Lessons from the History of the Cold War: Comment at the Berkeley Tom Schelling Symposium

I had thought that this session was not supposed to be the scary stuff...

I want to challenge Bob Powell's characterization of the Cold War, and to make the optimistic case that the coming of nuclear weapons does herald an age of relative global peace. I want to do this not because I believe it but because I think it is an important position that should be out on the table. The position goes roughly like this:

During the High Cold War both sides thought that they were playing for the future of humanity. Believing Communists thought that history was on their side--but only if the global bourgeoisie could be prevented from destroying the homelands of socialism with fire and sword and killing the activists and agitators who could teach the proletarians their destiny. Believing westerners saw Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism-Maoism as a totalitarian ideology that could only survive by
destroying the fortresses of freedom. For both sides, risks of annihilation were worth running because only thus could the opponent's military power be frozen.

But since the end of the High Cold War we are no longer playing for the future of humanity. The gains are not proportional to even a small risk of nuclear destruction. Is it worth running the risk of nuclear destruction on order to change the language of the mayor of Strasbourg? What is at stake in the Balkans that is worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier?

In short, we are now in the world that Norman Angell falsely thought he lived in a century ago--the one in which the domestic political
advantages and the benefits to the nation from brinkmanship that risks general war are too small for anyone sane to undertake. When we
faculty squabble over the lunch check, nobody pulls out a bomb and says: "Give in! Or this thing might go off!"

I think this optimistic Norman-Angell-with-nuclear-weapons point of view is wrong, but I am not sure why it is wrong, and I would like
some enlightenment.

Comments

[Nathan Myers]

It's wrong in that it only awaits a lunatic of the order of (say) Donald Rumsfeld or John McCain to achieve a position that allows a unilateral choice to use a nuclear weapon. The worlds has no shortage of lunatics, and no shortage of lunatics in positions of autocratic power. It only lacks lunatics in positions of autocratic power who actually control nuclear weapons and who happen to perceive some sort of local advantage in using them.

It may be likened to the Drake Equation. The numbers have no predictive value.

Thus far the lunatics have found the threat more productive than the use (two times excepted). Non-lunatics are obliged to try to make that finding evident to all the sufficiently equipped lunatics.

[Doctor Jay]

There is an advantage to be had by being "irrational". A common negotiating ploy is to is to take an irrational position and repeat it loudly and frequently enough and people will start thinking that they are the ones being unreasonable.

In the same way, some advantage can be gained through sheer obstinacy. Thus brinksmanship, and the threat of nuclear escalation. This makes chest beaters twice as dangerous, because of the thought "they would never nuke us over it."
This is why having "irrational" actors, such as terrorists, with access to nukes is such a problem. But it cuts both ways.

[burritoboy]

"Norman Angell falsely thought he lived in a century ago--the one in which the domestic political
advantages and the benefits to the nation from brinkmanship that risks general war are too small for anyone sane to undertake."

Er, but that's precisely the problem with thinking that what was hoped for a century ago is actually present today. Why did that stability and peace of 1908 (or 2008) fall apart? We have to begin by admitting that irrationality can sometimes be generated from within more reasonable systems. 1908's system was reliant upon several things which cemented the states of that time together (in 1908: nationalism, capitalism moderated by social spending, "scientific" racisms, etc), but which were at least somewhat irrational.

[bigTom]

Let us just look at the example of our Global War On Terror. Wasn't this just some folks taking exception to our meddling in the middle east. Yet many highly placed people over here are selling (believing?) the GWOT is an absolute struggle of good versus evil. And then we see where societies at war often create justification by throwing religion into the mix. Add religion, and small disputes can take on cosmic importance. Whats a few mushroom clouds when you are doing gods bidding?

[Bloix]

"both sides thought they were playing for the future of humanity"

This is a very peculiar characterization of the beliefs and goals of leaders like Nixon, Kissinger, Brezhnev, and Andropov, all of whom were much more interested in traditional Great Power politics than in the future of humanity.

In the bipolar post-war world, all geopolitical conflicts were drawn into the East-West confrontation. Therefore, nuclear weapons could not be used against any potential enemy without risking a superpower exchange that would destroy the world. However, because the Soviet Union greatly overmatched the US in conventional forces in Europe, the US nuclear arsenal could not be dismantled because it was needed to deter a Soviet invasion of Europe without maintaining a large conventional army there. The same rationale applied to the defense of South Korea and Japan. The US never renounced first strike capabality, precisely because the whole point of the US arsenal was to provide the ability to strike first in the event of a conventional invasion of Europe.

But the internal logic of the arms race produced a much larger nuclear force than necessary for these strategic purposes. No genuine nuclear war was contemplated against the Soviet Union or China, and the growth of the nuclear arsenals made accidents more likely while reducing freedom of movement outside of the key European and north Asian theaters. If the nuclear threat could be neutralized, conventional warfare elsewhere could proceed apace. Henry Kissinger understood this. Therefore he negotiated the ABM and SALT treaties, in order to make the world safe for war.

With the demise of the Soviet Union, the US now has leaders who believe that nuclear weapons can be used for strategic purposes without risk of a global conflagration. Just as we used nukes militarily to terminate World War II, the thinking goes, we can use them against other enemies. If the US chooses to nuke Iran, will Russia or China retaliate by using nuclear weapons against the United States? Of course they won't. Since the risk of mutually assured destruction no longer exists, nukes can and should be used, the thinking goes, to maintain US dominance as the world's only superpower.

[Carmel]

Cast in terms of North Korea but actually generic:

Where deterrence optimists argue that North Korea easily establishes deterrence credibility for its vital interests, a [Schelling] diplomatic process approach is concerned that North Korean deterrence of more probable US attacks, like attacks on nuclear capabilities, is more difficult than deterrence of unlikely attacks, like a US or coalition invasion. Deterrence of the more likely attacks may need to be made credible. Schelling argues that threats can be made credible by relinquishing the initiative, commitment, or by a “threat that leaves something to chance.” North Korea can relinquish the initiative by maintaining sufficient forces around potential targets so that any US attack must necessarily be large. North Korea can increase the credibility of its threats by commitments that put its national honor and reputation at stake. Finally, it can take actions that increase the risk that a war limited to particular attacks, like attacks on nuclear capabilities, will become a general war. It might test a nuclear weapon or make a demonstration shot; if possible, increase the alert level of nuclear capabilities; or move troops toward the DMZ. North Korea would hope that the US or other countries would perceive that the situation was slipping out of control and that the US would back off or be induced by other countries to do so.

Thus, there is a significant tension between deterrence optimists and diplomatic process perspectives. Deterrence optimists argue that deterrence is easily established and stable because other countries are fearful of nuclear retaliation. In contrast, [Schelling] diplomatic process argues that it is easy for North Korea to deter the least likely threat, an invasion with the intent of occupation by the coalition, but more difficult to dissuade with nuclear capabilities alone the US from attacking North Korea’s nuclear capabilities because the US may not be convinced that North Korea would retaliate with its surviving nuclear capabilities. North Korea can bolster its deterrence in ways that are not especially provocative, like stationing troops near its nuclear capabilities, but it may also commit provocative acts to convince the US and others that the threat of nuclear war is real and the US should act with care. Where deterrence optimists expect inaction, diplomatic process foresees the possibility of action in an attempt to avoid war that precipitates the war North Korea is attempting to deter.

[walkingtheline]

Kenneth Waltz has been saying this since the 1970s. His two seminal works are "Man, the State and War" and "A Theory of International Relations". The first is excellent by any measure. The second is excellent if you happen to like political theory.

Strange that conservatives emphasize the importance of deterrence at the first image (no gun control!) yet are terrified by it on the third.

[M. Carey]

One of the problems is- Norman Angel was actually "correct". it WAS stupid and irrational to have a big war in the early 1900's. Everybody sees that now. The other problem was - nobody really thought that they WOULD have a "big" war. On both sides, they said "Home by Christmas". Reminds one of "30,00 troops by September".

[Juan Jose Saenz]

Brad, not all agents are playing the same game. Remember the article "The new liberal imperialism", by Robert Cooper? It can be read here: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/apr/07/1

[Kelly]

I give you Norman as quoted by Lewis Lapham in Harpers:

"(Norman) Podhoretz asked a number of momentous
questions that could as easily
have occurred to Lieutenant General
Kuribayashi:
"Could World War II have been
won by Britain and the United
States if the two countries did not
have it in them to firebomb Dresden
and nuke Hiroshima and Nagasaki?"
"What if liberal democracies have
now evolved to a point where they
can no longer wage war effectively
because they have achieved a level
of humanitarian concern for others
that dwarfs any really cold-eyed pursuit
of their own national interests?"
"And as for the United States,
what if we have every tool at our disposal
to win a war-every weapons
system we could want manned by
the most superbly trained military
in history-except the ability to
match or exceed our antagonists in ruthlessness?"

[Jack]

I guess the problematic assumption is that leaders will be sane in their worldviews and, consequently, what, if anything, is worth destroying all or much of the world.
There are grades, I think, of irrationality here that are possible. For instance, it would be the rational thing for the U.S. to take a diplomatic, accomodationist stance towards other states and especially emerging world powers as that will reduce the likelihood of future conflicts with states likely to have the power to challenge us and our interests. But, for some, what I just wrote amounts to no more than a Munich-style appeasement policy. And so for such inviduals conflict is inevitable, so we might as well engage in it now while we have the military leverage. This may stop short of nuclear war, but at least the possibility of such a war becomes more prominent.
And some would go further and say that we need to recognize the evil in this world (if not what the root causes of it might be) and not shrink from our task to destroy it. This evil not only has interests contrary to our national interests, but is something greater are more threatening--it is an affront to humanity.
And then there are those that are convinced that such an evil is a necessary aspect of this world--not that there might be evil out there, but that there must be--and the only appropriate response to this metaphysical fact is a constant preparedness to engage in combat, as, again, evil is not to be negotiated with. There will always be evil until, of course, the world ends. And if we must end the world to destroy evil, then that is our duty.
Such people truly are insane, and, unfortunately, make up a large constituency of the Republican Party. (And, of course, they are in other parts of the world as well).
If any of this is true, than so much the worse for Norman Angell.

[Sam Penrose]

The problem is that even a "small" exchange of nuclear weapons is likely to devastate the planet, and there are many military men in a dozen or more countries who think that having the ability to initiate a "small" exchange of nuclear weapons will bring them power and prestige. The wonderful Richard Rhodes has spent a chunk of his life on this issue, for his most recent thoughts (and an important warning/call for help), see:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WYS1_7jgHaI