Grasping Reality with Both Hands

The Changing Nature of the American Business Cycle

Macroeconomic Advisers writes:

Please find "Q2-2009... GDP Tracking 0.2 percent", which has been updated. Exports were stronger than expected, and imports were much weaker than expected, suggesting a large upward revision to our estimate of second quarter net exports. Therefore, we raised our tracking estimate of [the annual] GDP growth [rate] in the second quarter by 1.8 percentage points to +0.2% [growth in GDP per year].

With labor input falling at a rate of 6% per year in the second quarter, that suggests a productivity growth rate in the economy as a whole of some 6.2%--which is really weird. It used to be the case that businesses hoarded labor in recessions because they did not want their skilled workers to wander off and to have to train new ones....

Now it is really beginning to look as though businesses take recessions as opportunities to greatly slim down their workforces without making the workers they retain too angry and depressed. We saw this in 2002-2003. We saw it before in 1992-1993. The fact that productivity is no longer strongly procyclical countercyclical in recessions is good news in the long run--it means that our average long-run rate of productivity growth is higher than we used to think. But it also means that there is more headroom for expansionary policy, and more need.

Thus statements like this one from the very sharp Allan Sinai:

Phil Izzo reports:: "The mother of all jobless recoveries is coming down the pike," said Allen Sinai of Decision Economics. But he doesn't favor more stimulus now, saying "lags in monetary and fiscal policy actions" should be allowed to "work through the system..."

make me pound my head against the wall. If as the policies we have now in train to support the economy work their way through the system we find that we still have "the mother of all jobless recoveries," then we should be acting now to provide additional government support. A jobless recovery is not a good thing. And we should avoid it if we can figure out how in time.

Paul Krugman on the Stimulus Trap

What Paul Krugman wrote:

Paul Krugman: The Stimulus Trap: As soon as the Obama administration-in-waiting announced its stimulus plan — this was before Inauguration Day — some of us worried that the plan would prove inadequate. And we also worried that it might be hard, as a political matter, to come back for another round. Unfortunately, those worries have proved justified.... There’s now a real risk that President Obama will find himself caught in a political-economic trap....

[H]ow [should] concerned citizens... be reacting to the disappointing economic news. Should we be patient and give the Obama plan time to work? Should we call for bigger, bolder actions? Or should we declare the plan a failure?...

When there’s an ordinary, garden-variety recession, the job of fighting that recession is assigned to the Federal Reserve. The Fed responds by cutting interest rates in an incremental fashion [to raise asset prices]. Reducing rates a bit at a time, it keeps cutting until the economy turns around. At times it pauses to assess the effects of its work [on asset prices and thus on private spending by businesses making investments in plant and equipment and on households that feel richer are willing to spend more]; if the economy is still weak, the cutting resumes.

During the last recession, the Fed repeatedly cut rates as the slump deepened — 11 times over the course of 2001. Then, amid early signs of recovery, it paused.... When it became clear that the economy still wasn’t growing fast enough to create jobs, more rate cuts followed. Normally, then, we expect policy makers to respond to bad job numbers with a combination of patience and resolve.... And that’s what the Obama administration should be doing right now with its fiscal stimulus. (It’s important to remember that the stimulus was necessary because the Fed, having cut rates all the way to zero, has run out of ammunition to fight this slump.) That is, policy makers should stay calm in the face of disappointing early results, recognizing that the plan will take time to deliver its full benefit. But they should also be prepared to add to the stimulus now that it’s clear that the first round wasn’t big enough.

Unfortunately, the politics of fiscal policy are very different from the politics of monetary policy. For the past 30 years, we’ve been told that government spending is bad, and conservative opposition to fiscal stimulus (which might make people think better of government) has been bitter and unrelenting even in the face of the worst slump since the Great Depression. Predictably, then, Republicans — and some Democrats — have treated any bad news as evidence of failure, rather than as a reason to make the policy stronger. Hence the danger that the Obama administration will find itself caught in a political-economic trap, in which the very weakness of the economy undermines the administration’s ability to respond effectively....

It’s perfectly O.K. for the administration to defend what it’s done so far.... It’s also reasonable for administration economists to call for patience, and point out, correctly, that the stimulus was never expected to have its full impact this summer, or even this year. But... [i]t was disturbing when President Obama walked back Mr. Biden’s admission that the administration “misread” the economy, declaring that “there’s nothing we would have done differently.” There was a whiff of the Bush infallibility complex in that remark... that’s an attitude neither Mr. Obama nor the country can afford.

What Mr. Obama needs to do is level with the American people. He needs to admit that he may not have done enough on the first try... and that some course adjustments — including, quite possibly, another round of stimulus — may be necessary...

"The Short and Simple Annals of the Poor..."

Thomas Gray, 1750:

Elegy Written in a Country Church-Yard":
Oft did the harvest to their sickle yield,
Their furrow oft the stubborn glebe has broke;
How jocund did they drive their team afield!
How bow'd the woods beneath their sturdy stroke!

Let not Ambition mock their useful toil,
Their homely joys, and destiny obscure;
Nor Grandeur hear with a disdainful smile
The short and simple annals of the Poor...

The first four or so times I read:

Robert C. Allen: The year 1762 witnessed two momentous changes in cropping [in Spelsbury in Oxfordshire]. First, turnip cultivation was shifted from the sainfoin [grass] enclosure to the open fields themselves.... Secondly, clover was introduced...

the word "momentous" did not strike me as at all out of place or inappropriate or funny...

Should I be alarmed? Or distressed? Or just accept that the particular road I have walked has made me a somewhat strange person?

---

St. Giles Church, Stoke Poges, Buckinghamshire, next door (well, only by California standards: an hour ro so by the M40 via Oxford and High Wycomb) to Spelsbury.

(Site of Gray's "Elegy," and also IIRC of the game of Centrifugal Bumble-Puppy in Brave New World, of scenes in the fims Bridget Jones's Diary and Goldfinger, and something to do with Bertie Wooster...)

A Good Seasonally-Adjusted New Unemployment Claims Number | Reuters

But how good exactly? Reuters:

Jobless claims drop steeply, skewed by autos | Reuters: WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The number of U.S. workers filing new claims for jobless benefits fell sharply last week but the data was distorted by an unusual pattern of layoffs in the automotive industry, which amplified the decline. The Labor Department said on Thursday that initial claims for state unemployment insurance fell 52,000, the largest drop since December, to a much lower-than-expected seasonally adjusted 565,000 in the week ended July 4, from 617,000 the prior week. It was the lowest reading since January. Analysts polled by Reuters had forecast claims to drop to 605,000 from a previously reported 614,000. However, in a sign of ongoing employment weakness, so-called continued claims of people still on jobless aid after an initial week of benefits rose by 159,000 to a record 6.883 million in the week ending June 27, the latest for which data is available.

A Labor Department official said that there had been far fewer automotive and other manufacturing layoffs last week than anticipated on the basis of past experience of claims over July, when many plants are commonly idled. The "seasonal factors" the department uses to adjust the data to provide a better sense of the underlying trend had expected a large increase in claims in the latest week. Actual claims in fact rose by a much smaller amount, which when seasonally adjusted, generated a large fall. A number of states said that auto sector layoffs apparently had already happened, reflecting closures in the battered U.S. automotive industry, while other states said they did not get the layoffs they had anticipated. "I would expect the underlying trend (in claims) is probably diminishing but it's hard to tell from this number how much is noise," said Keith Hembre, chief economist at First American Funds in Minneapolis.

The 4-week moving average for new claims declined by 10,000 to 606,000, the lowest reading since February. This measure is closely watched because it irons out weekly volatility, and it has now declined in four out of the last five weeks.

Looking at graphs like this:

reminds me of how very much in the high-frequency data we typically examine rests on the seasonal adjustment process--and how important it is to get that seasonal adjustment right. Of course, to the extent that the true seasonal adjustment factors are not absolutely invariant to the phase of the business cycle it very quickly becomes impossible to estimate them accurately.

What the standard seasonal adjustment factors for initial unemployment claims tell us is: "don't worry if new claims spike in January or July. But does that mean we should be greatly encouraged if they don't spike in January or July? In January 2008, July 2008, and January 2009 the seasonally-adjusted claims number improved because unadjusted claims did not spike enough. But anyone who took those declines as evidence of an improving economy--well, I have a bridge they might be interested in purchasing...

The Pivot of Global History: The Handoff from the First to the Second Industrial Revolution

Bob Allen of Oxford writes the smartest thing I have read in at least a year. The conclusion of Robert Allen (2009), The British Industrial Revolution in Global Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 9780521687850), p. 272 ff.:

I have argued that the famous inventions of the British Industrial Revolution were responses to Britain's unique economic environment and would not have been developed anywhere else.... Buy why did those inventions matter?.... Weren't there alternative paths to the twentieth century? These questions are closely related to another... asked by Mokyr: why didn't the Industrial Revolution peter out after 1815?... [O]ne-shot rise[s] in productivity [before] did not translate into sustained economic growth. The nineteenth century was different--the First Industrial Revolution turned into Modern Economic Growth. Why? Mokyr's answer... that scientific knowledge increased enough to allow continuous invention [is incomplete]....

Britain's pre-1815 inventions were particularly transformative.... Cotton was the wonder industry.... [T]he great achievement of the British Industrial Revolution was... the creation of the first large engineering industry that could mass-produce productivity-raising machinery. Machinery production was the basis of three developments that were the immeiate explanations of the continuation of economic growth until the First World War... (1) the general mechanization of industry; (2) the railroad; and (3) steam-powered iron ships. The first raised productivity... the second and third created the global economy and the international division of labor... (O'Rourke and Williamson, 1999). Steam... accounted for close to half of the growth in labor productivity in Britain in the second half of the nineteenth century (Crafts 2004). The nineteenth-century engineering industry was a spin-off from the coal industry. All three of the developments... depended on two things: the steam engine and cheap iron....

Cotton played a supporting role in the growth of the engineering industry.... The first is that it grew to immense size.... Mechanization in other activities did not have the same potential... global industry with.. price-responsive demand... cotton... sustained the engineering industry by providing it with a large and growing market for equipment....

There was a great paradox... the macro-inventions of the eighteenth century... increased the demand for capital and energy relative to labour. Since capital and energy were relatively cheap in Britain, it was worth developing the macro-inventions there and worth using them in their early, primitave forms. These forms were not cost-effective elsewhere.... However, British engineers improved this technology.... This local learning often saved the input that was used excessively in the early years of the invention's life and which restricted its use to Britain. As the coal consumption of rotary steam power declined from 35 pounds per horsepower-hour to 5 pounds, it paid to apply steam power to more and more uses.... Old fashioned, thermally inefficient steam engines were not "appropriate" technology for countries where coal was expensive. These countries did not have to invent an "appropriate" technology for their conditions, however. The irony is that the British did it for them....

[T]he British inventions of the eighteenth century--cheap iron and the steam engine, in particular--were so transformative... the technologies invented in France--in paper production, glass, and knitting--were not, The French innovations did not lead to general mechanization or globalization.... The British were not more rational or prescient than the French... simply luckier in their geology. the knock-on effect was large, however: there is no reason to believe that French technology would have led to the engineering industry, the general mechanization of industrial processes, the railway, the steamship, or the global economy.... [T]here was only one route to the twentieth century--and it traversed northern Britain.

What Bob Allen said.

---

N.F.R. Crafts (2004), "Steam as a General Purpose Technology: A Growth Accounting Perspective," Economic Journal 114:495, pp. 338-51.

Kevin O'Rourke and Jeffrey Williamson (1999), Globalization and History: The Evolution of a Nineteenth-Century Atlantic Economy (Cambridge: MIT Press).

Ben Bernanke's Tenure

Jon Hilsenrath, Sudeep Reddy, and David Wessel write:

White House Ponders Bernanke's Future: As the White House begins to ponder whether to reappoint or replace Ben Bernanke when his term expires in January, the Federal Reserve chairman's standing on Wall Street is on the rise while attacks on him from Congress mount. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner is expected to play a key role in advising President Barack Obama on whether to reappoint Mr. Bernanke. Mr. Geithner has worked closely both with Mr. Bernanke and with the leading alternative for the powerful post -- Lawrence Summers, the former Treasury secretary, who is currently the president's top economic adviser.

Before making a decision later this year, the White House also is expected to look at other economists, including Roger Ferguson and Alan Blinder, former Fed vice chairmen; Janet Yellen, president of the San Francisco Federal Reserve Bank; and Christina Romer, chairman of Mr. Obama's Council of Economic Advisers.

Mr. Bernanke's reputation on Wall Street has ebbed and flowed. But a Wall Street Journal survey conducted this week of 46 private-sector economists found that 43 endorsed his reappointment. "Bernanke's leadership during this financial crisis was outstanding, but not flawless," said Scott Anderson of Wells Fargo & Co., one of those surveyed. "But given human limitations and the limitations of economic and financial knowledge he deserves another tour of duty." Some saw benefits to continuity. "Don't change horses in midstream," said David Wyss of Standard & Poor's. Others cited the alternatives: "Stated differently: Don't appoint Summers," said Nicholas Perna of Perna Associates.

The White House isn't rushing to decide on reappointing Mr. Bernanke, who hasn't sent any signal that he wants to leave the post. The Intrade online wagering Web site puts 60% odds on reappointment. But a bad turn in the economy could prompt Mr. Obama to seek a new helmsman of his own choosing, or new embarrassing revelations about Mr. Bernanke's handling of the financial crisis could alter the picture before the president makes a decision. For now, the White House is concentrating on finding new members for the Fed board. Two of the seven seats are vacant. Two sitting governors -- Kevin Warsh, 39 years old, and Donald Kohn, 66 -- are widely believed to be eyeing the exits. The White House is seeking at least one candidate with financial-market experience, a tough task at a time when likely choices are tainted by Wall Street ties....

Mr. Bernanke has come under tough questioning on Capitol Hill, and new powers that the Obama administration proposes to give the Fed have intensified congressional scrutiny of the central bank. "If these new powers are going to be granted to the Fed, then maybe a professor of economics will never again be the best choice for the Fed chairman," said Darrell Issa (R., Calif.). Rep. Brad Sherman (D., Calif.) accuses the Fed of "a Wall Street mentality." Regarding Mr. Bernanke, he said, "Of those who are infected... better than average," but he said he would prefer a Fed chairman with "populist Democratic values."

Still, Mr. Bernanke has influential admirers -- including Rep. Barney Frank (D., Mass.), chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, and Rep. Carolyn Maloney (D., N.Y.), chairman of the Joint Economic Committee. Ms. Maloney, who backs Mr. Bernanke's reappointment, said, "He's basically an academic working in a nonpartisan way to save the economy." Mr. Bernanke would need to be confirmed by the Senate if reappointed for a second four-year term. Both the chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, Christopher Dodd (D., Conn.), and the panel's senior Republican, Richard Shelby of Alabama, have been critical of the Bernanke Fed...

A year ago I would have said that Ben Bernanke was almost certain to be a one-term Fed chair. The financial crisis was bad enough and enough decisions had to be made quickly enough that it was certain that he would make some big mistakes, and in the aftermath too many people would remember and he would be too damaged to be the right choice moving forward.

But given the quality of the opposition to a Bernanke reappointment that Hilsenrath and company have been able to dig up, it seems that I was wrong. The complaints about Bernanke seem... incoherent. And the consensus judgment appears to be the correct "outstanding but not flawless."

And, yes, Larry (or Janet, or Roger, or Allen, or Christy) would in all likelihood be very, very good at the job as well.

What, Me Worry?: Few Expected Green Shoots in the Bond Market

Paul Krugman has a chart:

and writes:

Bond panic subsiding?: Over the course of the spring there was a substantial rise in long-term interest rates; it was fed partly by talk of green shoots, but also, I suspect, by all the yelling about deficits and inflation. And, of course, the rise in rates was itself taken as evidence that inflation fears etc. were justified.

But the panic seems to be subsiding. Rates are still well above their post-Lehman lows, when credit markets were completely frozen and everyone was piling into govt. debt. But they’re low by historical standards, and not giving much ammunition to the worriers these days.

On the contrary, they are giving a significant amount of ammunition to the worriers--my brand of worriers, a different kind of worriers. We worry that the next two years are going to bring what happened after the end of the 2001 recession: something like this:

A recovery in which unemployment is higher two years later than when the recovery began is not much of a recovery. And I don't see what is going to keep the probability of such an eventuality low.

The lower are ten-year Treasury interest rates, the more are people trading in the bond market willing to bet their money that the future holds that kind of non-recovery recovery. And so I worry.

Bruce Bartlett Argues Against a Second Stimulus

He writes:

We do not need a second stimulus plan: As the US unemployment rate has risen to 9.5 per cent from 8.1 per cent since the $787bn fiscal stimulus package was enacted in February, many Democrats have become very nervous. They say that another large stimulus may be needed to keep unemployment from rising.... Another stimulus would be a grave mistake. The first one was justified by extraordinary circumstances. But it must be given time to work. People should not allow their impatience to lead to the adoption of policies that will not only fail to reduce unemployment this year, but could stoke inflation in the not-too-distant future....

The forecast also showed the unemployment rate peaking at 8 per cent with the stimulus and 9 per cent without. Obviously this was wrong. Yet it would be incorrect to conclude that the stimulus was doomed to failure, as many Republicans and conservative economists argued.... [T]he Romer-Bernstein document presents reasonable estimates of how quickly different forms of spending would raise gross domestic product. Tax cuts and government transfers are slow to have an effect and have a low multiplier, raising GDP less than $1 for every $1 increase in the deficit even when fully effective after two years. By contrast, government purchases stimulate growth much more quickly and have a higher multiplier, raising GDP by $1.57 for every $1 spent. Unfortunately, the low-impact spending has been the fastest to come online while the high-impact spending is dribbling out very slowly.

In a recent report to the International Monetary Fund, Doug Elmendorf, Congressional Budget Office director, looked at the rates of spending for different components of the stimulus package. He estimates that by the end of fiscal year 2009, which falls on September 30, 32 per cent of the income transfers for things such as food stamps and extended unemployment benefits will have been spent and 31 per cent of the tax cuts will have been disbursed. By the end of fiscal year 2010 virtually all of the money allocated to these programmes will have been spent.

However, just 11 per cent of the discretionary spending on highways, mass transit, energy efficiency and other programmes involving direct government purchases will have been spent by the end of this fiscal year. Even by the end of 2010 less than half the funds will have been disbursed and by the end of 2011 more than a quarter of the money will be unspent. Consequently, it is hardly surprising that five months after the stimulus bill passed it has not yet affected the unemployment rate....

What all this means is that it is foolish to think that any sort of stimulus that is enacted now will have an impact on the economy any time soon. We just have to wait for the medicine we have already taken to work. Pushing ahead with another stimulus will only make it harder to tighten fiscal policy down the road to keep inflation in check.

It's a balance of risks. Any second stimulus package passed this fall would have little impact on the economy until late 2010, that is true. But come late 2010 we might really need more demand to curb unemployment. On balance the inflationary risks of having an extra stimulus hit the economy in late 2010 if it is not needed are outweighed by the deflationary risks of not having an extra stimulus hit the economy in late 2010 if it is needed.

It is like driving a car with its windshield painted black by looking in the rear view mirror.

Second Stimulus Program...

Last December I said that a $1 trillion stimulus looked appropriate but that the incoming administration should get a second stimulus into the budget resolution, with appropriate triggers so that it would be sprung if things turned out to be worse than we then expected.

If the Obama administration had done so, right now we wouldn't be trying to persuade a political system that a stimulus designed for an 8% peak unemployent recession is too small for the 10% unemployment recession we have--let alone the 12% peak unemployment recession we fear.

I wish I weren't so smart...

Laura Tyson adds her voice to the good guys:

naked capitalism: Submitted by Edward Harrison of Credit Writedowns. Laura Tyson, an advisor to President Barack Obama, said in a speech to day in the lead up to the –8 conference that the ground work for a potential second stimulus bill must be laid now. To be sure, the G-8 leaders are expected to recommend continued policy accommodation worldwide. However, Vice President Joe Biden recently suggested that the Obama Administration has no plans for a second stimulus bill on the political TV show Meet the Press (transcript here).  So, which is it – stimulus or no stimulus?

The U.S. should consider drafting a second stimulus package focusing on infrastructure projects because the $787 billion approved in February was “a bit too small,” said Laura Tyson, an adviser to President Barack Obama.

The current plan “will have a positive effect, but the real economy is a sicker patient,” Tyson said in a speech in Singapore today. The package will have a more pronounced impact in the third and fourth quarters, she added, stressing that she was speaking for herself and not the administration.

Tyson’s comments contrast with remarks made two days ago by Vice President Joe Biden and fellow Obama adviser Austan Goolsbee, who said it was premature to discuss crafting another stimulus because the current measures have yet to fully take effect. The government is facing criticism that the first package was rolled out too slowly and failed to stop unemployment from soaring to the highest in almost 26 years.

Obama said last month that a second package isn’t needed yet, though he expects the jobless rate will exceed 10 percent this year. When Obama signed the first stimulus bill in February, his chief economic advisers forecast it would help hold the rate below 8 percent.

Retiring TARP Warrants: Obama's Treasury Makes a Significant Mistake

Whether or not you think that it is good for the system for banks to buyback the preferred-stock investments that the Treasury has made through the TARP program, there is no argument at all that it is good for the system to buy back the equity warrants: we want banks to have more equity capital right now, not less. If you don't want the U.S. government holding them, sell them on the open market. But don't retire them until the financial crisis is two years past.

There's at least one chance in ten that the banks will hit the wall again sometime in the next couple of years if the recession turns out to be worse than forecast, and we may once again be desperate to have the banks have as much equity as possible.

And I haven't even reached the issue of what price the warrants should be valued at: just don't do it.

David Mildenberg:

U.S. TARP Warrant Plan Favors Banks, Professor Says: Policy makers want to speed the withdrawal of the government from the banking industry, rather than attempt to maximize returns for the taxpayers by waiting for share prices to rise, Washington banking lawyer William Sweet of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom said last week. “The president has clearly stated that his objective is to dispose of the government’s investments in individual companies as quickly as is practicable,” the Treasury statement said. The Obama administration gave approval in June for 10 of the biggest U.S. banks, including JPMorgan Chase & Co., Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and Morgan Stanley, to repay $68 billion of TARP funds. When the money was first obtained, banks had to give the Treasury preferred stock plus warrants to buy stock at a future date at a specific price, called the strike price.

Wilson values JPMorgan’s warrants at $1.55 billion using the traditional method of determining how much the stock may gain in the next decade, compared with $1.33 billion set by Treasury, he said. The strike price for JPMorgan is $42.42, about 25 percent higher than yesterday’s closing price of $34.11 in New York Stock Exchange composite trading. Banks will have 15 days after retiring government stakes to propose a “fair-market value” for the warrants, the Treasury said last week. Should officials object to the estimate, up to three “independent advisers” will help set a price. If lenders don’t make an offer, the warrants will auctioned.

Negotiations as planned by Treasury open the door to political favoritism and corruption, Simon Johnson, an economist at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, said in an interview. Johnson favors public auctions. “The question is why wouldn’t you sell these on the open market and the answer is that the banks would probably lose,” he said. Treasury is bound by contracts with the banks that set out a specific negotiating process, spokesman Andrew Williams said.

Valuing the warrants may rile Congress because lawmakers including Sen. Jack Reed, a Rhode Island Democrat, have warned Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner not to let banks buy back government stakes at discount prices. “I will be watching closely to ensure Treasury’s pricing system works both fairly and efficiently for the benefit of taxpayers,” Reed said in a June 26 statement. At least 10 smaller banks have negotiated warrant buybacks with Treasury, including First Niagara Financial Group Inc., which paid $2.7 million, according to a statement this week. It’s among the best prices Treasury has received so far, equal to 65 percent of what the warrants were actually worth, compared with an average of 48 percent for the 10 previous repurchases, Wilson said.

Burning Chrome...

Greg Farrell:

Former Goldman employee accused of cyber-theft: Law enforcement officials in the US arrested a former Goldman Sachs employee over the July 4 holiday weekend, accusing him of stealing sensitive automated trading codes and uploading them to a server based in Germany. Sergey Aleynikov, a computer programmer who joined Goldman in May 2007 and resigned last month, was arrested late Friday as he disembarked from a flight at Newark International Airport and charged the next day with theft of trade secrets and transfer of stolen property.

According to an affidavit filed by a Federal Bureau of Investigation agent in the matter, Mr Aleynikov – who held the title of vice-president at Goldman before leaving June 5 – was part of a team that developed and improved the software codes used in the firm’s computerised trading programs. Mr Aleynikov was bound by Goldman’s standard confidentiality agreements. The FBI affidavit alleges Mr Aleynikov, after accepting the offer from his new firm – which has yet to be identified – downloaded approximately 32 megabytes of proprietary trading platform data from his desktop computer at work as well as his laptop at home on four separate occasions between June 1 and June 5, his last day at Goldman.

Robert Shiller, Jeff Madrick, Teresa Ghilarducci, Brad DeLong: Animal Spirits

1. Introduction3 min 25 sec
2. Robert Shiller: Why People Didn't Foresee the Crisis4 min 8 sec
3. Comparing the Current Crisis to The Depression3 min 5 sec
4. International Economic Fears2 min 38 sec
5. Obama's Economic Challenge2 min 13 sec
6. Tracking Changes in Home Prices6 min 26 sec
7. The Psychology of Bubbles2 min 15 sec
8. Analyzing Obama's Stimulus Plans5 min 39 sec
9. Implementing Long-Term Financial Solutions4 min 27 sec
10. Strategies for Keeping People in Homes4 min 47 sec
11. Brad DeLong: The Purpose of Financial Markets2 min 25 sec
12. Problems with Financial Markets2 min 55 sec
13. Vindicating Shiller's 'Animal Spirits' Theory5 min 9 sec
14. Why Government Intervention is Necessary6 min 3 sec
15. Teresa Ghilarducci: Rethinking Retirement Planning2 min 45 sec
16. The Origins of 41(k) Plans4 min 19 sec
17. Rethinking Obama's Stance on Retirement Plans3 min 58 sec
18. Implementing 'Guaranteed Retirement Accounts'2 min 26 sec
19. Commentary by Jeff Madrick5 min 29 sec
20. Robert Shiller's Response11 min 48 sec
21. Q 0 min 8 sec
22. Q1: Increasing the Size of the Stimulus1 min 53 sec
23. Q2: Avoiding Another Bubble0 min 49 sec
24. Q3: Rethinking Housing Subsidies2 min 35 sec
25. Q4: Implementing Countercyclical Regulation1 min 52 sec
26. Q5: Regulating Shadow Banks3 min 47 sec
27. Q6: Nationalizing Banks3 min 41 sec
28. Q7: Problems with the Auto Bailout5 min 39 sec

joe Biden Misses the Point...

If the Obama fiscal boost program has its anticipated impact on the economy as its main effects take hold over the next year, it is still half the size of the program it now looks like we need. Only if it magically turns out to be twice as strong as we think--only with simple Keynesian multipliers of 3 rather than 1.5--is it the right size.

And, of course, if the situation deteriorates further we will need an even bigger stimulus, while if the situation improves having too-big a stimulus is not a problem because we can soak up the demand through monetary policy.

So Vice President Joe Biden completely misses the point when he says:

I think it's premature to make that judgment [that we need a larger stimulus]. This was set up to spend out over 18 months. There are going to be major programs that are going to take effect in September, $7.5 billion for broadband, new money for high-speed rail, the implementation of the grid -- the new electric grid. And so this is just starting, the pace of the ball is now going to increase.

Of course, he is paid to miss the point. Which is one reason why being Vice President is a really lousy job.

Sam Stein reports:

Biden Ignores Warnings Of Krugman, Stiglitz, Roubini And Others: During his interview with ABC's This Week on Sunday, Vice President Joe Biden made what will be a much-discussed admission in the week ahead. The Obama administration, he said, had "misread" the extent of the economic catastrophe it inherited. "The truth is, we and everyone else misread the economy," declared Biden. "The figures we worked off of in January were the consensus figures and most of the blue chip indexes out there. We misread how bad the economy was, but we are now only about 120 days into the recovery package," the vice president said later in the interview. "The truth of the matter was, no one anticipated, no one expected that that recovery package would in fact be in a position at this point of having to distribute the bulk of money."

Certainly, the Obama administration's acknowledgment that it misjudged the crisis it inherited is rife with possibilities for its political opponents. House Minority Leader John Boehner rapped the White House repeatedly on Sunday for presiding over the loss of more than two million jobs since January. Former Bush strategist Matt Dowd, appearing on the ABC panel after Biden, did much the same. For an Obama White House that, two weeks ago, told the public to measure the success of its policies based on jobs they created, it is difficult to decry these critiques as inherently unfair, regardless of what troubles were passed on from the Bush administration.

But equally problematic is Biden's assertion that "everyone" - not just the White House - was off in their prognostications. This is simply untrue. Host George Stephanopoulos pointed out that "a lot of people were saying that you needed to do something bigger and bolder" when it came to the stimulus package. He named New York Times columnist Paul Krugman as one example. There are many others. The prize-winning Columbia University economist Joseph Stiglitz not only warned that the stimulus was too small during its construction, the day after Obama signed it into law he predicted how its shortcomings would make themselves apparent. "I think there is a broad consensus but not universal among economist that the stimulus package that was passed was badly designed and not enough. I know it is not universal but let me try to explain. First of all that it was not enough should be pretty apparent from what I just said: It is trying to offset the deficiency in aggregate demand and it is just too small," Stiglitz said. "The shortfall in state revenue [is] probably in the order of 150 to 200 billion dollars a year. And the states have balanced budget frameworks so if you follow the newspaper you know the drastic problems that California and New York are in, these are really serious problems and because of their balanced budget frameworks they have to reduce their spending... if their income comes down. So that would be a negative stimulus of 150 to 200 billion unless there is federal aid. And the stimulus package there was a little of federal aid but just not enough. So what we will be doing is we will be laying off teachers and laying off people in the health care sector while we are hiring construction workers. It is a little strange for a design of a stimulus package. You ask, why do you want to hire construction workers and fire teachers. I don't know what is the rationale behind that." Stiglitz was joined by a whole host of liberal economists -- from the University of Texas' James Galbraith to Dean Baker of the Center for Economic and Policy Research -- who warned that the stimulus package inexplicably underestimated the size of the crisis.

Several weeks after the stimulus passed, economist Nouriel Roubini, known affectionately as Dr. Doom, made the case that the administration's approach to stabilizing the economy lacked an effective international component. "You have to have a set of concerted, coherent policies done not just by the U.S. but by Europe, Japan, China and everyone else," he said. "The credit crunch is just massive. One thing that's needed is much more aggressive monetary easing. The second dimension is that you need much more fiscal stimulus -- in the countries that can afford it -- that is front-loaded. The U.S. [stimulus package] is $800 billion, but only $200 billion is front-loaded. Of that $200 billion [in stimulus] this year, half of it is tax cuts. That's going to be a waste of money, because people are not going to spend it." In mid-June, weeks before the latest round of poor job numbers came out, U.C. Berkeley professor and former Clinton administration official Brad DeLong was arguing that "the Obama administration's federal fiscal stimulus programs are on the low side of what is appropriate by a substantial margin. This is the largest economic downturn since the Great Depression and the standard tools of expansionary monetary policy are tapped out and broken right now," he wrote.

The day that June's job numbers came out, meanwhile, Nassim Taleb, principal of Universa Investments and author of 'The Black Swan,' offered a far more grim interpretation of what was transpiring, though one relatively consistent with what he had said in the past. "We're in the middle of a crash," said Taleb during an appearance on CNBC. "So if I'm going to forecast something, it is that it's going to get worse, not better."

Certainly Krugman himself has aired his share of skepticism. In late June, he reminded his readers that his early concerns had not been misplaced. "[S]ome of us warned about what might happen: if unemployment surpassed the administration's optimistic projections, Republicans wouldn't accept the need for more stimulus," he wrote in the Times. "Instead, they'd declare the whole economic policy a failure. And that's exactly how it's playing out. With the unemployment rate now almost certain to pass 10 percent, there's an overwhelming economic case for more stimulus. But as a political matter it's going to be harder, not easier, to get that extra stimulus now than it would have been to get the plan right in the first place. This past week, meanwhile, he declared once more that the Obama stimulus plan, while "better than nothing" needs to be supplemented with something more.

To be fair, the process of economic forecasting is, as Taleb noted in his CNBC segment, an inherently tricky proposition. In October 2008, for instance, Roubini was arguing that the government needed a $400 billion stimulus package, which ended up being just more than half of what the Obama White House settled on.

But among those who were sounding the loudest alarms about the potential inadequacies of the economic recovery plan, the consensus seems to be emerging that more now needs to be done. Later in his ABC segment, Biden - who is responsible for overseeing the stimulus - was asked if a second package was in the offing. No, he replied, without dismissing the possibility outright. "I think it's premature to make that judgment. This was set up to spend out over 18 months. There are going to be major programs that are going to take effect in September, $7.5 billion for broadband, new money for high-speed rail, the implementation of the grid -- the new electric grid. And so this is just starting, the pace of the ball is now going to increase."

Paying the Piper and Dancing the Tune

The investment banks want the Federal Reserve's lender-of-last-resort support without wanting its regulatory oversight. Sorry guys, it doesn't work that way.

Emanuel Derman, via James Wilmott:

Emanuel Derman's Blog: Are you bicestrian? You don't look bicestrian.: "So many riders in the Tour de France have been tossed out because of drugs, the overall leader is now a delivery guy from Empire Szechuan," joked David Letterman in 2007. Anyone who lives on the Upper West Side of Manhattan knows what it's like to walk across Broadway when the sign says WALK and then narrowly escape being hit by a delivery guy coming through on a bicycle. Or riding the wrong way down a one-way street.

There's a simple explanation. The delivery guys have been given the right at any time to regard themselves as either cyclists or a pedestrians. When the traffic light is green, they regard themselves as vehicles and ride. When the light is red they define themselves as a pedestrian who just happens to have wheels. They can choose whatever is advantageous at any time. Who can blame them? Life is short and they need the money.

I am reminded of this when I read rumors that some of the investment banks want to give up their bank holding company status now that their funding crisis is over.

Forensic Table Reading: Bush CEA Forecast Edition

In email, lurkers are questioning my claim that:

Forecasting the Obama Economy: ...what happened to the Mankiw CEA over the winter of 2003-2004, when high politics appears to have reached down into the forecast, changed the table for payroll employment (and only payroll employment: the rest of the forecast is not out of line with contemporary professional forecasts), and produced an estimate for December 2004 (a) inconsistent with the rest of the forecast, and (b) high by 2.3 million in its estimate of payroll employment--all because Karl Rove and company thought it important to avoid headlines like "Bush administration forecasts 2004 payroll employment to be less than when Bush took office." White House Media Affairs would have a much harder time pressuring the forecasters to produce a "rosy scenario" if the pressure has to be kept on month after month [as the Troika forecast is revised, updated, and released at a monthly frequency].

I think that the smoking gun is provided by a little forensic table reading--going through the Bush administration's economic forecasts year-by-year as they were published in the successive versions of the Bush-era CEA's Economic Report of the President, the ERP:

• In the 2002 ERP, Table 1.1 shows 3.2% growth expected for the next two years gives you 2.9 million jobs--for a forecast labor productivity growth rate of about 2.1% per year...
• In the 2003 ERP, Table 1.1 shows 3.5% growth expected for the next two years gives you 4.4 million jobs--for a forecast labor productivity growth rate of about 1.8% per year...
• In the 2004 ERP, Table 3.1 shows 3.7% growth expected for the next two years gives you 6.2 million jobs--for a forecast labor productivity growth rate of about 1.3% per year...
• In the 2005 ERP, Table 1.1 shows 3.4% growth expected for the next two years gives you 4.1 million jobs--for a forecast labor productivity growth rate of about 1.8% per year...
• In the 2006 ERP, Table 1.1 shows 3.3% growth expected for the next two years gives you 3.8 million jobs--for a forecast labor productivity growth rate of about 1.9% per year...
• In the 2007 ERP, Table 1.1 shows 3.0% growth expected for the next two years gives you 3.3 million jobs--for a forecast labor productivity growth rate of about 1.8% per year...

The forecast rate of labor productivity growth over the next two years or so is a relatively stable variable. It starts at an annual rate of 2.1% in the first Glenn Hubbard ERP, and then Glenn and company drop it to 1.8% the next year as they become less optimistic about productivity growth in the aftermath of the collapse of the high tech bubble. Thereafter the Bush CEA forecast assumes a labor productivity growth rate of 1.8% - 1.9% in every year save one: the 2004 ERP, issued at the start of 2004, drops the labor productivity growth rate to 1.3% (and the 2005 ERP raises it back up to 1.8%).

Was there anything in the economic data that would make one much more pessimistic about labor productivity growth in early 2004 and only early 2004? No.

But assuming a 1.8% labor productivity growth rate at the start of 2004 would have meant that the forecast average level of employment in Tqble 3.1 for 2004 would have been lower than the level of employment when Bush took office, and that would have created a point of political vulnerability. There were two ways to fix this that would have satisfied White House Media Affairs: (i) reformat the table so that it no longer reports an annual average payroll employment number, or (ii) push assumed labor productivity growth down because if you keep GDP the same but reduce labor productivity arithmetic forces your forecast to produce higher employment.

Why the Bush CEA didn't pick option (i) is something I have never understood...

---

Origins of the Current Financial Crisis

In which Barry Ritholtz encounters the unreliable Stan Liebowitz saying very strange and very false things about the mortgage market:

Zero Down Is a Foreclosure Factor: There is a kind of weird OpEd in today’s WSJ by Stan Liebowitz. The professor makes the incredible discovery that zero down payments, 100% LTV financings tend to slide in great numbers into foreclosure.... This is analysis by gross over-simplification. Not quite reductio ad absurdum, but close. Unfortunately, it leads to conclusions that are at best only partially correct. And that conclusion? The problem has been Prime, not sub-prime loans....

Here is where things get weird: I can’t verify many of [Liebowitz's] data points. They don’t square with the data I review via RealtyTrac or Mortgage Bankers Association or Bloomberg. (I assume the professor meant we had 4.3m foreclosures since Q3 2006, not during). As to prime versus sub-prime, it appears the Mortgage Bankers Association, data dispute the professor’s. Jay Brinkmann, chief economist for the MBA, noted in May 2009 that in 2008, prime, fixed-rate loans were only 19% of foreclosure starts nationwide, while Subprime adjustable-rate mortgages were 39%. More recently, the two levels have come together: prime loans are up to 29% of foreclosure starts while subprime adjustables came down to 27%.

But reporting only in percentages can be misleading. As Floyd Norris noted in August of 2008, “There are far more prime mortgages than subprime, of course, and subprime loans are much more likely to get into trouble. But this does show how the foreclosure problem is spreading.” Agreed. But the claim that during this crisis it has been Prime and not Subprime is simply unsubstantiated by the timeline or data. Subprime went bad first, then Alt-A, and then prime followed it later. Sub-prime and Alt-A went bad due to poor lending standards; Prime went bad in part due to job losses and as the economy got worse...

No, It Is Not a Sine Wave

Krishna Guha and Sarah O’Connor in Washington, Michael Mackenzie in New York and Ralph Atkins in Luxembourg write:

Jobs data dash recovery hopes: Published: July 2 2009 13:47 | Last updated: July 2 2009 21:49: Stock markets on both sides of the Atlantic tumbled on Thursday as investors took fright at a bigger-than-expected fall in US jobs last month that dashed hopes the recession was all but over in the world’s biggest economy. The data showed that the number of people in employment fell 467,000 in June and the unemployment rate rose from 9.4 per cent to 9.5 per cent, its highest for 26 years...

But what reason was there to hope that the recession was all but over in the first place? Just that the recent curve looked somewhat like a sine wave?

Krishna Guha: Please Discipline Your Headline Writers!

Krishna Guha to the orange courtesy phone, please.

The headline over your article is:

Romer Upbeat on US Economy

The quotes from the Hon. Christina D. Romer are:

• We do not want to repeat the mistake Japan made in the 1990s, when the moment things started to improve they tightened policy...

• [Stimulus spending is] going to ramp up strongly through the summer and the fall. We always knew we were not going to get all that much fiscal impact during the first five to six months. The big impact starts to hit from about now onwards...

• [Stimulus spending] should make a material contribution to growth in the third quarter...

• I am more optimistic that we are getting close to the bottom...

• I still hold out hope it will be a V-shaped recovery. It might not be the most likely scenario, but it is not as unlikely as many people think. We are going to get some serious oomph from the stimulus, there is the inventory cycle, and I believe there is some pent-up demand by consumers...

If that is what the FT calls "upbeat," what would be "downbeat"? "CEA Chair Romer advised Americans to stockpile bottled water, ammunition, gasoline, and sewing needles; and to start training for the Thunderdome"?

FT.com / US / Economy & Fed - Romer upbeat on US economy: The US economy will feel a substantial boost from the Obama administration’s emergency spending package over the next few months, says Christina Romer, a senior White House official, who has warned against tightening monetary and fiscal policy before recovery is well established. Ms Romer, chairman of the US president’s council of econ omic advisers, told the Financial Times in an interview she was “more optimistic” that the economy was close to stabilisation. But while hopeful that America could yet experience a V-shaped recovery, she said it was much too soon to begin tightening policy: “We do not want to repeat the mistake Japan made in the 1990s, when the moment things started to improve they tightened policy.”

Meanwhile, David Axelrod, a senior White House adviser, told NBC Television on Sunday the administration would be open to further stimulus if needed. “Let’s see in the fall where we are, but right now we believe what we have done is adequate to the task. If more is needed, we’ll have that discussion.”

Ms Romer’s comments come as opposition Republicans step up their attacks on the $787bn fiscal stimulus, pointing out that it has not prevented unemployment from hitting a quarter-century high of 9.4 per cent. Ms Romer said stimulus spending was “going to ramp up strongly through the summer and the fall. We always knew we were not going to get all that much fiscal impact during the first five to six months. The big impact starts to hit from about now onwards,” she said.

Ms Romer said that stimulus money was being disbursed at almost exactly the rate forecast by the Office of Management and Budget. “It should make a material contribution to growth in the third quarter.” But she acknowledged that cutbacks by states facing budget crises would push in the opposite direction. Ms Romer said the latest economic data were encouraging, following a weaker patch a month ago. “I am more optimistic that we are getting close to the bottom,” she said.

The CEA chairman, who has forecast a sharper rebound in 2010 than most economists, said she had lowered her estimates for growth this year “and also for next year, a bit” since the start of the year. She said the consensus forecast that unemployment would continue to rise for the rest of this year and peak early next year was probably accurate. But she added: “I still hold out hope it will be a V-shaped recovery. It might not be the most likely scenario but it is not as unlikely as many people think. We are going to get some serious oomph from the stimulus, there is the inventory cycle and I believe there is some pent-up demand by consumers.”

Fifty Little Herbert Hoovers Watch

The Economist's free exchange:

Fifty little Hoovers, hoovering up stimulus: MATTHEW YGLESIAS makes a good point:

Reading Harold Meyerson’s column on the looming devastation of California public services was yet another reminder of the remarkable extent to which the terrible continuing economic situation has bizarrely dropped off the political agenda. Even the whole “green shoots” debate is really about whether we can expect things to be somewhat better or somewhat worse six months out from now. In either case, things really are really bad right now. And a whole bunch of states—including large ones like California and Pennsylvania—are soon to implement substantial cutbacks in services at just the time when the objective need for social services is going up.

The American economy appears to be nearing the end of contraction. That's good news, particularly when one considers that only about 10% of the funds authorised in this year's stimulus bill has been spent; the plan is only beginning to ramp up and outlays will peak in 2010. We should expect that injection to provide the economy with a nice boost at a critical time.

On the other hand, state budget policies are sharply contractionary at this point. Despite allocations of federal aid to states, services are being cut, state employees are being laid off, and taxes are being raised in order to balance the budgets of local governments constitutionally unable to run deficits. It's not at all clear that the federal stimulus will entirely compensate for state-level fiscal tightening, which means that American fiscal policy could, on net, be contractionary.

Easy money is doing its part, of course, but the bottom line is that the fiscal boost many are expecting may not actually materialise. This will end up causing a lot of human suffering, and it may make for a long and shallow recovery—or worse, a tipping back into contraction.

Nobody thinks that it's time to go back in the water yet. And we do need a bigger stimulus.

I See No Green Shoots Here...

The BLS says:

And David Rosenberg, via Barry Ritholtz:

Getting Ready for a Bad Employment Number Friday Morning...

From Macro Advisers:

Private nonfarm payroll employment declined by 473,000 from May to June on a seasonally adjusted basis, according to the ADP National Employment Report™. Assuming government payrolls expand by 12,000 (the average monthly increase over the last year), this implies an estimated 461,000 decline in total nonfarm payroll employment, roughly 100,000 more of a decline than consensus expectations...

That Fiscal Stimulus Packages Work Is "Not Controversial," Says Bush CEA Chair Greg Mankiw

He said it back in 2003, when it was a Bush stimulus rather than an Obama stimulus program. But sauce for the goose...

Mark Thoma deals the deck:

Economist's View: "Deficits are Worrisome, but Not as Worrisome as an Economy that is Not Growing and is Rapidly Shedding Jobs": What do you think of this administration's arguments for deficit spending to spur the economy?:

Remarks of the Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers: I... want to discuss some larger issues about how fiscal policy should be evaluated.... I view the economy as experiencing something similar to a tug of war.... On the contraction end of the rope are the shocks that the U.S. economy has experienced.... Pulling hard on the other end of the rope are the expansionary forces of monetary and fiscal policy--the Federal Reserve’s series of interest rate cuts and the Administration’s... stimulus package.... I will not say much today about monetary policy.... But fiscal policy is my beat as CEA chair....

[A]nalysis done within the Administration has shown ... that ... the ... job market is not what we would like it to be right now, but it would have been worse without the Administration’s actions.... [Our stimulus] helps maintain the aggregate demand for goods and services. There is nothing novel about this. It is very conventional short-run stabilization policy: You can find it in all of the leading textbooks....

The qualitative effects... on the short-run output gap... are not controversial. There is less agreement on quantifying these effects.... To answer these questions, one would normally turn to a macroeconomic model such as those maintained by private forecasting firms.... I view such models as being very useful....

Deficits can raise interest rates and crowd out of investment, although I should note that the magnitude of this effect is much debated in the economics literature. The main problem now facing the U.S. economy is not high interest rates.... The Administration would prefer not to have deficits, but deficit reduction is only one of many goals.... Deficits are worrisome, but not as worrisome as an economy that is not growing and is rapidly shedding jobs....

The most important fiscal challenge facing the United States is not the current short-term deficits... but instead the looming long-term deficits associated with the rise in entitlement spending.... These longer-term issues, however, should not blind us to the immediate needs of the economy. The President came into office inheriting an economy... [in] a recession. He has responded vigorously to the challenges and, as a result, the current outlook for the U.S. economy is bright...

That was Greg Mankiw, on September 15, 2003 in a speech to the NABE. [Note: verb tense changed from past to present in a few places, 'chairman' was changed to 'chair,' and he is, of course, mainly promoting tax cuts, not government spending.]

I want to thank Mark for making me laugh louder than I have in two months.

Forecasting the Obama Economy

David Leonhardt writes:

Mistake by Obama’s Advisers in Predicting Job Losses: In the weeks just before President Obama took office, his economic advisers made a mistake. They got a little carried away with hope. To make the case for a big stimulus package, they released their economic forecast for the next few years. Without the stimulus, they saw the unemployment rate — then 7.2 percent — rising above 8 percent in 2009 and peaking at 9 percent next year. With the stimulus, the advisers said, unemployment would probably peak at 8 percent late this year. We now know that this forecast was terribly optimistic.... [T]he difference between the situation that the Obama advisers predicted and the one that has come to pass is about 2.5 million jobs. It’s as if every worker in the city of Los Angeles received an unexpected layoff notice.

There are two possible explanations that the administration was so wrong.... The first... is that the economy has deteriorated because the stimulus package failed.... The... answer is that the economy has deteriorated in spite of the stimulus. In other words, the patient is not as sick as he would have been without the medicine he received. But he is a lot sicker than doctors realized when they prescribed it.

To me, the evidence is fairly compelling that the second answer is the right one. The stimulus package does seem to have helped. But its impact has been minor — so far — compared with the harshness of the Great Recession. Unfortunately, the administration’s rose-colored forecast has muddied this picture.... Worst of all, the economy really may need more help.... There is no ironclad way to judge the stimulus, because we can’t rerun the last six months in an alternate universe. But you can get a pretty good sense by looking at the size of the gap between where the economy is today and where the administration thought it would be: those 2.5 million jobs that would still exist if the forecast had been right.

This gap is just far too large to be explained by the stimulus. The plan that Mr. Obama signed definitely has its flaws. It spends money more slowly than is ideal and spends some of it on projects of little long-term value. But no stimulus package could have come close to preventing 2.5 million job losses over six months.... When private economists began analyzing various stimulus proposals in January, they said that none would have a major effect on the jobless rate until the end of the year. By June, the effect would be only a few tenths of a percentage point, which translates into several hundred thousand jobs.

The stimulus that passed may in fact be having an impact of roughly this scale.... “Early results,” says Mark Zandi, [former McCain advisor and] chief economist of Moody’s Economy.com, “suggest the stimulus is performing close to expectations.” Obviously, though, the economy is not performing close to expectations...

As I understand matters, last December the median private-sector forecast had the unemployment rate topping out at 9% in the second half of 2009. The incoming Obama administration simply adopted that forecast. At the time I thought that was a mistake: (I thought that was a mistake: I thought they should have made a bifurcated forecast with a "good case" 80th-percentile scenario and a "bad case" 20th-percentile scenario; they should then have stressed that in the bad case we would need a large stimulus indeed to prevent high unemployment, and that in the good case we could restrain inflation via monetary policy.) By combining standard estimates of the effects of the fiscal boost package with that forecast, Jared Bernstein, Christie Romer, Steve Braun, Alan Krueger, and company came up with the "unemployment tops out at 8%" projected path for the economy that they put to bed a couple of days after New Year's and released at 6 AM EST Saturday, January 10, 2009.

By the end of January, when the Obama fiscal boost bill started working its way through congress, the situation had deteriorated significantly: things got worse in December as Christmas sales fell significantly below even recent expectations, et cetera. And here the Obama administration made its second mistake. The executive branch of the U.S. government is geared to do budget updates in two cycles six months apart: a January cycle and a July cycle. By the end of January the work on budget forecasting for the January cycle was well-advanced using the forecast as the transition had made it in mid-December. To change the forecast in early or mid-February to reflect the way the situation had changed over year-end would have required that OMB tear up a lot of estimation work and do it over at a time when the people in the NEOB are already working twelve-hour days to cope with all the extra work associated with a change of administration. I thought that they should have (a) changed the forecast and (b) simply not done the extra budget work: that they should simply have put an asterisk on every page of the budget saying that these numbers use the outdated mid-December rather than the current forecast. (In fact, I think the administration Troika should decouple its forecasts from the budget process, update them monthly, release them, and yet still feed them into the budget process only twice a year.) But, I think largely for these bureaucratic process reasons, they did not update their forecast. So by the time the stimulus bill was passed everyone's expectations were already that the 8% unemployment peak was way overoptimistic...

How about it guys? Can we get Steve Braun and company on a monthly forecast public update cycle decoupled from the budget process? It would improve the quality of information.

---

Among other things, it would make it extremely difficult for things to happen like what happened to the Mankiw CEA over the winter of 2003-2004, when high politics appears to have reached down into the forecast, changed the table for payroll employment (and only payroll employment: the rest of the forecast is not out of line with contemporary professional forecasts), and produced an estimate for December 2004 (a) inconsistent with the rest of the forecast, and (b) high by 2.3 million in its estimate of payroll employment--all because Karl Rove and company thought it important to avoid headlines like "Bush administration forecasts 2004 payroll employment to be less than when Bush took office."

White House Media Affairs would have a much harder time pressuring the forecasters to produce a "rosy scenario" if the pressure has to be kept on month after month...

---

Has Martin Wolf Been Reading too Many Comic Books?

He writes:

The cautious approach to fixing banks will not work: With one bound the banks are free...

Les Flaneurs vs. the Philosophers

Matthew Yglesias:

Matthew Yglesias » Home Page: Having read some excerpts (e.g.) from Chris Anderson’s Free and also Malcolm Gladwell’s takedown review, I think the whole subject could stand to benefit from a little less good writing and a bit more plodding distinction-drawing...

Please Allow Me to Introduce Myself: I'm a Central Banker of Wealth and Taste...

Now other people are weighing in. Here are a bunch of smart reactions to my "Sympathy for Greenspan" piece.

First, some scene-setting:

Knut Wicksell some eighty years ago argued that the purpose of a central bank like the Federal Reserve is to manipulate the money stock so that the "market" rate of interest is equal to the "natural" rate of interest. The natural rate of interest is the rate of interest at which intended savings is equal to intended investment--at which the rewards to saving call forth enough abstinence from consumption on the part of households to equal business desires to try to make additional profits by expanding capacity.

Why have the central bank manipulate the money stock? After all, won't the market eventually get it right? Wicksell said that the key was the "eventually": if the money stock was too low then the market rate of interest would be above the natural rate, and you would have a prolonged period of unanticipated deflation (because demand for consumption and investment goods together would be below the value of production, which is equal to households' incomes) that would cause lots of unemployment until the price level had fallen enough to make desired money holdings low enough to reduce the market rate to the natural rate; if the money stock was too low then the market rate of interest would be below the natural rate, and you would have a prolonged period of inflation (because demand for consumption and investment goods together would exceed the value of production, which is equal to households' incomes) that would cause lots of unjust wealth redistributions until the price level had risen enough to make desired money holdings high enough to increase the market rate to the natural rate. Better to aid the market in its job via activist central-bank monetary policy.

Thus Wicksell gave economists and central bankers:

• a goal for monetary policy: to set the market rate of interest equal to the natural rate.
• a rationale for monetary policy: to quickly carry out the adjustments to the real money stock that the unaided laissez-faire market would carry out only slowly and painfully.
• a way to judge the central bank: it was doing its job of setting the market to the natural rate if there was neither unanticipated inflation--which would mean the market rate was too low--or unanticipated deflation--which would mean the market rate was too high.

You can think of Wicksell's insights this way: In a credit economy the market interest rate would always be equal to the natural interest rate that balances desired saving and desired investment. However, we live not in a credit but in a monetary economy in which the interest rate has to both balance supply and demand for investment and balance desired increases in people's cash holdings to the increase in the money supply. It cannot do both of those--not and keep full employment--unless the increase in the money supply is of exactly the right magnitude. The job of the Federal Reserve is thus to change us back so that even though we live in a monetary policy interest rates are as if we lived in a credit economy.

That was what Alan Greenspan was trying to do in the first half of the 2000s: to set the market rate of interest equal to the natural rate. And he succeeded: there was neither unexpected inflation nor unexpected deflation.

But was it a mistake for Greenspan to have carried out the mission that Knut Wicksell assigned him? Should he have pushed the market rate of interest above the natural rate--pushed investment, production, and employment below their credit-economy laissez-faire levels--in the interest of avoiding the growth of a housing bubble?

I don't know: http://delong.typepad.com/sdj/2009/06/three-or-four-mistakes-in-american-monetary-policy.html. But other people are willing to venture an opinion:

Mark Thoma:

Economist's View: I have argued the Fed's decision to keep interest rates low contributed to the bubble, but was not itself the sole cause of it. As to whether the Fed made a mistake, I'll just note that the tradeoff wasn't quite as stark as Brad implies, i.e. there were other policy instruments that Fed could have used to limit the housing bubble. Regulation is certainly one means the Fed had to that end, but Fed communication could have helped too. If Greenspan had, for example, told people to stay away from mortgages because they were toxic rather than implicitly encouraging them to invest in housing, things might have been different.

Would limiting the bubble through regulation, communication, or other means have limited the employment response, the primary worry? I don't think so, at least not enough to matter. The money would have been invested somewhere, housing had an opportunity cost after all, so the next best alternatives would have been pursued to the extent that they were profitable (and many would have been, just not as profitable - apparently anyway - as investing in housing and mortgages). So people still would have been employed somewhere as the money was invested, just not in housing, and that would have helped to insulate us from the housing crash. (And a lot of them might still have those jobs, unlike the people who depended upon the housing markets for employment.)

So narrowly, keeping interest rates low and employment high was the right thing to do. The mistake was letting all of the action brought about by those low rates, or most of it anyway, occur in a single sector, housing, rather than using regulation and other means to limit the flow of resources into the housing market in pursuit of profits based upon the misperception of risk. Those resources could have been redirected into other sectors and put to productive use rather than wasted building houses nobody wants, and achieving this result did not require the Fed to aggressively raise the target rate, it only needed to use the other tools it already had available.

Unfortunately, however, those tools were not used, and the ideology Greenspan brought to the Fed played a large role in this outcome.

Michael @ Bright Rights:

Bright Rights: The causes of the financial crisis: Brad Delong has a nice post outlining some of the mistakes the government made before or during the crisis. I agree with all of the three points listed at the beginning of his article, but I disagree with his comment on Greenspan's involvement. Brad DeLong states:

On Tuesdays and Thursdays I think that going forward central bankers must now also recognize that it is imprudent to lower interest rates in pursuit of full employment when doing so risks an asset price bubble. On Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays I think that even with the extra information about the structure of the economy we have learned in the past two years that Greenspan's decisions in 2001-2004 were prudent and committed us to a favorable and acceptable bet. And I am writing this on a Friday.

I think before explaining my point of view, let me explain something about Alan Greenspan. Alan Greenspan believed (I don't know if he still holds this view) that central bankers should not involve themselves in asset bubbles. According to Mr. Greenspan, it is too difficult to identify when something is actually a bubble, until after it blows up. I think this is an incredibly irresponsible opinion. But I think if you are going to take the view, as Brad DeLong does at the end of his post, that Greenspan's actions were reasonable at the time, you have to take into account how Greenspan would react if he lost this bet. If an asset bubble occurs, in my opinion a central banker needs to step in and try to deflate it before it creates a crisis. However, Greenspan didn't believe in deflating bubbles; he believed in dealing with them after they blew up. Taking this view into account, it seems unreasonable to me to say Greenspan's actions were correct. I think they were only correct if he would have been willing to deflate bubbles. But we know he wasn't.

David Beckworth:

Macro and Other Market Musings: Yes Brad, the Fed's Low Interest Rate Policy Was a Mistake: Brad Delong is wondering whether the Federal Reserves' low interest rate policy in the early-to-mid 2000s was truly a mistake:

There is, however, active debate over whether there was a fourth mistake: whether Alan Greenspan's decision in 2001-2004 to push and keep nominal interest rates on Treasury securities very very low in order to try to keep the economy near full employment was a fourth mistake...I am genuinely not sure which side I come down on in this debate.

Brad's uncertainty is understandable given he invokes the entire 2001-2004 time frame. For during this period there was a time when the U.S. economic recovery was sputtering along (2001-2002) and a time when the recovery began to take hold (2003-2004). It was during this latter period that Fed's low interest rates were a big mistake. But even for that period I think Brad is misreading the data:

People claim that the Greenspan Federal Reserve "aggressively pushed the interest rate below its natural level."... [T]he market interest rate[, however,] was if anything above the natural interest rate in the early 2000s: not accelerating inflation but rather deflation threatened. The natural interest rate was very low because, as Ben Bernanke explained at the time, the world had a global savings glut (or, rather, a global investment deficiency). You can argue--and on Tuesdays and Thursdays I will believe you--that Alan Greenspan's policies in the early 2000s were wrong. But you cannot argue that he aggressively pushed the interest rate below its natural level. The low interest rate was at its natural level.

I think the evidence shows the opposite. The natural interest rate is a function of individual's time preferences, productivity, and the population growth rate. Of these three components, the one that changed the most in 2003-2004 was productivity.... [A] rise in productivity growth should lead to a rise in the natural interest rate and ultimately, a rise in the federal funds rate for monetary policy to stay neutral. However, this latter development did not happen. It seems, then, the Fed did push its policy rate below the natural rate and in the process created a huge Wicksellian-type disequilibria. This interpretation of events has been borne out more rigorously in this ECB paper. One a more practical level, this disequilbria comes through in the Taylor rule which similarly shows the federal funds rate was below the neutral rate during this time.

It is also worth noting that these same rapid productivity gains were the source of the deflationary pressures in 2003 that Brad mentions. Thus, these deflationary pressures did not indicate a weakening economy. In fact, aggregated demand (AD) was growing at at rapid rate in 2003-2004 which, if anything, indicated an overheating economy. The figure below shows a measure of AD, final sales to domestic purchasers, relative to the federal funds rate and has the period 2003-2004 marked off by the dotted lines (click on picture to enlarge):

The productivity gains, apparently, were offsetting the upward pressure on prices being created by the robust growth in AD at this time. There simply was no real deflationary threat in 2003. By way of contrast, this figure shows for 2008-2009 what a real AD-induced deflationary threat looks like. Regarding the saving glut theory I would recommend Menzie Chinn's post here or my previous post here...

Greg Ip:

What the regulators did wrong | Free exchange | Economist.com: BRAD DELONG catalogues the consensus on three mistakes the Fed made leading up to and during this crisis, and also gives a balanced and anguished analysis of a fourth: whether Alan Greenspan erred in keeping interest rates as low as he did.

I agree with almost everything here, in particular that it was almost impossible at the time to believe the Fed was erring in holding rates too low. (If the error was so obvious, surely more people would have pointed it out at the time, even if not a majority of people, right?) That this does not look the right decision in hindsight is because the small risk of a catastrophic financial collapse was in fact realised.

Where I do disagree, however, is his faulting abandoment of principles-based regulation, which he says allowed the shadow banking system to grow as much as it did beyond the reach of regulation. In fact, the decision to let the shadow banking system grow as large as it did was a textbook example of principles-based regulation. In most of the markets that went awry, bank regulators ran the show, and in America bank regulation is principles-based.

Regulators pride themselves on closely monitoring banks' behaviour, often from inside the banks themselves. If they get worried, they quietly tap the bankers on the shoulder and suggest they do something differently. When troubles arise, they are often handled with a nonpublic order. And when an order becomes public it is devoid of useful information, such as what the bank did wrong.

Contrast this with the SEC, which is rules-based and will make an errant broker take a perp walk in front of the TV cameras as a lesson to his peers. This different approach is precisely why, during the 2008 debate about financial modernisation, people like Hal Scott wanted a single financial regulator to adopt the approach of the bank regulators rather than that of the SEC.

This principals-based approach can be very powerful: regulators can bar a merger, ban a banker or do any number of far-reaching things. But the fact of the matter is that the bank regulators choose which principles to live by. They had countless opportunities to rein in the shadow banking system and chose not to because the most important principle guiding their action was to safeguard the depository. The Fed oversaw bank-holding companies and in theory had oversight of the off-balance sheet and non-bank activities that got banks into trouble. It chose not to exercise that oversight as long as the rest of the entity was a “source of strength” to the depository. Regulators also did not force banks to keep full capital on hand for off-balance-sheet vehicles, because to do so would've frustrated the very purpose of them: to legally segregate risky assets from the depository. In both these instances bank regulators used a principals-based approach. They simply deprioritised the principles that would prove most important. They failed to look for potential sources of systemic risk and think creatively about how things that should not have threatened the bank in theory did in practice.

This is a cautionary tale to those who call for principles-based regulation. Just how it works in practice depends on the principles being observed.

Noam Scheiber:

Are We Too Hard On Greenspan? (Hint: Probably Not.) - The Stash: I guess my problem with this analysis is that I don't think it's right to lump the years 2001-2004 together. From early 2001 to early 2003, the economy was indeed very weak, and it's hard to quibble with Greenspan's decision to ease interest rates aggressively and stay easy. But by mid-2003, the economy was growing at a decent clip. It may not have been quite at full employment, but certainly stable. And yet Greenspan lowered the fed funds rate another quarter point to an eye-popping 1 percent in June of 2003, and kept it there through June of 2004. (And though the tightening began at that point, the fed funds rate was still at a mere 2.25 percent through January of 2005.) During the four quarters between June '03 and June '04, the economy grew at a real rate of 7.5 percent, 2.7 percent, 3 percent, and 3.5 percent. So when people talk about a monetary policy mistake, I think they're generally refering to that final year of easing, not the 2001 through mid-2003 period.

The stated reason for this continued easing was that Greenspan wanted to take out an insurance policy against deflation, of which there were some mild hints at the time, though even Greenspan referred to them as remote. In retrospect, this concern was probably unwarranted, as inflation chugged along either at or well-above the Fed's implicit target through all of 2004. Worse, all the easing appears to have resulted in a massive real estate bubble.

But, as DeLong says, the question isn't whether a policymaker is wrong in retrospect. The question is whether he or she made a reasonable bet at the time. DeLong thinks maybe. I lean the other way. Here's why: DeLong's defense of Greenspan hinges on the idea that, if it turned out the Fed was wrong about the necessity of easing--so wrong it created a bubble that later popped and threatened a deflationary spiral--the Fed had enough powerful tools at its disposal to prevent a depression at that point.

Three or Four Mistakes in American Monetary Policy?

http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/delong91

In the circles in which I travel, there is near-universal consensus that here in America our monetary philosopher-princes have made three serious mistakes. This consensus is almost always qualified by fervent declarations that we have been very well served by our Federal Reserve chairs and others since at least Paul Volcker's accession to the chair at the end of the table in the Eccles' Building's conference room, and that each of us who has not sat in that chair knows that he or she would have made worse mistakes, but nevertheless there is a consensus that mistakes were made when:

• the Federal Reserve and the Treasury decided to nationalize AIG rather than to support AIG's counterparties last fall, allowing financiers to pretend that their strategies were fundamentally sound rather than things that would have shut down their firms had the Feds not paid AIG's bills.

• the Federal Reserve and the Treasury decided to let Lehman Brothers go into an uncontrolled bankruptcy last fall in order to try to teach financiers that having an ill-capitalized counterparty was not riskless and that people should not expect the government to come to their rescue always.

• the long-ago decision was made to eschew principles-based regulation and allow the shadow banking sector to grow unregulated with respect to its leverage and its compensation schemes in the belief that government regulation of finance should be minimal and that the government's guarantee of the commercial banking system was enough to keep us out of messes like the one we are currently in.

As I said, there is near-universal consensus in the circles in which I travel that these were mistakes and serious mistakes--and it is as certain as it is that the sun will rise in the east tomorrow morning that monetary policymakers will not make these mistakes again.

There is, however, active debate over whether there was a fourth mistake: whether Alan Greenspan's decision in 2001-2004 to push and keep nominal interest rates on Treasury securities very very low in order to try to keep the economy near full employment was a fourth mistake. Should Alan Greenspan have kept interest rates higher and triggered a much bigger recession with much higher unemployment back then in order to head off the growth of a housing bubble? If we push interest rates up, Alan Greenspan thought, millions of extra Americans will be unemployed and without incomes to no benefit--they will not enjoy the prolonged "staycations" they will be taking, and the rest of us won't have the stuff they could make. If we allow interest rates to fall, Alan Greenspan thought, these extra workers will be employed building houses and making things to sell to all the people whose incomes come from the construction sector and making things to sell to the people whose incomes come from making things to sell to people whose incomes come to the construction sector. Full employment is better than high unemployment if both can be accomplished without inflation, Alan Greenspan thought. If a bubble does develop, and if the bubble does not deflate but crashes, and if the crash threatens to cause a depression--well, Greenspan thought, then will be the time to deal with that, and the Federal Reserve is a very powerful institution with policy tools that can short-circuit that chain leading to catastrophe at any point.

With hindsight Alan Greenspan was wrong. Catastrophe does stare us in the face. His policies have crapped out. But not every good policy is certain to have a good outcome. The question is: was the bet that Alan Greenspan made a favorable one? Whenever in the future we find ourselves in a situation like 2003 should we try to keep the economy near full employment even at some risk of a developing bubble?

I am genuinely not sure which side I come down on in this debate. Central bankers have long recognized that it is imprudent to lower interest rates in pursuit of full employment if the consequence is an inflationary spiral in wages, resource prices, or consumer prices. On Tuesdays and Thursdays I think that going forward central bankers must now also recognize that it is imprudent to lower interest rates in pursuit of full employment when doing so risks an asset price bubble. On Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays I think that even with the extra information about the structure of the economy we have learned in the past two years that Greenspan's decisions in 2001-2004 were prudent and committed us to a favorable and acceptable bet. And I am writing this on a Friday.

I do, however, know that the way the issue is usually posed is wrong. People claim that the Greenspan Federal Reserve "aggressively pushed the interest rate below its natural level." But what is the natural level of the interest rate? Swedish economist Knut Wicksell defined the natural rate of interest in the 1920s: it is the interest rate at which, economy wide, desired investment is equal to desired savings and hence in which there is neither upward pressure for consumer price, resource price, and wage inflation to accelerate as aggregate demand outruns supply nor downward pressure on those three inflation rates as demand falls short of supply. On Wicksell's definition--which is the best, in fact, to my knowledge the only definition--the market interest rate was if anything above the natural interest rate in the early 2000s: not accelerating inflation but rather deflation threatened. The natural interest rate was very low because, as Ben Bernanke explained at the time, the world had a global savings glut (or, rather, a global investment deficiency).

You can argue--and on Tuesdays and Thursdays I will believe you--that Alan Greenspan's policies in the early 2000s were wrong. But you cannot argue that he aggressively pushed the interest rate below its natural level. The low interest rate was at its natural level. Rather, Greenspan's mistake--if it was a mistake--was his failure to overrule the market and aggressively push the interest rate up above its natural rate, thus deepening and prolonging the recession that started in 2001.

It's Friday, and I don't think Greenspan's failure to push the interest rate up above its natural rate to generate high unemployment and head off the growth of a mortgage-finance bubble was a mistake. There were mistakes--other places where the chain that has generated the catastrophe that faces us should have been interrupted. But today at least I don't think Greenspan's unwillingness to overrule the market's choice of the natural interest rate was one of them.

---

Open publication - Free publishing - More wicksell

The Public Plan for Health Insurance: In Which Greg Mankiw Confesses to Remarkable Ignorance and Asks a Question that We Answer...

He wonders:

Greg Mankiw's Blog: The Arbiter of Ignorance: In a brief blog post on healthcare, Paul Krugman says that George Will and I are "either remarkably ignorant or simply disingenuous." I cannot speak for George, but I can attest that I am completely ingenuous. So I suppose I must be remarkably ignorant.

There is a lot of that going around lately. In an earlier post on the state of macroeconomics, Paul says, "Brad DeLong and I have been sort of tag-teaming the Great Ignorance which seems to have overtaken much of the economics profession."

What is going through Paul's head as he writes these posts?...

Two things are going through Paul's mind:

1. That at least since Kenneth Arrow weighed in on the subject... generations ago, there has been a consensus among health economists that adverse selection and moral hazard make properly structuring health-care markets very hard and very tricky, and that even if you do many of the usual benefits of market mechanisms are greatly attenuated in the health sector.

2. He reads what Mankiw is writing right now--for example: "The Pitfalls of the Public Option in Health Care: [Obama's] economic logic regarding the public option is hard to follow. Consumer choice and honest competition are indeed the foundation of a successful market system, but they are usually achieved without a public provider. We don’t need government-run grocery stores or government-run gas stations to ensure that Americans can buy food and fuel at reasonable prices..."--and he doesn't find any recognition that information and selection problems that are not present in grocery or gasoline markets are of the essence in the health care sector.

The economic logic behind a public plan springs from these information and selection problems. Private health-insurance companies are currently spending a fortune in a negative-sum game by which they try to make other private companies and not themselves actually pay for treating sick people. A public plan run by bureaucrats would not face those incentives, and would not waste money in that way. A public plan would, however, have its own inefficiencies: it would be run by bureaucrats, and would waste money in other ways.

Which set of inefficiencies would be greatest? We don't know. The argument for a public plan is that we should be like the mongoose Rikki-Tikki-Tavi, whose motto is: "run and find out." We should set up a public plan, let it compete with the privates, and see if it can provide care people like more cheaply than the private insurance companies. Friedrich Hayek would approve: the idea is to use the market as an institutional discovery mechanism.

The arguments against a public plan are two:

1. It would be able to provide people with better health care more cheaply, and would drive the private-insurance companies out of business, and their executives would lose their jobs and be sad, and their shareholders would lose their money and be sad, and their lobbyists would lose their jobs and be sad, and their tame legislators would lose their campaign contributions and be sad.

2. Mankiw's argument that a public plan will inevitably receive large and wasteful federal subsidies no matter what the initial law says.

The exammple Mankiw uses to back up his argument seems to me to be very strange. It is: "Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the mortgage giants created by federal law, were once private companies. Yet many investors believed--correctly, as it turned out--that the federal government would stand behind Fannie’s and Freddie’s debts..." and thus provide them with a subsidy.

There is a problem with this argument.

The problem is that in the past year and a half the Federal government has stood behind the debts of not just Fannie and Freddie, but AIG, Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, Bank of America, Morgan Stanley, and Goldman Sachs--none of which bear any resemblance whatsoever to a "public plan." The government has stood behind Fannie and Freddie not because they were, before 1968, public enterprises but because they were--like AIG, Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, Bank of America, Morgan Stanley, and Goldman Sachs--too big to fail. The Treasury staff would have loved to have let Fannie and Freddie default on their bonds had they not feared the systemic consequences.

The fact that Mankiw can't find an example of his argument (2) makes me think that it is very weak, and that the real reason people oppose the public plan is (1).

Andrew Samwick Is in Despair...

Pessimism of the intellect! But optimism of the will, Andrew! I must say I want my sensible bipartisan center back, I want it back real bad.

Andrew:

Climate Vote Shows Why I Am Still a Man Without a Party: I had three reactions to yesterday's cap-and-trade vote, two of which came from The New York Times article that I read this morning and one of which came from Stan's very smart post.  Here they are:

• From the article, "Only eight Republicans voted for the bill, which runs to more than 1,300 pages."
• From the article, "The bill would grant a majority of the permits free in the early years of the program, to keep costs low."
• From Stan, "But the bigger story is that the White House once again has demonstrated an excellent ability to get Congress to go along with the things it wants."

And now let me take each one in turn.

1) From the article, "Only eight Republicans voted for the bill, which runs to more than 1,300 pages." Much as you may like the idea, this is another 1300 pages of complexity and loopholes.  Buried in there, I'll wager, are more than enough ways for large organizations (the ones who hire lobbyists) to get all the exemption and evasion they'll need.  Consider the alternative of a carbon tax calibrated to achieve the same emission reductions, and applied to all sectors including vehicle fuel consumption.  I'm no expert on translating ideas into pages of a bill, but that can't be much.  And given that it allows us to do away with the CAFE standards, I figure we've done a great service of dramatically simplifying the whole regulatory process for carbon emissions.

2) From the article, "The bill would grant a majority of the permits free in the early years of the program, to keep costs low." That's a couple of interesting pages, no?  This is the critical issue and the bill is flawed for giving into the special interests who demanded and got this giveaway.  The caps require the price to go up, much like a tax would.  Advocates of a green tax swap, like me, would like the additional revenue that consumers of carbon-intensive products pay to be returned to the private sector in a way that lowers the taxes on something desirable, like payroll.  Giving the revenue back to the producers should not be an option.

3) From Stan, "But the bigger story is that the White House once again has demonstrated an excellent ability to get Congress to go along with the things it wants." I think that this sentence -- which is a completely accurate description of the way policy gets made in Washington -- is also an indication of what's backwards about the way policy gets made in Washington.  The power in government should reside with the legislature, not the executive.  I think that much of the reason why the presidential election season has grown to its current monstrous proportions (a full two years of campaigning) is that politicians have realized that the presidency has all the power and the Congress has made itself a weak, secondary player.  I'll be a much happier citizen when Stan has occasion to write, "But the bigger story is that the Congress once again has demonstrated an excellent ability to get the White House to go along with the things it wants."

So how does all of this make me a man without a party?  On each one of these issues, my reading of the polical landscape is that the Republicans are further from the correct policy action than the Democrats. 

It's a step. It's not a big step. It's a very small step. And it's mostly in a sideways direction. But at least it is a step that is not away from where we need to be, and the hope is that having taken one step it will then be easier to take another.

But God only knows what--if anything--will come out of the Senate and conference if this is what comes out of the House.

I want my Al Gore BTU tax from 1993 back!

Washington Post Crashed-and-Burned Watch (Ceci Connolly/Health Care Coverage Department)

Why would the Washington Post have a health-care story written by a reporter who knows neither legislative process nor health-care policy substance?

Outsourced to Robert Waldmann (Robert! Paul and Nadine Mende say hello!):

Decimate or Alienate: A good sign of a totally bogus argument is reliance on contradictory presumptions of fact. When one is simply wrong, one can often make a convincing argument by inventing facts. When one is being absurd, one can fall into the temptation to invent inconsistent facts.

In this article in the Washington Post Ceci Connolly is being absurd. She argues that progressives (such as movon) who attack Democratic Senators who don't support a public option are endangering health care reform. For brevity only I will call the first group "leftists" and the second "centrists." "Centrists" is not as accurate as "people who care more about the value of insurance company shares than equity or efficiency and who are willing to sell their votes for campaign contributions" would be more accurate but too long.

She presents two arguments: one stated in her own name (in what is supposed to be a news article), and one ascribed to an anonymous source whom she does not criticize.

The first is that the centrists have the power and might destroy health care reform if their feelings are hurt. Hence her personally stated opinion that leftist pressure is a bad idea because "the intraparty rift runs the risk of alienating centrist Democrats who will be needed to pass a bill." Now I know it was rude of me to suggest that said centrists are more or less corrupt, but at least I didn't assert--as Connolly did--that they are willing to leave people without health insurance out of pique.

The second is that centrist Democrats are better than Republicans and terribly weak so that criticizing them will cause them to lose office -- just look what a close call Ben Nelson had last time. Hence the anonymous source:

The strategist, who asked for anonymity because he was criticizing colleagues, said: "These are friends of ours. I would much rather see a quiet call placed by [Obama chief of staff] Rahm Emanuel saying this isn't helpful. Instead, we try to decimate them?"

So which are they? People so powerful that they must not be offended or they will damage the country, or people so weak that one tenth of them will die horrible deaths if they are criticized?... Oh and did the strategist also ask that it not be mentioned whether or not he or she is paid by big business for helping them with public relations?

Just reading the headline, I knew I'd be hearing about this at eschaton, who linked to Adam Green.

Boy am I late on this. I'm not even the first Waldman[n] to denounce Connolly...

---

And, of course, from the past: Eric Boehlert on why the world would be a better place if Ceci Connolly had never written a word:

The Press vs. Al Gore : Rolling Stone: Lots of well-known embellishment stories were not legitimate, such as the infamous Love Canal incident. When Gore spoke at Concord High School in New Hampshire on November 30th, 1999, and urged students to take an active role in politics, he recalled that it was a letter years before from a student in Toone, Tennessee, that got then-Rep. Gore interested in the topic of toxic waste. "I called for a congressional investigation and a hearing," Gore told the students. "I looked around the country for other sites like that. I found a little place in upstate New York called Love Canal. I had the first hearing on that issue - and Toone, Tennessee, that was the one that you didn't hear of. But that was the one that started it all."

The next day, both the Washington Post and the New York Time botched the quote, erroneously reporting Gore had bragged, "I was the one that started it all."

The Post's Ceci Connolly, who covered Gore campaign for eighteen months and made the error, today insists that her miscue "did not change the context" of Gore's original statement. She contends that the key quote, the one that catches Gore embellishing, was the quote "I found a little place in upstate New York called Love Canal." Yet clearly from his response, Gore used the term "found" in reference to "looking around the country for other sites like" Toone, and in no way suggested he uncovered the Love Canal toxic-waste disaster.

Thanks to the high-profile misquote, though, the media's echo chamber erupted, with MSNBC's Chris Matthews mocking Gore for being delusional, while ABC's George Stephanopoulos lamented that the vice president had "revealed his Pinocchio problem." (In a press release, the ever-helpful Republican National Committee cleaned up the mangled quote, changing "that" to "who" in order to make the misquote grammatically correct: "I was the one who started it all.") This time Gore responded quickly but was again too humble, calling a reporter the morning after the Concord visit to say he was sorry if his Love Canal comments had not been clear enough.

It was actually local students, enrolled in a media-literacy course, who had to set the record straight by taking the unusual step of issuing their own press release under the headline TOP TEN REASONS WHY MANY CONCORD HIGH STUDENTS FEEL BETRAYED BY SOME OF THE MEDIA COVERAGE OF AL GORE'S VISIT TO THE THEIR SCHOOL.

It took the Post and the Times a week to run Love Canal corrections. Yet one month before Election Day, the usually reliable Associated Press reported confidently, "Gore's exaggerations have placed him more centrally than warranted at the creation of . . . the Love Canal toxic-waste investigation." The episode fit a distinct pattern: Journalists just refused to drop unflattering Gore stories, no matter what the facts revealed...

DRAFT Lecture Notes for September 1 & 3, 2009: Econ 115: Twentieth Century Economic History

The state of the world's economy in 1870, back at the start of the "long" twentieth century.

(DRAFTS only--without reference notes yet, and saying a number of things I think are wrong...)

---

---

Download now or preview on posterous

Download now or preview on posterous

DeLong: The Simplest Possible Behavioral Finance Bubble Model

There are, I think, two big questions in behavioral finance:

1. Under what circumstances will normal, human behavior by investors produce forces in financial markets that drive them to speculative excess?

2. Under what circumstances will arbitrageurs--smart, sophisticated investors who understand what is going on--fail to help the situation much?

A first whack at trying to answer (1):

---

Download now or preview on posterous

---

Can the Federal Reserve Shrink the Money Stock Rapidly Now that It Can Pay Interest on Reserves?

Tyler Cowen asks:

Marginal Revolution: Paying interest on reserves, and why it should be easy to disarm future inflationary pressures. Do I believe it?

The correct answer is "maybe."

If inflationary pressure comes because banks and others regain their confidence and seek to move their excess reserve deposits into higher-yielding dollar denominated assets, then the Federal Reserve can fix that with a flick of its wrist by raising the interest rate on deposits.

If inflationary pressure comes because banks and others fear a large dollar depreciation and seek to move their excess reserve deposits into non-dollar denominated assets, then the Federal Reserve is helpless, and the situation is dire--unless the Federal Reserve has gotten the authority to issue bonds and has preemptively used that authority to mop up the excess liquidity.

Paul McCulley of PIMCO:

PIMCO - Global Central Bank Focus June 2009 Exit Strategy: Most rational investors accept the dual proposition that a Fed funds rate pinned against zero and near-$800 billion of excess reserves sloshing around the banking system are not enduringly sustainable. This is the case despite the fact that most – though a smaller most – applaud the Fed for engineering these outcomes, so as to cut off the fat tail risk of deflationary Armageddon. The consensus overwhelmingly holds that once that fat tail has been cut off and then killed, borrowing from Colin Powell’s famous description of America’s strategy for running Iraq out of Kuwait, it will be necessary for the Fed to exit its extraordinarily accommodative strategy, hiking the Fed funds rate and soaking up all those excess reserves. It’s hard to argue with the basic thrust of this exit thesis. Because it’s basically right!

I must admit, however, that I’m perplexed that so many pundits put so much emphasis on the importance of the Fed soaking up excess reserves, as if it is a necessary condition for hiking the Fed funds rate. It is not. To be sure, it used to be, before the Fed had the legal authority to pay interest on reserves, which Congress granted last fall. Before then, the only way the Fed could achieve a meaningfully positive Fed funds rate target was to constrain the supply of reserves relative to the banking system’s demand for reserves, essentially required reserves. If there were excessive excess reserves, then the Fed funds rate would fall below the Fed’s target, as banks with excess would be willing to lend them out in the Fed funds market below the Fed funds target, given that if they simply left them at the Fed, they would earn nothing. But now, the Fed pays interest on banks’ excess reserves (presently at an interest rate of 0.25%, the top of the Fed’s 0% – 0.25% target band for the Fed funds rate). Thus, logic says that banks with excess reserves will not lend them in the Fed funds market at a rate appreciably lower than the Fed pays, but simply leave them on deposit at the Fed. Accordingly, the rate that the Fed pays on excess reserves should now act as a proximate floor for the Fed funds rate, even if there are huge excess reserves in the system. Thus, by hiking the rate it pays on excess reserves, the Fed now has the ability to enforce a rising Fed funds rate target – even before it “unwinds” its bloated balance sheet....

The Federal Reserve’s approach to supporting credit markets is... credit easing... focuses on the mix of loans and securities that it holds and on how this composition of assets affects credit conditions.... [C]redit spreads are much wider and credit markets more dysfunctional in the United States today than was the case during the Japanese experiment with quantitative easing. To stimulate aggregate demand in the current environment, the Federal Reserve must focus its policies on reducing those spreads and improving the functioning of private credit markets more generally.... When markets are illiquid and private arbitrage is impaired by balance sheet constraints and other factors, as at present, one dollar of longer-term securities purchases is unlikely to have the same impact on financial markets and the economy as a dollar of lending to banks, which has in turn a different effect than a dollar of lending to support the commercial paper market.... [T]he stance of Fed policy in the current regime – in contrast to a QE regime – is not easily summarized by a single number....

Yes, I know that many of your eyes are probably glazing over about now, given my (and Ben’s) wonkishness. I’m sorry about that, but this is really, really important stuff to understand, given the widespread yammering about the need for the Fed to have an exit strategy to de-create all the excess reserves it has created, as if they are intrinsically the kindling for an (eventual) rip-roaring inflationary fire. They are not.... [W]e can categorically say that the near-zero Fed funds rate is not, for the moment, fueling an inflationary pace of aggregate demand growth.... And neither is the Fed’s Credit Easing.... Yes, in the fullness of time, zero Fed funds could conceptually re-ignite borrowers’ and lenders’ mojo. Indeed, that’s precisely the Fed’s objective. And if and when that objective is achieved, the Fed funds rate will need to be hiked.... But right now, the least of my worries, and I think the Fed’s, too, is the prospect for an overheated economy, putting too many idled resources, both labor and industrial capacity, back to work too quickly... it would be delightful if that were our primary worry! But it isn’t....

Chairman Bernanke and a number of his colleagues have talked about all these various tools, stressing they have plenty of potential doors in their exit strategy. And indeed they do, even though simply hiking the rate the Fed pays on excess reserves is the cleanest way to hike the Fed funds rate...

The Structural Deficit

It is, I think, much too early to be worrying about closing America's structural deficit through any policies other than trying to set health care cost-containment in motion. Recession-fighting should be the agenda for 2009-2010. Structural balance should be the agenda for 2011-2012.

Ed Luce disagrees:

Deficit disorder: Back in February, Barack Obama’s presidency suffered an early setback when Judd Gregg, the Republican senator from New Hampshire, withdrew as his nominee for commerce secretary... decided he could not belong to an administration that would preside over such high budget deficits.... The Congressional Budget Office, a nonpartisan watchdog, forecasts that the US will post deficits in excess of a trillion dollars in each of the next 10 years... national debt will double to 82 per cent of GDP in the next decade – a level not seen since the second world war.... America’s fiscal outlook has rapidly become the object of widespread alarm....

The administration cannot be blamed for what is this year an almost entirely inherited deficit. Mr Obama’s new spending accounts for only about one-tenth of it. The effects of the recession, the costs of the bank bail-out and the structural legacy of the three large tax cuts and two wars bequeathed by George W. Bush account for the remainder. Nor do critics, including Mr Gregg, blame the new president for pushing through a $787bn two-year fiscal stimulus within a month of moving into the White House. “We needed to dig the economy out of a hole,” says Mr Gregg. “I understand that.”...

Barack Obama made it clear this week that the door to further fiscal stimulus is wide open – even as he stressed that his administration has not yet decided to seek one from Congress, writes Krishna Guha. “I think it’s important to see how the economy evolves and how effective the first stimulus is,” he told a news conference. But the US president added that “nobody understood what the depths of this recession were going to look like” when the current stimulus package was passed weeks after he took office in January. Many analysts think it is all but inevitable that the administration will end up seeking an additional stimulus if only to smooth the cliff-edge effect when the effects of the previous boost fade and tax cuts introduced under George W. Bush expire from late 2010. Otherwise, many see a serious risk of a double-dip recession in 2011....

But politics is quick to change. The otherwise deeply unpopular Republican party is starting to sense an opportunity. A rapidly growing proportion of the US public is registering anxiety at the sea of red ink.... Ben Bernanke, governor of the Federal Reserve, told Congress this month: “Unless we demonstrate a strong commitment to fiscal sustainability in the longer term, we will have neither financial stability nor healthy economic growth.” All this leaves Mr Obama in a deepening quandary. In Augustinian style, he needs to keep pumping the economy in the short term, since consumers, who are the mainstay of the US economy, are unlikely to resume spending soon. But he needs simultaneously to reassure investors that he has put in place plans for a return to fiscal responsibility the moment recovery sets in.

The White House promises to halve the deficit it inherited by the end of Mr Obama’s first term in 2012. But few believe the economic growth numbers on which its projections are based. “I probably shouldn’t say this but President Obama’s plans remind me of George W. Bush,” says Douglas Holtz-Eakin, a former head of the CBO who was John McCain’s chief economic adviser during the the presidential election. “Both presidents experienced a crisis – 9/11 and the financial meltdown. Both promised to halve their resulting budget deficits. Neither were credible.”...

[T]he vast looming deficits in Medicare and Medicaid.... Conventional wisdom says Mr Obama should set up a bipartisan commission to tackle the problem. This would be the only way of shielding both parties from the political fall-out that would undoubtedly result from a cut in benefits.... Most Republicans, meanwhile, would agree to join the commission only if it excluded the possibility of tax increases – a precondition that would in effect kill the exercise before it began....

A plausible alternative scenario is that Mr Obama will head into next year’s midterm congressional elections, which will help determine his re-election chances in 2012, facing a sullen electorate that fears the Democrats are taking their country towards bankruptcy. It might not be fair – Mr Bush, rather than Mr Obama, deserves most of the blame for America’s deepening structural deficits. But it is the kind of message that could help bring a moribund Republican party back to life...

In Which Stanford Economist John Taylor Adopts the False, Exploded "Treasury View" of More than Eighty Years Ago...

You know, it is very odd: When nominal interest rates on short-term Treasury securities are at their normal levels--4% or 3% or even 2% per year--I am among the very first to declare that discretionary fiscal policy has no proper role to play, and that the task of managing the business cycle should be left to the fiscal automatic stabilizers and to the Federal Reserve.

But things are--as we economists have known for nearly a century--different when short-term safe nominal interest rates are at their floor to make safe short-term bonds nearly perfect substitutes for cash, for then the standard mechanisms of monetary policy--flooding the system with cash and relying on the fact that holding wealth in cash is expensive (for it means that you forego interest) to trigger a rise in spending--is not guaranteed to work. And then fiscal policy has a place. To deny that fiscal policy has a place is then, it seems, to me, to fail the most basic test of thinking like an economist. As John Hicks put it back in 1937, we know that the speed at which people spend their cash--the velocity of money--is a function of the short-term safe nominal interest rate. And we know that the velocity of money becomes very elastic as the short-term safe nominal interest rate becomes very low:

On grounds of pure value theory, it is evident that the direct sacrifice made by a person who holds a stock of money is a sacrifice of interest; and it is hard to believe that the marginal principle does not operate at all in this field. As Lavington puts it:

The quntity of resources which (an individual) holds in the form of money will be suh that the unit of money which is just and only just worthwhile holding in this form yields him a return of convenience nad security equal to the... net rate of interest.

The demand for money depends upon the rate of interest!...

It is not only possible to show that a given supply of money determines a certain relation between [national] income and interest... it is also possible to say something about the shape of the cure. It will probably tend to be nearly horizontal on the left.... If is lies to the right, then we can indeed increase employment by increasing the quantity of money; but if IS lies to the left [and short-term safe interest rates are at their minimum], we cannot do so; merely monetary means will not force down the interest rate any further...

and we have to resort to fiscal policy and banking policy--things that affect not the quantity of money but the flow-of-funds through financial markets.

Now, however, we have to add John Taylor to the votaries of the 1920s-era "Treasury View": the claim that fiscal policy must be ineffective. He is thus one of those who, as Olivier Blanchard puts it, does not know things that Irving Fisher and Knut Wicksell (or at least John Hicks) knew.

Why John Taylor believes in the "Treasury View" is not at all clear. Paul Krugman writes:

The virus is spreading: I just taped Fareed Zakaria with John Taylor, who is a fine economist. But if I understood John’s position, it was that fiscal expansion is actually contractionary, because deficits drive up interest rates, unless the fiscal expansion takes the form of permanent tax cuts...

I'm not so sure about Taylor. The last paper of his I cracked... wasn't impressive. It was supposed to show that fiscal policy could not be powerful. And it didn't deliver.

Here's what I had to say about it at a conference at Stanford early in May:

Tuesday afternoon I sat down to... Cogan, Cwik, Taylor, and Wieland (2009).... I dug--and found that Cogan et al.’s claim [that they and the Obama administration had analzyed] “exactly the same policy change” was simply wrong. Romer-Bernstein model an increase in government spending with the Federal Reserve expanding and keeping on expanding the money supply in order to keep the short-term Treasury Bill interest rate the same. Taylor (1993) models an increase in government spending with the Federal Reserve contracting the real money supply to push the short-term Treasury Bill interest rate up over time as unemployment falls and inflation creeps up. There is no “robustness” problem with Romer-Bernstein at all: the results are different because the policy changes are different.

“Geez,” my first thought was, “this is embarrassing--none of four coauthors of Cogan actually read Romer-Bernstein at all carefully. Sloppy.” Then I got to page 5 of Cogan: “Romer and Bernstein assume that the Federal Reserve pegs the interest rate....” Cogan et al. know perfectly well that the policy changes are not “exactly the same.” They just say they are.

I am sorry. In Europe that gets you four red cards. In America that gets you sent to the showers. The first intellectual responsibility of critique is to accurately present what you are critiquing. When Cogan et al. learn that they can come back into the game. But not until then.

What is their explanation for not telling us up front that they are assuming a different monetary policy? They give none. What is their explanation for assuming a different fiscal policy? It is this:

Romer and Bernstein assume that the Federal Reserve pegs the interest rate—the federal funds rate—at the current level of zero.... [S]uch a pure interest rate peg is prohibited in new Keynesian models with forward-looking households and firms because it... lead[s] to instability and non-uniqueness.... Inflation expectations of households and firms become unanchored and unhinged and the price level may explode in an upward spiral….

In short, the monetary policy rule that Romer and Bernstein believe that the Federal Reserve is following makes fiscal policy incredibly powerful: so powerful that the level of nominal spending explodes. So we are going to make a different assumption about monetary policy that makes fiscal policy weak because we assume the Federal Reserve neutralizes the effects of government spending.

Do they provide any reason to justify their monetary policy assumption--any reason to believe that the Federal Reserve is currently engaged in raising short-term interest rates to neutralize the effects of fiscal expansion? No, they do not.

---

Open publication - Free publishing - More macroeconomics

In Praise of Good Government by Barack Hussein Obama

Stan Collender watches Obama take his responsibilities to the nation seriously:

Attention All Deficit Hawks: Do You Know Where Your Veto Threats Are? | Capital Gains and Games: The White House yesterday did something that should truly warm the hearts of deficit hawks everywhere: it threated to veto the 2010 military authorization bill over two big spending issues -- the F22 and the alternate engine for the F35.

A little background.  Although both of these programs were questioned for years by the Bush White House, Congress kept insisting that the Pentagon spend the money anyway and the president always went along.  This year, The F22 was a target of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates ....

The Obama veto threat is a much bigger deal than it seems.

First, the White House didn't have to do it.  It's threating to veto an authorization bill that, even if it's adopted, won't actually spend any money.  That will happen later in the year with the appropriation.  That means that the administration is drawing the line now and trying to stop the spending for both programs from gaining any momentum.  That's a good sign.... Second, the veto threat came in the midst of the much bigger fight for the White House on health care.  The White House could have backed away so that it didn't antagonize the members who support these programs... but it didn't.  Again, another good sign for deficit hawks who want proof of the president's devotion to reduced spending...

Fiscal Policy Watch: Anyone Have a Good Feeling About the Next Employment Report? Anyone? Anyone? Bueller?

I certainly don't.

And once again I am reminded of the two rules for understanding the world:

1. Paul Krugman is right.
2. If you ever think Paul Krugman is wrong, refer to rule #1.

Paul Krugman:

What I was afraid of: Back in March, when I was lamenting the inadequate size of the Obama stimulus, I made this prediction:

Republicans are now firmly committed to the view that we should do nothing to respond to the economic crisis, except cut taxes — which they always want to do regardless of circumstances. If Mr. Obama comes back for a second round of stimulus, they’ll respond not by being helpful, but by claiming that his policies have failed.

And I laid out the following scenario:

So here’s the picture that scares me: It’s September 2009, the unemployment rate has passed 9 percent, and despite the early round of stimulus spending it’s still headed up. Mr. Obama finally concedes that a bigger stimulus is needed. But he can’t get his new plan through Congress because approval for his economic policies has plummeted, partly because his policies are seen to have failed, partly because job-creation policies are conflated in the public mind with deeply unpopular bank bailouts.

It’s only June, but Republicans are already claiming that the Obama economic plan has failed. (Yes, that’s insane — hardly any of the money has flowed to the economy yet — but this was predictable.) Meanwhile, unemployment is already above 9 percent. And the green shoots are looking browner by the week, especially on the jobs front: new claims for unemployment insurance are stubbornly running at more than 600,000 a week, far above the 350,000 or so that would be consistent with a stable unemployment rate.

We really do need a bigger stimulus. But it’s going to be hard slogging.

I understand that last December we thought (wrongly) we had a one-quarter long and not a two-quarter long collapse in the economy and thus that the unemployment rate could be kept from rising above 8%. I understand the (wrong) judgment that Congress would increase and make more effective rather than diminish and make less effective whatever stimulus program bid Obama put on the table. But what I don't understand is the failure to understand that a too-big fiscal boost package could be neutralized by the Federal Reserve's raising interest rates while a too-small package could not be further boosted by the Federal Reserve's lowering interest rates, and hence that prudent policy last December involved at least planning for a fiscal boost package that would then look very large indeed.

Remember: World War II-style deficit spending was needed to get the unemployment rate down from 10% to 3%, suggesting to me at least that a truly effective fiscal boost capable of doing half that would have to be a quarter to a third of large. And we are not there: we are far from there:

Americans Keep Getting Fired...

From the Department of Labor:

ETA Press Release: Unemployment Insurance Weekly Claims Report: In the week ending June 20, the advance figure for seasonally adjusted initial claims was 627,000, an increase of 15,000 from the previous week's revised figure of 612,000. The 4-week moving average was 617,250, an increase of 500 from the previous week's revised average of 616,750...

Unemployment is still going up for quite a while...

Page Rank

Why Does Ric Mishkin Insist on Talking in Code?

Ric Mishkin writes:

How to Get The Fed Out Of Its 'Box': When the Federal Open Market Committee meets this Tuesday and Wednesday, the Federal Reserve will face a serious dilemma. Since the last committee meeting six weeks ago, the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield has risen by around 70 basis points (0.70%), with the result that the interest rate on 30-year mortgages has risen by a similar amount. The rise in long-term interest rates is particularly worrisome, because it has the potential to choke off economic recovery and lead to further deterioration in the housing market. That would put an already weakened financial system under stress. Does the situation call for the Fed to expand its purchases of Treasury bonds to lower long-term interest rates?

To answer this question, we need to look at why long-term interest rates have risen. Here, there is good news and bad news. One cause of the rise in long-term rates is the more positive economic news of the past couple of months, particularly in financial markets. The bad news is that long-term interest rates are higher because of concerns about the deteriorating fiscal situation, with massive budget deficits expected for the indefinite future. To fund these budget deficits, the Treasury has to sell large quantities of bonds both now and in the future, causing bond prices to fall and interest rates to rise. The increased supply of Treasury debt puts pressure on the Fed to buy it up.... The Fed is boxed in. The slack in the economy that is likely to persist for a very long time suggests the need for stimulative monetary policy to lower long-term interest rates through the purchase of Treasurys. The fiscal situation argues against this policy action, because it would weaken the Fed's inflation-fighting credibility.

How can the Fed get out of the box and pursue the expansionary monetary policy that is needed right now? The answer is that the Obama administration and Congress have to get serious about long-run fiscal sustainability. Large budget deficits naturally occur during severe recessions when tax revenue undergoes a substantial decline. In addition, fiscal stimulus to promote economic recovery when the economy is in a severe recession is a sensible prescription. However, the failure to take steps to get future budgets under control is a recipe for disaster.... [I]t may even make the fiscal stimulus package less effective... if you know that the government is issuing a lot of debt that has to be paid back someday you can expect to pay much higher taxes in the future. With the prospect of higher taxes, you will be less likely to spend today.

How can the Obama administration and Congress help the Fed do its job and help the fiscal stimulus package work? It needs to address exploding spending on entitlements -- Social Security and particularly Medicare -- which are causing future deficit projections to be so bleak. One possibility is to establish a nonpartisan commission on entitlement reform, along the lines of the National Commission on Social Security in the early 1980s.... Another is taxing health-care benefits as part of any package to reform health care.... There are surely many other ways to promote more fiscal responsibility. The Fed can assist this process. It could indicate that implementing measures that would promote fiscal sustainability will be rewarded with Federal Reserve actions to bring long-term Treasury rates down. Deals like this have been successfully made in the past. In the current extremely difficult economic environment, we surely need such a deal now.

I think pieces like Ric Mishkin's are much less useful than they could be, because Mishkin talks in a peculiar kind of code:

• When Mishkin writes: "[t]he Fed... could indicate that implementing measures that would promote fiscal sustainability will be rewarded with Federal Reserve actions to bring long-term Treasury rates down. Deals like this have been successfully made in the past..." he means: "Alan Greenspan and Bill Clinton and the Democratic Party did a very good thing back in 1993 when--over unanimous Republican opposition--they coordinated action to raise taxes, cut the future growth path of spending, and ease monetary policy."

• When Mishkin writes: "nonpartisan commission on entitlement reform, along the lines of the National Commission on Social Security in the early 1980s..." he means: "the Democratic Party then did a good thing in giving Republican President Ronald Reagan bipartisan cover to raise taxes and so reduce the damage to long run fiscal stability that he had done in his first year..."

• When Mishkin writes: "budget deficits naturally occur during severe recessions when tax revenue undergoes a substantial decline... fiscal stimulus to promote economic recovery when the economy is in a severe recession is a sensible prescription..." he means: "Republican root-and-branch opposition to Obama's stimulus plan is stupid and harmful to the country..."

Everyone who was around in 1982, or 1993, or 2001-3 (when Republicans were welcoming and expanding deficits as recession-fighting measures understands the code that Mishkin is talking in: that Republican politicians behaved badly and Democratic politicians behaved well, and it would be good for the country if the Democratic politicians were to step up to the plate and once again do the right thing for the country. But for some reason Mishkin won't say that in anything but the most elliptical of implicatory sentences.

It matters, I think, because until senior Republican presidential appointees like Ric Mishkin will call Republican politicians on their misdeeds--and cross the aisle in response--Republican politicians will continue to misbehave. And it is not clear the country can afford that.

The Federal Reserve

It watches and waits:

Full text: Fed statement:

Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in April suggests that the pace of economic contraction is slowing. Conditions in financial markets have generally improved in recent months. Household spending has shown further signs of stabilizing but remains constrained by ongoing job losses, lower housing wealth, and tight credit. Businesses are cutting back on fixed investment and staffing but appear to be making progress in bringing inventory stocks into better alignment with sales. Although economic activity is likely to remain weak for a time, the Committee continues to anticipate that policy actions to stabilize financial markets and institutions, fiscal and monetary stimulus, and market forces will contribute to a gradual resumption of sustainable economic growth in a context of price stability.

The prices of energy and other commodities have risen of late. However, substantial resource slack is likely to dampen cost pressures, and the Committee expects that inflation will remain subdued for some time.

In these circumstances, the Federal Reserve will employ all available tools to promote economic recovery and to preserve price stability. The Committee will maintain the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and continues to anticipate that economic conditions are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate for an extended period. As previously announced, to provide support to mortgage lending and housing markets and to improve overall conditions in private credit markets, the Federal Reserve will purchase a total of up to $1.25 trillion of agency mortgage-backed securities and up to $200 billion of agency debt by the end of the year. In addition, the Federal Reserve will buy up to $300 billion of Treasury securities by autumn. The Committee will continue to evaluate the timing and overall amounts of its purchases of securities in light of the evolving economic outlook and conditions in financial markets. The Federal Reserve is monitoring the size and composition of its balance sheet and will make adjustments to its credit and liquidity programs as warranted.

Voting for the FOMC monetary policy action were: Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman; William C. Dudley, Vice Chairman; Elizabeth A. Duke; Charles L. Evans; Donald L. Kohn; Jeffrey M. Lacker; Dennis P. Lockhart; Daniel K. Tarullo; Kevin M. Warsh; and Janet L. Yellen.

Storage at Fifteen Cents per Gigabyte

And the flashdrive is the new paperclip...

How to Save Two Trillion Dollars (Total, Over the Next Ten Years) on Health Care Spending

Total systemwide savings rising to $400 billion in 2019--and we will need those savings and more to pay for the government health programs as they are currently constituted.

Melinda Beeuwkes Buntin and David M. Cutler:

The Two Trillion Dollar Solution: Saving Money by Modernizing the Health Care System: The fundamental challenge in health reform is to reduce the growth rate of health care costs.... If we cannot “bend the curve” of increasing health care costs, then we will not be able to afford our current commitments to Medicare, Medicaid, and the State Children’s Health Insurance Program, let alone the cost of covering the 45 million uninsured Americans....

[W]idely accepted solutions include bringing health care into the information age, reforming health insurance markets, and learning what works and which health care providers are better at what they do. Reform will also require reorienting payments away from fee-for-service... toward value-based systems that pay for entire episodes of care, stressing prevention and not just acute treatment....

[O]ur best guess is that fundamental health system reform involving just three of these strategies will lead to federal savings of about $550 billion over the next decade... [First,] health information technology... direct federal savings of $196 billion between 2010 and 2019... administrative simplification... more productive use of time by physicians and nurses. Second... insurance “exchanges”... $64 billion over the next 10 years. Finally, payment system reforms... could save the federal government $299 billion... by reducing the frequency and intensity of hospitalizations.

These three sets of policies together would yield overall [additional] system savings of $1.5 trillion over the coming decade [in reduced private and state costs]....

We first lay out the two potential means for achieving savings—by cutting waste and inefficiency out of the “base” of current health care spending and by aligning incentives to encourage the growth of only effective health care services. We then discuss how other industries have achieved efficiency gains and the specific policies that experts agree can bring cost savings. In the second half of the paper, we present evidence about the quantitative impact of these types of policies taken together. We sum up each section with a discussion of [additional] related strategies that [also] have promise...

http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/06/pdf/2trillion_solution_execsumm.pdf

http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/06/pdf/2trillion_solution.pdf

Memo to Self: Read This Today!!

Payment Reform to Improve Health Care: Ways to Move Forward, by Ellen-Marie Whelan and Judy Feder

Martin Wolf on the Reform of Incentives as Part of Financial Regulation

Wolf:

FT.com / Columnists / Martin Wolf - Reform of regulation has to start by altering incentives: At the heart of the financial industry are highly leveraged businesses. Their central activity is creating and trading assets of uncertain value, while their liabilities are, as we have been reminded, guaranteed by the state. This is a licence to gamble with taxpayers’ money. The mystery is that crises erupt so rarely....

[B]anks are special sorts of businesses: for them, debt is more than a means of doing business; it is their business. Thus limited liability is likely to have an exceptionally big impact on their behaviour.... In a highly leveraged limited liability business, shareholders will rationally take excessive risks, since they enjoy all the upside but their downside is capped: they cannot lose more than their equity stake, however much the bank loses. In contemporary banks, leverage of 30 to one is normal....

A solution seems evident: let creditors lose. Rational creditors would then charge a premium for lending to higher-risk operations, leading to lower levels of leverage. One objection is that creditors may be ill-informed about the risks being run by banks they are lending to. But there is a more forceful objection: many creditors are protected by insurance backed by governments. Such insurance is motivated by the importance of financial institutions as sources of credit, on the asset side, and suppliers of money, on the liability side. As a result, creditors have little interest in the quality of a bank’s assets or in its strategy. They appear to have lent to a bank. In reality, they have lent to the state.... [C]reditors are most at risk in a systemic crisis. But a systemic crisis is precisely when governments feel compelled to come to the rescue, as they did at the end of last year....

The well-known solution is to regulate such insured institutions very tightly. But an enormous part of what banks did in the early part of this decade – the off-balance-sheet vehicles, the derivatives and the “shadow banking system” itself – was to find a way round regulation....

Such a crisis is not only the result of a rational response to incentives. Folly and ignorance play a part. Nor do I believe that bubbles and crises can be eliminated from capitalism. Yet it is hard to believe that the risks being run by huge institutions had nothing to do with incentives.... Regulatory reform cannot end with incentives. But it has to start from incentives...

There are three players relevant here: shareholders of banks, lenders to banks, and managers and traders of banks.

Shareholders are already on the hook to some extent: they can lose their investment. Nevertheless, there is space for reform. The natural reform I would like to try--to see what happens--would be to make financial-institution stock into par-value stock. It would work like this: If you hold a share of a regulated bank, then in a crisis the bank can call on you for an additional capital investment of up to $X. As a condition of their licenses to do business, financial institutions would be required to have outstanding equity on such terms and conditions that they can always call for half their book net worth from their shareholders.

Lenders are now largely off the hook in the event of a systemic crisis. (They are on the hook for a one-off collapse.) I think lenders need to stay off the hook in a systemic crisis--what you gain in ex ante caution you more than lose in the additional likelihood of bank runs.

Managers and traders are, however, where I would focus most of my attention. I believe we need compensation reform: compensation schemes that make it a complete personal catastrophe for the CEO and all other employees if their bank fails. If managers and traders are, personally, wiped out--reduced in assets to their last two cars and their last four-bedroom house--if any financial institution they worked for goes bankrupt anytime in the next two years, then we have a chance of creating sufficient caution. Otherwise, I don't see how we do it.

Fear, Uncertainty, Doubt, Loathing, and Copyright

Tyler Cowen says that he is "pro-copyright... but... the default settings make it too hard for successful negotiations to occur..."

I wonder: doesn't that also mean that he is "anti-copyright, but the default settings don't provide enough rewards to creative authorship..."?

How would one tell the difference between the qualified pro-copyright and the qualified anti-copyright positions?

Marginal Revolution: Kindle and DRM and Netflix too: As a reader, I find it good policy to keep the number of books on my Kindle to below twenty.  That forces me to read the ones I order and it also protects me from "stranded" consumer durables.  Uncertainty and confusion about my rights only strengthens my desire to keep that policy. 

As a writer, I expect the Kindle is temporarily in my financial self-interest, as it gets more "influentials" reading my work and perhaps talking it up.  In the longer run I suspect it means a lower equilibrium price for books.  One question is whether publishers use "sticky" or inconvenient DRM practices as an implicit collusive method for limiting the spread of Kindle.

Today I was struck by this passage about the origins of Netflix:

Netflix's selection of more than 100,000 DVD rental titles is made possible by the "first-sale doctrine" of U.S. copyright law, which permits buyers of DVDs to lend them out without studios' consent.

In Netflix's early days, its buying team would sometimes purchase DVDs at local Wal-Marts or Best Buys if it couldn't get copies through studios, says Ted Sarandos, Netflix's chief content officer.

In contrast, to deliver movies and television shows over the Internet, Netflix has to license them from studios. So far, it has gotten only about 12,000 titles, a hodgepodge of older films such as "Diehard," episodes of popular TV shows including "30 Rock" and a smattering of new releases.

That's right, we had more innovation because some of the usual copyright strictures about negotiating rights did not apply.  I am pro-copyright, but once again the default settings make it too hard for successful negotiations to occur.

Me? I'm putting my trust in Google as semi-benevolent kami. Google Books is rolling forward. Google Movies and Google Music are YouTube in disguise. When the titanic battle between them and iTunes takes place, it will shake the universe.

Republicans Lie, and the Press Echoes Their Lies

Shame on ABC News and Fortune. This isn't even "opinions on shape of earth differ" journamalism. This is "the earth is f;at" journamalism.

Shame on John Boehner and Lindsey Graham.

We could have fruitful and productive normal politics right now--if we had a better class of Republicans, and a better class of journalists.

Igor Volsky:

Wonk Room » The Public Insurance Plan Is Not Responsible For High CBO Scores: Since the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) issued very preliminary cost estimates of the Health, Education, Labor and Pensions (HELP) committee’s health bill and the Senate Finance Committee’s draft legislation, Republicans and some in the media have argued that the somewhat higher-than expected price tags undermine the President’s contention that a new public heath insurance plan would lower health care spending:

Rep. John Boehner (R-OH): The Congressional Budget Office came out with a score on Senator Kennedy’s bill, just part of the score — of the — of his bill, that says that the public option would cost over $1 trillion, and would cause 23 million Americans to lose their private health care coverage, and only 16 million of which would — would be covered under the — the government plan. [CNN, 6/16/2009]

ABC News: The President’s chances for an optional health care plan that would be run by the government may be fading after a Congressional Budget Office report found a Democratic plan in the Senate would cost at least a trillion dollars over the ten years and cover just 1/3 of the uninsured. [ABC News, 6/16/2009]

Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC): The CBO estimates were a death blow to a government run health care plan. The finance committee has abandoned that. [This Week, 6/21/2009]

Fortune Magazine’s Nina Easton: And I think the, the big speed bump this week, of course, was that CBO, Congressional Budget Office study that said that the costs of a public plan are going to be well beyond what they expected. [MTP, 6/21/2009]

But both estimates never scored the public option. The HELP Committee’s bill omitted any language about the public plan and, according to reporting by the Health Beat’s Maggie Mahar, the CBO couldn’t “mark up the Senate Finance Committee plan because the Senate Finance Committee plan doesn’t yet exist.” “Yesterday, I spoke to Peter Orszag’s Office of Management and Budget and they confirmed that there are many blank lines in the draft CBO is looking at. What was missing included a public-sector insurance option,” Mahar wrote.

In fact, rather than add to the costs of reform, a robust public option could produce savings that could actually be scored and identified by the CBO as a money-saver. As the New York Times editorialized on Sunday, “A public plan would have lower administrative expenses than private plans, no need to generate big profits, and stronger bargaining power to obtain discounts from providers. That should enable it to charge lower premiums than many private plans.” “It would also shave hundreds of billions of dollars from the amount needed to cover the uninsured — a crucial advantage as Congress scrambles to finance the reform effort,” the NYT concluded.

Why oh why can't we have a better press corps?

Kent Conrad and Max Baucus Have No Freedom of Action Because of Kent Conrad and Max Baucus

Matthew Yglesias watches, bemused:

Matthew Yglesias » Senators Have Agency: In today’s column, Paul Krugman lamented the circular arguments you sometimes see presented as a reason for watering-down reform:

And Senator Kent Conrad of North Dakota offers a perfectly circular argument: we can’t have the public option, because if we do, health care reform won’t get the votes of senators like him. “In a 60-vote environment,” he says (implicitly rejecting the idea, embraced by President Obama, of bypassing the filibuster if necessary), “you’ve got to attract some Republicans as well as holding virtually all the Democrats together, and that, I don’t believe, is possible with a pure public option.”

Timothy Noah had a great example of this near the end of a recent column offering a tour of health care systems around the world:

Afterward, Sen. Ken Salazar, D-Colo., who has since become interior secretary, noted that other countries saw a conflict between profits and health. How could the United States possibly persuade insurance companies to give up profits? [Author T.R.] Reid answered that Switzerland, home to many powerful insurance companies, had done it in 1994 when it adopted the Bismarck model. The insurers fought it tooth and nail, of course, but now they compete energetically to sign up people for basic care on a nonprofit basis because they constitute a customer base for supplemental insurance that they’re allowed to sell on a for-profit basis. This answer didn’t satisfy Baucus. “Perhaps you don’t know how much money [U.S. insurers] have,” he told Reid.

Which would be an amusing and apposite remark from Baucus were it not for the small part that Max Baucus is the most powerful legislative voice on health care policy in the country. It makes sense for Tim Noah or Paul Krugman or Matt Yglesias or TR Reid to ironically step outside the debate and start talking about the political obstacles to really hitting the insurance companies where it hurts. But Max Baucus chairs the Senate Finance Committee! “Political reality” is something pundits and activists need to adjust to, it’s something powerful Senators create.

Another One from Paul Krugman: (Slightly) Rising Interest Rates a Sign of Improvement

What Paul said:

What’s moving interest rates?: I’ve written recently about applying the Engel-Frankel method to making sense of interest rate movements: ask what else moves when rates move, and you get a clue to what’s driving the changes. I’ve previously argued that the behavior of commodity prices suggests that the big rise in interest rates this spring was driven by economic optimism, not fear of deficits.

Here’s another indicator: which way do rates move when we get good or bad news about the economy? If you believed that deficits were the driver, bad news about the economy should push rates up, good news push them down. After all, a weaker economy means lower revenues, a stronger economy higher revenues. But if you believe that interest rates are being driven by changing expectations about when the Fed will be able to come off the zero-rate policy, you’d expect the opposite correlation.

And there’s no question about which way things work in practice. Late last week, for example, a couple of new figures — a better-than-expected Philadelphia manufacturing survey, a decline in continued claims for unemployment insurance — made investors more optimistic about the economy; long-term rates bounced. This morning, a gloomy World Bank Report is weighing on the market; long-term rates are down.

It’s not deficits. It’s the economy, stupid.

We Really Would Be Better Off without the Washington Post (Yet Another Robert Samuelson/Climate Change Edition)

Why oh why can't we have a better press corps?

Remember the presumption when reading the Post: if it's true, you probably already knew it; if you didn't already know it, it probably isn't true. For example, Robert Samuelson on the costs of greening the economy.

Let's outsource it to Paul Krugman:

Climate change fantasies: A while back I wrote about anti-green economics — the insistence, by opponents of policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, that the economic cost of cap-and-trade would be immense and unsupportable. I cited Robert Samuelson, who ridiculed the Environmental Defense Fund for suggesting that major action on greenhouse gases would only cost a dime a day per person.

Now comes the Congressional Budget Office, which estimates the cost to households of Waxman-Markey in 2020 at $22 billion — which, given a projected population of 335 million, comes to 18 cents a day. Hah! EDH was being over-optimistic. Seriously, EDF was essentially right: the costs of cap-and-trade are very, very low.

The point is that we need to be clear about who are the realists and who are the fantasists here. The realists are actually the climate activists, who understand that if you give people in a market economy the right incentives they will make big changes in their energy use and environmental impact. The fantasists are the burn-baby-burn crowd who hate the idea of using government for good, and therefore insist that doing the right thing is economically impossible.