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Posts from May 2008

May 18, 2008

Ezra Klein Calls for the Total and Immediate Removal of America's Mainstream Political News Media

Makes sense to me:

Ezra Klein: A campaign without the 'gotchas': Gore was seen, in 2000, as a condescending, exaggeration-prone prig. But in the ensuing years, he stepped out of campaign journalism. He began sending his speeches out directly over MoveOn.org's e-mail list, made a movie that asked people to sit down and listen to him for the better part of two hours, and did his rounds on interview shows on which he could have fairly lengthy conversations with hosts.

The result? A massive rehabilitation of his reputation, including in the eyes of the very political pundits who once spurned him.... Ask those pundits about the new Gore, of course, and they will sigh and search the heavens and moan that, oh, if he had only been this way when he was in politics, how different it all could have been. But he was.... He was a substantive global-warming obsessive with a penchant for long disquisitions on meaty topics.... [H]is pipeline to the public was a gaffe-hungry media looking for ways to humiliate him, that didn't turn out so well. When he was able to speak directly to the public, those traits were considerably more attractive....

The problems for the media are structural.... [T]he shows are really run as a type of soap opera. Campaigns become ongoing stories with a cast of characters and a history that can be referred back to. That requires the daily construction of a story line. Characters need definition and catchphrases and frailties... clips that can be easily and endlessly replayed to remind viewers of what they're watching and what happened in past episodes... the media hunger for out-of-character gaffes and missteps -- those moments are crucial to the business model.

But politicians increasingly have alternatives.... And now the campaigns of Obama and McCain are broaching the idea of Lincoln-Douglas-style debates -- a series of unmoderated debates that would leverage the public interest in the campaign to force the media to cover debates without imposing their own narrative or needs on the structure. It's campaigning as politicians, rather than the media, would have it. Weird as it sounds, that might be better for the process. And, for the candidates, it certainly sounds like more fun.

Not just the TV shows: the campaign coverage of the newspapers and magazines as well.

Why oh why can't we have a better press corps?

"Fundamental Weighting" and Indexing

Joseph Nocera reviews the bidding:

Passions Run High on Indexing: the Financial Analysts Journal... letters the magazine published in its March/April issue. André Perold, a finance professor at Harvard Business School, had written an article in a previous issue criticizing a new kind of financial product called fundamentally weighted indexes, which have been devised in large part by a man named Robert D. Arnott. Mr. Arnott is the chairman of Research Affiliates, a six-year-old company that markets and licenses such funds — and he’s also the former editor of The Financial Analysts Journal. “André Perold’s article in the November/December 2007 issue entitled ‘Fundamentally Flawed Indexing’ might have been better titled, ‘A Fundamentally Flawed Critique,’ ” steamed Mr. Arnott, in a letter jointly written with the Nobel laureate, Harry Markowitz, who is one of his consultants.

Mr. Perold quickly shot back (“This characterization is completely inaccurate.”), as did several other participants in the debate. It reminded me of the good old days at The New York Review of Books, when authors would spend issues on end cagily insulting each other in the letters page. There is nothing quite like an old-fashioned academic cat fight....

At its core, the fight is about whether fundamentally weighted indexes — which, unlike traditional index funds, don’t rely on market capitalization to “weight” a stock in an index — are superior to old-fashioned index funds, which allow investors to invest in such broad market indexes as the Standard & Poor’s 500 or the Russell 2000.

Obviously, Mr. Arnott thinks the answer is a resounding yes; so convinced is he that he is onto something big that he’s trying to patent his methodology. Mr. Schwab, Mr. Markowitz and Jeremy Siegel, the Wharton economist who serves as a consultant and spokesman for Mr. Arnott’s chief competitor, Wisdom Tree Investments, are all in this camp.... Critics include Mr. Bogle — who helped create the original index fund — Mr. Malkiel, Mr. Perold (who is a Vanguard director), and Clifford Asness, the co-founder of AQR, a big quantitative hedge fund.... I came away thinking they’ve both got a point....

A traditional index fund is a mirror of the market. The Vanguard 500 Index Fund, for instance, replicates the stocks in the Standard & Poor’s 500... larger market capitalizations have a larger weighting in the index than stocks with smaller market caps. Investors who use index funds (and everyone should!) do so in part because their costs are so low... but also because they have learned the essential futility of trying to beat the market....

But that doesn’t mean the stock market is completely efficient.... On any given day, some stocks are overvalued while others are undervalued.... Thus, back in 1999, when Cisco Systems had, absurdly, the largest market capitalization in the world, it also had the biggest weighting in the Vanguard 500 Index Fund.... Indeed, it was the Internet bubble that really gave impetus to fundamental indexing. “I remember George Keane, the founder of the Commonfund, saying to me that there has to be a better way to index,” Mr. Arnott told me the other day. “We have people investing tens of billions of dollars in index funds and they are getting drawn into bubbles.” Mr. Arnott continued: “It was very clear what was wrong with the index was that the weight was linked to the price. If the price was wrong the weight was wrong.”...

When you talk to Mr. Arnott — as well as Mr. Siegel, speaking for Wisdom Tree — about why fundamental indexing seems to beat the market, at least on an historical basis, they offer several theories. One is that, by using a company’s fundamental measures to weight the stocks, their indexes are eliminating all the “noise” surrounding individual stocks that can cause them to become over or under valued.

Secondly... they are, in effect, tilting their weighting toward value stocks and away from growth stocks....

The real point of contention, however — and the reason this matters to investors — is that Mr. Arnott and Mr. Siegel make it sound as if their new indexing strategy is so far superior to traditional indexing that investors should abandon the latter for the former.... “It is not indexing,” insists Mr. Bogle. “It is a form of asset allocation, or active management strategy. It is being oversold as something it is not.”... According to Mr. Bogle, Mr. Arnott and the Wisdom Tree folks are trying to do what all active managers do: beat the market. And sometimes they will, and sometimes they won’t. But they are not going to match the market because their funds are not, ultimately, trying to replicate the market the way a cap-weighted index fund does...

The argument for indexing is that the average investor will receive the average return. Divide investors into four groups: (i) passive investors, (ii) active investors who know more than the average active investor, (iii) active investors who know less than the average active investor but think they know more, and (iv) active investors who know less than the average active investor and think they know less. Group (i) should index: they will receive the average return on average--and indexing is the way to do this with the least risk. Group m(iv) should index as well: if they don't index, they are the fools in the market--and they know enough to know that they are the fools. Group (ii) profit from their knowledge, inasmuch as group (iii) and those of (iv) who don't act on their knowledge of their own ignorance are their lawful prey--but everybody who thinks that he or she is in group (ii) should ponder hard whether he or she is in fact in group (iii) instead.

"Fundamental indexing" is a form of (ii): those who engage in it are active investors, and their informational edge--the thing they know that the average active investor doesn't--is that there are enough noise traders of group (iii) out there in the market that book or earnings or other fundamental weighting factors provide an easy way to take on the role of the house in the casino that is the stock market.

This is, I think, true--until there comes a day when there are enough investors following fundamental-indexation strategies that they become part of the least-informed half of active investors.

Little Brothers: Panel on David Brin's "The Transparent Society": Thursday May 22 Omni New Haven 3-5 PM George A&B

Thursday afternoon in New Haven, CT, I am on a panel to talk about David Brin's decade-old book The Transparent Society: Will Technology Force Us to Choose Between Privacy and Freedom? at the 2008 Computers, Freedom, and Privacy conference: http://www.cfp2008.org/wiki/index.php/%22The_Transparent_Society:%22_Ten_Years_Later.

Omni New Haven Hotel at Yale
155 Temple Street
New Haven, Connecticut 06510
Phone: (203) 772-6664 or (800) 843-6664.
Fax: (203) 974-6777
Web site: http://www.omnihotels.com/FindAHotel/NewHavenYale/MeetingFacilities/CFP2008ComputersFreedomandPrivacyConference5.aspx

David Brin, Alan Davidson, J. Bradford DeLong, A. Michael Froomkin, Stephanie Perrin, Zephyr Teachout

Here are posts from the past, hoisted from the archives:


Lots of Little Brothers:

Not Just Big Brother, But Lots of Little Brothers Too...: Archive Entry From Brad DeLong's Webjournal: My father is jolted by his new issue of Reason:

The latest issue of Reason magazine arrived in the mail, and the cover causes a jolt. It is an aerial photo of my neighborhood, with my house circled and the legend underneath: "James DeLong: They Know Where You Are!"

But then he calms down:

The accompanying story has a rather different spin, though. Written by Declan McCullagh, chief political correspondent for News.com and keeper of the well-known politech email list, it is entitled "Database Nation: The upside of 'zero privacy.'" The theme is that the increasing availability of data is excellent news for all of us in many ways, primarily because of the increases in efficiency and choice in the provision of goods and services that are enabled by information.

After all, if you think that a counterparty's possessing too much information about you is not to your benefit, you can always hide your identity in some way--undertake a transaction through intermediaries, establish cover identities via forgery and using them to set up PayPal accounts and anonymized email addresses, make sure to only use public-access computers out of the range of spycams, et cetera.

And he concludes:

As for the jolt of surprise -- my address has been in the telephone book forever, so anyone with a map and a crayon could always do what Reason did. My feeling of a loss of privacy is actually rather illusory.

I don't have settled (or especially informed) views on this, Dad. But I wonder if your first reaction might not have been more accurate. It takes 20 seconds to find and circle a house with a telephone book, a map, and a crayon--at $10 an hour total cost for low-wage labor, that's six cents an address. Very few people will have an incentive to organize and analyze their data on you at that cost. Those whom you want to send you magazines every month will, but how many others. I think we do have to worry about how governments--future Stasis--will use computers. And there are additional (but far lesser) potential vulnerabilities: weaknesses of the will at the personal or household level that might be exploited. One reason Ann Marie and I never let the kids watch Saturday morning cartoons was that we didn't want to be eroded by advertising-induced waves of pressure for X or Y. We hang up on all telephone solicitations immediately because we know our vulnerability to persuasion too well. And once enough people out there have figured out who we are, our internet wire transmits information both ways.

The way Larry Summers put it was that he wants everybody in the world to know that trying to sell him golf stuff is a waste of time, but that he might well bite if offered tennis stuff. But at the same time he's profoundly uneasy about negotiating with or interacting with somebody who knows and has had plenty of time to think about every detail about all of his purchases for the past twenty years.

Sometimes what look like quantitative changes--the falling cost of information processing--make qualitative differences. This may or may not be one of them. But it may be time to start thinking about how one would live in a world in which every conversation (even informal ones with close family members) may be broadcast around the world.

Useful Comments:

Isn't the kind of privacy we're concerned about losing here a very modern development? I spent a couple of years living in a village in a developing country, and everyone knew everything about everyone else. The universe of people local enough to be interesting was small enough that any tidbit of information: an unusual purchase, a change in routine... anything, was synthesized quickly into a coherent narrative that got passed around to everyone in the village. If you wanted to do something privately, you had to literally keep it a secret -- do it behind closed doors without in any way signalling publically that there was anything untoward going on. This certainly sounds annoying from a modern American point of view, but it really wasn't all that unlivable once you got used to it, and it's how people have lived since the dawn of history. The anonymity we're used to, being able to do things publically that we would prefer our acquaintances to remain unaware of by relying on the difficulty of compiling the huge amount of public information out there, is very new, probably post-WW II for most Americans. What are the ill effects we expect from losing it? Posted by: LizardBreath on May 16, 2004 08:23 AM

For those who missed it, medical privacy in the US is apparently at an end (see http://www.medicalprivacycoalition.org/). I have no idea whether the situation is similar here in Canada, though I should. "The Justice Department now states that patients "no longer possess a reasonable expectation that their histories will remain completely confidential," adding that federal law "does not recognize a physician-patient privilege."" Posted by: Tom Slee on May 16, 2004 08:24 AM

Suddenly, monitoring and information processing is cheap, and so, potentially, control is cheap. The "ethics" of a society/polity in which monitoring/information processing was expensive no longer apply. Listing your phone number in a phone directory no longer has the same implications. The penalty for, say, speeding on the freeway, which is appropriate, when the police can only observe and cite, say, one in 4,000 speeders, is not going to be appropriate when the police can cite one in 50, or one in 5. The ACLU approach, which is a reactionary attempt to prevent use of cheaper monitoring to do what corporations and governments will do, is hopeless and misguided. Misguided because it stands in the way of desirable increases in technical efficiency and productivity; hopeless because you cannot stop a force of nature. I suspect the solution is the "empowerment" of the individual by the same technology. Concealment of a kind is made cheaper by the same technology, which makes monitoring cheaper. by: Brian Wilder on May 16, 2004 09:43 AM

"In the greatest surveillance effort ever established, the US National Security Agency (NSA) has created a global spy system, codename ECHELON, which captures and analyzes virtually every phone call, fax, email and telex message sent anywhere in the world. ECHELON is controlled by the NSA and is operated in conjunction with the Government Communications Head Quarters (GCHQ) of England, the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) of Canada, the Australian Defense Security Directorate (DSD), and the General Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) of New Zealand. These organizations are bound together under a secret 1948 agreement, UKUSA, whose terms and text remain under wraps even today." http://fly.hiwaay.net/~pspoole/echelon.html "An international surveillance network established by the National Security Agency and British intelligence services has come under scrutiny in recent weeks, as lawmakers in the United States question whether the network, known as Echelon, could be used to monitor American citizens. The House Committee on Intelligence requested that the National Security Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency provide a detailed report to Congress explaining what legal standards they use to monitor the conversations, transmissions and activities of American citizens." http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/99/05/cyber/articles/27network.html Connect the dots: ECHELON --->BUSH --->ENEMY COMBATANT. We've got nothing to worry about though. Right? Right??? Posted by: Dubblblind on May 16, 2004 10:51 AM

"The biggest threat to our society, he warns, is that surveillance technology will be used by too few people not by too many." Brin does not strike me as someone who has a realistic view of human psychology. His claim is basically that with good enough surveillance tech, everyone has the potential to survey and monitor everyone else so might as well dump privacy to practically eliminate crime, government oppression, etc. As far as I can see this is quite a silly view. We will combine the worst aspects of small villages with the worst aspects of big societies. In a small village everyone knows what everyone else is doing. This produces community but also an often rather straitjacketed conformity. In a big city you lose some of that community but you can also more easily escape the busybodies who try to enforce conformity. In an urban surveillance society, on the other hand, you start to get some nasty social dynamics. Because while it may be easy to COLLECT certain forms of information, it is not so easy to ANALYZE and USE the masses of data that result. In interpersonal affairs this would be a victory for moralists and busybodies. There will be enough of them to immediately tie any "deviant" behavior to an individual and make it public. But the elimination of privacy would not magically bring tolerance for the nonconformists. You will get a "small town" conformity effect enforced not by community rumor but by a small minority of people driven by enough moralistic outrage to spend lots of their time observing others. This observation will be directed disproportionately at deviants. Unlike a real small town where people know about everyone, there will be relatively few people interested in processing the information about your typical average, boring person and then disseminating it where it can do the most damage. A similar thing applies to the government, but with a difference in technological expertise and capabilities. Frankly the internet and advancing personal surveillance tech do not and will not give citizens some magical capability to observe the government. You won't even be able to use your mini-cameras to catch cops beating people in jail if they use the simple expedient of removing such devices from suspects. It's not like you're going to be able to set up webcams in NSA headquarters either. I certainly don't see how it would do anything about the potential for intelligence abuses - collecting information on dissidents and threatening to use that against them. Indeed, they can sit back and relax while that information is collected for them and the public demands that something be done about the undesirables. We're a society that doesn't watch CSPAN or support real investigative reporting. How the heck would there be enough people to do the difficult and mostly-boring job of collecting lots of amateur intelligence about their own government? Hell no, we're far more interested in gossip about each other and in enforcing conformity, that's where virtually all of the energy will go. Posted by: Ian Montgomerie on May 16, 2004 12:16 PM

DeLong's aware of Brin's ideas on this subject. He reviewed Brin's "The Transparent Society" soon after its publication: http://www.j-bradford-delong.net/Econ_Articles/Reviews/Transparent.html I'm moderately ashamed to say that I haven't read Transparent Society, despite having read most of Brin's fiction, and having been exposed to his basic thoughts on privacy and transparency in lite form there. Posted by: RT on May 16, 2004 02:30 PM

I had a recent experience that relates to the issue of privacy, albeit peripherally. Bear with me and go easy on the flames if you feel that this is irrelevant: "I got a call from someone at the Ford Motor Company Credit department concerning someone whose name I did not recognize. I assumed that this person (let's call him Joe Blow, although I forgot his real name) had listed me or someone whose name was similar to mine as a credit reference and FMC was calling to check up on him. I didn't want to screw the guy's chances of getting credit because a mistake was made, so I called FMC (during my workday, because the time difference necessitated it). It turns out this was not a credit check gone wrong, but instead Mr. Blow was my upstairs neighbor at the apartment complex I lived in, and the FMC representative started to ask me a number of questions about him. No, I had never met him. No, I had never seen a black Mustang in the garage where I park. And no, there is no way that I would relay a message to him. Actually, I regret saying no to that last one. I should have said yes, then asked how much I would be paid to work as a paid agent of the Ford Motor Company Credit Division, and whether they would insure me if Joe Blow took umbrage at the messenger of bad news and beat the shit out of me." I guess all this is to say that I think that private corporations will be as blithely unconcerned as the government about the privacy (and safety) of others, and will eagerly enlist unrelated parties to do their dirty work. Yes, what the government can do to you is generally worse than what corporations can do to you (at least here in the U.S.), but the experience was far creepier than any I have had with any governmental agent. Posted by: no name on May 16, 2004 03:21 PM

I spent Saturday afternoon with my eight year old son on a tour or Jet Propulsion Labs in Pasadena. I have a friend who works there (Cal (BS) '82 MIT (PhD) '85); it was the annual open house to the public and science exhibitions for children. He showed my son and his daughters around. The highlights were the kids lying down and having a six-wheeled robot truck drive over them; and, looking as the 42" flat panel screen hanging on the wall outside my friend's office and moving a mouse to zoom in on an image of the Western United States, then California, then Southern California, then Los Angeles County, then Jet Propulsion Labs, then over to my neighborhood, then to my street. I'm told they can get a lot closer with a lot better resolution. My friend is now mapping the rain forests to track deforestation using radar technology to make maps and pictures. Posted by: Cal on May 16, 2004 10:13 PM


Book Review:

David Brin (1998), The Transparent Society, (New York: Addison-Wesley: 020132802X): For perhaps two centuries people living in today's advanced industrial societies have had a modicum of privacy. Before two centuries ago, privacy was nearly unheard-of: you lived in a village where everyone knew everyone else and everyone else's business. Between two centuries ago and the present, people moved out of the village and out to a--relatively isolated--farm, or into a city where the sheer number of people made relative anonymity--and thus privacy--possible. But, at least according to David Brin, the future will be different. In the future privacy as we know it today will be nearly impossible to attain.

In the future privacy will be next to nonexistent because of the explosion of audiovisual, communications, and computer technologies. Cheap hard disks will allow people to collect massive information about transactions: who did what. Cheap cameras will allow people to collect massive amounts of information about locations: who was where. Cheap computer power will allow the sorting and searching of massive amounts of information in search of those nuggets of data relevant to any one particular person. And cheap computers will allow anyone--or anyone with access codes--to access what will essentially become the stored life history of anyone. From David Brin's perspective, this change is coming. The only question is who will have access to the information that will be contained in the great surveillance databases. Will the information be "secret" and "private"--in which case only governments which may turn thuggish will have access? Or will the information be "open" and "public"--in which case we will once again be back in the village, where nearly everything is done in public and everybody knows everybody else's business: truly a global village.

Brin makes a good case that the technology will bring us to one of these two outcomes. And he argues that the first outcome--in which we try to preserve our "privacy" by restricting access to the great surveillance databases--is a very dangerous outcome. It is a dangerous outcome because secret knowledge is power, and if the twentieth century has proven anything it is that governments cannot be trusted with secret knowledge. The great tyrannies of the twentieth century flourished because their surveillance gave them control and their secrecy kept enough citizens from realizing what they were up to fast enough. The advent of modern audiovisual, communications, and computing technologies greatly amplifies the power of surveillance, and greatly multiplies the danger if it is not countered by a greatly amplified power of the people to survey the government. And popular surveillance over the government carries as a side effect a potential loss of privacy. Anything that restricts popular access to information about other citizens restricts popular access to information about the government as well.

I believe that Brin's book is not necessarily an accurate forecast. The futures that he envisions will probably never come to pass. And the choice that he foresees may well never be posed in the stark form in which he poses it. Yet the book is useful: the future Brin envisions is clearly one of the possible futures that might come to pass, and the consequences of what he sees as the wrong choice in that possible future could turn the twenty-first century into an abattoir that would make the twentieth century look like a Sunday picnic.

If enough people read Brin's book, or are brushed by the currents of thought in represents, then it may turn into a self-negating prophecy: a warning of dystopia that by virtue of the horror it paints helps avoid that horror. That was the function of George Orwell's 1984. That is an honorable role for anyone's book.Book Review:

David Brin (1998), The Transparent Society, (New York: Addison-Wesley: 020132802X): For perhaps two centuries people living in today's advanced industrial societies have had a modicum of privacy. Before two centuries ago, privacy was nearly unheard-of: you lived in a village where everyone knew everyone else and everyone else's business. Between two centuries ago and the present, people moved out of the village and out to a--relatively isolated--farm, or into a city where the sheer number of people made relative anonymity--and thus privacy--possible. But, at least according to David Brin, the future will be different. In the future privacy as we know it today will be nearly impossible to attain.

In the future privacy will be next to nonexistent because of the explosion of audiovisual, communications, and computer technologies. Cheap hard disks will allow people to collect massive information about transactions: who did what. Cheap cameras will allow people to collect massive amounts of information about locations: who was where. Cheap computer power will allow the sorting and searching of massive amounts of information in search of those nuggets of data relevant to any one particular person. And cheap computers will allow anyone--or anyone with access codes--to access what will essentially become the stored life history of anyone. From David Brin's perspective, this change is coming. The only question is who will have access to the information that will be contained in the great surveillance databases. Will the information be "secret" and "private"--in which case only governments which may turn thuggish will have access? Or will the information be "open" and "public"--in which case we will once again be back in the village, where nearly everything is done in public and everybody knows everybody else's business: truly a global village.

Brin makes a good case that the technology will bring us to one of these two outcomes. And he argues that the first outcome--in which we try to preserve our "privacy" by restricting access to the great surveillance databases--is a very dangerous outcome. It is a dangerous outcome because secret knowledge is power, and if the twentieth century has proven anything it is that governments cannot be trusted with secret knowledge. The great tyrannies of the twentieth century flourished because their surveillance gave them control and their secrecy kept enough citizens from realizing what they were up to fast enough. The advent of modern audiovisual, communications, and computing technologies greatly amplifies the power of surveillance, and greatly multiplies the danger if it is not countered by a greatly amplified power of the people to survey the government. And popular surveillance over the government carries as a side effect a potential loss of privacy. Anything that restricts popular access to information about other citizens restricts popular access to information about the government as well.

I believe that Brin's book is not necessarily an accurate forecast. The futures that he envisions will probably never come to pass. And the choice that he foresees may well never be posed in the stark form in which he poses it. Yet the book is useful: the future Brin envisions is clearly one of the possible futures that might come to pass, and the consequences of what he sees as the wrong choice in that possible future could turn the twenty-first century into an abattoir that would make the twentieth century look like a Sunday picnic.

If enough people read Brin's book, or are brushed by the currents of thought in represents, then it may turn into a self-negating prophecy: a warning of dystopia that by virtue of the horror it paints helps avoid that horror. That was the function of George Orwell's 1984. That is an honorable role for anyone's book.

May 17, 2008

links for 2008-05-18

P.Z. Myers on the Platypus

P.Z. Myers says that the platypus is a fine animal--it has just been pushed around by different evolutionary pressures over the past 160 million years than have modern mammals, reptiles, and birds. I say that the platypus is an otter gone horribly wrong:

Pharyngula: The platypus genome: Every organism is going to be a mix of conserved, primitive characters and evolutionary novelties — a mouse is just as "weird" as a platypus from an evolutionary perspective, since each is the product of processes that promote divergence from a common ancestor, and each are equidistant from that ancestor.... [M]odern echidnas, elephants, and emus are all products of different evolutionary trajectories through history, and no one by itself is a representative of the ancestral condition. We derive the ancestral state by comparison of multiple lineages... [this] adds another lineage to the [genomic] data set, one that diverged from ours over 160 million years ago. It is a lens that helps us see what novelties arose in that 160 million year window....

So what are the details that we've learned from the platypus? One important message is the unity of life. The platypus has about 18,000 genes; humans have 18-20,000 genes. Roughly 82% of the platypus genes are shared between monotremes, marsupials, eutherians, birds, and reptiles....

An interesting specialization in the platypus is the evolution of venoms. The platypus has small, sharp spurs on its hindlimbs that it uses to inject defensive poisons into predators, a very unusual feature not found in other mammals. Where did these venoms come from? As it turns out, by duplication of genes that have other functions, with subsequent divergence, and many of these genes also come from the innate immune system. In particular, there are a set of proteins called the β-defensins... the bullets of the immune system; they can bind to viral coat proteins, they can punch holes in bacterial membranes.... The platypus has repurposed these genes, making copies that have been selected for more effective toxicity when injected into other animals.

One very cool observation is that these are also the same proteins used in venomous reptiles... two distant relatives, the lepidosaurs and the monotremes, all use β-defensin derived venoms. Does this imply that their last common ancestor also used these venoms? No, and this is where the details are important. Venomous snakes and the platypus have different duplications of the β-defensin genes... these are independently derived features, not primitive at all... convergent evolution....

One virtue of the platypus is that it provides a relatively closely related outgroup to help tie together, and give perspective on, the various mammalian genome projects. It's all part of the big picture in defining what a mammal is...

Philippe Sands on John Yoo's Torture Memo and Berkeley Law School Dean Chris Edley

Over here: http://delong.typepad.com/the_torture_memo/2008/05/philippe-sand-1.html.

Here is a taste of what Philippe Sands has to say. He is reassured that his conclusions "have not been challenged":

VF Daily: Guantanamo Update: A New York Times editorial described [John] Yoo’s continued employment at Berkeley as “inexplicable”, and this seems to have stung the Dean at that law school, Chris Edley, into explaining the limited options available to him.... I have less sympathy... for Dean Edley’s assertion that:

no argument about what [Yoo] did or didn’t facilitate, or about his special obligations as an attorney, makes his conduct morally equivalent to that of his nominal clients, Secretary Rumsfeld, et al., or comparable to the conduct of interrogators distant in time, rank and place...

[L]awyers play a crucial role, as gatekeepers of legality.... When the lawyers bend... cross a line... ethics violations... criminal violations.... I was told that, under their rules of criminal law, “the lawyer has the same responsibility as the interrogator,” and that, when it comes to torture authorized by a lawyer, “the lawyer who gives such legal advice is not [treated] as an accomplice, it is as though he is the author"...

Why Mike Huckabee Will Never Be President, or Vice President

Hoisted from Comments: Political Economy Major "Concentrations" at Berkeley

The highly-intelligent and industrious David Guarino writes:

Hoisted from Comments: David Guarino: Berkeley Political Economy "Concentrations": A few practical constraints from an "on the ground" perspective worth noting:

  1. The fleeting accuracy of course names: While the content of Econ 100B will rarely fluctuate beyond the relative weight given to short/medium-term and long-term/growth models, this is exceedingly the exception in PEIS spectrum. Much to my (pleasant) surprise, "Rhetoric of Social Science" the semester I took it turned out to be more a genealogy of Marxist approaches to economics since the school's namesake than anything else. This means the average PEIS student can rarely predict what combination of Dept names and 3-digit numbers fit within his or her thematic constraints in a given semester. This is to say nothing of the regularity (or lack thereof) of the offered classes.

  2. The shadow of regimes past: The advising staff has traditionally not accepted geographic concentrations, and many of the examples you've given appear to me to be just that. Not to say that I disagree with the notion; indeed, it may be the best "narrowing" mechanism to eventually lead to a thesis topic. BUT, you must recognize this would represent an implicit regime shift among the advising staff and likely for many of the major's stakeholders (at the very least whoever pushed for geography being insufficient in the first place).

  3. The frantic irrationality of a first-week student: Let's admit it, the vast majority of undergrads choose classes based on a few main considerations: to what degree the major forces one to take it, one's first impression of a professor, what time it's at, and how interesting the material seems. In my experience, most also select in this order. It's a simple iterated optimization game for people, with the major imposing most of the constraints.

My major point (no pun) is that most students just improvise their way through it all, and to a large degree this is what PEIS is about: lower bureaucratic constraints so that intellectual utility might be more fully optimized; the flexibility to take that one Agricultural Econ class that won't ever be offered again and not have to stay a ninth semester because they let you work it into your concentration. The primary problem is this leads to thoroughly confused students - even exceedingly dedicated ones - come senior year.

All this is to say concentrations in PEIS really cannot be planned. They arise from the strange iterated game mentioned already. And that fact must be recognized, if not actively encouraged as the norm. The major should be an exploration, with each stage (lower div's, core methods, concentration, thesis) progressively narrowing in scope. Perhaps more focus ought to be given to how each stage really contributes to the student's own ability to further narrow, through increasing exposure to the methodologies he or she is interested in applying to a specific problem.

(End rant)

As a comment on my:

The "Concentration" requirement in Berkeley's Political Economy major is meant to give students the opportunity to deepen their understanding of the nature of the relationship between politics and economics as it relates to a particular issue. You are graduating with a Political Economy degree. That means you know a little about each of history, sociology, political science, economics, possibly philosophy, rhetoric, anthropology, geography or other disciplines as well. You should know a lot about something. the Concentration requirement forces you to define that something.

Each student chooses an existing or potential issue or problem in political economy, and takes four courses bearing on that issue or problem. The courses need to inform the student's study of the Concentration topic. In a better world than this, the Concentration requirement would also include a senior honors thesis on some aspect of the Concentration topic.

The key to the Concentration requirement is that it is your own: the Concentration is self-defined. You must develop a topic that is an existing or potential issue or problem in political economy. You then choose four courses to inform inform your view and increase your knowledge. Select courses from different departments. Note that courses listed in the PEIS Student Handbook will automatically be approved for appropriate concentration topics--but courses not listed in the handbook can be taken for the concentration: all you have to do is make the case that it is appropriate for the concentration. And, of course, no double dipping: courses taken for your concentration cannot be double-counted towards another major requirement.

Here are fifteen sample recent concentrations. Note that these are not the best possible courses offered at some Platonic Ideal of Berkeley for this concentration--these are real-world courses that students can actually get into and take...

New York Times Death Spiral Watch (Tom Friedman Edition)

It's plummeting fast something awful...

Abu Muqawama watches the approaching wreck:

abu muqawama: Future TV: Did Tom Friedman really just describe Future TV as "progressive"? Really? Progressive in, uh, what way? Because it has the word "future" in its name?

Abu Muqawama thought Hizbollah shutting the station down was just as cowardly and thuggish as anyone, but let's be honest -- Future TV and al-Mustaqbal newspaper are sectarian propaganda organs for March 14th and the Hariri family.

Friedman then went on to say that Hizbollah shut down Future TV so that its "propaganda machine could dominate the airwaves." Are you kidding me? Is that the way it works in Lebanon, Tom? Have you been back since 1984? There are only two news stations there now, huh? Did LBC fold up shop and emigrate to France? And are al-Arabiyya and al-Jazeera unavailable?

Stupid stuff like this in the first four paragraphs of a newspaper column is enough to make Abu Muqawama quit reading. So if Friedman said anything smart in the rest of the column, let us know.

Update: Charlie, here. For those of you who enjoy shooting Friedman fish in a barrel (always great sport), be sure to check out this classic review of The World is Flat.

His [Friedman's] description of the early 90s:

The walls had fallen down and the Windows had opened, making the world much flatter than it had ever been--but the age of seamless global communication had not yet dawned.

How the f--- do you open a window in a fallen wall? More to the point, why would you open a window in a fallen wall? Or did the walls somehow fall in such a way that they left the windows floating in place to be opened?

Four hundred and 73 pages of this, folks. Is there no God?

Robert Waldmann on E.J. Dionne (Washington Post Death Spiral Watch)

If the Washington Post is going to survive four more years, it is going to have to train its columnists to fact-check Republicans before they take their word. It's not hard. But it is not done.

Here is Robert Waldmann on E.J. Dionne:

Robert's Stochastic thoughts: The excellent E.J. Dionne has a nice column about Republican panic. He notes, among other things, that the iron party discipline appears to be breaking. Mainly, he interviews Senator Bob Corker (R-Tenn). Corker hints at something very important

And Corker said voters did not believe the Republicans were "solving the major problems," notably guaranteeing Americans health coverage. "We just haven't been responsible," Corker said. "We deserve to be where we are. I hope we right ourselves."

Oh my. That is a Republican senator who just said that he wants to guarantee Americans health coverage. Corker is saying that if the Democrats are looking for a few Republican votes for Cloture on health care reform in 2009, he is ready to deal.

However, I am going to focus on something very unimportant. Corker was the only Republican to win a close race for the Senate in 2006, so he is a natural person to ask what the other Republicans are doing wrong. However, Corker's version of the 2006 Tennessee senate race is totally false.

Yet the national party almost blew the race near the end, Corker said, by running an ad that many saw as racist. The commercial, aired without Corker's knowledge, included a young, blonde, white actress declaring that she had met Ford "at the Playboy party." It ended with her whispering the words: "Harold, call me."

Corker was furious, and not just because his six-point lead melted into a four-point deficit. The party eventually pulled the radioactive ad, and Corker won narrowly.

At the time, lefty bloggers argued that the ad would help Corker, then argued that it had helped Corker. I wasn't following it, but it seems that ABC news agreed with Corker's recent claim that the ad backfired

You can guess the rest.

Hard data, that is polls, show that lefty bloggers were right, that ABC news was clueless and that the excellent E.J. Dionne allowed Corker to lie mislead about recent history by cherry picking two polls, which, in contrast to the overall average of polls, suggest that his support fell when the ad aired.

The ad came out in late October 2006. In September and early October, the polls were almost exactly tied. At the time of the ad controversy, Corker pulled ahead. Then he won. I recall that, at the time, people argued that the shift occurred because Ford confronted Corker at a Corker campaign event and not because of the ad. No one dinied the shift and the coincidence in timing. Two years later an agreed fact has made it down the memory hole.

Here is the report with a graph of polls from Pollster.com

E.J. Dionne should know better than to leave a Republican's fact claim unchecked.

May 16, 2008

links for 2008-05-17

Manna From Heaven for the iPhone!

Hosanna:

Ecamm Network: PhoneView FAQ - Disk mode for the Apple iPhone: Q: What kinds of files can be converted into Notes? A: You can convert text files, rich text files, PDF files, Word files, and HTML files into notes on your iPhone by dragging them into the notes list. See the instructions for details...

A Crisis in Translation from the Classical Greek

Concerning Gryphons is on the case...

After the Examination All Professors Are Sad: A Dialogue About Teaching the Wrong Thing

Akhilleus: You look morose.

Glaukon: It's 99.9F degrees out.

Akhilleus: So you are thinking of Suzanne Vega?

Glaukon: No, the chocolate bar I keep in my backpack has melted all over my backup portable disk drive. But that's not why I am morose.

Akhilleus: So why are you morose then?

Glaukon: Because, looking back over my syllabus this semester, I realized that I spent five full weeks--one third of the semester--teaching them the Solow growth model...

Khelona: It's a fine model...

Glaukon: And yet when the rubber hits the road, it doesn't do us any good. It doesn't tell us anything first-order about the world--aside from post-WWII Japanese convergence from a bouncing-rubble B-29 testfield to a prosperous OECD economy.

Khelona: Actually, I don't think the Solow growth model explains that...

Glaukon: You don't?

Khelona: Post-WWII Japan converged to the OECD norm. And the Solow growth model has some convergence in it--if you start out really poor because your economy's capital stock has been turned into rubble or worse by B-29 strikes, you will grow fast because a low capital stock gives you a high social marginal product of investment and depreciation cannot be a drag on growth if there is no capital to depreciate. But these have always struck me as second- or third-order mechanisms in the story of post-WWII economic growth. Trade. Technology transfer. Institutional reform. The survival of the economic-mobilization components of the fascist Tojo dictatorship. The destruction of the other components of the fascist Tojo dictatorship. The ability of large firms to strike high-productivity bargain with their core workforces by shifting risks onto small-scale producer-suppliers and secondary-sector workers. The neocolonial origins of comparative development--that for Cold War-fighting reasons the U.S. was willing to cut Japan an enormous amount of slack in terms of market access that it was not willing to cut Mexico or Argentina or anyone else outside NATO. You know the story. You know the story better than I do.

Glaukon: Great! So now you've depressed me further--you have gotten me down from one example of the model at work telling us something interesting down to zero.

Zeno: I wouldn't be so depressed. It may be a small step, but it is a step, and steps add up...

Akhilleus: You are the wrong person to say that small steps add up!

Zeno: I have learned how to do limits properly in the past 2400 years...

Khelona: But it does provide a useful service: it is a tractable model that teaches students this mode of thought, and when you apply it to the world it teaches you that--with some caveats--capital accumulation is not the most important thing to study when you focus on growth...

Glaukon: So then why did I spend five weeks on it?

Akhilleus: Ummm... What did you teach, exactly?

Glaukon: This:

  • The Solow growth model: setup, balanced-growth equilibirum, convergence
  • Raw materials and natural resource scarcity in the Solow model
  • Endogenous population growth and the Malthusian equilibrium
  • Transition to modern economic growth: the invention of invention and innovation via the industrial research lab
  • Modes of organizing research and development:
    • State--distributing the R&D for free, and having a central bureaucratic process make the decision about what to work on
    • Nonprofits--distributing the R&D for free, and having a decentralized desire to win the tenure game make the decisions about what to work on
    • Private companies--intellectual property protection and selling the products of R&D, and having profit-seeking companies decide to work on what they can sell
  • The Great Divergence of the world economy from 1850-1975: western Europe and Pacific Asia but not much else have converged, U.S. now 30 times richer than Kenya
  • DeLong and Summers: equipment investment, high marginal product of investment as a reality or as a statistical illusion
  • Post-1975: China and India stand up; Africa falls behind
  • The golden rule and the "optimal" national savings rate
  • From the Solow model to the Ramsey model: more sophisticated takes at optimal savings rates

Khelona: Sounds like a smashing success to me...

Glaukon: But the bottom line is that we don't have good explanations at any deep level for why the U.S. today is and stays 30 times richer than Kenya.

Akhilleus: Or, rather, that we have good explanations but they are historians', political scientists', and sociologists' explanations--not explanations in which a facility with the differential calculus is terribly helpful and thus not explanations instrumentally useful to a sect of academics who want to use their facility with the differential calculus to impose a form of hegemonic domination over social science in general.

Glaukon: And we can say that you will grow fast if you have lots of research and deveiopment--both your own and also do a good job of transferring technology in from outside. But we can't say how much is optimal. Or how it should be organized. Or what legal system should underpin it. We have to decide whether R&D is going to be done by centralized government bureaucracies and freely distributed, by guildmasters working at nonprofits on projects they think of as intellectually interesting and then freely distributed, or by profit-seeking companies with some degree of intellectual property protection giving them monopoly power. But we can't say anything coherent and convincing about what the mix should beand what the degree of intellectual property protection should be.

Akhilleus: But surely there is value in being confused about the issue at a higher and more sophisticated level...

Khelona: I agree: too arrive at the point where you can say that these are the most important issues to think about is a very important achievement...

Thrasymakhos: Especially if it leads immediately to higher funding levels for universities...

James Fallows vs. Vista

James Fallows continues his war against bad hardware and software:

My three computers (MacBook Air saga, cont..):

  1. The sublime elegance of VMWare Fusion... once it was installed, it let me run PC programs and Mac programs side by side, in normal screen windows from which you can cut and paste text back and forth. My cherished PC program Zoot is there in a window right alongside the Mac's Scrivener or DevonThink Pro. And so are Microsoft Outlook and Word 2007. I have learned to be skeptical of the assurance that something "just works." But for me, over three months, Fusion has just worked.... Of course... under Fusion they are actually running on Windows XP, not Vista as on this ThinkPad.... This leads us to the second point for the day:

  2. The bottomless villainy of Vista. I am sure I would not be in the middle of switching platforms now if I hadn't bought a Vista-equipped laptop 15 months ago.... [N]early a year and a half after it went on the market, Vista is still an unbelievable dog (as many senior Microsoft officials knew before it was released.)... 99% of the problem turns on slowness... slow to start up, slow to shut down, slow to detect and connect to wireless networks, slow to get programs like Outlook up and running.... It has taken my Vista/ThinkPad at least eight minutes to come fully to life, to recognize the local wifi network, to become responsive with Outlook, to stop its disk churning.... The MBAair was ready to go in well under one minute....

  3. The willful inelegance of the Mac keyboard.... Whether or not the Mac layout is objectively better or worse than the PC's, it's different, which requires countless small adjustments....

Sooner or later, three more points (including about MBA's battery, operating temperature, and so on)...

Dean Scrimgeour: Monetary Policy Shocks and Commodity Prices...

Macro lunch...

"Is this for or against Jeff Frankel?" "How about orthogonal? As orthogonal as possible..."

  • Barsky and Killian (2001)
  • Barsky and Killian (2004)
  • Frankel (2006)
  • Scrimgeour (2008)
  • Cook and Hahn (1989)
  • Bernanke and Kuttner
  • Kuttner (2001) -- fed funds futures shock...

  • Volatility

  • Recent elevated commodity prices
  • Dornbusch overshooting model--commodity prices as asset prices

Ross Douthat Writes a Truly Terrifying Horror Story

It's about people doing to George W. Bush in the future what others have in the past done to the foreign policy of Teddy Roosevelt:

The Atlantic Online | June 2008 | Redeeming Dubya | Ross Douthat: The national memory often confuses hubris with greatness. That’s good news for George W. Bush: The idea that history might rehabilitate George W. Bush seems too ludicrous to be seriously entertained. His approval ratings have been so low for so long, it’s hard to remember that he was ever popular. The Iraq War, his signal endeavor, has lasted for more years than America’s involvement in the Second World War and seems likely to last longer; a fragile truce in a wrecked, misgoverned country is the best the next president can hope for.

Even many of the president’s ideological allies consider him a failure... a false conservative who betrayed the Reagan legacy... a blunderer... [whp] couldn’t follow through. His liberal foes, whose bill of indictments has swollen to the size of Gravity’s Rainbow, while away the hours until January 2009 by arguing over just how terrible a president he’s been. The worst since Nixon? Since Hoover? Since James Buchanan?...

[N]early every presidential reputation, however tarnished, eventually finds someone willing to defend it.... But something more than partisan apologetics will be needed for his presidency to be remembered as something other than a failure.... George W. Bush will have to win over not only centrists but at least some liberals.... Imagining that these liberals, and others, might be won over again requires two big assumptions. First, assume that the years immediately after Bush leaves office pass without domestic calamity.... The harder assumption... America’s intervention in Iraq eventually needs to come out looking like a success story rather than a folly.

This seems improbable, to put it mildly. But the crucial word here is eventually. The Bush administration has often seemed bent on vindicating, in the short run and by force of arms, Francis Fukuyama’s famous long-term prediction that liberal democracy will ultimately triumph... if the Iraq of 2038 or so is stable, democratic, and at peace with its neighbors, and if American troops have maintained a constant presence in the country--no one should be surprised to hear hawkish liberals as well as conservatives taking up the idea that George W. Bush deserves a great deal of the credit.

I do not mean to suggest that this is a likely outcome, or that it would be a just one. The cost of the Iraq War, in lives and dollars and squandered opportunities, ought to far outweigh the possibility that a long-term American presence might push the Middle East in a direction it was headed anyway.... [W]e’ve forgiven Teddy Roosevelt his role in the bloody and disgraceful occupation of the Philippines.... Despite our crimes, the Philippines turned out well enough in the long run... these well-respected presidents have benefited, as well, from the American tendency to overvalue activist leaders....

[A] too-keen awareness of the American tendency to associate great leadership with world-historical ambition has wrecked the presidency of George W. Bush. But the enthusiasm for Barack Obama and John McCain suggests that the yearning, on the left and right alike, for presidents who will pursue greatness has only been enhanced by the debacle in Iraq. This is good news for Bush.... But it’s dangerous news for America. Those who rehabilitate the follies of the past are condemned to repeat them.

Economics of the Transhuman Condition

This was on Chad Jones's desk this morning:

iPhoto

Yes, the horizontal axis scale is in years...

Non-Supervisory Real Hourly and Weekly Wages

Andrew Samwick's meditation object for the week:

Picasa Web Albums - Andrew - CGG - earnings.jpg

Jeebus! This Is Humiliating!

First time I have been late to an exam in thirty years in this business.

Fortunately, I was only ten minutes late.

Unfortunately, I was the one giving the exam...

Rising Economic Insecurity

If you are in DC the week after next on May 29, this looks very useful:

Economic Policy Institute forum.... Breakfast & Registration: 10:00 - 10:30 AM. Presentations & Discussion: 10:30 AM - 12:30 PM. Book signing: 12:30 - 1:00 PM

Moderator: Louis Uchitelle, The New York Times...

Panelists:

Jacob Hacker, Professor of Political Science, Yale University, Institution for Social and Policy Studies; Elisabeth Jacobs: Fellow, Harvard University, Multidisciplinary Program on Inequality & Social Policy. Hacker and Jacobs will present and discuss their new study: "The Rising Instability of American Family Incomes, 1969-2004."

Peter Gosselin, Los Angeles Times. Gosselin will discuss his new book, High Wire. The Precarious Financial Lives of American Families (Basic Books, June 2, 2008) (available for purchase and signing at event).

Discussant: Brink Lindsey, Cato Institute. Author of The Age of Abundance: How Prosperity Transformed America's Politics and Culture. (Collins)

Economic Policy Institute
1333 H Street, NW
East Tower, Suite 300
Washington, DC 20005

May 15, 2008

links for 2008-05-16

Is This Allowed?

100F?

In Berkeley?

At 5PM?

WTF?

Matthew Yglesias: Why Are We in Iraq?

he quotes Spencer Ackerman:

Matthew Yglesias: Traffic Stop: Spencer Ackerman:

Geoffrey Millard, a soldier with the New York National Guard, was a general's assistant in Iraq. He related a story he attended a briefing his boss about: a soldier at a traffic control point, faced with a speeding, oncoming car, "made a split-second decision" to fire "more than 200 rounds into the vehicle," killing its inhabitants. "He then watched as the mother, father and two children were carried from that car.

"That evening, as it was briefed to the general -- and I flipped the slides for that briefing -- Col. [William] Rochelle, from the 42nd Infantry Division, DISCOM [Division Support Command] commander -- and I have to apologize for a little vulgarity here, but I feel it's intricate for my testimony -- he turned in his chair to an entire division-level staff, and he said, and I quote, 'If these fucking Hajjis learned to drive, this shit wouldn't happen.'"

To me, in a sense, it's these checkpoints incidents, more than anything else, that exposes the fundamental folly of occupation.

If you're an American, it's just not going to be tolerable to have a bunch of foreigners who only speak Arabic manning traffic stops while heavily armed and ultimately accountable only to an all-foreign chain of command. Nobody would put up with that -- it's absurd. And of course if an American cop had put 200 rounds into a car and killed a whole civilian family over a traffic violation there would have been a shitstorm about it in local politics and the legal system. Even if the shooter evaded any criminal sanction, there would be consequences -- you couldn't possibly just brush it off and put the guy back out there directing traffic!

And conversely, suppose you were asked to finish up your basic training and then go to a foreign country where you don't speak the language but there is a domestic insurgency that forms one part of a complicated patchwork of oft-violent political machinations that you have no way of understanding. You've got a gun, some of your colleagues have been blown up, and here's car speeding right toward you. How am I going to blame you for opening fire? And can you imagine orders going down the chain of command asking U.S. soldiers to radically increase their chances of getting killed in order to somewhat reduce the odds of Iraqis being killed in good faith mistakes? Or putting your life in the hands of your fellow soldiers and then turning around and ratting them out if their errors led to loss of civilian life?

The whole thing is maddeningly impossible. I can't at all imagine the right way to handle these situations. Shrugging it off with an "If these fucking Hajjis learned to drive, this shit wouldn't happen" clearly isn't the right answer, but is there one? I say, no there isn't -- there's just no good way to be a long-term occupying power. American soldiers are (rightly) accountable to American politicians who are (rightly) accountable to American voters but that means they can't be the ultimate source of authority in Iraq in any kind of reasonable way.

Monthly GDP from Macroeconomic Associates

Econbrowser: High Frequency GDP Estimates

April is likely to be down again...

Crime and Punishment

Felix Salmon:

How Unleaded Gasoline Slashed the Violent Crime Rate - Finance Blog - Felix Salmon - Market Movers - Portfolio.com: The paper, from the NBER, is 70 pages long, but the conclusion, from Jessica Wolpaw Reyes, is simple, and stunning:

The main result of the paper is that changes in childhood lead exposure are responsible for a 56% drop in violent crime in the 1990s.

What are those "changes in childhood lead exposure"? Primarily the move to unleaded gasoline, which happened in the US between 1975 and 1985.

This result is not entirely surprising: I blogged a similar finding, by Rick Nevin, last summer. Nevin's paper is more international in scope: it covers the USA, Britain,Canada, France, Australia, Finland, Italy, West Germany, and New Zealand. But it also uses a less rich dataset: the new paper really nails this finding down.

What I learn from this paper is that sometimes the Law of Unintended Consequences can mean unintended positive consequences: the 1970 Clean Air Act had a much more beneficial effect on America than anybody guessed it would at the time. (Today, of course, we're living in a country where the federal government is suing California not to impose stricter emissions standards on automobiles, which is depressing.)

And as Shankar Vedantam of the Washington Post noted when writing about Nevin last year, these findings make politicians' claims to have reduced crime much less compelling, especially when you combine them with Steve Levitt's findings about the effect of abortion on crime. Here's Wolpaw Reyes:

The elasticity of violent crime with respect to childhood lead exposure is estimated to be approximately 0.8. This implies that, between 1992 and 2002, the phase-out of lead from gasoline was responsible for approximately a 56% decline in violent crime... The effect of legalized abortion reported by Donohue and Levitt [2001] is largely unaffected, so that abortion accounts for a 29% decline in violent crime (elasticity 0.23), and similar declines in murder and property crime. Overall, the phase-out of lead and the legalization of abortion appear to have been responsible for significant reductions in violent crime rates.

Significant? I'll say. 56% plus 29% is 85%, which means that the overwhelming majority of the reduction in crime can be attributed to exogenous factors for which local politicians can take no credit. Not unless they were involved in the Clean Air Act or Roe vs Wade, anyway.

Mawwidge, A Dweam within a Dweam

Marty Olney down the hall is very happy. Now I have to think about wedding presents: I suspect I will have to buy lots for lots of friends:

California's top court overturns gay marriage ban: In a monumental victory for the gay rights movement, the California Supreme Court overturned a voter-approved ban on gay marriage Thursday in a ruling that paves the way for allowing same-sex couples in the nation's biggest state to tie the knot. Domestic partnerships are not a good enough substitute for marriage, the justices ruled 4-3 in an opinion. Outside the courthouse, gay marriage supporters cried and cheered as news spread of the decision. Jeanie Rizzo, one of the plaintiffs, has been with her partner Pali Cooper for 19 years. Rizzo called Cooper, who is traveling in Italy, on her cell phone and asked her "Pali, will you marry me?" "This is a very historic day. This is just such freedom for us," Rizzo said. "This is a message that says all of us are entitled to human dignity."

In the Castro, historically a center of the gay community in San Francisco, Tim Oviatt started crying while watching the news on television. "I've been waiting for this all my life. This is a life-affirming moment," he said. The cases were brought by the city of San Francisco, two dozen gay and lesbian couples, Equality California and another gay rights group in March 2004 after the court halted San Francisco's monthlong same-sex wedding march that took place at Mayor Gavin Newsom's direction...

Some Political Economy "Concentrations": DRAFT

The Concentration requirement in Berkeley's Political Economy major is meant to give students the opportunity to deepen their understanding of the nature of the relationship between politics and economics as it relates to a particular issue. You are graduating with a Political Economy degree. That means you know a little about each of history, sociology, political science, economics, possibly philosophy, rhetoric, anthropology, geography or other disciplines as well. You should know a lot about something. the Concentration requirement forces you to define that something.

Each student chooses an existing or potential issue or problem in international political economy, and takes four courses bearing on that issue or problem. The courses need to inform the student's study of the Concentration topic. In a better world than this, the Concentration requirement would also include a senior honors thesis on some aspect of the Concentration topic.

The key to the Concentration requirement is that it is your own: the Concentration is self-defined. You must develop a topic that is an existing or potential issue or problem in international political economy. You then choose four courses to inform inform your view and increase your knowledge. Select courses from different departments. Note that courses listed in the PEIS Student Handbook will automatically be approved for appropriate concentration topics--but courses not listed in the handbook can be taken for the concentration: all you have to do is make the case that it is appropriate for the concentration. And, of course, no double dipping: courses taken for your concentration cannot be double-counted towards another major requirement.

Here are fifteen sample recent concentrations. Note that these are not the best possible courses offered at some Platonic Ideal of Berkeley for this concentration--these are real-world courses that students can actually get into and take for their respective concentrations:


Democracy, Globalization, and China

  • Mass Comm 102: Effects of Mass Media
  • Soc 172: Development and Globalization
  • Soc 183: Contemporary Chinese Society
  • Poli Sci 143C: Chinese Politics
  • Poli Sci 143D: Democracy and China

The Euro

  • Econ 161: International Trade
  • Hist 158C: Modern Europe, 1914-Present
  • Poli Sci 147H: The Domestic Politics of Postwar Western Europe
  • Soc 122: Comparative Perspectives: US and Europoe
  • Hist 160: The International Economy of the Twentieth Century

The European Union: Rhetoric and Reality

  • Rhet 150: Rhetoric of Contemporary Politics
  • Rhet 172: Rhetoric of Social Theory
  • Poli Sci 147: Western European Politics
  • Hist 158C: Modern Europe: 1914-Present

Economic Development and Human Rights

  • Econ 171: Economic Development
  • PS 139B: Politics of Development
  • PACS: Human Rights
  • Poli Sci 146AB: African Politics

Sustainable Development

  • IAS 115: Global Poverty
  • ESPM 161: Environmental Philosophy and Ethics
  • ESPM 167: Environmental Health and Development
  • Geo 130: Natural Resources and Populations
  • EEP 153: Population, Environment, and Development

International Power: Economic, Political, and Military

  • Poli Sci 124A: War
  • Poli Sci 124C: Justice in International Affairs
  • Econ 181: International Trade
  • Poli Sci 138B: Market Economics
  • EEP 152: Development and International Trade

Political Economy of Northeast Asia

  • Poli Sci 1230A: International Relations
  • History 113B: Modern Korean History
  • Poli Sci 128: Chinese Foreign Policy
  • UGBA 118: International Trade
  • Hist 118C: Japan: The Late Nineteenth Century to the Present

Development in the Information Age

  • IFS 100D: Introduction to Technology, Society, and Culture
  • DS 100: Development in Theory and History
  • Info 190: Technology and Poverty
  • Am Stud 134: Information Technology and Society
  • Poli Sci 138D: Governance of the E-conomy

Barriers to the Delivery of health Care Services in the United States

PH 150D: Intro to Health Policy and Management ESPM 162: Bioethics and Society Econ 157: Health Economics GWS 150: Gender and Health


Decolonization and the Political and Economic Development of the Middle East

  • Hist 109C: History of the Middle East
  • MES 130: Jews and Muslims
  • Poli Sci 124A: Middle Eastern Politics
  • Soc 172: Development and Globalization

Behavioral Economics and Economic Planning

  • Env Des 100: The City
  • EEP C151: Economic Development
  • Pub Pol 101: Intro to Policy Analysis
  • Econ C175: Economic Demography
  • CRP 118AC: Community and Economic Development

Cosmopolitanism and International Development

  • IAS 150: Cosmopolitanism
  • Poli Sci 138B: The Politics of Market Economies
  • UGBA 118: International Trade
  • UGBA 178: Introduction to International Business
  • Econ : Game Theory

American Political and Economic Imperialism in Latin America

  • LAS 150: Latin American Development and World Markets
  • PACS 149: Global Change and World Order
  • Anthro 139: Controlling Processes
  • Hist : Latin American History

Law, Politics, and Development in the Middle East

  • Phil 115: Political Philosophy
  • Leg Stud 145: Law and Economics
  • Poli Sci 149C: Modernization in Iran, Turkey, and Afghanistan
  • Poli Sci 139B: Development Politics

Immigration Law and Policy

  • Soc 111: Sociology of the Family
  • Poli Sci 198A: Latin American Politics
  • Leg Stud 176: American Legal History
  • Chic Stud 159: Mexican Immigration

Joe Klein Is Shrill!

It's teh Republicans that have done it to him:

Hamas Hysteria - TIME: You've got to wonder what sort of anti-Israel, soft-on-terrorism nutjob said this after the elections that brought Hamas to power in 2006:

So the Palestinians had another election yesterday, and the results of which remind me about the power of democracy ... Obviously, people were not happy with the status quo. The people are demanding honest government. The people want services ... And so the elections should open the eyes of the Old Guard there in the Palestinian territories ... There's something healthy about a system that does that...

Wait a minute. That wasn't some pro- terrorist nutjob. It was George W. Bush.... Bush had a stake in the Palestinian elections. His Administration had demanded them, over the quiet objections of the Israelis and the Palestinian Authority -- both of which suspected that the service-providing terrorists of Hamas might win. And very soon after that initial, gracious statement, Bush changed course... refused to deal with the Hamas government unless it recognized Israel. The message to democracy activists in the region was crystal clear: We want elections unless we don't like the results of those elections. It stands as Exhibit A of the incoherence of the Bush foreign policy.

How to deal with groups like Hamas should be an important debate in the coming U.S. election, but it won't be. It was taken off the table... John McCain allowed his campaign to spread the word that Barack Obama had been "endorsed" by a leader of Hamas. That will be one of McCain's main lines of attack: Obama is soft on terrorism. He wants to negotiate with Iran. He has advisers like Zbigniew Brzezinski who have been "anti-Israel" in the past.... Obama responded quickly and definitively to McCain's attack. He told Jeffrey Goldberg of the Atlantic, "I've repeatedly condemned [Hamas]. I've repeatedly said ... since [Hamas] is a terrorist organization, we should not be dealing with them until they recognize Israel, renounce terrorism and abide by previous agreements."... [G]iven Obama's oft-stated position that we should be talking to all parties in the region, the Illinois Senator's position on Hamas can only be considered a sad abandonment of principles. And McCain's predilection for bluster marks him as a leader potentially less flexible than even Bush....

Meanwhile, the unofficial contacts that people like Malley have with Hamas are extremely valuable.... In Iraq, the U.S. military has had quiet talks with everyone from the Sunni insurgents in Fallujah in 2004 to the "special groups" in Sadr City today.... Why should it be easier for an Israeli politician to favor talks with Hamas than it is for an American?

"If you're not talking to everyone, you're going to be Chalabied every time," says Daniel Levy, an Israeli who has negotiated extensively with Palestinians, referring to Ahmad Chalabi, the Iraqi who helped mislead the U.S. into war with Iraq. Indeed, the next President will be negligent if he doesn't include someone like Malley in his circle of Middle East advisers. There is a need to keep all channels open in that insanely complicated region. It is tragic that both McCain and Obama seem poised to fail this essential test of leadership.

Falling Industrial Output

Rex Nutting:

Industrial output plunges 0.7% in April: WASHINGTON (MarketWatch) -- Industrial output of the nation's factories, mines and utilities dropped 0.7% in April in a broad-based decline led by falling production of motor vehicles, the Federal Reserve reported Thursday. Output of factories fell 0.8%, the biggest decline since September 2005, when Hurricane Katrina disrupted the economy. Industrial production has risen 0.2% in the past year, and is down 1.2% since January. The decline in output was worse than the 0.6% drop expected by economists surveyed by MarketWatch.... Capacity utilization -- a key gauge of inflationary pressures -- fell from 80.4% to 79.7%, the lowest since September 2005