203 entries categorized "Berkeley: Teaching"

May 17, 2008

Hoisted from Comments: Political Economy Major "Concentrations" at Berkeley

The highly-intelligent and industrious David Guarino writes:

Hoisted from Comments: David Guarino: Berkeley Political Economy "Concentrations": A few practical constraints from an "on the ground" perspective worth noting:

  1. The fleeting accuracy of course names: While the content of Econ 100B will rarely fluctuate beyond the relative weight given to short/medium-term and long-term/growth models, this is exceedingly the exception in PEIS spectrum. Much to my (pleasant) surprise, "Rhetoric of Social Science" the semester I took it turned out to be more a genealogy of Marxist approaches to economics since the school's namesake than anything else. This means the average PEIS student can rarely predict what combination of Dept names and 3-digit numbers fit within his or her thematic constraints in a given semester. This is to say nothing of the regularity (or lack thereof) of the offered classes.

  2. The shadow of regimes past: The advising staff has traditionally not accepted geographic concentrations, and many of the examples you've given appear to me to be just that. Not to say that I disagree with the notion; indeed, it may be the best "narrowing" mechanism to eventually lead to a thesis topic. BUT, you must recognize this would represent an implicit regime shift among the advising staff and likely for many of the major's stakeholders (at the very least whoever pushed for geography being insufficient in the first place).

  3. The frantic irrationality of a first-week student: Let's admit it, the vast majority of undergrads choose classes based on a few main considerations: to what degree the major forces one to take it, one's first impression of a professor, what time it's at, and how interesting the material seems. In my experience, most also select in this order. It's a simple iterated optimization game for people, with the major imposing most of the constraints.

My major point (no pun) is that most students just improvise their way through it all, and to a large degree this is what PEIS is about: lower bureaucratic constraints so that intellectual utility might be more fully optimized; the flexibility to take that one Agricultural Econ class that won't ever be offered again and not have to stay a ninth semester because they let you work it into your concentration. The primary problem is this leads to thoroughly confused students - even exceedingly dedicated ones - come senior year.

All this is to say concentrations in PEIS really cannot be planned. They arise from the strange iterated game mentioned already. And that fact must be recognized, if not actively encouraged as the norm. The major should be an exploration, with each stage (lower div's, core methods, concentration, thesis) progressively narrowing in scope. Perhaps more focus ought to be given to how each stage really contributes to the student's own ability to further narrow, through increasing exposure to the methodologies he or she is interested in applying to a specific problem.

(End rant)

As a comment on my:

The "Concentration" requirement in Berkeley's Political Economy major is meant to give students the opportunity to deepen their understanding of the nature of the relationship between politics and economics as it relates to a particular issue. You are graduating with a Political Economy degree. That means you know a little about each of history, sociology, political science, economics, possibly philosophy, rhetoric, anthropology, geography or other disciplines as well. You should know a lot about something. the Concentration requirement forces you to define that something.

Each student chooses an existing or potential issue or problem in political economy, and takes four courses bearing on that issue or problem. The courses need to inform the student's study of the Concentration topic. In a better world than this, the Concentration requirement would also include a senior honors thesis on some aspect of the Concentration topic.

The key to the Concentration requirement is that it is your own: the Concentration is self-defined. You must develop a topic that is an existing or potential issue or problem in political economy. You then choose four courses to inform inform your view and increase your knowledge. Select courses from different departments. Note that courses listed in the PEIS Student Handbook will automatically be approved for appropriate concentration topics--but courses not listed in the handbook can be taken for the concentration: all you have to do is make the case that it is appropriate for the concentration. And, of course, no double dipping: courses taken for your concentration cannot be double-counted towards another major requirement.

Here are fifteen sample recent concentrations. Note that these are not the best possible courses offered at some Platonic Ideal of Berkeley for this concentration--these are real-world courses that students can actually get into and take...

May 16, 2008

After the Examination All Professors Are Sad: A Dialogue About Teaching the Wrong Thing

Akhilleus: You look morose.

Glaukon: It's 99.9F degrees out.

Akhilleus: So you are thinking of Suzanne Vega?

Glaukon: No, the chocolate bar I keep in my backpack has melted all over my backup portable disk drive. But that's not why I am morose.

Akhilleus: So why are you morose then?

Glaukon: Because, looking back over my syllabus this semester, I realized that I spent five full weeks--one third of the semester--teaching them the Solow growth model...

Khelona: It's a fine model...

Glaukon: And yet when the rubber hits the road, it doesn't do us any good. It doesn't tell us anything first-order about the world--aside from post-WWII Japanese convergence from a bouncing-rubble B-29 testfield to a prosperous OECD economy.

Khelona: Actually, I don't think the Solow growth model explains that...

Glaukon: You don't?

Khelona: Post-WWII Japan converged to the OECD norm. And the Solow growth model has some convergence in it--if you start out really poor because your economy's capital stock has been turned into rubble or worse by B-29 strikes, you will grow fast because a low capital stock gives you a high social marginal product of investment and depreciation cannot be a drag on growth if there is no capital to depreciate. But these have always struck me as second- or third-order mechanisms in the story of post-WWII economic growth. Trade. Technology transfer. Institutional reform. The survival of the economic-mobilization components of the fascist Tojo dictatorship. The destruction of the other components of the fascist Tojo dictatorship. The ability of large firms to strike high-productivity bargain with their core workforces by shifting risks onto small-scale producer-suppliers and secondary-sector workers. The neocolonial origins of comparative development--that for Cold War-fighting reasons the U.S. was willing to cut Japan an enormous amount of slack in terms of market access that it was not willing to cut Mexico or Argentina or anyone else outside NATO. You know the story. You know the story better than I do.

Glaukon: Great! So now you've depressed me further--you have gotten me down from one example of the model at work telling us something interesting down to zero.

Zeno: I wouldn't be so depressed. It may be a small step, but it is a step, and steps add up...

Akhilleus: You are the wrong person to say that small steps add up!

Zeno: I have learned how to do limits properly in the past 2400 years...

Khelona: But it does provide a useful service: it is a tractable model that teaches students this mode of thought, and when you apply it to the world it teaches you that--with some caveats--capital accumulation is not the most important thing to study when you focus on growth...

Glaukon: So then why did I spend five weeks on it?

Akhilleus: Ummm... What did you teach, exactly?

Glaukon: This:

  • The Solow growth model: setup, balanced-growth equilibirum, convergence
  • Raw materials and natural resource scarcity in the Solow model
  • Endogenous population growth and the Malthusian equilibrium
  • Transition to modern economic growth: the invention of invention and innovation via the industrial research lab
  • Modes of organizing research and development:
    • State--distributing the R&D for free, and having a central bureaucratic process make the decision about what to work on
    • Nonprofits--distributing the R&D for free, and having a decentralized desire to win the tenure game make the decisions about what to work on
    • Private companies--intellectual property protection and selling the products of R&D, and having profit-seeking companies decide to work on what they can sell
  • The Great Divergence of the world economy from 1850-1975: western Europe and Pacific Asia but not much else have converged, U.S. now 30 times richer than Kenya
  • DeLong and Summers: equipment investment, high marginal product of investment as a reality or as a statistical illusion
  • Post-1975: China and India stand up; Africa falls behind
  • The golden rule and the "optimal" national savings rate
  • From the Solow model to the Ramsey model: more sophisticated takes at optimal savings rates

Khelona: Sounds like a smashing success to me...

Glaukon: But the bottom line is that we don't have good explanations at any deep level for why the U.S. today is and stays 30 times richer than Kenya.

Akhilleus: Or, rather, that we have good explanations but they are historians', political scientists', and sociologists' explanations--not explanations in which a facility with the differential calculus is terribly helpful and thus not explanations instrumentally useful to a sect of academics who want to use their facility with the differential calculus to impose a form of hegemonic domination over social science in general.

Glaukon: And we can say that you will grow fast if you have lots of research and deveiopment--both your own and also do a good job of transferring technology in from outside. But we can't say how much is optimal. Or how it should be organized. Or what legal system should underpin it. We have to decide whether R&D is going to be done by centralized government bureaucracies and freely distributed, by guildmasters working at nonprofits on projects they think of as intellectually interesting and then freely distributed, or by profit-seeking companies with some degree of intellectual property protection giving them monopoly power. But we can't say anything coherent and convincing about what the mix should beand what the degree of intellectual property protection should be.

Akhilleus: But surely there is value in being confused about the issue at a higher and more sophisticated level...

Khelona: I agree: too arrive at the point where you can say that these are the most important issues to think about is a very important achievement...

Thrasymakhos: Especially if it leads immediately to higher funding levels for universities...

Dean Scrimgeour: Monetary Policy Shocks and Commodity Prices...

Macro lunch...

"Is this for or against Jeff Frankel?" "How about orthogonal? As orthogonal as possible..."

  • Barsky and Killian (2001)
  • Barsky and Killian (2004)
  • Frankel (2006)
  • Scrimgeour (2008)
  • Cook and Hahn (1989)
  • Bernanke and Kuttner
  • Kuttner (2001) -- fed funds futures shock...

  • Volatility

  • Recent elevated commodity prices
  • Dornbusch overshooting model--commodity prices as asset prices

May 15, 2008

Some Political Economy "Concentrations": DRAFT

The Concentration requirement in Berkeley's Political Economy major is meant to give students the opportunity to deepen their understanding of the nature of the relationship between politics and economics as it relates to a particular issue. You are graduating with a Political Economy degree. That means you know a little about each of history, sociology, political science, economics, possibly philosophy, rhetoric, anthropology, geography or other disciplines as well. You should know a lot about something. the Concentration requirement forces you to define that something.

Each student chooses an existing or potential issue or problem in international political economy, and takes four courses bearing on that issue or problem. The courses need to inform the student's study of the Concentration topic. In a better world than this, the Concentration requirement would also include a senior honors thesis on some aspect of the Concentration topic.

The key to the Concentration requirement is that it is your own: the Concentration is self-defined. You must develop a topic that is an existing or potential issue or problem in international political economy. You then choose four courses to inform inform your view and increase your knowledge. Select courses from different departments. Note that courses listed in the PEIS Student Handbook will automatically be approved for appropriate concentration topics--but courses not listed in the handbook can be taken for the concentration: all you have to do is make the case that it is appropriate for the concentration. And, of course, no double dipping: courses taken for your concentration cannot be double-counted towards another major requirement.

Here are fifteen sample recent concentrations. Note that these are not the best possible courses offered at some Platonic Ideal of Berkeley for this concentration--these are real-world courses that students can actually get into and take for their respective concentrations:


Democracy, Globalization, and China

  • Mass Comm 102: Effects of Mass Media
  • Soc 172: Development and Globalization
  • Soc 183: Contemporary Chinese Society
  • Poli Sci 143C: Chinese Politics
  • Poli Sci 143D: Democracy and China

The Euro

  • Econ 161: International Trade
  • Hist 158C: Modern Europe, 1914-Present
  • Poli Sci 147H: The Domestic Politics of Postwar Western Europe
  • Soc 122: Comparative Perspectives: US and Europoe
  • Hist 160: The International Economy of the Twentieth Century

The European Union: Rhetoric and Reality

  • Rhet 150: Rhetoric of Contemporary Politics
  • Rhet 172: Rhetoric of Social Theory
  • Poli Sci 147: Western European Politics
  • Hist 158C: Modern Europe: 1914-Present

Economic Development and Human Rights

  • Econ 171: Economic Development
  • PS 139B: Politics of Development
  • PACS: Human Rights
  • Poli Sci 146AB: African Politics

Sustainable Development

  • IAS 115: Global Poverty
  • ESPM 161: Environmental Philosophy and Ethics
  • ESPM 167: Environmental Health and Development
  • Geo 130: Natural Resources and Populations
  • EEP 153: Population, Environment, and Development

International Power: Economic, Political, and Military

  • Poli Sci 124A: War
  • Poli Sci 124C: Justice in International Affairs
  • Econ 181: International Trade
  • Poli Sci 138B: Market Economics
  • EEP 152: Development and International Trade

Political Economy of Northeast Asia

  • Poli Sci 1230A: International Relations
  • History 113B: Modern Korean History
  • Poli Sci 128: Chinese Foreign Policy
  • UGBA 118: International Trade
  • Hist 118C: Japan: The Late Nineteenth Century to the Present

Development in the Information Age

  • IFS 100D: Introduction to Technology, Society, and Culture
  • DS 100: Development in Theory and History
  • Info 190: Technology and Poverty
  • Am Stud 134: Information Technology and Society
  • Poli Sci 138D: Governance of the E-conomy

Barriers to the Delivery of health Care Services in the United States

PH 150D: Intro to Health Policy and Management ESPM 162: Bioethics and Society Econ 157: Health Economics GWS 150: Gender and Health


Decolonization and the Political and Economic Development of the Middle East

  • Hist 109C: History of the Middle East
  • MES 130: Jews and Muslims
  • Poli Sci 124A: Middle Eastern Politics
  • Soc 172: Development and Globalization

Behavioral Economics and Economic Planning

  • Env Des 100: The City
  • EEP C151: Economic Development
  • Pub Pol 101: Intro to Policy Analysis
  • Econ C175: Economic Demography
  • CRP 118AC: Community and Economic Development

Cosmopolitanism and International Development

  • IAS 150: Cosmopolitanism
  • Poli Sci 138B: The Politics of Market Economies
  • UGBA 118: International Trade
  • UGBA 178: Introduction to International Business
  • Econ : Game Theory

American Political and Economic Imperialism in Latin America

  • LAS 150: Latin American Development and World Markets
  • PACS 149: Global Change and World Order
  • Anthro 139: Controlling Processes
  • Hist : Latin American History

Law, Politics, and Development in the Middle East

  • Phil 115: Political Philosophy
  • Leg Stud 145: Law and Economics
  • Poli Sci 149C: Modernization in Iran, Turkey, and Afghanistan
  • Poli Sci 139B: Development Politics

Immigration Law and Policy

  • Soc 111: Sociology of the Family
  • Poli Sci 198A: Latin American Politics
  • Leg Stud 176: American Legal History
  • Chic Stud 159: Mexican Immigration

May 07, 2008

Econ 210a: May 7: The twentieth-century experience: half empty or half full?

May 7: The twentieth-century experience: half empty or half full?


Let's start today with Karl Marx: "The Future Results of British Rule in India," New York Daily Tribune, August 8, 1853:

The political unity... imposed by the British sword, will now be strengthened and perpetuated by the electric telegraph. The native army, organized and trained by the British drill-sergeant, was the sine qua non of... India ceasing to be the prey of the first foreign intruder. The free press, introduced for the first time into Asiatic society.... is a new and powerful agent of reconstruction.... From the Indian natives, reluctantly and sparingly educated at Calcutta, under English superintendence, a fresh class is springing up, endowed with the requirements for government and imbued with European science. Steam.... The day is not far distant when, by a combination of railways and steam-vessels, the distance between England and India, measured by time, will be shortened to eight days, and when that once fabulous country will thus be actually annexed to the Western world.

The ruling classes of Great Britain have had, till now, but an accidental, transitory and exceptional interest in the progress of India. The aristocracy wanted to conquer it, the moneyocracy to plunder it, and the millocracy to undersell it.... [T]he English millocracy intend to endow India with railways with the exclusive view of extracting at diminished expenses the cotton and other raw materials for their manufactures. But when you have once introduced machinery into the locomotion of a country, which possesses iron and coals, you are unable to withhold it from its fabrication. You cannot maintain a net of railways over an immense country without introducing all those industrial processes necessary to meet the immediate and current wants of railway locomotion, and out of which there must grow the application of machinery to those branches of industry not immediately connected with railways. The railway-system will therefore become, in India, truly the forerunner of modern industry.... Modern industry, resulting from the railway system, will dissolve the hereditary divisions of labor, upon which rest the Indian castes, those decisive impediments to Indian progress and Indian power.

All the English bourgeoisie may be forced to do will neither emancipate nor materially mend the social condition of the mass of the people, depending not only on the development of the productive powers, but on their appropriation by the people. But what they will not fail to do is to lay down the material premises for both. Has the bourgeoisie ever done more? Has it ever effected a progress without dragging individuals and people through blood and dirt, through misery and degradation?...

The devastating effects of English industry, when contemplated with regard to India, a country as vast as Europe, and containing 150 millions of acres, are palpable and confounding. But we must not forget... [t]he bourgeois period of history has to create the material basis of the new world — on the one hand universal intercourse founded upon the mutual dependency of mankind, and the means of that intercourse; on the other hand the development of the productive powers of man and the transformation of material production into a scientific domination of natural agencies. Bourgeois industry and commerce create these material conditions of a new world in the same way as geological revolutions have created the surface of the earth. When a great social revolution shall have mastered the results of the bourgeois epoch, the market of the world and the modern powers of production, and subjected them to the common control of the most advanced peoples, then only will human progress cease to resemble that hideous, pagan idol, who would not drink the nectar but from the skulls of the slain.

Continue reading "Econ 210a: May 7: The twentieth-century experience: half empty or half full?" »

Econ 101b: May 7: The Long-Run Fiscal Situation: Theory and Practice II

May 7: The Long-Run Fiscal Situation: Theory and Practice II

Notes: Lecture Audio; Solow and Ramsey

May 03, 2008

Note to Self: The Ramsey Model Once Again

Theoretical Public Finance in the Long Run: National Saving Edition

J. Bradford DeLong (2008), "Economic Growth: From Solow to Ramsey" http://www.j-bradford-delong.net/2008_pdf/ramsey_iii.pdf

William T. Smith (2006), "A Closed Form Solution to the Ramsey Model" http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1356&context=bejm

William T. Smith (2007) "Inspecting the Mechanism Exactly: A Closed-form Solution to a Stochastic Growth Model" http://www.bepress.com/bejm/vol7/iss1/art30

May 02, 2008

Econ 101b Final Exam

UCB Online Schedule of Final Exams: Search Results: Displaying 1 match to your request for Spring 2008 Final Exams:

Course:  ECONOMICS 101B P 001 LEC
Course Title:  Economic Theory--Macro
Date/Time:  FRIDAY, MAY 16, 2008   8-11A
Location:  277 CORY
Instructor:  DELONG, J B
Course Control Number:  22579
Final Exam Group:  4

Econ 101b: May 2: The Long-Run Fiscal Situation: Theory

May 2: The Long-Run Fiscal Situation: Theory

Notes: Lecture Audio

Readings:

May 01, 2008

Econ 101b: April 30: "Conservative" Central Bankers

April 30: "Conservative" Central Bankers

Notes: Lecture Audio

Readings:

Econ 210a: Apr 30: WWII and the thirty glorious years [DeLong]

Apr 30: WWII and the thirty glorious years [DeLong]

Audio


Let us sit in 1945 and look at western Europe. What do we see?

  • A truly genocidal subcontinent--devastated over the past four centuries by wars of religion, ideology, and nationalism.
  • A not-that-rich subcontinent--levels of output per worker averaging perhaps half those of what appears possible given technology elsewhere, in America, Canada, and Australia.
  • A Eurosclerotic subcontinent--lobbies and entrenched interests playing negative-sum games, whether unions, aristocracies, small craft producers, or mini-nations.
  • A politically-disordered subcontinent--Nazis, fascists, communists, shaky democracies, coups, street riots, large-scale political street violence.

You would have had to have been a brave person to predict the post-WWII western European renaissance...

  • Conversely, you might have been "optimistic" about the Soviet Union: cruel, barbarous, murderous, but also--effective in accomplishing its tasks.

Why the reversals of fortune of the 30 glorious years?


What Barry Eichengtreen and I wrote back in 1991:

The 1930’s in Europe had seen not chronic bottlenecks but chronic deficiencies of aggregate demand. Production had fallen far below normal for the entire decade; market forces had failed to restore demand to normal levels. Circumstances during the Great Depression had been exceptional, but circumstances in the aftermath of World War II were exceptional as well. Many feared the return of the Depression.

In fact (aside from the possibility that fear of a renewed Great Depression would act as a self-fulfilling prophecy) the return of the Great Depression was a less likely possibility in the 1940’s than was generally feared. The memory of the Depression, and the greater strength and incorporation of social democratic political movements in government kept right-wing governments from adopting policies of out-and-out national deflation. The availability of the large United States market to European exports--especially with the coming of the Korean War Boom and NATO in the early 1950’s--prevented any large world aggregate demand shortfall as in the Great Depression. With the American locomotive under full steam, Western European economies were unlikely to suffer from prolonged Keynesian demand-shortfall depressions.

Nevertheless, a live possibility in the absence of the Marshall Plan was that governments would not stand aside and allow the market system to do its job. In the wake of the Great Depression, many still recalled the disastrous outcome of the laissez-faire policies then in effect. Politicians were predisposed toward intervention and regulation: no matter how damaging “government failure” might be to the economy, it had to be better than the “market failure” of the Depression. Had European political economy taken a different turn, post-World War II European recovery might have been stagnant. Governments might have been slow to dismantle wartime allocation controls, and so have severely constrained the market mechanism. In fact the Marshall Plan era saw a rapid dismantling of controls over product and factor markets in Western Europe, and the restoration of price and exchange rate stability. An alternative scenario would have seen the maintenance and expansion of wartime controls in order to guard against substantial shifts in income distribution. The late 1940’s and early 1950’s might have seen the creation in Western Europe of allocative bureaucracies to ration scarce foreign exchange, and the imposition of price controls on exportables in order to protect the living standards of urban working classes.

The likely consequences of such alternative policies for post-World war II Europe can be seen in the Argentine mirror....

In 1929 Argentina had appeared as rich as any large country in continental Europe. It was still as rich in 1950, when Western Europe had for the most part reattained pre-World War II levels of national product. But by 1960 Argentina was poorer than Italy and had less than two-thirds of the GDP per capita of France or West Germany. One way to think about post-World War II Argentina is that its mixed economy was poorly oriented: the government allocated goods, especially imports, among alternative uses; the controlled market redistributed income. Thus neither the private nor the public sector was used to its comparative advantage.

In post-World War II Western Europe, by contrast, market forces allocated resources--even, to a large extent, for nationalized industries--the government redistributed income, and the outcome was much more favorable....

In Díaz Alejandro's estimation, four factors set the stage for Argentina’s relative decline: a politically-active and militant urban industrial working class, economic nationalism, sharp divisions between traditional elites and poorer strata, and a government used to exercising control over goods allocation that viewed the price system as a tool for redistributing wealth rather than for determining the pattern of economic activity.

From the perspective of 1947, the political economy of Western Europe would lead one to think that it was at least as vulnerable as Argentina to economic stagnation induced by populist overregulation. The war had given Europe more experience than Argentina with economic planning and rationing. Militant urban working classes calling for wealth redistribution voted in such numbers as to make Communists plausibly part of a permanent ruling political coalition in France and Italy. Economic nationalism had been nurtured by a decade and a half of Depression, autarky and war. European political parties had been divided substantially along economic class lines for a generation.

Yet post-World War II western Europe avoided this trap. After World War II Western Europe’s mixed economies built substantial redistributional systems, but they were built on top of and not as replacements for market allocations of goods and factors. Just as post-World War II Western Europe saw the avoidance of the political-economic “wars of attrition” that had put a brake on post-World War I European recovery, so post-World War II Western Europe avoided the tight web of controls that kept post-World War II Argentina from being able to adjust and grow...


April 25, 2008

Econ 101b: April 25: Long-Run Growth Revisited: Endogenous Growth

April 25: Long-Run Growth Revisited: Endogenous Growth

Notes: Lecture Audio; “Infant Industries,” Industrial Policy, and Development in a Model of Productive Variety http://www.j-bradford-delong.net/2008_pdf/20080424_industrial_policy.pdf

Readings:

April 23, 2008

April 23: Econ 210a: WWI and the Great Depression [DeLong]

April 23: WWI and the Great Depression [DeLong]


Memo Question for April 30: "Thirty Glorious Years": A growing literature develops explanations for 'Europe's golden age' (the European economy's fast growth in the third quarter of the 20th century). Is this effort misguided? In other words, do we really need fancy explanations for a straightforward phenomenon that is easily explained in terms of convergence and delayed structural change?


Memo Question for April 23: The Great Depression: What do our readings tell us about the answers to the following two questions?

  • Why was the Great Depression so great?
  • Why has there been only one Great Depression in the long span between the commercial revolution and today?

World War I and the Task of Rebuilding:

John Maynard Keynes (1920), The Economic Consequences of the Peace, chapters 1, 2, and 6 http://www.gutenberg.org/files/15776/15776-h/15776-h.htm

The Coming of the Great Depression:

Christina Romer (1990), "The Great Crash and the Onset of the Great Depression," Quarterly Journal of Economics 104, pp.719-736, http://www.jstor.org/view/00335533/di971078/97p00037/0

Ben Bernanke (1983), "Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of the Great Depression" American Economic Review 73, pp. 257-276, http://www.jstor.org/view/00028282/di950033/95p00602/0

Understanding the Great Depression:

John Maynard Keynes (1932), "The World's Economic Outlook," Atlantic http://www.theatlantic.com/unbound/flashbks/budget/keynesf.htm

Paul Krugman, "Introduction" to John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money http://www.pkarchive.org/economy/GeneralTheoryKeynesIntro.html

Consequences of the Great Depression:

Margaret Weir and Theda Skocpol, "State Structures and Social Keynesianism: Responses to the Great Depression in Sweden and the United States," International Journal of Comparative Sociology pp. 4-29 http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=GLQ3AAAAIAAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA7-IA3&dq=Margaret+Weir+and+Theda+Skocpol,+%22State+Structures+and+Social+Keynesianism&ots=P2iXGFkFfu&sig=APmY6D1P2QkJ0l28RRWX5YxjBmg#PPA29,M1


World War I and the Task of Rebuilding:

John Maynard Keynes (1920), The Economic Consequneces of the Peace, chapters 1, 2, and 6 http://www.gutenberg.org/files/15776/15776-h/15776-h.htm

  • Very few of us realize with conviction the intensely unusual, unstable, complicated, unreliable, temporary nature of the economic organization by which Western Europe has lived for the last half century. We assume some of the most peculiar and temporary of our late advantages as natural, permanent, and to be depended on, and we lay our plans accordingly. On this sandy and false foundation we scheme for social improvement and dress our political platforms, pursue our animosities and particular ambitions, and feel ourselves with enough margin in hand to foster, not assuage, civil conflict in the European family. Moved by insane delusion and reckless self-regard, the German people overturned the foundations on which we all lived and built. But the spokesmen of the French and British peoples have run the risk of completing the ruin, which Germany began, by a Peace which, if it is carried into effect, must impair yet further, when it might have restored, the delicate, complicated organization, already shaken and broken by war, through which alone the European peoples can employ themselves and live.... What an extraordinary episode in the economic progress of man that age was which came to an end in August, 1914! The greater part of the population, it is true, worked hard and lived at a low standard of comfort, yet were, to all appearances, reasonably contented with this lot. But escape was possible, for any man of capacity or character at all exceeding the average, into the middle and upper classes, for whom life offered, at a low cost and with the least trouble, conveniences, comforts, and amenities beyond the compass of the richest and most powerful monarchs of other ages. The inhabitant of London could order by telephone, sipping his morning tea in bed, the various products of the whole earth, in such quantity as he might see fit, and reasonably expect their early delivery upon his doorstep; he could at the same moment and by the same means adventure his wealth in the natural resources and new enterprises of any quarter of the world, and share, without exertion or even trouble, in their prospective fruits and advantages; or be could decide to couple the security of his fortunes with the good faith of the townspeople of any substantial municipality in any continent that fancy or information might recommend. He could secure forthwith, if he wished it, cheap and comfortable means of transit to any country or climate without passport or other formality, could despatch his servant to the neighboring office of a bank for such supply of the precious metals as might seem convenient, and could then proceed abroad to foreign quarters, without knowledge of their religion, language, or customs, bearing coined wealth upon his person, and would consider himself greatly aggrieved and much surprised at the least interference. But, most important of all, he regarded this state of affairs as normal, certain, and permanent, except in the direction of further improvement, and any deviation from it as aberrant, scandalous, and avoidable. The projects and politics of militarism and imperialism, of racial and cultural rivalries, of monopolies, restrictions, and exclusion, which were to play the serpent to this paradise, were little more than the amusements of his daily newspaper, and appeared to exercise almost no influence at all on the ordinary course of social and economic life, the internationalization of which was nearly complete in practice...

  • This chapter must be one of pessimism. The Treaty includes no provisions for the economic rehabilitation of Europe,—nothing to make the defeated Central Empires into good neighbors, nothing to stabilize the new States of Europe, nothing to reclaim Russia; nor does it promote in any way a compact of economic solidarity amongst the Allies themselves; no arrangement was reached at Paris for restoring the disordered finances of France and Italy, or to adjust the systems of the Old World and the New. The Council of Four paid no attention to these issues, being preoccupied with others,—Clemenceau to crush the economic life of his enemy, Lloyd George to do a deal and bring home something which would pass muster for a week, the President to do nothing that was not just and right. It is an extraordinary fact that the fundamental economic problems of a Europe starving and disintegrating before their eyes, was the one question in which it was impossible to arouse the interest of the Four. Reparation was their main excursion into the economic field, and they settled it as a problem of theology, of polities, of electoral chicane, from every point of view except that of the economic future of the States whose destiny they were handling...

  • If we take the view that for at least a generation to come Germany cannot be trusted with even a modicum of prosperity, that while all our recent Allies are angels of light, all our recent enemies, Germans, Austrians, Hungarians, and the rest, are children of the devil, that year by year Germany must be kept impoverished and her children starved and crippled, and that she must be ringed round by enemies; then we shall reject all the proposals of this chapter.... But if this view of nations and of their relation to one another is adopted... heaven help us all. If we aim deliberately at the impoverishment of Central Europe, vengeance, I dare predict, will not limp. Nothing can then delay for very long that final civil war between the forces of Reaction and the despairing convulsions of Revolution, before which the horrors of the late German war will fade into nothing, and which will destroy, whoever is victor, the civilization and the progress of our generation. Even though the result disappoint us, must we not base our actions on better expectations, and believe that the prosperity and happiness of one country promotes that of others, that the solidarity of man is not a fiction, and that nations can still afford to treat other nations as fellow-creatures?...


The Coming of the Great Depression:

Christina Romer (1990), "The Great Crash and the Onset of the Great Depression," Quarterly Journal of Economics 104, pp.719-736, http://www.jstor.org/view/00335533/di971078/97p00037/0

Ben Bernanke (1983), "Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of the Great Depression" American Economic Review 73, pp. 257-276, http://www.jstor.org/view/00028282/di950033/95p00602/0

  • http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2937892.pdf

  • http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1808111.pdf


Understanding the Great Depression:

John Maynard Keynes (1932), "The World's Economic Outlook," Atlantic http://www.theatlantic.com/unbound/flashbks/budget/keynesf.htm

Paul Krugman, "Introduction" to John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money http://www.pkarchive.org/economy/GeneralTheoryKeynesIntro.html

  • Keynes: The immediate causes of the world financial panic -- for that is what it is -- are obvious. They are to be found in a catastrophic fall in the money value, not only of commodities, but of practically every kind of asset. The 'margins,' as we call them, upon confidence in the maintenance of which the debt and credit structure of the modern world depends, have 'run off.'... Debtors of all kinds find that their securities are no longer the equal of their debts. Few governments still have revenues sufficient to cover the fixed money charges for which they have made themselves liable. Moreover, a collapse of this kind feeds on itself. We are now in the phase where the risk of carrying assets with borrowed money is so great that there is a competitive panic to get liquid. And each individual who succeeds in getting more liquid forces down the price of assets in the process of getting liquid, with the result that the margins of other individuals are impaired and their courage undermined. And so the process continues.... We have here an extreme example of the disharmony of general and particular interest.... Practically all the remedies popularly advocated to-day are of this... beggar-my-neighbor description. For one man's expenditure is another man's income. Thus, while we undoubtedly increase our own margin, we diminish that of someone else; and if the practice is universally followed everyone will be worse off. An individual may be forced by his private circumstances to curtail his normal expenditure, and no one can blame him. But let no one suppose that he is performing a public duty in behaving in such a way. The modern capitalist is a fair-weather sailor. As soon as a storm rises, he abandons the duties of navigation and even sinks the boats which might carry him to safety by his haste to push his neighbor off and himself in. Unfortunately the popular mind has been educated away from the truth, away from common sense. The average man has been taught to believe what his own common sense, if he relied on it, would tell him was absurd.... Meanwhile the problem of reparations and war debts darkens the whole scene...

  • Krugman: The message of Keynes: It’s probably safe to assume that the “conservative scholars and policy leaders” who pronounced The General Theory one of the most dangerous books of the past two centuries haven’t read it. But they’re sure it’s a leftist tract, a call for big government and high taxes. That’s what people on the right, and some on the left, too, have said about The General Theory from the beginning. In fact, the arrival of Keynesian economics in American classrooms was delayed by a nasty case of academic McCarthyism. The first introductory textbook to present Keynesian thinking, written by the Canadian economist Lorie Tarshis, was targeted by a right-wing pressure campaign aimed at university trustees. As a result of this campaign, many universities that had planned to adopt the book for their courses cancelled their orders, and sales of the book, which was initially very successful, collapsed. Professors at Yale University, to their credit, continued to assign the book; their reward was to be attacked by the young William F. Buckley for propounding “evil ideas.”

  • But Keynes was no socialist – he came to save capitalism, not to bury it. And there’s a sense in which The General Theory was, given the time it was written, a conservative book. (Keynes himself declared that in some respects his theory had “moderately conservative implications.” [377]) Keynes wrote during a time of mass unemployment, of waste and suffering on an incredible scale. A reasonable man might well have concluded that capitalism had failed, and that only huge institutional changes – perhaps the nationalization of the means of production – could restore economic sanity. Many reasonable people did, in fact, reach that conclusion: large numbers of British and American intellectuals who had no particular antipathy toward markets and private property became socialists during the depression years simply because they saw no other way to remedy capitalism’s colossal failures.

  • Yet Keynes argued that these failures had surprisingly narrow, technical causes. “We have magneto [alternator] trouble” he wrote in 1930, as the world was plunging into depression. And because Keynes saw the causes of mass unemployment as narrow and technical, he argued that the problem’s solution could also be narrow and technical: the system needed a new alternator, but there was no need to replace the whole car. In particular, “no obvious case is made out for a system of State Socialism which would embrace most of the economic life of the community.” [378] While many of his contemporaries were calling for government takeover of the whole economy, Keynes argued that much less intrusive government policies could ensure adequate effective demand, allowing the market economy to go on as before. Still, there is a sense in which free-market fundamentalists are right to hate Keynes. If your doctrine says that free markets, left to their own devices, produce the best of all possible worlds, and that government intervention in the economy always makes things worse, Keynes is your enemy. And he is an especially dangerous enemy because his ideas have been vindicated so thoroughly by experience. Stripped down, the conclusions of The General Theory might be expressed as four bullet points:

    • Economies can and often do suffer from an overall lack of demand, which leads to involuntary unemployment
    • The economy’s automatic tendency to correct shortfalls in demand, if it exists at all, operates slowly and painfully
    • Government policies to increase demand, by contrast, can reduce unemployment quickly
    • Sometimes increasing the money supply won’t be enough to persuade the private sector to spend more, and government spending must step into the breach
  • To a modern practitioner of economic policy, none of this – except, possibly, the last point – sounds startling or even especially controversial. But these ideas weren’t just radical when Keynes proposed them; they were very nearly unthinkable. And the great achievement of The General Theory was precisely to make them thinkable.


Consequences of the Great Depression:

Margaret Weir and Theda Skocpol, "State Structures and Social Keynesianism: Responses to the Great Depression in Sweden and the United States," International Journal of Comparative Sociology pp. 4-29 http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=GLQ3AAAAIAAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA7-IA3&dq=Margaret+Weir+and+Theda+Skocpol,+%22State+Structures+and+Social+Keynesianism&ots=P2iXGFkFfu&sig=APmY6D1P2QkJ0l28RRWX5YxjBmg#PPA29,M1

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Econ 101b: April 23: The Chinese Economy

April 23: The Chinese Economy

Notes: Slides: http://delong.typepad.com/delongslides/2008/04/econ-101b-april.html; Lecture Audio: http://www.j-bradford-delong.net/2008_mov/20080423_091349.mp3

Readings:

April 21, 2008

April 21: Econ 101b: Why Is Asia Gambling on Bretton Woods II?

April 21: Why Is Asia Gambling on Bretton Woods II?

Notes: Slides: http://delong.typepad.com/delongslides/2008/04/econ-101b-april.html; Lecture Audio: http://www.j-bradford-delong.net/2008_mov/20080421_091146.mp3

Readings:

April 16: Econ 101b: Risks of International Financial Crisis II

April 16: Risks of International Financial Crisis II

April 14: Econ 101b: Risks of International Financial Crisis

April 14: Risks of International Financial Crisis

Notes:

Readings:

April 11, 2008

April 11: Econ 101b: International Finance and "Global Imbalances": Introduction

April 11: International Finance and "Global Imbalances": Introduction

Notes: Lecture Audio http://www.j-bradford-delong.net/2008_mov/20080411_091301.mp3

Readings:

April 09, 2008

Notes for April 9: Econ 210a: "Settler" Industrialization, 1700-1914

Memo Question for April 9: The economies settled from northwestern Europe--the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand--were all resource rich. So why did they industrialize? Why didn't they simply become gigantic Denmarks, shipping agricultural and other resource-based products to the European industral powers in return for manufactures?


This week we have four readings:

They all four bear on the question of settler industrialization--and thus on the question of why the heart of the world economy today is not somewhere near Amsterdam but somewhere between Los Angeles and New York. You would think that the center of innovative industry would remain near its original heartlands--that agglomeration economies in R&D and economic activity would keep Manchester the heart of the world economy. But that is not what happened:

http://papers.nber.org/papers/h0066.pdf

The nineteenth-century periphery industrialized and grew rich--but only a part of the nineteenth-century periphery, and not just the English-speaking British-institutions nineteenth-century periphery--Japan, Barbados, Jamaica, British Guyana, Mississippi...


Paul Krugman on Evsey Domar:

Paul Krugman: [Domar] came up with a simple yet powerful insight: there's no point in enslaving or enserfing a man unless the wage you would have to pay him if he was free is substantially above the cost of feeding, housing, and clothing him. Imagine a pre-industrial society where population is pressing on limited land supplies, and the marginal product of labor... is barely at subsistence. In that case, why bother establishing property rights in human beings? It costs no more to hire a free worker than to feed an indentured laborer. Indeed, by 1300 - with Europe very much a Malthusian society - serfdom had withered away from lack of interest. But now suppose that for some reason land becomes abundant, and labor scarce. Then competition among landowners will tend to push up wages of free workers, and the ruling class will try, if it can, to pin peasants down and prevent them from bargaining for a higher standard of living. In Russia, it was all about gunpowder: suddenly steppe nomads were no longer so formidable, and the rich lands of the Ukraine were open for settlement. Serfdom was an effort to keep peasants from taking advantage of this situation. (And if I've got it right, those who were venturesome enough to run away and set up outside the system became Cossacks.)

Meanwhile, the New World opened in the west. Sure enough, the colonizing powers tried various forms of indentured servitude - making serfs of the Indians in Spanish territories, bringing over indentured servants in Virginia. But eventually they hit on a better solution, from their point of view: importing slaves from Africa...

Brad DeLong on Evsey Domar:

Brad DeLong: Domar's contribution is truly one of the most effective and powerful pieces of synthetic social science I have ever read. It isn't perfect. He has more predecessors than he realizes (Marx, for example, especially Marx's observations on the Swan River Colony in Australia, and the whole section on primitive accumulation and the creation of agrarian capitalism in Britain). And Domar misses one big cause of serfdom and slavery. During the formation of the Roman Empire, in Poland at the end of the Middle Ages, and in the Caribbean islands during the early modern period, slavery and serfdom did not emerge because a high land-labor ratio meant that the ruling elite could not afford to bid for labor in a free labor market. Slavery and serfdom emerged, instead, because high demand for staple products (grain, sugar, tobacco...) greatly lowered the gap between the productivity of free and the productivity of bound workers. Staple production is easier for gang-bosses to monitor than more diversified farming. Staple production also has lower skill requirements for workers. When demand for staple products is very high--to feed the proletariat of imperial Rome, to feed the growing cities of late-Medieval Flanders, or to supply the cheap luxuries demanded by early modern England--slavery or serfdom can emerge even without an extraordinarily high land/labor ratio....

[And there are the] two big questions:

  • First, why didn't the Western European nobility re-enserf the peasantry after the Black Death and the resulting big rise in the land/labor ratio? Domar wrestles with this question unsuccessfully in his paper. But I have to say that it is still largely a mystery.

  • Second, why hasn't bound labor reemerged in the modern world? Elites in developing countries can no longer be confident in their ability to earn hefty incomes by employing workers and paying them much less than their average product: an elite monopoly of land ownership is no longer worth much. So why haven't they responded to the potential erosion of their collective economic edge by turning to politics and force to bind workers. One answer is that, to some extent, they have: Consider that modern states are surprisingly effective as tax-collection machines, and in large chunks of the world the elite's power and (relative) prosperity is rooted in its "new class" control over the flow of resources from the state. Consider, also, the Communist Party of Vietnam--what is it but a gang labor boss for unfree labor deployed to produce shoes for Nike?

Very good questions, a very good paper, and I cannot feel but that my 210a class would have gone better [that] year had I kept Domar on the reading list, canned the "labor scarcity and interchangeable parts" part of the course, and spent not half a class on American slavery but a whole class on Unfree Labor in Historical Perspective.


Engerman and Sokoloff: Why did Latin America stay poor?

http://papers.nber.org/papers/h0066.pdf

...

http://papers.nber.org/papers/h0066.pdf

...

http://papers.nber.org/papers/h0066.pdf

...

http://papers.nber.org/papers/h0066.pdf

...

http://papers.nber.org/papers/h0066.pdf


Peter Temin, "Labor Scarcity":

http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2115648.pdf

...

http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2115648.pdf

....

  • A = F(L,R); K--capital, R--resources, A--agricultural goods
  • M = G(K,L); L--labor, M--manufactures
  • capital is made up of manufactured goods...
  • f--price of food, w--wage, r--real interest rate, m--price of manufactures and capital

  • M = g(K/L)L

  • r = {m(g'(K/L))}/m
  • K/L = g'-1(r)

Goldin and Sokoloff:

http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1885960.pdf

...

http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1885960.pdf


ref: W Arthur Lewis http://www.j-bradford-delong.net/2008_pdf/Lewis_Evolution_A.pdf http://www.j-bradford-delong.net/2008_pdf/Lewis_Evolution_B.pdf

April 9 Lecture: Econ 101b: Arguments Against Lender-of-Last Resort Operations

Lecture Audio


Arguments Against Standard Central Bank Lender-of-Last Resort Operations:

  • Since at least 1844, central banks have been trying to avoid great depressions by acting as lenders-of-last-resort in times of financial crisis
    • Stage I: provide liquidity (at a penalty rate)
    • Stage II: lower interest rates on safe assets (via open market operations)
    • Stage III: direct market support of some kind

The critics say...

  • This is immoral

    • We have a system in which the Princes of Wall Street earn great fortunes by virtue of their analytical skills, entrepreneurial vision, and willingness to take and bear risks
    • The lender-of-last-resort function provides them with a safety net, and so turns them from economic heroes into villains
    • Response I: There are no Randites in a panic...
    • Response II: Exactly: if it's good to have a safety net for rich financiers, it's better to have a safety net for the middle class and the poor as well--and a progressive income tax to fund it...
  • This is unfair

    • Rich, feckless financiers who ought to be punished escape with their wealth to their yachts
    • Thriftless, feckless, imprudent borrowers who ought to have known better escape loss--and live more lavishly than the thrifty and prudent who played by the rules
    • Response: Markets aren't fair--the lucky prosper, and this is a form of luck. Markets are about productivity and efficiency, politics is about justice--see above re progressive income tax, etc.
  • This won't work in the long run

    • I: Moral Hazard:
      • Financiers in the future, knowing that the central bank has always shown up in the past, will be even more imprudent and feckless
      • Thus the rescue doesn't cure the current financial crisis so much as create future ones
      • Response I: Yes, this is a danger to guard against--but the risks we want to guard against are those of running the real economy into an iceberg, not an unfair rearranging of the chairs on the pool deck
      • Response II: The principals of Bear Stearns lost the bulk of their wealth; the principals of LTCM lost their fortunes as well; how much additional moral hazard is created by LoLR?
    • II: Adverse Selection
      • You need big depressions and their losses to clean the the ranks of the entrepreneurs...
    • III. Overinvestment
      • The financial crisis is a reflection of a real disequilibrium--of an overinvestment. Boosting the prices of financial assets simply generates more overinvestment--and a bigger problem, because the bigger amount of overinvestment then has to be worked off...

This is a very old argument indeed: Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels made it.

It is, I think, a matter of time and scale: we want investment spending to decline as rapidly as workers can be redeployed to other potential leading sectors--but no faster. The bubble needs to "deflate," not "pop"...

Paul Krugman has, I think, the best answer:

THE HANGOVER THEORY: Are Recessions the inevitable payback for good times?: A few weeks ago, a journalist devoted a substantial part of a profile of yours truly to my failure to pay due attention to the "Austrian theory" of the business cycle--a theory that I regard as being about as worthy of serious study as the phlogiston theory of fire. Oh well. But the incident set me thinking--not so much about that particular theory as about the general worldview behind it. Call it the overinvestment theory of recessions, or "liquidationism," or just call it the "hangover theory." It is the idea that slumps are the price we pay for booms, that the suffering the economy experiences during a recession is a necessary punishment for the excesses of the previous expansion.

The hangover theory is perversely seductive--not because it offers an easy way out, but because it doesn't. It turns the wiggles on our charts into a morality play, a tale of hubris and downfall. And it offers adherents the special pleasure of dispensing painful advice with a clear conscience, secure in the belief that they are not heartless but merely practicing tough love.... The many variants of the hangover theory all go something like this: In the beginning, an investment boom gets out of hand... all that investment leads to the creation of too much capacity--of factories that cannot find markets, of office buildings that cannot find tenants... reality strikes--investors go bust and investment spending collapses. The result is a slump whose depth is in proportion to the previous excesses. Moreover, that slump is part of the necessary healing process: The excess capacity gets worked off, prices and wages fall from their excessive boom levels, and only then is the economy ready to recover.

Except for that last bit about the virtues of recessions, this is not a bad story about investment cycles.... But let's ask a seemingly silly question: Why should the ups and downs of investment demand lead to ups and downs in the economy as a whole?... Here's the problem: As a matter of simple arithmetic, total spending in the economy is necessarily equal to total income (every sale is also a purchase, and vice versa). So if people decide to spend less on investment goods, doesn't that mean that they must be deciding to spend more on consumption goods--implying that an investment slump should always be accompanied by a corresponding consumption boom? And if so why should there be a rise in unemployment?

Most modern hangover theorists probably don't even realize this is a problem for their story. Nor did those supposedly deep Austrian theorists answer the riddle. The best that von Hayek or Schumpeter could come up with was the vague suggestion that unemployment was a frictional problem created as the economy transferred workers from a bloated investment goods sector back to the production of consumer goods. (Hence their opposition to any attempt to increase demand: This would leave "part of the work of depression undone," since mass unemployment was part of the process of "adapting the structure of production.") But in that case, why doesn't the investment boom--which presumably requires a transfer of workers in the opposite direction--also generate mass unemployment? And anyway, this story bears little resemblance to what actually happens in a recession, when every industry--not just the investment sector--normally contracts.... The hangover theory, then, turns out to be intellectually incoherent; nobody has managed to explain why bad investments in the past require the unemployment of good workers in the present. Yet the theory has powerful emotional appeal. Usually that appeal is strongest for conservatives.... But moderates and liberals are not immune to the theory's seductive charms--especially when it gives them a chance to lecture others on their failings...


Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, 1848:

The bourgeoisie, during its rule of scarce one hundred years, has created more massive and more colossal productive forces than have all preceding generations together. Subjection of Nature's forces to man, machinery, application of chemistry to industry and agriculture, steam-navigation, railways, electric telegraphs, clearing of whole continents for cultivation, canalisation of rivers, whole populations conjured out of the ground - what earlier century had even a presentiment that such productive forces slumbered in the lap of social labour?...

Modern bourgeois society with its relations of production, of exchange and of property, a society that has conjured up such gigantic means of production and of exchange, is like the sorcerer, who is no longer able to control the powers of the nether world whom he has called up by his spells.... It is enough to mention the commercial crises that by their periodical return put on its trial, each time more threateningly, the existence of the entire bourgeois society. In these crises a great part not only of the existing products, but also of the previously created productive forces, are periodically destroyed. In these crises there breaks out an epidemic 10 that, in all earlier epochs, would have seemed an absurdity - the epidemic of over-production. Society suddenly finds itself put back into a state of momentary barbarism; it appears as if a famine, a universal war of devastation had cut off the supply of every means of subsistence; industry and commerce seem to be destroyed; and why? Because there is too much civilization, too much means of subsistence, too much industry, too much commerce.... The conditions of bourgeois society are too narrow to comprise the wealth created by them. And how does the bourgeoisie get over these crises? On the one hand by enforced destruction of a mass of productive forces; on the other, by the conquest of new markets, and by the more thorough exploitation of the old ones. That is to say, by paving the way for more extensive and more destructive crises, and by diminishing the means whereby crises are prevented...

Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, 1851:

The years 1843-5 were years of industrial and commercial prosperity, a necessary sequel to the almost uninterrupted industrial depression of 1837-42. As is always the case, prosperity very rapidly encouraged speculation. Speculation regularly occurs in periods when overproduction is already in full swing. It provides overproduction with temporary market outlets, while for this very reason precipitating the outbreak of the crisis and increasing its force. The crisis itself first breaks out in the area of speculation; only later does it hit production. What appears to the superficial observer to be the cause of the crisis is not overproduction but excess speculation, but this is itself only a symptom of overproduction. The subsequent disruption of production does not appear as a consequence of its own previous exuberance but merely as a setback caused by the collapse of speculation....

In the years of prosperity from 1843 to 1845, speculation was concentrated principally in railways, where it was based upon a real demand.... The extension of the English railway system... 1845... the number of bills presented for the formation of railway companies [i.e., IPOs] amounted to 1,035.... The heyday of this speculation was the summer and autumn of 1845. Stock prices rose continuously, and the speculators' profits soon sucked all social classes into the whirlpool. Dukes and earls competed with merchants and manufacturers for the lucrative honour of sitting on the boards of directors of the various companies; members of the House of Commons, the legal profession and the clergy were also represented in large numbers. Anyone who had saved a penny, anyone who had the least credit at his disposal, speculated in railway stocks. The number of railway journals rose from three to twenty. The large daily papers often each earned £14,000 per week from railway advertisements and prospectuses. Not enough engineers could be found, and they were paid enormous salaries. Printers, lithographers, bookbinders, paper-merchants and others, who were mobilized to produce prospectuses, plans, maps, etc; furnishing manufacturers who fitted out the mushrooming offices of the countless railway boards and provisional committees — all were paid splendid sums. On the basis of the actual extension of the English and continental railway system and the speculation which accompanied it, there gradually arose in this period a superstructure of fraud.... Hundreds of companies were promoted without the least chance of success, companies whose promoters themselves never intended any real execution of the schemes, companies whose sole reason for existence was the directors' consumption of the funds deposited and the fraudulent profits obtained from the sale of stocks.

In October 1848 a reaction ensued, soon becoming a total panic.... The railway crisis lasted into the autumn of 1848, prolonged by the successive bankruptcies of less unsound schemes as they were gradually affected by the general pressure and as demands for payment were made. This crisis was also aggravated by developments in other areas of speculation, and in commerce and industry; the prices of the older, better-established stocks were gradually forced down, until in October 1848 they reached their lowest level....

If the new cycle of industrial development which began in 1848 takes the same course as that of 1843-7, the crisis will break out in 1852. As a symptom that the excess speculation which is caused by overproduction, and which precedes each crisis, will not be long in coming, we can quote the fact that the discount rate of the Bank of England has not risen above 3 per cent for two years. But when the Bank of England keeps its interest rates down in times of prosperity, the other money dealers have to reduce their rates even more, just as in times of crisis when the Bank raises the rate considerably, they have to raise their rates above the Bank's. The additional capital which, as we have seen above, is always unloaded onto the bond market in times of prosperity, is enough by itself to force down the interest rate, as a result of the laws of competition; but the interest rate is reduced to a much larger extent by the enormous expansion of credit produced by general prosperity, which lowers the demand for capital. In these periods a government is in a position to reduce the interest rate on its funded debts, and the landowner is able to renew his mortgage on more favourable terms. The capitalists with investments in loan capital thus see their income reduced by a third or more, at a time when the income of all other classes is rising. The longer this situation lasts, the more they will be under pressure to look for more profitable capital investments. Overproduction gives rise to numerous new projects, and the success of a few of them is sufficient to attract a whole mass of capital in the same direction, until gradually the bubble becomes general. But, as we have seen, speculation has at this point of time only two outlets; cotton growing and the new world market routes created by the development of California and Australia. It is evident that this time the scope for speculation will assume far greater dimensions than in any earlier period of prosperity....

Sir Robert Peel... has been apotheosized in the most exaggerated fashion by almost all parties as England's greatest statesman. One thing at least distinguished him from the European 'statesmen' — he was no mere careerist. Beyond this, the statesmanship of this son of the bourgeoisie who rose to be leader of the aristocracy consisted in the view that there is today only one real aristocracy: the bourgeoisie.... Catholic emancipation and the reform of the police, by means of which he increased the bourgeoisie's political power... the Bank Acts of 1818 and 1844, which strengthened the financial aristocracy... the tariff reform of 1842 and the free trade legislation of 1846, with which the aristocracy was nothing short of sacrificed to the industrial bourgeoisie.... His power over the House of Commons was based upon the extraordinary plausibility of his eloquence. If one reads his most famous speeches, one finds that they consist of a massive accumulation of commonplaces, skillfully interspersed with s large amount of statistical data. Almost all the towns in England want to erect a monument to the man who repealed the Corn Laws. A Chartist journal has remarked, referring to the police trained by Peel in 1829: 'What do we want with these monuments to Peel? Every police officer in England and Ireland is a living monument to Peel...


From BobbyK's Paul Krugman Archive:

: THE HANGOVER THEORY: Are Recessions the inevitable payback for good times?

SYNOPSIS: The constantly occuring idea of helpful Recessions is incoherent and faulty

A few weeks ago, a journalist devoted a substantial part of a profile of yours truly to my failure to pay due attention to the "Austrian theory" of the business cycle--a theory that I regard as being about as worthy of serious study as the phlogiston theory of fire. Oh well. But the incident set me thinking--not so much about that particular theory as about the general worldview behind it. Call it the overinvestment theory of recessions, or "liquidationism," or just call it the "hangover theory." It is the idea that slumps are the price we pay for booms, that the suffering the economy experiences during a recession is a necessary punishment for the excesses of the previous expansion.

The hangover theory is perversely seductive--not because it offers an easy way out, but because it doesn't. It turns the wiggles on our charts into a morality play, a tale of hubris and downfall. And it offers adherents the special pleasure of dispensing painful advice with a clear conscience, secure in the belief that they are not heartless but merely practicing tough love.

Powerful as these seductions may be, they must be resisted--for the hangover theory is disastrously wrongheaded. Recessions are not necessary consequences of booms. They can and should be fought, not with austerity but with liberality--with policies that encourage people to spend more, not less. Nor is this merely an academic argument: The hangover theory can do real harm. Liquidationist views played an important role in the spread of the Great Depression--with Austrian theorists such as Friedrich von Hayek and Joseph Schumpeter strenuously arguing, in the very depths of that depression, against any attempt to restore "sham" prosperity by expanding credit and the money supply. And these same views are doing their bit to inhibit recovery in the world's depressed economies at this very moment.

The many variants of the hangover theory all go something like this: In the beginning, an investment boom gets out of hand. Maybe excessive money creation or reckless bank lending drives it, maybe it is simply a matter of irrational exuberance on the part of entrepreneurs. Whatever the reason, all that investment leads to the creation of too much capacity--of factories that cannot find markets, of office buildings that cannot find tenants. Since construction projects take time to complete, however, the boom can proceed for a while before its unsoundness becomes apparent. Eventually, however, reality strikes--investors go bust and investment spending collapses. The result is a slump whose depth is in proportion to the previous excesses. Moreover, that slump is part of the necessary healing process: The excess capacity gets worked off, prices and wages fall from their excessive boom levels, and only then is the economy ready to recover.

Except for that last bit about the virtues of recessions, this is not a bad story about investment cycles. Anyone who has watched the ups and downs of, say, Boston's real estate market over the past 20 years can tell you that episodes in which overoptimism and overbuilding are followed by a bleary-eyed morning after are very much a part of real life. But let's ask a seemingly silly question: Why should the ups and downs of investment demand lead to ups and downs in the economy as a whole? Don't say that it's obvious--although investment cycles clearly are associated with economywide recessions and recoveries in practice, a theory is supposed to explain observed correlations, not just assume them. And in fact the key to the Keynesian revolution in economic thought--a revolution that made hangover theory in general and Austrian theory in particular as obsolete as epicycles--was John Maynard Keynes' realization that the crucial question was not why investment demand sometimes declines, but why such declines cause the whole economy to slump.

Here's the problem: As a matter of simple arithmetic, total spending in the economy is necessarily equal to total income (every sale is also a purchase, and vice versa). So if people decide to spend less on investment goods, doesn't that mean that they must be deciding to spend more on consumption goods--implying that an investment slump should always be accompanied by a corresponding consumption boom? And if so why should there be a rise in unemployment?

Most modern hangover theorists probably don't even realize this is a problem for their story. Nor did those supposedly deep Austrian theorists answer the riddle. The best that von Hayek or Schumpeter could come up with was the vague suggestion that unemployment was a frictional problem created as the economy transferred workers from a bloated investment goods sector back to the production of consumer goods. (Hence their opposition to any attempt to increase demand: This would leave "part of the work of depression undone," since mass unemployment was part of the process of "adapting the structure of production.") But in that case, why doesn't the investment boom--which presumably requires a transfer of workers in the opposite direction--also generate mass unemployment? And anyway, this story bears little resemblance to what actually happens in a recession, when every industry--not just the investment sector--normally contracts.

As is so often the case in economics (or for that matter in any intellectual endeavor), the explanation of how recessions can happen, though arrived at only after an epic intellectual journey, turns out to be extremely simple. A recession happens when, for whatever reason, a large part of the private sector tries to increase its cash reserves at the same time. Yet, for all its simplicity, the insight that a slump is about an excess demand for money makes nonsense of the whole hangover theory. For if the problem is that collectively people want to hold more money than there is in circulation, why not simply increase the supply of money? You may tell me that it's not that simple, that during the previous boom businessmen made bad investments and banks made bad loans. Well, fine. Junk the bad investments and write off the bad loans. Why should this require that perfectly good productive capacity be left idle?

The hangover theory, then, turns out to be intellectually incoherent; nobody has managed to explain why bad investments in the past require the unemployment of good workers in the present. Yet the theory has powerful emotional appeal. Usually that appeal is strongest for conservatives, who can't stand the thought that positive action by governments (let alone--horrors!--printing money) can ever be a good idea. Some libertarians extol the Austrian theory, not because they have really thought that theory through, but because they feel the need for some prestigious alternative to the perceived statist implications of Keynesianism. And some people probably are attracted to Austrianism because they imagine that it devalues the intellectual pretensions of economics professors. But moderates and liberals are not immune to the theory's seductive charms--especially when it gives them a chance to lecture others on their failings.

Few Western commentators have resisted the temptation to turn Asia's economic woes into an occasion for moralizing on the region's past sins. How many articles have you read blaming Japan's current malaise on the excesses of the "bubble economy" of the 1980s--even though that bubble burst almost a decade ago? How many editorials have you seen warning that credit expansion in Korea or Malaysia is a terrible idea, because after all it was excessive credit expansion that created the problem in the first place?

And the Asians--the Japanese in particular--take such strictures seriously. One often hears that Japan is adrift because its politicians refuse to make hard choices, to take on vested interests. The truth is that the Japanese have been remarkably willing to make hard choices, such as raising taxes sharply in 1997. Indeed, they are in trouble partly because they insist on making hard choices, when what the economy really needs is to take the easy way out. The Great Depression happened largely because policy-makers imagined that austerity was the way to fight a recession; the not-so-great depression that has enveloped much of Asia has been worsened by the same instinct. Keynes had it right: Often, if not always, "it is ideas, not vested interests, that are dangerous for good or evil."