid.

I haven’t seen this chart published elsewhere, but it seems to me that it tells the story. The blue line shows residential investment as a share of GDP (left scale). It has plunged impressively. The red line shows exports as a share of GDP (right scale). Thanks to the weak dollar, they’ve risen almost enough to offset the housing plunge.

Meanwhile, consumer spending has held up, and there has been a modest plus from state and local government spending.

No particular policy moral here, just an observation.

8B75DC66-72A7-4E59-8BB0-781F02938188.jpg

20071208_delong_micro.jpg I think that there is a policy moral here. Most of the macroeconomic disaster scenarios I have been painting over the past five years had domestic construction spending falling before exports began rising rapidly. We do seem to have dodged that bullet completely.

God does indeed look after fools, children, and the United States of America...

December 28, 2007

Rainy Grey Afternoon Female Vocalist Blogging

20071208_delong_micro.jpg Rainy grey afternoons are so rare around here, they must be savored appropriately:

Rilo Kiley, "Silver Lining":

Bonnie Raitt, "Angel from Montgomery"

Alison Brown, "Angel"

Liz Phair, "Divorce Song":

links for 2007-12-29

A Burning Question Answered!

Many of us have asked over the years: "Was David Ignatius always the clueless ignorant dweeeb he is today?"

The answer is now clear: the answer is "yes":

The Legacy of Benazir Bhutto: by David Ignatius Friday, December 28, 2007; A21: Try to imagine a young Pakistani woman bounding into the newsroom of the Harvard Crimson in the early 1970s and banging out stories about college sports teams with the passion of a cub reporter. That was the first glimpse some of us had of Benazir Bhutto. We had no idea she was Pakistani political royalty...

Why oh why can't we have a better press corps?

Technological Progress

From http://blog.gadgetlite.com/: 1 Gigabyte in 1987 and 2007:

7304CE0A-5A03-4408-BEB2-BF2008961306.jpg

DeLong Smackdown Watch...

20071208_delong_micro.jpg Surely there must be more things worthy of being immortalized in the DeLong Smackdown Watch, mustn't there? Anybody have any favorites? Anybody? Anybody? Bueller?


DeLong Smackdown Watch archives:

Grasping Reality with Both Hands: Economist Brad DeLong's Semi-Daily Journal: DeLong Smackdown Watch: From D-Squared Digest: The unique Daniel Davies writes:

D-squared Digest -- FOR bigger pies and shorter hours and AGAINST more or less everything else: This is such a big heap of partisan right-wing bullshit that there must be a pony in there somewhere! Just before this slips down the grating; Brad DeLong waves the waggy finger of disapproval at anyone who slurs Milton Friedman's name...


Grasping Reality with Both Hands: Economist Brad DeLong's Semi-Daily Journal: Mendacious Wacko of the Right Nominated as Undersecretary--DeLong Smackdown Watch: I was saying that James K. Glassman--author of Dow 36000 and now Undersecretary of State-Designate--was the worst of the mendacious wackos of the financial right in the late 1990s. "No, no, no," somebody said. "George Gilder was the worst." Others agreed. They are right...


Grasping Reality with Both Hands: Economist Brad DeLong's Semi-Daily Journal: DeLong Smackdown Watch: Brad Setser: Brad Setser agrees with Jeff Faux that China's exports to the United States must be cut--but for very different reasons:

Brad Setser: DeLong’s position – that the US needs to position itself as a friend of China’s economic development -- is an appealing one. But it is also one that I suspect glosses over some big issues...


Grasping Reality with Both Hands: Economist Brad DeLong's Semi-Daily Journal: DeLong Smackdown Watch: Dani Rodrik Strikes Back: The learned and thoughtful Dani Rodrik has a good response. He writes:

Dani Rodrik's weblog: What's different about international trade?: UPDATE: Brad DeLong does not express my views accurately...


Semi-Daily Journal Archive: DeLong Smackdown Watch...: Why oh why haven't I been reading Blake Hounshell regularly?

Whither Free Trade? - American Footprints: Brad DeLong scoffs at Jacob Weisberg's contention that "free trade is the real election casualty." The good professor says:

Normally, these days, Republican presidents are better on free trade than Democratic presidents. But George W. Bush is not a "normal" president. WCI is right that the appropriate response of other countries to Weisberg's spin is "hollow laughter."

But this is dodging the question...


Semi-Daily Journal Archive: DeLong Smackdown Watch! ("Are My Methods Unsound?" Edition): Matthew Yglesias demonstrates that he is Il Maestro di Color che Sanno as far as quotes from "Apocalypse Now" are concerned:

Health Care as Opportunity | TPMCafe: An interesting perspective from Brad DeLong.... Brad steals a page from my book, quoting "Apocalypse Now" to describe the Bush approach to public policy, but he mangles the lines. Willard says, "They told me that you had gone totally insane, and that your methods were unsound." Kurtz asks: "Are my methods unsound?" And Willard replies: "I don't see any method at all, sir." (They're surrounded by deep-jungle tribespeople, decapitated heads on sticks, all sorts of corpses, etc.) I think that about sums it up.

In comments, Robert Waldmann piles on as well. Clearly I need to buy a DVD of "Apocalypse Now" if I'm going to run with big dogs...


Brad DeLong's Website: DeLong Smackdown Watch: Julian Sanchez gives an effective critique of (i) DeLong's version of preference utilitarianism and of (ii) attempts to figure out how to implement it by asking people what makes them happy.

Notes from the Lounge: No problem, say the utilitarian theorists (and economists), we'll switch to preference utilitarianism, wherein "utility" or "happiness" are defined in terms of the satisfaction of preferences. This has the virtue of realigning the object of maximization with what people subjectively value, which makes for a sturdier fact/value bridge. It has the disadvantage of making it much less clear whether that appealingly simple maximizing structure is still a good fit for the task. Even rendering the very different forms of satisfaction and dissatisfaction people are capable of feeling comparable seemed a bit of a stretch. (How many of the bon vivant's wild nights on the town does it take to equal the same amount of "utility" in the monk's serene satisfaction in a day of contemplation?) Preferences over states of the world that need not be experience by the subject who prefers them make things a much bigger tangle. And should we think it's better for people to have more (and more intense) preferences, so that more of them can be satisfied? But I digress.

DeLong's problem seems to be that he's using this second, preference-based sense of "happiness." But this isn't the colloquial sense of the word.... DeLong is like a Ptolemaic astronomer who... [claims] the proposition that the earth revolves around the sun... [is the same as] the absurd proposition that the earth doesn't exist, since "the earth" is defined as the thing at the center of the universe...


Brad DeLong's Website: DeLong Smackdown Watch: A correspondent writes, challenging my claims about the Stupidest People Alive. I confess that I was in error:

Brad DeLong, you are a fool. Donald Luskin's claim to the "Stupidest Man Alive" crown cannot be shaken...


Grasping Reality with Both Hands: Economist Brad DeLong's Semi-Daily Journal: DeLong Smackdown Watch: Doug Elmendorf on the Subprime Meltdown: Hoisted from Comments: Doug Elmendorf writes:

Brad DeLong--Economics Only: What Is to Be Done? (About the Subprime Meltdown, That Is): Thanks for linking to my notes. I think you misunderstand my point #5, where the key word is "federal." Ned Gramlich pointed out that half of subprime mortgages in 2005 were issued by mortgage companies chartered and supervised by the states (compared with essentially no prime mortgages), and that the problem mortgages are heavily concentrated in that sector. He concluded in his book that all mortgage lenders should be covered by a federal supervisor. Others have argued that federal supervision is important for the Fed's ability to restore liquidity to these institutions.

However, in Ned's Jackson Hole remarks, he said that the same regulatory end might be achieved by collaboration among federal and state supervisors, which was already underway...

Calculated Risk on New Home Sales

Calculated Risk writes:

Calculated Risk: More on New Home Sales: Let's start with revisions. This month (November) is one of the few months were the initial report wasn't higher than the previous month. Usually the small reported gain in sales is then revised away in subsequent releases.... [T]he Census Bureau revised down sales for August, September and October. This has been the pattern for most of the housing bust; almost all the revisions have been down. I believe the Census Bureau is doing a good job, but the users of the data need to understand what is happening (during down trends, the Census Bureau initially overestimates sales)....

This graph shows New Home Sales vs. Recession for the last 35 years. New Home sales were falling prior to every recession, with the exception of the business investment led recession of 2001. This is what we call Cliff Diving! And this shows why so many economists are concerned about a possible consumer led recession - possibly starting right now...

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It's Not a Lecture: If I Were a Congressional Staffer...

David Wescott writes:

It's Not a Lecture: If I were a congressional staffer...

...the bits of data I'd give the Senator tomorrow would probably include the following:

Home forclosures rose 68 percent in November from the previous November.... Because the US savings rate is so low, people have been relying on their houses as a source of wealth and equity. When adjustable rate mortgages reset, wages remained relatively stagnant, and other costs (like healthcare) continued to rise, people lost their houses. That's a financial and emotional hit that most people won't ever forget.

[Editorial intrusion: foreclosures have risen from a rate of 1.5 million a year last year--about 2.5% of homes being foreclosed upon in a year--to 2.5 milliion a year--about 4% of homes being foreclosed upon in a year--this year. Mortgage resets are proceeding at a pace of about 2 million a year.]

20 million Americans will use credit cards to pay for home heating this winter. This is obviously a double-whammy. Energy costs are up - frankly, due to demand more than anything else - and people don't have the available cash to make up the difference. This cash flow issue (probably caused by higher mortgage and rent costs, higher health care costs, and stagnant wages) will effectively increase home heating costs by up to 20 percent when you consider interest carried over a few months...

More Americans will have catastrophic health expenses in 2008. Nearly 1 in 4 Americans under the age of 65 live in a family that will spend more than 10 percent of that family's pre-tax income on health expenses. More than 80 percent of these people have health insurance. This sounds like a health statistic, but it's unquestionably an "economic indicator" in my book...

[The better statistic for the senator, I think, is "17.8 million non-elderly Americans—-more than three-quarters of whom have health insurance—-are in families that will spend more than 25 percent of their pre-tax income on health care costs in 2008.]

My Most Recent Email

In response to an editorial query:

[D]do you think there's a possibility
of working on it over the next few days?

I reply:

Yes, definitely, but not right now--I have a bad cold, and am feeling miserable in bed. Coherent thought and writing is not possible...

20071208_delong_micro.jpg Blogging, however, appears to still be very possible. I wonder what that shows...

John Scalzi Gets Medieval on MSNBC!!

Downright shrill, in fact:

Why We’re All Going to Hell, Part 54,302: A multi-billionaire industrialist donates 97% of his fortune to help fund clean water in Africa, education for blind children, and housing for the mentally ill, and it’s presented by one of the largest news organizations in the world in terms of what it means for Paris Hilton...

Why oh why can't we have a better press corps?

Josh Micah Marshall and Paul Krugman Have a Request

Josh writes:

Talking Points Memo: The leading Dem candidates for president appear to be in a pitched battle to make the most craven and insipid uses of the Bhutto assassination for immediate political advantage. A true horse race.

Paul writes:

Its not about you: To all the presidential campaigns trying to claim that the atrocity in Pakistan somehow proves that they have the right candidate — please stop.

This isn’t about you; in fact, as far as I can tell, it isn’t about America. It’s about the fact that Pakistan is a very messed-up place. This has very bad consequences for us, but it’s hard to see what, if anything, it says about US policy.

If you’re a tough guy (or gal) who believes in exerting US power — never mind, there are just too many heavily armed people in Pakistan for anyone but Norman Podhoretz to believe that we could throw our weight around. If you believe you can bring new understanding to the world through your enlightened outlook — sorry, there are too many people in Pakistan who don’t want to be enlightened. If you believe that we’d have more influence in the world if we hadn’t squandered our resources and good will in Iraq (which I do) — well, sorry, that influence wouldn’t extend to being able to bring peace and light to Pakistan.

This isn’t about us, and it’s out of our control.

Felix Salmon's First Golden Book of Collateralized Debt Obligations

20071208_delong_micro.jpg You see, children, it is very important to understand the differences in the correlation matrixes generated by an amalgamation of BBB bonds that are BBB because of idiosyncratic risk generated by individual local real estate markets, and the correlation matrixes generated by an amalgamation of BBB bonds that are BBB because they themselves are derived securities and hence subject not to local real estate market idiosyncratic risk but instead to the systematic risk that the whole industry will find itself past the second bend in the toilet. The first can be diversified away via the law of large numbers. The second cannot.

Felix Salmon writes:

Explaining CDOs, Overcollateralization Edition - Finance Blog - Felix Salmon - Market Movers - Portfolio.com: [W]hat happened over the past few years was that demand for those AAA-rated CDO tranches went through the roof, and it became harder and harder to find a nice diverse universe of BBB-rated bonds to throw into the cauldron. As a result, the ingredients getting thrown into the cauldron started getting less and less diverse, until it reached the point that all, or nearly all, of them were, in some way or another, ultimately reliant on subprime mortgage payments....

Now remember Fred? He was fourth or fifth in line for subprime mortgage payments, holding a BBB-rated security. And although a triple-B rating is indeed "investment grade", it turns out that Fred's investment wasn't a very good one. The default rate on subprime bonds spiked much more than anybody anticipated, and Fred, standing as he was at the back of the queue, ended up with no money at all.

Now that... would be bad for Fred if he had held on to his bond. But he didn't: he simply turned around and sold it to a CDO which was desperate for BBB-rated paper. As did Frank, and Fergus, and Fraser, and even Ferdinand, whom you might think would have been a bit more bullish. All of them bought BBB-rated subprime debt, and all of them sold it to a CDO, which reckoned that since it was buying lots of different bonds from all over the country, it was thereby diversified.

Oops.

It would be churlish to point out that the fact that one should be extremely leery of arguments that diversification radically improves the safety of bond investments was well known back by Edgar L. Smith and others back in 1923.

The Housing Price-Rent Ratio

Paul Krugman writes:

http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/12/28/housing-how-far-is-down/: [T]he housing-rent ratio... [is] comparable to the PE ratio on stocks... it fluctuated in a relatively narrow range until this decade, then took off for the wild blue yonder.... [I]s there any fundamental reason why this ratio shouldn’t go back to historical norms?...

Well, one thing has changed: interest rates, including mortgage rates, are lower, in large part because of huge capital inflows from China and other countries.... But is this enough to justify prices anywhere near current levels? I don’t think so — for three reasons. First, the math doesn’t work.... Second, the average is misleading... in “flatland”, where new housing can easily be built, real prices never rose much; the big rises have come in the “zoned zone,” where land and permits are constrained — and those rises... make no sense even given a maximum allowance for interest rates. Third, we won’t always get lots of free money from China.

So I come down to the view that the price-rental ratio will have to move most if not all the way back to historical norms. And that’s a long, long way down...

"A long, long way down" means, I think, "a fifty percent fall along the coasts."

I would cut that in half for two reasons: not 50% but 25% along the coasts, and much less in the interior. First, the likelihood that savings interested in being invested in the secure-property U.S. will be ample over the next generation is high: we will sell political risk insurance to foreign individuals and governments for quite a while yet. So real interest rates are likely to be lower in the past. Second, the zoned zone is not growing--and America's population still is. The gap between heartland and coastal values is likely to grow over time, and that anticipated capital gain should push up prices now.

Why Oh Why Can't We Have a Better Press Corps? (Elisabeth Bumiller/Robert Dallek/New York Times Edition)

More low comedy from the New York Times this morning, picked up by Scott Lemieux and Matthew Yglesias, who give their snark muscles a power workout by mocking Elisabeth Bumiller and Robert Dallek.

Here is Yglesias:

Fun With Antecedents: By the same token, if earth's yellow sun gave me the powers of a kryptonian, I'd be a super hero. If my blog had Engadget's traffic, I'd be the most popular political blogger. If George Bush could breath underwater, he'd be a fish...

Here is Lemieux:

And If The Devil Rays Win the Next 18 World Series, Their Reputation as an Organization Will Be Greatly Enhanced: Uh, yeah. And if I discover a way of powering cars entirely with oxygen, emitting a vapor that would result in the immediate killing of cockroaches and paralysis in the hands of every Hollywood producer about to sign a contract with Joel Schumacher and Uwe Boll, my reputation as a world-class scientist would be greatly enhanced. I'm reminded of nothing so much as David Adesnik's suggestion that Bush signal his commitment to a rational foreign policy by appointing Dick Lugar...

They are talking about this, from Robert Dallek's review of Elisabeth Bumiller's Condi Rice biography:

Condoleezza Rice: An American Life - Elisabeth Bumiller: Ms. Bumiller understands that Ms. Rice’s place in history will rest... on her record in the Bush administration. And “with 18 months left in office,” Ms. Bumiller wrote as she finished her book, “it was still too early to come to definite conclusions.”... Ms. Bumiller says that if President Bush and Ms. Rice can produce a settlement in the Middle East between Israelis and Palestinians and an end to North Korea’s nuclear program, it would give them claims on success that would significantly improve their historical reputations...

Lemieux says more:

Lawyers, Guns and Money: And If The Devil Rays Win the Next 18 World Series, Their Reputation as an Organization Will Be Greatly Enhanced: [N]othing signals a Must To Avoid more than a positive book review that describes an unreadable book. Such is the case with Robert Dallek's review of a new book about Condi Rice by official Bush administration mash note writer Elisabeth Bumiller. Apparently, we're meant to think that the fact that the book makes no judgments and contains no interesting analysis of Rice's tenure as Secretary of State is a feature, not a bug...

20071208_delong_micro.jpg I by contrast, was struck by the striking disjunction between what happens when you start reading Dallek's review from the beginning:

Condoleezza Rice: An American Life - Elisabeth Bumiller: The writer of contemporary history is like the man with his nose pressed against the mirror trying to see his whole body, Arnold Toynbee cautioned. Yet whatever their limitations, books about prominent sitting officials are irresistible, partly driven by an insatiable public appetite for gossip about public figures and an interest in understanding and judging them.... More important, these first drafts of history are indispensable assets... capture... the tone and mood of the day.... Elisabeth Bumiller’s biography of Condoleezza Rice is an excellent case... 10 interviews with Ms. Rice and 150 with other people... a compelling portrait of the country’s first black female secretary of state... its absence of finger pointing or polemics... scrupulously fair.... In Ms. Bumiller’s rendering Ms. Rice is neither hero nor villain but an ambitious woman whose achievements and shortcomings speak for themselves.... Ms. Bumiller refuses to offer any decisive judgments on Ms. Rice’s performance...

and what happens when you start reading Dallek's review backward, from the end:

Condoleezza Rice: An American Life - Elisabeth Bumiller: Ultimately Ms. Bumiller’s book will be seen not just as a discussion of Ms. Rice’s role in shaping one administration’s missteps in foreign affairs but also as a cautionary tale about the gap between ambitious presidential appointees and their unwillingness to speak truth to power.

Inevitably Ms. Rice will be compared to previous national security advisers and secretaries of state, notably Henry Kissinger. Judging from Ms. Bumiller’s account, Ms. Rice, like Mr. Kissinger, was driven more by ambition for high station than fidelity to international realities. Mr. Kissinger’s loyalty to President Richard M. Nixon and Ms. Rice’s to President Bush made them as much political operatives ingratiating themselves with their respective presidents as detached foreign policy analysts serving the national well-being.

“Some of Rice’s friends,” Ms. Bumiller writes, “were stunned that she actually seemed to believe Bush’s argument in the final days of the war buildup that a liberated Iraq could spread freedom across the Middle East.” Ms. Rice also believed that “the postwar phase would be like the successful occupation of Germany after World War II, and that it would be possible to plant democracy in a shattered Iraq.” Either Ms. Rice knew less than she should have about pre- and post-1945 German history, or she was carried away by false optimism.

By the start of the invasion in March 2003, the Rice of early 2000, who had published an article in Foreign Affairs decrying the Clinton administration’s “moral impulse to spread American democracy,” had morphed into a forceful public advocate of bringing down Saddam Hussein, whom she pictured as intent on acquiring nuclear weapons that could lead to “a mushroom cloud” over the United States...

It is still unclear to me--and I have talked to her about this--whether Elisabeth Bumiller that that her mash notes to the Bush administration were what she was supposed to do as a White House correspondent, or understood that she was not doing the job the New York Times's readers had hired her to do but was too much of a coward to do it.

It is clear to me that Robert Dallek understands what the job the readers of the New York Times have hired him to do is--read backwards, the review is pretty good and informative. But that's not the review Dallek writes. Instead, he puts what he thinks are the most important things he has to say at the end of the newspaper story, where they are least likely to be read, and stuffs the most-read beginning with fluff: "indispensable asset... excellent case... a compelling portrait... scrupulously fair.... In Ms. Bumiller’s rendering Ms. Rice is neither hero nor villain but an ambitious woman whose achievements and shortcomings speak for themselves..."

Robert Dallek is simply a coward.

December 27, 2007

links for 2007-12-28

December 26, 2007

links for 2007-12-27

Presenting National Review's Weblog About Jonah Goldberg's "Liberal Fascism"

The book variously called Liberal Fascism: The Secret History of the American Left, From Mussolini to the Politics of Meaning, Liberal Fascism: The Totalitarian Temptation From Hegel to Whole Foods, and Liberal Fascism: The Totalitarian Temptation from Mussolini to Hillary Clinton has a weblog.

Here is the weblog, in its entirety:

Liberal Fascism on National Review Online:

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Monday, December 17, 2007

A third one  

Here's the third

12/17 10:49 AM


Another Entry

here's another

12/17 10:48 AM


First Post Title     First Post Text

12/17 10:09 AM

Santa Clause Did Not Come to Felix Salmon This Year

So Felix Salmon needs a visit from the html markup wysiwyg fairy:

felixsalmon.com: — Merry Christmas Bleg: Merry Christmas to you. As for me, all I want for Christmas is...

...a very simple WYSIWYG HTML editor. Why can't I find one?

I spend most of my days writing blog entries.... If I really wanted to, I could hand-code all this stuff in a text editor – well, all of it except the tables, anyway, where a WYSIWYG editor is invaluable. But I'm not the kind of geek who loves to look at code: I'm much happier looking at something which more or less resembles what it is I'm trying to write. Plus hand-coding hyperlinks is always a bore, and I'm perfectly happy to leave it to my HTML editor to remember what all my special characters are in HTML.

Then, once it's written, I want to be able to copy and paste the raw HTML into a web interface in order to publish it. How hard can that be?

I have tried out a few HTML editors. Some, like MarsEdit, are ridiculously bare-bones: they're basically text editors with blog-publishing features. Others are designed for people putting together complicated websites, and are great at creating stylesheets and beautiful pages and whatnot, but are really bad at generating ultrasimple HTML. Others, like KompoZer and GoodPage, also fall short of what I want. SeaMonkey is not even close.... I use ecto quite a lot, and I like it.... But... you can't create a table in it, and it has an incredibly annoying habit of slapping an http:// onto the beginning of anything you put in a hyperlink, even if you don't want one there.

Now there is a program which does everything I want: it's called Dreamweaver, it costs $400, and it also does a gazillion things I don't want. But is there some other app I can use without going down the ridiculously-overspecced Dreamweaver road?

20071208_delong_micro.jpg I say that MarsEdit http://marsedit.com/ in Markdown mode http://daringfireball.net/projects/markdown/ hits the sweet spot here...

And surely Conde Nast has a site license for Dreamweaver?

Ed Glaeser on Ha-Joon Chang

Ed writes:

Those Who Do Not Know the Past - December 26, 2007 - The New York Sun: Mr. Chang alleges, with scant evidence, that [America and Britain] grew great because of these tariff barriers.... Mr. Chang... argues that since rich countries have public ownership and deficits, it is rank hypocrisy for us to try to forbid them to the poor. An alternative view is that economists shouldn't be required to endorse the worst policies of their own countries. While it is easy to quibble with some of Mr. Chang's more bizarre statements about American political history, such as his claim that "slavery was not a