632 entries categorized "Economics: Macro"

May 09, 2008

The Current State of Dodd-Franik

Jeanne Sahadi

Dodd-Frank: In a 266-154 vote... lawmakers approved... Frank... to let the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) insure up to $300 billion in new loans over four years if lenders agree to reduce the mortgage principal.

To qualify, the lender would have to cut the debt to no more than 85% of a home's current appraised value. If the FHA-refinanced loans went into default, the FHA would pay the lender the remaining principal owed.

While 1.4 million loans are likely to be eligible for such a program, the Congressional Budget Office estimates such a measure would end up insuring 500,000 borrowers. The CBO estimates the FHA expansion program would cost taxpayers $1.7 billion.

"This bill is very time limited and limited in specifics to a subset of mortgages and meant to mitigate a market failure," Frank said during the floor debate on Thursday.... [T]he program is limited to loans for owner-occupied residents... lenders and investors would be taking a loss on every loan... borrower[s] would be paying higher-than-usual premiums to the FHA... would share equity in their home with the government. "No borrower who goes through this process will say at the end of it, 'Boy, that was fun. Where do I buy a ticket to get back on Space Mountain?" Frank said.... If the bill is a bailout for anyone, they say, it's a bailout for communities across the country, which suffer when home values and property taxes go down because of foreclosures...

David Wessell on Dodd-Frank

David Wessel writes:

Capital - WSJ.com: The latest flash point in the debate over the nation's bursting housing bubble is this: Since so many American houses are worth less than their mortgages, should the government do more to get lenders to settle...?

Of the 80 million houses in the U.S., about 55 million have mortgages. Of those, four million are behind on payments. Foreclosure proceedings were begun on about 1.5 million homes last year, up more than 50% from 2006. This year will be worse. The Treasury, according to presentations its officials have made recently, predicts house prices could fall another 10% to 15% before touching bottom.

Moody's Economy.com estimates that one in roughly 12 American families with mortgages -- four million in all -- already... are... "underwater." The firm predicts that by early 2009 nearly one in four, or 12 million... underwater. Most will continue to pay mortgages on time. Many won't....

Lenders... prefer to avoid foreclosure if possible.... Better to cut a deal than end up with an empty, decaying house.... In ordinary times, a lender shouldn't need prodding from the government to do what's in its self-interest. But these aren't ordinary times. The drop in home prices is pervasive, mortgage markets messy and complexities caused by turning mortgages into securities many....

Mr. Frank would offer lenders and eligible borrowers a deal: If the lender agrees to cut the debt so the homeowner owes no more than 90% of the house's current value, and the Federal Housing Administration (or an outfit to whom it outsources this) determines the homeowner can afford a new loan, then the lender gets rid of the mortgage and the FHA insures a new mortgage for the remaining balance.

The lender takes a hit, but gets rid of the risk.... [T]he lender has to chip in another 5% of the property's current value. The homeowner has to surrender some profits, if any... when the house is sold.

The White House condemns this.... [T]he Treasury argued in a recent PowerPoint presentation: "Homeowners who can afford their mortgage but walk away because they are underwater are merely speculators." (It's a bit jarring to hear the Treasury vilifying people who are acting in their economic self-interest.)...

Despite the restrictions, the plan could allow some homeowners to get a deal they don't deserve; that's the unfortunate byproduct of any rescue. But the Treasury and Fed surrendered the let-the-market-work-it-out high ground when they agreed to risk nearly $30 billion of taxpayer money to shield Bear Stearns, its creditors and counterparties from losses....

[T]he Congressional Budget Office... predict[s] only 500,000 mortgages would be refinanced.... So, perhaps it's best considered a prudent experiment for coping with a bad situation that might get worse: Create a mechanism now so the bugs are worked out, in case home prices plunge more than anticipated...

May 08, 2008

Martin Feldstein Calls for Large-Scale Public Intervention in the Housing Market...

He writes:

FT.com / Comment & analysis / Comment - Misleading growth statistics give false comfort: Macroeconomic Advisers... [estimates monthly GDP] using the same conceptual approach as the government uses for its quarterly estimates.... Its most recent estimates... show that real GDP rose from an annual $11,649bn [real 2000 dollars] last October to $11,701bn in December and $11,777bn in January but fell to $11,686bn in March, a decline of about $100bn in two months.... The misstatement that the economy expanded in the first quarter creates an inappropriately sanguine view of the months ahead....

Although the tax rebates now under way may provide some temporary help, the combination of falling real incomes, declining household wealth and a dramatic drop in consumer confidence suggests further falls in consumer spending and GDP. But the most serious risk is that the rapid fall in house prices – down more than 12 per cent in the past year and falling at a 25 per cent rate in the past three months – will raise the number of negative-equity mortgages, leading to widespread defaults and foreclosures.

Because US mortgages are “no-recourse”... individuals with negative equity have an incentive to default. There are now an estimated 8m negative-equity mortgages – more than 15 per cent of all outstanding mortgages.... A downward spiral in house prices would cause a fall in household wealth and in the capital of financial institutions, potentially resulting in a deeper and longer recession than any seen in the past several decades.

Now is the time for policy action to forestall such a house price collapse. There is nothing more the Federal Reserve can do by lowering short-term interest rates or by creating new credit facilities.... What is missing is action to prevent positive-equity mortgages from becoming negative-equity mortgages. The federal government could achieve that by providing low-interest loans with full recourse that would allow any homeowner to pay down a significant fraction of his mortgage. Homeowners would be in effect giving up the potential to default on their mortgage loans in exchange for lower interest costs...

Different from the more typical proposal these days of having the Federal government guarantee private mortgages (in exchange for warrants on the upside), but different in ways that I suspect are minor...

May 07, 2008

Brad DeLong Interviewed by Philippe Gohier

In Macleans magazine:

The Macleans.ca Interview: Brad DeLong | Macleans.ca - Canada - Features: Q: As a general rule, Republicans say the U.S. isn't in a recession, while Democrats say it is. In your opinion, is the U.S. in or headed for a recession?

A: We’re saying it looks like it’s the weakest possible not-recession. Come July, the Commerce Department is going to revise the GDP numbers and that’s going to change things. It could make things either look less recessionary, or it could push us into determining we’re in a recession. The odds are about 50/50.

Q: In simple terms, what does a recession mean for Americans?

A: It means it’s a lot harder to get jobs. A lot more people are unemployed and without income. People who are employed are scared and eager to settle for much lower increases in real wages, or even accept real wage cuts. It means a lot of people who could be doing something useful are unable to get themselves matched with firms that can use their talent. [A recession is] something you would definitely rather avoid, even if [avoiding it] does produce some costs. It's better to have some investment flowing into the wrong sectors than it is to have all your investment proportions exactly what they should be and a whole bunch of people who could be working and want to work sitting at home, feeling poor.

Q: The Bush administration has already dealt out a pretty expensive stimulus package.

A: I a $13-trillion economy, we’re at about $150-billion of fiscal stimulus this year. That’s only one per cent. Together with what the Federal Reserve has done, everyone hopes this is going to be enough to keep us near full employment without creating an inflation problem for the longer run. But that’s just a hope at the moment.

Q: Has the sputtering economy been properly managed?

A: One way to look at it is this all starts back in 1995, when Alan Greenspan said, ‘It looks like this new economy stuff may really be there. I’m going to ignore all my staff who’s telling me about limits to growth and likelihood of inflationary pressures. I’m not going to raise interest rates and see how much high-tech investment we can get going on the grounds that this might be an opportunity for a serious boom.' Indeed, there was a lot of irrational exuberance. A lot of the world's richest people invested in Internet startups and communications companies. They paid for an enormous amount of dark fibre out of which they never got any dividends, but which did give the rest of us very cheap phone calls and data for half a decade or so.

Then comes 2000 and 2001, and it becomes clear, not that the technology has been oversold, but that the ability to use the Internet to actually make huge profits has been oversold. The Federal Reserve’s response was, ‘We need another leading sector. How about if we drop interest rates and see if we can get a construction boom going?' So, Greenspan does this and it works. In fact, it works beyond his wildest dreams. Then, there’s the irrational exuberance that comes out of the financial bubble, as [some] mortgage companies stop checking people’s loan.

Right now, we have an interesting game going on. As the housing boom unwinds, it's become clear the U.S. built perhaps three million more houses than would be supportable at 2007 housing prices. Construction employment is collapsing and the hope is that, once again, you can replace a leading sector that’s had a boom and a bubble with another one. This time the sector that’s growing is exports and import-competing manufacturing, especially as the dollar falls, first against the Europeans and against the Canadians and hopefully soon against the Asians. But the U.S. economy is already, relative to trend labour force growth, down three-quarters of a million jobs relative to last December. So even if it’s not a recession, it feels like a recession.

Q: American economist Joseph Stiglitz has made the argument that the U.S. economic problems are in part due to the war in Iraq.

A: The war has certainly pushed up oil prices a bunch, directly and indirectly. And I think the war has made us significantly weaker. A trillion dollars that could have been spent doing something useful has been spent creating a situation that, for most Iraqis, has been worse than living under the cruel, semi-totalitarian dictatorship of Saddam Hussein. It still seems to be a much more minor contribution to the current macroeconomic puzzle. I think Joe’s letting his view about the future and the likely good course of U.S. foreign policy lead him to overstate the case a bit. The argument against our adventure in Iraq would still be there even if we were still in the housing boom.

Q: Economic figures for the month of February were recently released in Canada and they showed the country's economy shrank 0.2 per cent. There’s some worry we’re on the brink of recession here.

A: If U.S. demand for Canadian exports keep falling and the U.S. goes into a recession, it seems highly likely.

Q: The federal government in Canada has taken a laissez-faire approach and promoted aggressive tax cuts as a solution. Do you have any thoughts on that?

A: I learned my macroeconomics at the knee of Martin Feldstein, back when the Republican Party in the United States was still the party of sound money and fiscal surpluses. I was just running through my class the argument Marty made around 1980: that basic utilitarian calculations suggest the United States should be saving half again as much as it is and investing it into the future. Unfunded tax cuts take what would otherwise be national savings and divert them into government deficits. While I do see a very small and limited role for tax cuts in a recession to try to prevent mass unemployment, I’m still with Marty--or at least with the old, unmuzzled Marty. Developed countries ought to be running substantial government surpluses because the opportunities for saving and investment are great, because aging populations are going to require debt capacity in the future, and because the technological revolution in medical care is going to produce a huge future demand for governments to spend money keeping people healthy. I have this instinctive, allergic reaction to unfunded tax cuts, even in recessions. And we’re not quite in a recession, yet.

Q: The presidential candidates in the U.S. have had a lot to say on the economy. How would you rate their economic platform?

A: We were sitting around here in the lounge yesterday, all feeling sorry for Douglas Holtz-Eakin, McCain’s economic guy. He is a sensible guy who’s now saying extremely silly and stupid things. He seems to have lost an internal struggle about what the McCain economic policy for the campaign should be. Phil Gramm, another of McCain's economic advisers, is smart as a whip and is a serious person for whom we have to have respect--even if he is a right-wing hyena of a magnitude rarely seen. Our hope is that everything McCain is saying about the economy right now is for shoring up [his support on] the right, [is] for campaign purposes only. Paul Krugman, on the other hand, is out there saying all of us who have hopes for the McCain economic policy are deluding ourselves.

The candidates’ economic policy [proposals] on the Democratic side [pretty much all] looked like sensible attempts to approach very hard problems--or so I thought until Hillary Clinton came out in favour of [McCain's] temporary gas tax holiday. Global warming says you want to increase gas taxes rather than diminish them, and income distribution suggests you don’t want temporary holidays because they're quickly over and have no effect on supply. To boost gasoline supply takes a long time. The McCain gas tax holiday for the summer seems to simply be a ‘let’s transfer a lot of money from the government to the oil companies while doing something that sounds like it’ll help driving consumers but actually won’t.’ Clinton’s plan is to have a gas tax holiday and pay for it by a tax on refineries; as Paul Krugman wrote, this had the effect of making the proposal pointless rather than evil. Maybe you have to give Clinton’s economic policy people credit for coming up with something that sounds good and manages to turn an economic minus into an economic zero. But it wasn’t a terribly good sign...

Econ 101b: May 7: The Long-Run Fiscal Situation: Theory and Practice II

May 7: The Long-Run Fiscal Situation: Theory and Practice II

Notes: Lecture Audio; Solow and Ramsey

May 05, 2008

Jeffrey Sachs Communes with His Inner Hayek

Jeff writes:

The roots of crisis | Comment is free: The US federal reserve's desperate attempts to keep America's economy from sinking... do not seem to be effective. Although interest rates have been slashed and the Fed has lavished liquidity on cash-strapped banks, the crisis is deepening. 

To a large extent, the US crisis was actually made by the Fed.... [I]n 2001... the Fed turned on the monetary spigots to try to combat an economic slowdown... pumped money into the US economy and slashed its main interest rate.... The Fed held this rate too low for too long....

What was distinctive this time was that the new borrowing was concentrated in housing... commercial and investment banks created new financial mechanisms to expand housing credit to borrowers with little creditworthiness. The Fed declined to regulate these dubious practices....

[T]he home-lending boom... became self-reinforcing... buying pushed up housing prices, which made banks feel that it was safe to lend money to non-creditworthy borrowers.... [T]he Fed, under Greenspan's leadership, stood by as the credit boom gathered steam.... At a crucial moment in 2005... Bernanke described the housing boom as reflecting a prudent and well-regulated financial system, not a dangerous bubble. He argued that vast amounts of foreign capital flowed through US banks to the housing sector because international investors appreciated "the depth and sophistication of the country's financial markets (which among other things have allowed households easy access to housing wealth)."...

The housing bubble was bursting by last fall, and banks with large mortgage holdings started reporting huge losses, sometimes big enough to destroy the bank itself, as in the case of Bear Stearns.... [T]he Fed... has been cutting interest rates.... But... credit expansion is... flowing into... commodity speculation and foreign currency. The Fed's easy money policy is now stoking US inflation rather than a recovery....

Having stoked a boom, now the Fed can't prevent at least a short-term decline in the US economy, and maybe worse. If it pushes too hard on continued monetary expansion, it won't prevent a bust but instead could create stagflation - inflation and economic contraction...

I confess, I don't see why the Fed can't prevent a recession. Push the value of the dollar down far enough and export and import-competing manufacturing will grow fast enough to prevent a recession. The Fed may not like the inflation that this generates. But I don't see why monetary expansion will necessarily be ineffective in boosting output and employment.

Why Aren't We in a Recession?

Andrew Samwick muses:

The Fixed Investment Picture | Capital Gains and Games: That we are not in a recession, based on weak GDP growth and a host of other macroeconomic indicators that have been flat since last summer, is quite remarkable.  Here's the path of quarterly investment as a share of GWeDP:

The Fixed Investment Picture | Capital Gains and Games

Note that the fall in residential investment has been just as large and even steeper than the decline in equipment and software investment that was the driver of the last recession. Equipment and software investment fell to and has hovered around the share of GDP that it was in 1993.  Residential investment has fallen to that level.  It's not clear when the fall will stop.

Well, I think that we are in a recession--or, at least, in a recessionary-like period. The great moderation continues, and I tend to attribute it more and more to swift response to shocks than to a diminished amplitude of shocks. In any time before 1985, I think, such a shock would have produced not doubt, confusion, and uncertainty but rather certainty that we were in a substantial recession.

May 03, 2008

Note to Self: The Ramsey Model Once Again

Theoretical Public Finance in the Long Run: National Saving Edition

J. Bradford DeLong (2008), "Economic Growth: From Solow to Ramsey" http://www.j-bradford-delong.net/2008_pdf/ramsey_iii.pdf

William T. Smith (2006), "A Closed Form Solution to the Ramsey Model" http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1356&context=bejm

William T. Smith (2007) "Inspecting the Mechanism Exactly: A Closed-form Solution to a Stochastic Growth Model" http://www.bepress.com/bejm/vol7/iss1/art30

May 02, 2008

Jim Hamilton on the GDP Release

He writes:

http://www.econbrowser.com/archives/2008/04/gdp_still_growi.html Econbrowser: GDP still growing (barely)

Menzie Chinn on GDP Data Revisions

Here he is:

http://www.econbrowser.com/archives/2008/04/revisions_again.html

Memory Monitor

Econ 101b: May 2: The Long-Run Fiscal Situation: Theory

May 2: The Long-Run Fiscal Situation: Theory

Notes: Lecture Audio

Readings:

The Recession-Like Episode Continues...

Payroll employment down 20K in April, and now 260K less than in December.

Or, in other words, an employment gap that has widened by 750K over the past four months.

Job market is weak, but not collapsing - MarketWatch

May 01, 2008

Econ 210a: Apr 30: WWII and the thirty glorious years [DeLong]

Apr 30: WWII and the thirty glorious years [DeLong]

Audio


Let us sit in 1945 and look at western Europe. What do we see?

  • A truly genocidal subcontinent--devastated over the past four centuries by wars of religion, ideology, and nationalism.
  • A not-that-rich subcontinent--levels of output per worker averaging perhaps half those of what appears possible given technology elsewhere, in America, Canada, and Australia.
  • A Eurosclerotic subcontinent--lobbies and entrenched interests playing negative-sum games, whether unions, aristocracies, small craft producers, or mini-nations.
  • A politically-disordered subcontinent--Nazis, fascists, communists, shaky democracies, coups, street riots, large-scale political street violence.

You would have had to have been a brave person to predict the post-WWII western European renaissance...

  • Conversely, you might have been "optimistic" about the Soviet Union: cruel, barbarous, murderous, but also--effective in accomplishing its tasks.

Why the reversals of fortune of the 30 glorious years?


What Barry Eichengtreen and I wrote back in 1991:

The 1930’s in Europe had seen not chronic bottlenecks but chronic deficiencies of aggregate demand. Production had fallen far below normal for the entire decade; market forces had failed to restore demand to normal levels. Circumstances during the Great Depression had been exceptional, but circumstances in the aftermath of World War II were exceptional as well. Many feared the return of the Depression.

In fact (aside from the possibility that fear of a renewed Great Depression would act as a self-fulfilling prophecy) the return of the Great Depression was a less likely possibility in the 1940’s than was generally feared. The memory of the Depression, and the greater strength and incorporation of social democratic political movements in government kept right-wing governments from adopting policies of out-and-out national deflation. The availability of the large United States market to European exports--especially with the coming of the Korean War Boom and NATO in the early 1950’s--prevented any large world aggregate demand shortfall as in the Great Depression. With the American locomotive under full steam, Western European economies were unlikely to suffer from prolonged Keynesian demand-shortfall depressions.

Nevertheless, a live possibility in the absence of the Marshall Plan was that governments would not stand aside and allow the market system to do its job. In the wake of the Great Depression, many still recalled the disastrous outcome of the laissez-faire policies then in effect. Politicians were predisposed toward intervention and regulation: no matter how damaging “government failure” might be to the economy, it had to be better than the “market failure” of the Depression. Had European political economy taken a different turn, post-World War II European recovery might have been stagnant. Governments might have been slow to dismantle wartime allocation controls, and so have severely constrained the market mechanism. In fact the Marshall Plan era saw a rapid dismantling of controls over product and factor markets in Western Europe, and the restoration of price and exchange rate stability. An alternative scenario would have seen the maintenance and expansion of wartime controls in order to guard against substantial shifts in income distribution. The late 1940’s and early 1950’s might have seen the creation in Western Europe of allocative bureaucracies to ration scarce foreign exchange, and the imposition of price controls on exportables in order to protect the living standards of urban working classes.

The likely consequences of such alternative policies for post-World war II Europe can be seen in the Argentine mirror....

In 1929 Argentina had appeared as rich as any large country in continental Europe. It was still as rich in 1950, when Western Europe had for the most part reattained pre-World War II levels of national product. But by 1960 Argentina was poorer than Italy and had less than two-thirds of the GDP per capita of France or West Germany. One way to think about post-World War II Argentina is that its mixed economy was poorly oriented: the government allocated goods, especially imports, among alternative uses; the controlled market redistributed income. Thus neither the private nor the public sector was used to its comparative advantage.

In post-World War II Western Europe, by contrast, market forces allocated resources--even, to a large extent, for nationalized industries--the government redistributed income, and the outcome was much more favorable....

In Díaz Alejandro's estimation, four factors set the stage for Argentina’s relative decline: a politically-active and militant urban industrial working class, economic nationalism, sharp divisions between traditional elites and poorer strata, and a government used to exercising control over goods allocation that viewed the price system as a tool for redistributing wealth rather than for determining the pattern of economic activity.

From the perspective of 1947, the political economy of Western Europe would lead one to think that it was at least as vulnerable as Argentina to economic stagnation induced by populist overregulation. The war had given Europe more experience than Argentina with economic planning and rationing. Militant urban working classes calling for wealth redistribution voted in such numbers as to make Communists plausibly part of a permanent ruling political coalition in France and Italy. Economic nationalism had been nurtured by a decade and a half of Depression, autarky and war. European political parties had been divided substantially along economic class lines for a generation.

Yet post-World War II western Europe avoided this trap. After World War II Western Europe’s mixed economies built substantial redistributional systems, but they were built on top of and not as replacements for market allocations of goods and factors. Just as post-World War II Western Europe saw the avoidance of the political-economic “wars of attrition” that had put a brake on post-World War I European recovery, so post-World War II Western Europe avoided the tight web of controls that kept post-World War II Argentina from being able to adjust and grow...


Final Sales vs. Production

The wedge between production and final sales is unanticipated inventory accumulation--things that are made that firms cannot sell. The NIPA conventions is that a recession is a fall in production, not a fall in demand. But this is an arbitrary choice of convention:

About that GDP report: I’ve had time to look at it a bit more closely — and it’s much weaker than the headline number suggests (and MUCH weaker than the previous quarter, even though the growth rate was the same.) It’s not just that final sales fell, so that the economy grew only because of inventory accumulation. If you look at consumer spending, purchases of goods actually fell substantially. Only service purchases rose — and much of that was housing and medical care. As Michael Mandel at Business Week has pointed out, those aren’t “really” consumer decisions: housing “consumption” is largely imputed rents on owner-occupied homes, and medical care is mostly paid for by insurance.

So this really does look like an economy at stall speed, not an economy skirting past the edge of recession (whatever recession means).

Michael Mussa on the Liquidity Tsunami

Michael Mussa argues that this is one slowdown in which nobody can claim that the Federal Reserve has been "behind the curve" as far as its response to the slowdown in the pace of real spending, demand, and production is concerned. Indeed, the liquidity tsunami the Federal Reserve and its companions have unleashed upon global credit markets is truly extraordinary:

  • Dropping nominal interest rates on the Treasury assets truly free of nominal risk to levels at times only a fraction of a percent per year.
  • Guaranteeing the unsecured debt of every major investment bank in America.
  • Guaranteeing (or, rather, somehow inducing the Bank of America to guarantee) the unsecured debt of Countrywide.
  • Unleashing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to borrow an extra half a trillion dollars or so, and spend it buying up and managing mortgages and so profiting from the spread between mortgages and Treasuries.

If all this isn't enough to keep the flow of funds to finance investment steady and so save America from large-scale cyclical unemployment, I will be genuinely surprised.

Michael:

Michael Mussa (2008), "Global Economic Prospects 2008/2009: Hoping for a Global Slowdown and a US Recession": The extent of this crisis in credit markets is even more remarkable in view of the exceedingly aggressive actions taken by the Federal Reserve and the important but less aggressive actions of other leading central banks. Contrary to the nonsense spoken by many financial-market commentators, the Federal Reserve has not been "behind the curve" in its policy response. In fact, the easing of US monetary policy in the present possible recession has far outstripped the pace of easing in past actual recessions. On top of this, the Federal Reserve has recently taken truly extraordinary actions to extend specific liquidity support to a wide range of US financial institutions.

The official explanation for these extraordinary actions is not that they are motivated primarily by the desire to protect financial institutions from losses but rather to head off the risk of major damage to the general economy spreading from difficulties in the financial sector. So far, however, there is little indication that the general economy is suffering much damage from the credit market turmoil—beyond some deepening of the downturn in US residential investment. In particular, the present slowdown in the US economy and around the world is not much more than what we would normally have expected in view of falling home values, higher food and energy prices, and other developments aside from the turmoil in credit markets.

Does this imply that the Federal Reserve, in its efforts to protect the financial sector, has overreacted to the credit market turmoil? Has it eased too aggressively, unduly raising the risk of inflation down the road? Has its rescue of the financial sector by cutting massively the cost of funds and the provision of specific liquidity support generated far too much moral hazard relative to the value of the protective effect of these actions against real hazards faced by the general economy?

At this point, the answers to these questions are not entirely clear, but two conclusions can be reached with high confidence. First, given the massive easing already undertaken by the Federal Reserve and the likelihood of some modest further easing, the US economy now needs to undergo at least a near recession if the Federal Reserve's easing is not to be excessive. Second, if the Federal Reserve's highly aggressive actions have really been warranted to protect the economy from substantial harm, then deep reforms of the financial system, including the Federal Reserve's policies and practices, are clearly needed to reduce the likelihood of such problems in the future. The Federal Reserve cannot pose only as the hero riding to the rescue of the economy and the financial system. Its role as one of the villains whose earlier actions and inactions contributed to the present crisis needs to be fully and carefully assessed.

April 25, 2008

Asset Price Deflation

George Soros on the financial crisi:

The Financial Crisis: George Soros: I think it was, but it would have required recognition that the system, as it currently operates, is built on false premises. Unfortunately, we have an idea of market fundamentalism, which is now the dominant ideology, holding that markets are self-correcting; and this is false because it's generally the intervention of the authorities that saves the markets when they get into trouble. Since 1980, we have had about five or six crises: the international banking crisis in 1982, the bankruptcy of Continental Illinois in 1984, and the failure of Long-Term Capital Management in 1998, to name only three.

Each time, it's the authorities that bail out the market, or organize companies to do so. So the regulators have precedents they should be aware of. But somehow this idea that markets tend to equilibrium and that deviations are random has gained acceptance and all of these fancy instruments for investment have been built on them.... The large potential risks of such investments are not being acknowledged....

The authorities, the regulators--the Federal Reserve and the Treasury--really failed to see what was happening. One Fed governor, Edward Gramlich, warned of a coming crisis in subprime mortgages in a speech published in 2004 and a book published in 2007, among other statements. So a number of people could see it coming. And somehow, the authorities didn't want to see it coming. So it came as a surprise.... [Y]ou have a whole establishment involved. The economics profession has developed theories of "random walks" and "rational expectations" that are supposed to account for market movements. That's what you learn in college. Now, when you come into the market, you tend to forget it because you realize that that's not how the markets work. But nevertheless, it's in some way the basis of your thinking....

[T]he situation is definitely much worse than is currently recognized. You have had a general disruption of the financial markets, much more pervasive than any we have had so far. And on top of it, you have the housing crisis, which is likely to get a lot worse than currently anticipated because markets do overshoot.... I'm sure that it will be necessary to arrest the decline [in housing] because the decline, I think, will be much faster and much deeper than currently anticipated.... [F]oreclosures are going to add to the supply of housing a very large number of properties.... There are about six million subprime mortgages outstanding, 40 percent of which will likely go into default in the next two years.... Problems with... adjustable-rate mortgages are going to be of about the same magnitude as with subprime mortgages. So you'll have maybe five million more defaults facing you over the next several years....

[Y]ou need to reduce the number of foreclosures. You need to keep as many people as possible in their houses so that they don't come onto the market. You need to arrest the decline in house prices, but you also need to prevent human suffering and social disruption because it's going to be very, very severe....

[Rescue] is their [the Federal Reserve's] job, whether unhealthy or not... to save the system when it is in danger. However, because that is their job, it ought to be their job also to prevent asset bubbles from developing. And that task has not been recognized. Greenspan once spoke about the "irrational exuberance" of the market.... [I]t's generally accepted that the Fed tries to control core inflation, but not asset prices. I think that control of asset prices has to be an objective in order to prevent asset bubbles because they are so frequent.... You have to recognize that just controlling money doesn't control credit.... [Y]ou have to take into account the willingness to lend. And if it's too great—if borrowers can obtain large loans on the basis of inadequate security--you really have to introduce margin requirements for such borrowing and try to discourage it....

[W]e are close to a tipping point [for the dollar] where, in my view, the willingness of banks and countries to hold dollars is definitely impaired. But there is no suitable alternative so central banks are diversifying into other currencies; but there is a general flight from these currencies. So the countries with big surpluses—Abu Dhabi, China, Norway, and Saudi Arabia, for example—have all set up sovereign wealth funds, state-owned investment funds held by central banks that aim to diversify their assets from monetary assets to real assets. That's one of the major developments currently and those sovereign wealth funds are growing. They're already equal in size to all of the hedge funds in the world combined. Of course, they don't use their capital as intensively as hedge funds, but they are going to grow to about five times the size of hedge funds in the next twenty years.

I must say, these days when I read my backlist I feel like a genius--for example, back in 1998 I tried to convince the Brookings Panel that:

Why We Should Fear Deflation: Economies may well have more to fear than declines in broad goods-and-services price indices alone. If securities and real estate holdings have been pledged as collateral for debt contracts, then large-scale asset price declines also trigger the confusion of macroeconomic events with entrepreneurial failure that makes deflation feared.

Is the United States today potentially vulnerable to large-scale asset price declines in this way? In real estate no [this was written in 1999]. In the stock market yes [ditto]. Perhaps fundamental patterns of equity valuation have truly changed, as investors have recognized that the equity premium over the past century was much too large--in which case stock prices have reached a permanent and high plateau. But it seems more likely that there are substantial risks of stock market declines on the order of fifty percent back to Campbell-Shiller fundamentals...

http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2534666.pdf

April 24, 2008

Elsby and Shapiro: Stepping Off the Wage Escalator: A Theory of the Equilibrium Employment Rate

Michael W. L. Elsby and Matthew D. Shapiro (2008), "Stepping Off the Wage Escalator: A Theory of the Equilibrium Employment Rate" http://www.eief.it/it/files/2008/04/stepping-off-2008-04-01.pdf

Abstract: This paper develops a theory of equilibrium labor supply based on the lifelong return to work. This lifelong return to work is the product of the general wage level and the return to experience. The paper shows how the return to experience has different effects from general wage growth because it creates a wedge between the return to work and not working. The model of the paper thereby generates a powerful relationship between employment rates and productivity growth. Calculations based on the model are able to replicate the comovements in employment rates and productivity growth for low-skill workers in the United States.


  • Blanchard surveys various approaches to mapping productivity growth into wages. He concludes that these approaches “deliver, to a first order, long run neutrality of unemployment to productivity growth.” He points out that existing theories may have different implications for the short and medium run effects of productivity growth, but concludes our understanding of the link between productivity and employment is weak. “The truth is we do not know. And this is a serious hole in knowledge” (Blanchard, 2007, p.416)...

http://www.eief.it/it/files/2008/04/stepping-off-2008-04-01.pdf

April 23, 2008

April 23: Econ 210a: WWI and the Great Depression [DeLong]

April 23: WWI and the Great Depression [DeLong]


Memo Question for April 30: "Thirty Glorious Years": A growing literature develops explanations for 'Europe's golden age' (the European economy's fast growth in the third quarter of the 20th century). Is this effort misguided? In other words, do we really need fancy explanations for a straightforward phenomenon that is easily explained in terms of convergence and delayed structural change?


Memo Question for April 23: The Great Depression: What do our readings tell us about the answers to the following two questions?

  • Why was the Great Depression so great?
  • Why has there been only one Great Depression in the long span between the commercial revolution and today?

World War I and the Task of Rebuilding:

John Maynard Keynes (1920), The Economic Consequences of the Peace, chapters 1, 2, and 6 http://www.gutenberg.org/files/15776/15776-h/15776-h.htm

The Coming of the Great Depression:

Christina Romer (1990), "The Great Crash and the Onset of the Great Depression," Quarterly Journal of Economics 104, pp.719-736, http://www.jstor.org/view/00335533/di971078/97p00037/0

Ben Bernanke (1983), "Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of the Great Depression" American Economic Review 73, pp. 257-276, http://www.jstor.org/view/00028282/di950033/95p00602/0

Understanding the Great Depression:

John Maynard Keynes (1932), "The World's Economic Outlook," Atlantic http://www.theatlantic.com/unbound/flashbks/budget/keynesf.htm

Paul Krugman, "Introduction" to John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money http://www.pkarchive.org/economy/GeneralTheoryKeynesIntro.html

Consequences of the Great Depression:

Margaret Weir and Theda Skocpol, "State Structures and Social Keynesianism: Responses to the Great Depression in Sweden and the United States," International Journal of Comparative Sociology pp. 4-29 http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=GLQ3AAAAIAAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA7-IA3&dq=Margaret+Weir+and+Theda+Skocpol,+%22State+Structures+and+Social+Keynesianism&ots=P2iXGFkFfu&sig=APmY6D1P2QkJ0l28RRWX5YxjBmg#PPA29,M1


World War I and the Task of Rebuilding:

John Maynard Keynes (1920), The Economic Consequneces of the Peace, chapters 1, 2, and 6 http://www.gutenberg.org/files/15776/15776-h/15776-h.htm

  • Very few of us realize with conviction the intensely unusual, unstable, complicated, unreliable, temporary nature of the economic organization by which Western Europe has lived for the last half century. We assume some of the most peculiar and temporary of our late advantages as natural, permanent, and to be depended on, and we lay our plans accordingly. On this sandy and false foundation we scheme for social improvement and dress our political platforms, pursue our animosities and particular ambitions, and feel ourselves with enough margin in hand to foster, not assuage, civil conflict in the European family. Moved by insane delusion and reckless self-regard, the German people overturned the foundations on which we all lived and built. But the spokesmen of the French and British peoples have run the risk of completing the ruin, which Germany began, by a Peace which, if it is carried into effect, must impair yet further, when it might have restored, the delicate, complicated organization, already shaken and broken by war, through which alone the European peoples can employ themselves and live.... What an extraordinary episode in the economic progress of man that age was which came to an end in August, 1914! The greater part of the population, it is true, worked hard and lived at a low standard of comfort, yet were, to all appearances, reasonably contented with this lot. But escape was possible, for any man of capacity or character at all exceeding the average, into the middle and upper classes, for whom life offered, at a low cost and with the least trouble, conveniences, comforts, and amenities beyond the compass of the richest and most powerful monarchs of other ages. The inhabitant of London could order by telephone, sipping his morning tea in bed, the various products of the whole earth, in such quantity as he might see fit, and reasonably expect their early delivery upon his doorstep; he could at the same moment and by the same means adventure his wealth in the natural resources and new enterprises of any quarter of the world, and share, without exertion or even trouble, in their prospective fruits and advantages; or be could decide to couple the security of his fortunes with the good faith of the townspeople of any substantial municipality in any continent that fancy or information might recommend. He could secure forthwith, if he wished it, cheap and comfortable means of transit to any country or climate without passport or other formality, could despatch his servant to the neighboring office of a bank for such supply of the precious metals as might seem convenient, and could then proceed abroad to foreign quarters, without knowledge of their religion, language, or customs, bearing coined wealth upon his person, and would consider himself greatly aggrieved and much surprised at the least interference. But, most important of all, he regarded this state of affairs as normal, certain, and permanent, except in the direction of further improvement, and any deviation from it as aberrant, scandalous, and avoidable. The projects and politics of militarism and imperialism, of racial and cultural rivalries, of monopolies, restrictions, and exclusion, which were to play the serpent to this paradise, were little more than the amusements of his daily newspaper, and appeared to exercise almost no influence at all on the ordinary course of social and economic life, the internationalization of which was nearly complete in practice...

  • This chapter must be one of pessimism. The Treaty includes no provisions for the economic rehabilitation of Europe,—nothing to make the defeated Central Empires into good neighbors, nothing to stabilize the new States of Europe, nothing to reclaim Russia; nor does it promote in any way a compact of economic solidarity amongst the Allies themselves; no arrangement was reached at Paris for restoring the disordered finances of France and Italy, or to adjust the systems of the Old World and the New. The Council of Four paid no attention to these issues, being preoccupied with others,—Clemenceau to crush the economic life of his enemy, Lloyd George to do a deal and bring home something which would pass muster for a week, the President to do nothing that was not just and right. It is an extraordinary fact that the fundamental economic problems of a Europe starving and disintegrating before their eyes, was the one question in which it was impossible to arouse the interest of the Four. Reparation was their main excursion into the economic field, and they settled it as a problem of theology, of polities, of electoral chicane, from every point of view except that of the economic future of the States whose destiny they were handling...

  • If we take the view that for at least a generation to come Germany cannot be trusted with even a modicum of prosperity, that while all our recent Allies are angels of light, all our recent enemies, Germans, Austrians, Hungarians, and the rest, are children of the devil, that year by year Germany must be kept impoverished and her children starved and crippled, and that she must be ringed round by enemies; then we shall reject all the proposals of this chapter.... But if this view of nations and of their relation to one another is adopted... heaven help us all. If we aim deliberately at the impoverishment of Central Europe, vengeance, I dare predict, will not limp. Nothing can then delay for very long that final civil war between the forces of Reaction and the despairing convulsions of Revolution, before which the horrors of the late German war will fade into nothing, and which will destroy, whoever is victor, the civilization and the progress of our generation. Even though the result disappoint us, must we not base our actions on better expectations, and believe that the prosperity and happiness of one country promotes that of others, that the solidarity of man is not a fiction, and that nations can still afford to treat other nations as fellow-creatures?...


The Coming of the Great Depression:

Christina Romer (1990), "The Great Crash and the Onset of the Great Depression," Quarterly Journal of Economics 104, pp.719-736, http://www.jstor.org/view/00335533/di971078/97p00037/0

Ben Bernanke (1983), "Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of the Great Depression" American Economic Review 73, pp. 257-276, http://www.jstor.org/view/00028282/di950033/95p00602/0

  • http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2937892.pdf

  • http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1808111.pdf


Understanding the Great Depression:

John Maynard Keynes (1932), "The World's Economic Outlook," Atlantic http://www.theatlantic.com/unbound/flashbks/budget/keynesf.htm

Paul Krugman, "Introduction" to John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money http://www.pkarchive.org/economy/GeneralTheoryKeynesIntro.html

  • Keynes: The immediate causes of the world financial panic -- for that is what it is -- are obvious. They are to be found in a catastrophic fall in the money value, not only of commodities, but of practically every kind of asset. The 'margins,' as we call them, upon confidence in the maintenance of which the debt and credit structure of the modern world depends, have 'run off.'... Debtors of all kinds find that their securities are no longer the equal of their debts. Few governments still have revenues sufficient to cover the fixed money charges for which they have made themselves liable. Moreover, a collapse of this kind feeds on itself. We are now in the phase where the risk of carrying assets with borrowed money is so great that there is a competitive panic to get liquid. And each individual who succeeds in getting more liquid forces down the price of assets in the process of getting liquid, with the result that the margins of other individuals are impaired and their courage undermined. And so the process continues.... We have here an extreme example of the disharmony of general and particular interest.... Practically all the remedies popularly advocated to-day are of this... beggar-my-neighbor description. For one man's expenditure is another man's income. Thus, while we undoubtedly increase our own margin, we diminish that of someone else; and if the practice is universally followed everyone will be worse off. An individual may be forced by his private circumstances to curtail his normal expenditure, and no one can blame him. But let no one suppose that he is performing a public duty in behaving in such a way. The modern capitalist is a fair-weather sailor. As soon as a storm rises, he abandons the duties of navigation and even sinks the boats which might carry him to safety by his haste to push his neighbor off and himself in. Unfortunately the popular mind has been educated away from the truth, away from common sense. The average man has been taught to believe what his own common sense, if he relied on it, would tell him was absurd.... Meanwhile the problem of reparations and war debts darkens the whole scene...

  • Krugman: The message of Keynes: It’s probably safe to assume that the “conservative scholars and policy leaders” who pronounced The General Theory one of the most dangerous books of the past two centuries haven’t read it. But they’re sure it’s a leftist tract, a call for big government and high taxes. That’s what people on the right, and some on the left, too, have said about The General Theory from the beginning. In fact, the arrival of Keynesian economics in American classrooms was delayed by a nasty case of academic McCarthyism. The first introductory textbook to present Keynesian thinking, written by the Canadian economist Lorie Tarshis, was targeted by a right-wing pressure campaign aimed at university trustees. As a result of this campaign, many universities that had planned to adopt the book for their courses cancelled their orders, and sales of the book, which was initially very successful, collapsed. Professors at Yale University, to their credit, continued to assign the book; their reward was to be attacked by the young William F. Buckley for propounding “evil ideas.”

  • But Keynes was no socialist – he came to save capitalism, not to bury it. And there’s a sense in which The General Theory was, given the time it was written, a conservative book. (Keynes himself declared that in some respects his theory had “moderately conservative implications.” [377]) Keynes wrote during a time of mass unemployment, of waste and suffering on an incredible scale. A reasonable man might well have concluded that capitalism had failed, and that only huge institutional changes – perhaps the nationalization of the means of production – could restore economic sanity. Many reasonable people did, in fact, reach that conclusion: large numbers of British and American intellectuals who had no particular antipathy toward markets and private property became socialists during the depression years simply because they saw no other way to remedy capitalism’s colossal failures.

  • Yet Keynes argued that these failures had surprisingly narrow, technical causes. “We have magneto [alternator] trouble” he wrote in 1930, as the world was plunging into depression. And because Keynes saw the causes of mass unemployment as narrow and technical, he argued that the problem’s solution could also be narrow and technical: the system needed a new alternator, but there was no need to replace the whole car. In particular, “no obvious case is made out for a system of State Socialism which would embrace most of the economic life of the community.” [378] While many of his contemporaries were calling for government takeover of the whole economy, Keynes argued that much less intrusive government policies could ensure adequate effective demand, allowing the market economy to go on as before. Still, there is a sense in which free-market fundamentalists are right to hate Keynes. If your doctrine says that free markets, left to their own devices, produce the best of all possible worlds, and that government intervention in the economy always makes things worse, Keynes is your enemy. And he is an especially dangerous enemy because his ideas have been vindicated so thoroughly by experience. Stripped down, the conclusions of The General Theory might be expressed as four bullet points:

    • Economies can and often do suffer from an overall lack of demand, which leads to involuntary unemployment
    • The economy’s automatic tendency to correct shortfalls in demand, if it exists at all, operates slowly and painfully
    • Government policies to increase demand, by contrast, can reduce unemployment quickly
    • Sometimes increasing the money supply won’t be enough to persuade the private sector to spend more, and government spending must step into the breach
  • To a modern practitioner of economic policy, none of this – except, possibly, the last point – sounds startling or even especially controversial. But these ideas weren’t just radical when Keynes proposed them; they were very nearly unthinkable. And the great achievement of The General Theory was precisely to make them thinkable.


Consequences of the Great Depression:

Margaret Weir and Theda Skocpol, "State Structures and Social Keynesianism: Responses to the Great Depression in Sweden and the United States," International Journal of Comparative Sociology pp. 4-29 http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=GLQ3AAAAIAAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA7-IA3&dq=Margaret+Weir+and+Theda+Skocpol,+%22State+Structures+and+Social+Keynesianism&ots=P2iXGFkFfu&sig=APmY6D1P2QkJ0l28RRWX5YxjBmg#PPA29,M1

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April 21, 2008

The Current Macroeconomic Situation: April 21, 2008

Audio: http://www.j-bradford-delong.net/2008_mov/20080421_131604.mp3

Slides:

April 14: Econ 101b: Risks of International Financial Crisis

April 14: Risks of International Financial Crisis

Notes:

Readings:

April 20, 2008

Argentina: We Have Seen This Movie Before

Dani Rodrik says that Argentina's future is bright--if only they could get their fiscal balance in order. Strangely, he doesn't seem to recognize that he is echoing every single Argentina-optimist for more than a century:

Dani Rodrik's weblog: Will Argentina waste a historic opportunity? Rarely do you see a country where the mood among business people tells such a different story than the statistics. Now, in Argentina there are statistics are then there are damn lies--inflation figures are made up--but the broad contours of the economic performance of the last few years are not in dispute. Argentina has been growing at Asian rates, its investment rate has risen to levels not seen in decades, national saving is at record levels, and TFP growth has been stellar. By their own admission, Argentine businessmen are making more money now than they ever have in recent memory.

Yet business people are somber, bitter, and angry at the government. The general sense, even among those that supported Nestor Kirchner's policies, is that the government is frittering away a golden opportunity. Worse, the government has authoritarian--some would say thuggish--tendencies that portend ill for the future of Argentina's democracy.

What is going on?

First, the good news. Recent economic growth, unlike that of the 1990s, is of the good kind and it not just the result of high commodity prices. The investment boom of the last few years is supported by high saving.... [R]ecent growth has been fueled by a competitive currency, which increased the relative profitability and output of a wide range of tradables.... Unemployment and poverty rates have come down.... The weak currency has stimulated the right kind of structural change--from lower productivity activities to higher-productivity tradables--which is the source of the economy-wide increases in TFP we have seen. This is a textbook illustration of the magic of sustained currency undervaluation....

Now the bad news. In a growing economy, the tendency for the real exchange rate is to appreciate.... While the peso is stable against the dollar in nominal terms, the overheated economy has generated inflationary pressures (over 20% annually at present) which are being grossly mismanaged.... [T]he government has been resorting to ad hoc and temporary measures: price controls, export taxes, and intervention in currency markets. It has no coherent plan to deal with inflation and no strategy for sustaining competitiveness in the face of the real appreciation that will take place even in the best of circumstances.

Even worse is the growing disconnect between the government and the business community. In its approach to the private sector, the government is developing a reputation for being abusive, threatening, and intimidating. The Kirchners' strategy seems to be to play to their main political power base while assuming that growth will continue. But in the current environment it is difficult to imagine that the private sector will continue to invest as strongly as it has.

In the early 1990s, after years of mismanagement and hyperinflation, the binding constraint on Argentinean growth was lack of confidence in macroeconomic policies. The Convertibility Law was an ingenious short-cut for overcoming this constraint. But as circumstances changed and the binding constraint became lack of competitiveness instead, the Convertibility Law turned into a liability.... The post-2002 policies were in turn successful because they removed the competitiveness constraint. But the growing gulf between the private and public sectors has put lack of confidence and credibility once again front and center--now as the binding constraint on sustaining Argentina's growth.

And that is a pity, because there is a lot that is going right with the Argentine economy today. The underlying model is much more sound than anything in memory. There is nothing wrong with it that a larger fiscal surplus and a bit of dialog between the public and private sectors would not cure.

Confusion in Economic Policy

Dean Baker mocks Henry Paulson and Ben Bernanke:

The High Dollar: Wasn't Bernanke Trying to Stimulate the Economy?

Last weekend, Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernanke and Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson said they would take steps to prevent the dollar from falling further. This is strange, because the dynamic duo had previously indicated that they wanted to stimulate the economy with policies like interest rate cuts and the tax rebate plan.

There is probably no more effective mechanism for stimulating the economy at this point than a decline in the value of the dollar. This will make imports more expensive, causing people to buy more domestically produced goods. It will also make our exports cheaper for people living in other countries which will naturally cause them to buy more American goods. The effect is a reduction in our trade deficit which is an essential part of any recovery plan.

There is a -- slight -- degree of non-insanity in what Paulson and Bernanke are saying. They want a weak dollar to stimulate exports, true. But they also want a dollar that is not expected to fall any further. In our economic models, the two automatically go together. But Paulson and Bernanke fear that in reality they do not.

April 18, 2008

Paul Krugman on Youngstown, Ohio

Paul Krugman writes:

Dying Midwestern city blogging: Youngstown, Ohio, is the poster child for towns where the factories left and aren't coming back.... Yet there have been better and worse periods. Nonfarm employment in the Youngstown-Warren-Boardman metro area actually rose in the 1990s, before falling again this decade (I'd add pre-1990 data, but the BLS doesn't have it.) And small-town Americans, contrary to myth, do drink lattes (small luxuries are sometimes all they can afford). The Starbucks store locator shows 5 in the metro area...

April 16, 2008

The Collapse of Construction Investment

Greg Robb reports:

U.S. March housing starts down 11.9% to 947,000: WASHINGTON (MarketWatch) - New construction of U.S. houses plunged to the lowest level in 17 years in March, the Commerce Department estimated Wednesday. Starts fell 11.9% in March to a seasonally adjusted 947,000 annualized units weaker than the 988,000 pace expected by economists surveyed by MarketWatch. This is the lowest level of starts since March 1991. Starts are dpwn 36.5% year-on-year. Starts of new single-family homes fell by 5.7% to 680,000 in March, while starts of large apartment units fell 24.6% to 267,000. Building permits, a leading indicator of housing construction, fell 5.8% to a seasonally adjusted annual rate of 927,000. This is the lowest level of permits since April 1991...

Mozilla Firefox 3 Beta 4


U.S. March housing starts down 11.9% to 947,000 - MarketWatch

April 15, 2008

Note to Self: What the Federal Reserve Has Been Doing...

Steve Cecchetti writes:

Federal Reserve policy responses to the crisis of 2007-08 | vox - Research-based policy analysis and commentary from leading economists: Central bankers are conservative people. They take great care in implementing policy; they speak precisely; they explain changes completely; and they study the environment trying to pinpoint where the next disaster looms. Good monetary policy is marked by its predictability, but when the world changes, policymakers change with it. If a crisis hits and the tools at hand are not up to the job, then central bank officials can and will improvise....

For some time now, there has been a consensus among monetary economists... policymakers' operational instrument should be an interest rate; and officials need to be transparent and clear in communicating what they are doing and why they are doing it. Furthermore, there is agreement that the central bank is the right institution to monitor and protect the stability of the financial system as a whole.

An important part of the consensus has been that central banks should provide short-term liquidity to solvent financial institutions that are in need. But, as events in 2007 and 2008 have shown, not all liquidity is created equal. And critically, the consensus model used by monetary economists to understand central bank policy offers no immediate way to organise thinking about this sort of problem....

On 9 August 2007, the crisis hit and central banks swung into action, supplying large quantities of reserves in response to stresses in the interbank lending market. The spread on 3-month versus overnight interbank loans exploded. And, as problems worsened into the winter, the spread between U.S. government agency securities -- those issued by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the like -- and U.S. Treasury securities of equivalent maturity rose as well. Investors shunned anything but U.S. Treasury securities themselves.... Reductions in the target federal funds rate, the objective of Federal Reserve policy in normal times, had little impact on interbank lending markets... the purchase of securities through open market operations enabled policymakers to inject liquidity... [but] could not insure that it went to the institutions that needed it most.

In response... Fed officials created... the Term Auction Facility (TAF) and the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF), and... the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF). The TAF... seeks to eliminate the stigma attached to normal discount borrowing. The PDCF extends lending rights from commercial banks to investment banks... the TSLF allows investment banks to borrow Treasury bills, notes and bonds using mortgage-backed securities as collateral.... [T]he Fed made adjustments to existing procedures... extended the term of their normally temporary repurchase agreements to 28 days... accepted mortgage-backed securities rather than the normal Treasury securities.... extended swap lines to the European Central Bank and the Swiss National Bank that allowed them to offer dollars to commercial banks in their currency areas... provided a loan that allowed the investment bank Bear Stearns to remain in operation and then be taken over by JP Morgan Chase.

These new programs are very different from the ones that had been in place prior to the crisis.... By changing the level of the monetary base (really commercial bank reserve deposits at the central bank) Fed officials keep the market-determined federal funds rate near their target.... Given the quantity of assets it owns, the Fed can decide whether it wants to hold Treasury securities, foreign exchange reserves, or a variety of other things.... By the end of March 2008, the Fed had committed more than half of their nearly $1 trillion balance sheet to these new programs:

  • $100 billion to the Term Auction Facility,
  • $100 billion to 28-day repo of mortgage-backed securities,
  • $200 billion to the Term Securities Lending Facility,
  • $36 billion to foreign exchange swaps,
  • $29 billion to a loan to support the sale of Bear Stearns,
  • $30 billion so far to the Primary Dealer Credit Facility.

Changes in the composition of central bank assets are intended to influence the relative price a financial assets -- that is, interest rate spreads. So, by changing its lending procedures, Fed officials hoped that they would be able to reduce the cost of 3-month interbank loans and the spread between U.S. agency securities and the equivalent maturity Treasury rate. At this writing, these programs have met with only modest success.

As I have said before, I find it helpful to group all the things the Fed does and might do into three baskets, each corresponding to a different stage of the seriousness of the financial crisis and the soundness of the financial system.

Stage I policies are "Bagehot rule" policies: the central bank acts to keep the economy at the good equilibrium in a panic when multiple equilibria are possible by lending freely to solvent but illiquid institutions at a penalty rate. Emergency discount window operations are of this kind--and the conventions that the discount rate should be higher than the bank-to-bank federal funds market rate and that borrowing from the discount window should create a stigma and a presumption of a higher degree of future regulatory and counterpary scrutiny are part of the "penalty rate" charged for asking for such help from the central bank. The idea is that institutions that have gotten themselves underreserved and need emergency liquidity should feel some pain as a result of the systemic risk they caused.

Stage II policies are conventional consensus monetary policies: the central bank uses open-market operations to buy Treasury securities for cash in order to flood the market with liquidity--so that nobody will be illiquid--and also to push down real borrowing costs (thus encouraging investment) and push up the cash values of all kinds of debt. If there was worry about the liquidity or solvency of the system before, the hope is that these open-market purchases will drive such worry away.

Then comes stage III. It comes after stage I policies aimed at curing a temporary inability to turn assets into cash at any but fire-sale prices have failed to repair matters. It comes after stage II policies of lowering interest rates across the entire spectrum and flooding the system with liquidity have failed to ease worries that one's counterparties are still insolvent or still at risk of becoming illiquid at an awkward moment. The purpose of stage III policies is to boost relative demand for risky assets and thus to opeate on the margin that is the spread in prices and yields between safe assets like Treasury securities and the risky assets whose falling prices are threatening the stability of the financial system and the macroeconomic flow of investment.

Since last fall the Federal Reserve has done eight things:

  1. five cuts in the target federal funds rate totaling 225 basis points, or 2¼ percentage points;
  2. a drop in the premium on primary (discount) lending from 100 to 50 and then to 25 basis points, above the federal funds rate target;
  3. the creation and then enlargement of the "Term Auction Facility" (TAF) ($100 billion);
  4. the extension of collateral status for 28-day repos to mortgage-backed securities ($100 billion)
  5. the extension of credit to the European Central Bank and the Swiss National Bank ($36 billion);
  6. the change in the preexisting securities lending program to initiate the "Term Securities Lending Facility" (TSLF) ($200 billion);
  7. extension of credit to primary dealers through the newly created "Primary Dealer Credit Facility" (PDCF) ($30 billion)
  8. the authorization of lending to support the JP Morgan Chase purchase of Bear Stearns ($29 billion)

Policy move (1) is conventional stage II open-market operation monetary policy: flood the system with liquidity and tilt the intertemporal price system to the advantage of financial institutions that borrow short and lend long in order to boost investment spending and relieve fears of counterparty illiquidity or insolvency that might lead to financial meltdown. Policy moves (2) and to some degree (3) are attempts to take stage I tools and use them for stage II purposes by removing the stigma and penalty rate attached to discount borrowing. This reflects a decision that the time to punish the underreserved for their fecklessness has passed and is an obstacle to effective monetary policy.

The rest of (3)--and (4) through (8)--strike me as stage III policies of various kinds, aimed at boosting demand for and the prices of risky assets more directly, given that stage II policies have failed to fix the problem. But I have a hard time analyzing exactly how these programs should be expected to have meaningfully different effects, or how effective they could possibly be.

Paul Krugman is very pessimistic: http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/03/08/whats-ben-doing-very-wonkish/.

April 13, 2008

New York Times Death Spiral Watch: ar, Peter Goodman, Friedman Would Have Welcomed the Fed's Intervention in Bear Stearns

Peter Goodman of the New York Times writes that Milton Friedman "would surely be unhappy with this turn" of events as the Federal Reserve intervenes in financial markets to cushion the impact of things like the collapse of Bear Stearns.

No, Peter Goodman, you are wrong. Friedman would have welcomed the Fed's intervention in Bear Stearns as a way of preventing a downward move in the deposit-currency ratio and thus a fall in the money stock.

On a deeper level, I really think that Peter Goodman of the New York Times gets Milton Friedman wrong. Milton Friedman said that prosperity springs from markets as long as:

  • The government is not allowed to establish and maintain islands of monopoly power.
  • The government stabilizes the money stock and keeps the economy liquid--keeps the stock of assets people can readily spend growing at a steady pace.

Had Peter Goodman actually read anything Milton Friedman wrote about the Great Depression, Goodman would know that when Milton Friedman "attributed the worst economic unraveling in American history to regulators," he placed special stress on Depression-era regulators' refusal to move aggressively to handle bank failures--in Friedman and Schwartz's The Great Contraction, the moment when a normal recession becomes the Great Depression comes about when the Bank of United States fails and the Federal Reserve refuses to step in to handle the situation. Friedman was very much pro-bailout as far as bank depositors were concerned when a failure to do so would lead to a systemic reduction in the money stock.

And Friedman's line was always not that market are perfect, but rather that while markets can and do fail governments have more common and worse modes of failure--except for a narrow range of core functions: rule of law, systemic financial stability, increasing-returns infrastructure, et cetera.

There are tens of thousands of people--left, right, and center--who know Milton Friedman's work, and who would not have committed the elementary error of writ