Robert Waldmann Speculates on Basra and Sadr City

This makes more sense than anything else I have seen:

Robert's Stochastic Thoughts: Glanz and Rubin note "many Iraqis have recently speculated, Mr. Sadr's stock has recently fallen in Iranian eyes."... Still I note the extreme similarity of the position of the Mahdi army and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Neither denounces or resists the exercise of Iraqi sovereign authority in Basra. Each denounces and opposes the same in Sadr city. Ambassador Qumi went on to denounce fighting in Sadr City:

Strikingly, however, Ambassador Qumi simultaneously condemned American-led operations against the Mahdi Army in the Shiite enclave of Sadr City, where major new clashes broke out on Saturday. He said the American-backed fighting in that densely populated district was causing only civilian casualties rather than achieving any positive result.

>>"The American insistence on coming and having a siege on a couple of million people in one area and striking them with warplanes and shelling them randomly -- many innocent people will be killed through this operation," Mr. Qumi said. "The result of this operation will be the sabotage and destruction of buildings, and many people will leave their homes."

The events in Basra, in contrast with the Mahdi Army's continued fighting in Sadr City, renewed questions about where the Sadrist movement stands in Iraq's unstable political landscape.

Glanz and Rubin note that, given the extreme closeness of the Iranian and Iraqi governments, it is very likely that Iran approved the Basra offensive including the initial unsuccessful Basra offensive

Because leaders of the council and its armed wing spent years and sometimes decades in exile in Iran during Saddam Hussein's regime, it was assumed that the silence of the Badr Organization during the Basra offensive indicated that Iran had given at least tacit approval for the move.

In fact, IIRC al Sadr didn't denounce it immediately but just warned that they Iraqi government forces better not mess with the Mahdi army.

That would leave criminal gangs and Fadhila as targets of the offensive. On March 26 Michael Kamber and James Glanz wrote in The New York Times

In the weeks leading up to the operation, Iraqi officials indicated that part of the operation would be aimed at the Fadhila groups, who are widely believed to be in control of Basra's lucrative port operations and other parts of the city. The ports have been plagued by corruption, draining revenue that could flow to the central and local governments. But the operation also threatens the Mahdi Army's strongholds in Basra.

This suggests an alternative interpretation of recent events (put your tinfoil hat on).

There was an agreement between the people who count in Iraq -- al Hakim, al Sadr, al Maliki, al Sistani and Khameini -- to do something about Fadhila. al Maliki and al Hakim tried to use the operation to weaken the Mahdi army too. Their representatives were called to Qom and called to order by the head of the Martyrs Brigade of the Revolutionary Guard. A second try at a reasonable operation in Basra in which only anti-Iranian militias will be disarmed is in course (this would mean UK soldiers just went into the field to support Iran in an Iran vs UK proxy war without understanding what was going on).

However, al Maliki and al Hakim are still making trouble in Sadr city. Iran and al Sadr firmly warn them to stick to the plan. This would make al Mahdi's threat not bluster to hide his weakness, but a reminder of an agreement: "If you do not stop we will announce a war until liberation."

The day's events would still be good news. The difference is really a difference in guesses about what role Iran sees for the Mahdi army. In any case, it would be good if Iran could prevent their many allies in Iraq from fighting each other. I don't like the idea of a major role for al Sadr but, hey, al Hakim and al Mailiki are almost equally horrible.

As for the possibility of an Iraq genuinely independent of Iran, well, I am willing to speculate, but not to fantasize.

Comments

[Bruce Wilder]

I don't know anything about Iraq, beyond what I see on TeeVee and read on the Internets. I have listened to some, who, it appears, know lots of the details of the intrigues and complexities of Iraqi politics. And, I am inclined to think that knowing more detail about the chaos of Iraqi politics is like knowing more detail about the weather: it doesn't help predict anything.

In predicting the weather, a few broad generalizations and simple rules get just about all the predictive accuracy that is available.

In the Game of Iraq, the prize is control of an Iraqi state, in control of the oil. The key to controlling an Iraqi state is two-fold: control of the capital and control of the port at Basra.

The U.S. occupation prevents the on-going civil war from reaching for a resolution for two reasons: 1.) massive expenditure by the U.S. in Iraq sustains the economy -- practically the whole Iraqi GDP can be attributed to U.S. expenditure; 2.) the U.S. military won't let any party to the civil war crush any other party. So, the economic pressure to resolve control of the state is belayed, and no one really knows the strength and resiliency of the other contenders for power.

For the Shiites, disorganized and disunited, there are two competing strategies, revolving around the goals of Shiite-domination of the prospective Iraqi state. The Dawa/ISCI strategy is a majority of a majority strategy -- organize a Shiite core, which can command the loyalty of all the Shiites and organize Shiite domination of the whole Iraqi state (or at least the non-Kurdish part). Sadr's Mehdi Army gets to play the odd man out -- powerless minority of the majority in this drama, but Sadr has a counter-strategy: "nationalism" in the form of a willingness ally himself with the alienated Sunni's.

The Sunni's are a minority, but they have ruled in Iraq; they are capable, and their alienated position focuses their minds. What the Sunni's no longer have is physical access to the keys to an Iraqi State: they have no way on the ground to take control of the capital or Basra. Sadr has demonstrated, rather dramatically, that he does have both capabilities: Sadr is in good local position to bid for control of both the capital and Basra. Sadr is advertising his availability at a time of increasing Sunni restlessness. He's signalling to the Sunnis that he's an available strategic partner, with essential requisites for seizing control of the Iraqi state.

Sadr can play this one of two ways. He can use his value to the Sunnis as a "nationalist" leader, as a way to improve his bargaining position within the Shiite coalition -- to become a more senior member of the majority of a majority calling the shots, by leveraging the threat to go elsewhere against the Dawa/ISCI desire to marginalize Sadr in the powerless minority of the majority.

For Sadr, the immediate strategic problem is credibility. Can a Shiite sheep like Sadr be crazy enough to invite the Sunni wolf inside the door? And, the long-term problem, assuming that Sadr, in the up-coming elections, does not gain enough to make himself a senior member of the majority controlling the majority Shiites, is whether he really does want to gamble with a Sunni alliance.

The "writing on the wall" being a local invention, I imagine the Iraqis are well-aware that the U.S. will leave, and probably quite precipitously (within a six-month frame starting sometime in 2009). All sides are struggling to accumulate resources against the day, when civil war can start in earnest. al-Maliki and Hakim, being the government, have some advantages in accumulating these resources -- particularly their ability to capture both U.S. and oil-stream revenues and sock them away. But, being the government also has disadvantages, as incumbency during an occupation breeds contempt and illegitimacy.

If Sadr does not get what he wants with the Shiite coalition, he will have to choose whether to throw in with the Sunnis. For a while, he may believe it is sufficient to build his own legitimacy among Shiites alienated by the government. I doubt that he has what it would take to ride the Sunni tiger, without getting eaten. But, he's young and may not know that; and, other Shiites may not know that Sadr does not know just how dangerous a ride it would be.

That's how the Iraqi "weather" looks from the blurry satellite photos I get from occasional news articles.

[gordon]

Waldmann: "As for the possibility of an Iraq genuinely independent of Iran, well, I am willing to speculate, but not to fantasize".

What are the chances of an Iraq independent of the USA?

[vt codger]

***What are the chances of an Iraq independent of the USA?*** That's what al Sadr wants. It's what I want. It's what the majority of the American people seem to want. Come November, why don't we clean house, fire the bunch of crazies running this country, and let al Sadr, al Sistani, the Iranians, and anyone else willing to try, clean up the incredible shambles we have created?

[Robert Waldmann]

I think that al Sadr will not be able to ally with the Sunni's. He has certainly tried this. During the campaign to re-re-retake Fallujah (after the lynching of the 4 security contractors) goods were collected at Shi'ite mosques in Sadr city and taken in a convoy towards Fallujah (stopped by the US army). This was one of the events which breiftly made me hope for Iraq (happens off an on total of one month of hope so far). Later (IIRC) al Sadr presented himself as an intermediary offering to negotiate with the Sunni insurgents based on their common aim of a schedule for US withdrawal (hey they agree with the vast majority of the US public too bad we don't count).

The problem is that Iraqi Sunni's must know that they need an alliance with al Sadr as much as they need a hole in the head -- literally -- his guys have drilled holes in too many Sunni heads for his strategy to work.

I think that Iraq will be genuinely free from the USA in the not so distant future. The people united can never be defeated, and the people of the USA are getting close to being united in support of getting the hell out of Iraq.

[bigTom]

vt: Funny thing, it's also what I want. But we Murricans are hung up on symbolic nonsense. This would be considered as a loss, and Americans cannot stomach that word. So rather than cut our losses, and lick our wounds, we are likely to vote in another fool and try to muddle on.

[p.wilmington]

I find Cockburn, Fiske and Cole to be far better sources.

Here are links to Cockburn and cole:

http://counterpunch.org/patrick04192008.html

http://www.juancole.com/

[Daniel]

I doubt any long term alliance between Sadr and Sunnis, but there may be a short term tactical alliance, either explicit, or, more likely, tacit. Both Sadr and the Sunnis want Iraq not to be an Iranian satellite. Hakim and the U.S., for God (or maybe Allah) knows what reason want the Iranians on top. In any case, there is bound to be a showdown between Hakim and Sadr, as a coalition is unlikely.

[Daniel]

I doubt any long term alliance between Sadr and Sunnis, but there may be a short term tactical alliance, either explicit, or, more likely, tacit. Both Sadr and the Sunnis want Iraq not to be an Iranian satellite. Hakim and the U.S., for God (or maybe Allah) knows what reason want the Iranians on top. In any case, there is bound to be a showdown between Hakim and Sadr, as a coalition is unlikely.

[p.wilmington]

From www.juancole.com today:

"Kudos to James Glanz and Alissa Rubin of the NYT for getting the story! They point out that the US and Iran are on the same side in southern Iraq, both fearful of the nativist Sadr movement. This correct narrative is completely the opposite of what Americans have been spoon fed on television and by Bush / Pentagon spokesmen. I had pointed out this Bush- Iran convergence last week and also pointed out that US intelligence analysis admits it. The article is the first one I have seen to say that Iran supports al-Hakim's ISCI in its bid to create a Shiite superprovince in Iraq's south. I've never been able to discover what the Iranians feel about this and had wondered if they weren't at least a little bit worried about a soft partition of Iraq because of its implications for Iranian Kurdistan, which might become restive and seek to join Iraqi Kurdistan. But it is plausible that Tehran might risk this scenario in order to gain a permanent regional ally in the form of the Shiite Regional Government in southern Iraq."