Streams: (BiWeekly) Honest Broker Feed

Unclear and Inadequate Thoughts on Financial Stability and Monetary Policy Once Again: The Honest Broker for the Week of October 24, 2014

Screenshot 10 10 14 5 42 PMOver at Equitable Growth: As I continue to try to worry--without great success--the question of just where the increases in financial instability produced by the prolonged period of past and expected future extremely low interest rates and by quantitative easing comes from...

Two sources of risk:

  1. Sudden downward revisions in the expected future cash flows of underlying real assets that back financial assets.
  2. Sudden upward revisions in the rate at which expected future cash flows are discounted.

To recap my thinking before now:

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PIMCO: How to Lose (Lots of) Money and Still Influence People: The Honest Broker for the Week of October 10, 2014

Joshua Brown: “Do we need to fire PIMCO?”: "In February of 2011, [Bill] Gross loudly proclaimed...

[that] Pimco Total Return had taken its allocation to US Treasury bonds down to zero. As recently as the previous December, Pimco Total Return had been carrying as much as 22 percent of its AUM in Treasurys.... Gross compounded the move by being extremely vocal about his rationale--he went so far as to call Treasury bonds a 'robbery' of investors given their ultra-low interest rates and the potential for inflation. He talked about the need for investors to 'exorcise' US bonds from their portfolios, as though the asset class itself was demonic. He called investors in Treasury bonds 'frogs being cooked alive in a pot'. The rhetoric was every bit as bold as the fund’s positioning. It’s really hard to pound the table like this and then be flexible in the aftermath...

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Monday Smackdown: Yet More Chapter 11 of David Graeber's "Debt" in Chapter 7: (Definitely Not) the Honest Broker for the Week of October 3, 2014

NewImageDuring the past two weeks the drought of high-quality DeLong smackdowns on the internet has resumed. So it is time to turn back to the promise I made myself on April Fools Day 2013, and see whether the rest of the chapters of David Graeber's Debt: The First Five Thousand Mistakes are of as low quality as the utterly bolixed up chapter 12.

As you will recall, David Graeber is infamous for:

Apple Computers is a famous example: it was founded by (mostly Republican) computer engineers who broke from IBM in Silicon Valley in the 1980s, forming little democratic circles of twenty to forty people with their laptops in each other's garages...

and for having, concurrently and subsequently, offered three different explanations of how this howler came to be written and published:

  1. He has claimed that it it all perfectly true, just not of Apple but of other companies (none of which he has ever named).

  2. He has claimed that he had been misled by Richard Wolff, who taught him about Silicon Valley's communal garage laptop circles of the 1980s.

  3. He has claimed that what he had written was coherent and accurate, but that (for some unexplained reason) his editor and publisher had bolixed it all up.

This passage is, in the words of the very sharp LizardBreath:[1]

The Thirteenth Chime... that make[s] me wonder whether any fact in the book I don't know for certain to be true can be trusted...

And things have gone downhill from there...

Continue reading "Monday Smackdown: Yet More Chapter 11 of David Graeber's "Debt" in Chapter 7: (Definitely Not) the Honest Broker for the Week of October 3, 2014" »


Over at Equitable Growth: Potential Output and Total Factor Productivity since 2000: Marking My Beliefs to Market: The Honest Broker for the Week of September 26, 2014

Over at Equitable Growth: I am still thinking about the best assessment of potential output and productivity growth that we have--that of the extremely-sharp John Fernald's "Productivity and Potential Output Before, During, and After the Great Recession". And I am--slowly, hesitantly, and unwillingly--coming to the conclusion that I have to mark my beliefs about the process of economic technological change to market, and revise them significantly.

Let's start with what I wrote last July: READ MOAR

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Over at Equitable Growth: Department of "Huh?!" John J. Mearsheimer Thinks the West Caused the Ukraine Crisis?: The Honest Broker for the Week of September 19, 2014

NewImageOver at Equitable Growth: John Mearsheimer is only one of a surprising number claiming that the current crisis in Ukraine is predominantly the U.S.'s, and NATO's, and the Ukraine's fault:

John Mearsheimer: How the West Caused the Ukraine Crisis: Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: "The United States and its European allies share most of the responsibility...

...The taproot of the trouble is NATO enlargement.... For Putin, the illegal overthrow of Ukraine’s democratically elected and pro-Russian president--which he rightly labeled a “coup”--was the final straw.... Realpolitik remains relevant--and states that ignore it do so at their own peril. U.S. and European leaders blundered in attempting to turn Ukraine into a Western stronghold on Russia’s border....

Soviet leaders... and their Russian successors did not want NATO to grow any larger and assumed that Western diplomats understood their concerns. The Clinton administration evidently thought otherwise.... The first round of enlargement... 1999... the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. The second... 2004... Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Moscow complained bitterly.... The alliance considered admitting Georgia and Ukraine.... Putin maintained that admitting those two countries to NATO would represent a “direct threat” to Russia.... READ MOAR

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"Trapped in the 'Dark Corners'"?: Thoughts on Olivier Blanchard's "Where Danger Lurks": The Honest Broker for the Week of September 12, 2014

Over at Equitable Growth: "Trapped in the 'Dark Corners'"?: Thoughts on Olivier Blanchard's "Where Danger Lurks"

Olivier Blanchard, inveighing against "ergodicity" and "linearity" as assumptions, sounds like some post-Keynesian from the 1980s. They were right then. He is right now:

Olivier Blanchard: Where Danger Lurks: "One has to go back to the so-called rational expectations revolution...

...What was new was the development of techniques to solve models under the assumption that people and firms did the best they could in assessing the future. (A glimpse into why this was technically hard: current decisions by people and firms depend on their whole expected future. But their whole expected future itself depends in part on current decisions.) These techniques... made sense only... [if] economic fluctuations were regular enough so that, by looking at the past, people and firms (and the econometricians)... could understand their nature and form expectations... and simple enough so that small shocks had small effects.... Thinking about macroeconomics was largely shaped by those assumptions....

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Over at Equitable Growth: A Note on the Core PCE Inflation Phillips Curve: The Honest Broker for the Week of August 30, 2014

A Note on the Core PCE Inflation Phillips Curve

The Honest Broker for the Week of August 30, 2014

Over at Equitable Growth:

David Beckworth notes that in the Bernanke-Yellen era the FOMC gets uncomfortable and decides that it has to loosen policy and steps up its interventions when PCE inflation falls below 1.5%/year and gets uneasy and decides that it has to tighten policy when PCE inflation rises above 2%/year:

[This] reduced-form relationship... is highly suggestive and consistent with my claim... that... there is a 2% ceiling to an inflation target corridor...

Macro and Other Market Musings About the Fed Not Trying Hard Enough To Hit Its Inflation Target

Macro and Other Market Musings About the Fed Not Trying Hard Enough To Hit Its Inflation Target READ MOAR

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The Taper, Nick Rowe, Quantitative Easing, and Intellectual Coordination Failures: Over at Equitable Growth: Wednesday Focus for August 27, 2014/The (Not So) Honest Broker for the Week of August 30, 2014

NewImageOver at Equitable Growth: Nick Rowe begs for North Atlantic central banks to do what he (and I) regard as their proper job, and whimpers:

Nick Rowe: Money, Prices, and Coordination Failures "The more interesting cases are...

...where a non-monetary coordination failure has spillover effects, and causes a monetary coordination failure. A worsening of asymmetric information problems in financial markets, which is a coordination problem in its own right, also causes an increased demand for money and a monetary coordination problem. Should we say that the problem in financial markets is the "root cause" of the recession, and one that should be addressed directly, if possible, by something other than monetary policy? No. Monetary policy should take the world as it is, warts and all, and do what it can do. And what it can do is eliminate that excess demand for money, even if it cannot eliminate that original problem that initially caused the excess demand for money. It does not matter, for the monetary authority, whether that increased demand for money was caused by some natural event like the weather, which nobody can change, or whether it was caused by some other problem, which the fiscal authority can and should fix. READ MOAR

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Reviewing Lawrence Summers's et al.'s VoxEU Ebook on "Secular Stagnation": The Honest Broker for the Week of August 23, 2014

Over at Equitable Growth: The Setup:

Let's start with Paul Krugman, who made me aware of this ebook by writing:

Paul Krugman: All About Zero: "Way back in 2008 I (and many others) argued...

...that the financial crisis had pushed us into a liquidity trap... in which the Fed and its counterparts elsewhere couldn’t restore full employment even by reducing short-term interest rates all the way to zero.... In practice the zero lower bound has huge adverse effects on policy effectiveness... [and] drastically changes the rules... [as] virtue becomes vice and prudence is folly. We want less saving, higher expected inflation, and more.... Liquidity-trap analysis has been overwhelmingly successful in its predictions: massive deficits didn’t drive up interest rates, enormous increases in the monetary base didn’t cause inflation, and fiscal austerity was associated with large declines in output and employment.... READ MOAR

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Under What Circumstances Should You Worry That the Stock Market Is "too High"?: The Honest Broker for the Week of August 16, 2014

UPDATE: As Noah Smith politely points out, I did a no-no in being so lazy as to take averages of monthly returns to be "close enough" to cumulative compounded returns. Fixing that requires some edits, which I have made:


Over at Equitable Growth: Robert Shiller: The Mystery of Lofty Stock Market Elevations: "The CAPE ratio, a stock-price measure I helped develop...

...is hovering at a worrisome level.... Above 25, a level that has been surpassed... in only... the years clustered around 1929, 1999 and 2007. Major market drops followed those peaks.... We should recognize that we are in an unusual period, and that it’s time to ask some serious questions about it...

The first question I think we should ask is: how damaging in the long run to investor portfolios were the major market drops that followed the 1929, 1999, and 2007 CAPE peaks? The CAPE is the current price of the S&P index divided by a ten-year trailing moving average of its earnings: the CAPE looks back ten years to try to get an estimate of what normal earnings are and how stock prices deviate from them. Let's look ahead and calculate ten-year forward earnings to get a sense of what signals the CAPE sends for those of us interested in stocks for the long run.

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Elementary Philosophy of Probability and the War on Nate Silver: The (Not Very) Honest Broker for the Week of August 2, 2014

The 2012 Election A Big Win for Big Data Big Think Think TankOf all the weird things that have happened in the American public sphere in my life, the most weird was the War on Nate Silver--launched in the fall of 2012 by David Brooks, Joe Scarborough, Dylan Byers, and a remarkably large company.

The underlying argument appeared to be that Nate Silver was doing something wrong and unfair by using... evidence. By... counting things. By... using statistics. By... estimating probabilities...

A few of the "best" examples:

David Brooks on the PBS NewsHour:

What I hate are the forecasts, when they say so and so has a 66 percent chance of winning or a 32 percent chance of winning.... If you tell me you think you can quantify an event that is about to happen that you don’t expect, like the 47 percent comment or a debate performance, I think you think you are a wizard. That’s not possible...

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Monetarist, Keynesian, and Minskyite Depressions Once Again: Yes, Lloyd Metzler Was the Greatest Chicago Macroeconomist Ever: The Honest Broker for the Week of July 19, 2014

Over at Equitable Growth: I have said this before. But I seem to need to say it again...

The very intelligent and thoughtful David Beckworth, Simon Wren-Lewis, and Nick Rowe are agreeing on New Keynesian-Market Monetarist monetary-fiscal convergence. Underpinning all of their analyses there seems to me to be the assumption that all aggregate demand shortfalls spring from the same deep market failures. And I think that that is wrong.

Simon Wren-Lewis writes:

I really like David Beckworth’s Insurance proposal against ‘incompetent’ monetary policy. Here it is: 1) Target the level of nominal GDP (NGDP). 2) "The Fed and Treasury... agree... should a liquidity trap emerge anyhow... quickly work together to implement a helicopter drop...." Market Monetarists and New Keynesians [do not] suddenly agree about everything... for David this is an insurance against incompetence by the central bank, whereas Keynesians... view hitting the ZLB as unavoidable if the shock is big enough. However this difference is not critical... READ MOAR

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Oversharing About Money: An International Financial Wire Transfer from Lafayette, California, USA to Ahero, Nyando District, Nyanza Province, Kenya: The Honest Broker for the Week of July 12, 2014

Writers with Drinks: An Evening of Oversharing About Money: 7:30 p.m. July 12 :: Make-Out Room :: 3225 22nd St. San Francisco, CA :: Price: $5-$20 http://writerswithdrinks.com: "If time is money, then consider this evening with Charlie Jane Anders, J. Bradford DeLong, Frances Lefkowitz, Farhad Manjoo, and Carol Queen to be a good investment..."


Oversharing About Money: An International Financial Wire Transfer from Lafayette, California, USA to Ahero, Nyando District, Nyanza Province, Kenya

J. Bradford DeLong

A few short years ago we lived, for the school district, in Lafayette. Lafayette is close to here in space and time, but distant in attitude. Lafayette is a place an unkind observer based in and comfortable in San Francisco might describe as an unholy mix of the worst parts of northern and southern California. There we had a neighbor, Bie Bostrom. She had been the oldest Peace Corps volunteer in East Africa. She kept in touch with what had been her town: Ahero, population 10K, in Nyando District, Nyanza Province, Kenya. And there she funds and runs a one-elderly-woman one-town NGO with zero administrative overhead: Grandmothers Raising Grandchildren. That's http://grgahero.org: godzilla-rath of Khan (with an r)-godzilla-alien-hitchhiker-empire strikes back-rath of Khan-omen-dot-omen-rath of Khan-godzilla. No, I'm not going to hit you up--you've been hit up already coming here, at the door.

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Trying and Failing to Understand the 84th BIS Annual Report: Monetarist, Deleveraging, Fiscalist, and ??? Understandings of Our Current Dilemmas: The Honest Broker for the Week of July 5, 2014

NewImageOver at Equitable Growth: I confess that I do not understand the recent BIS Annual Report. I have tried--I have tried very hard--to wrap my mind around just what the BIS position is. But I have failed.

So let me try to lay out how I see it--where I think we are, and what I think the three live macroeconomic-policy positions are:

First, where we are:

We had in the late-1990s a high-pressure full-employment low-inflation tight-fiscal equilibrium. It was, however, unsustainable: based on exaggerated beliefs not about the utility but the profitability of companies based on the high-tech computer and communications technologies of the 1990s. When expectations adjusted to the reality of profitability, the high investment part of the 1990s boom went away, and the economy fell into the minor recession of the early 2000s. READ MOAR:

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The Longest-Run Shape of the Global Economy: PRELIMINARY AND INCOMPLETE: The Honest Broker for the Week of June 14, 2014

Equitable Growth

If we are to talk about "equitable growth", we should have firm notions of both what is "equitable" and of "economic growth". Let us leave the first to the side for now. What do we know or can we infer about the shape of economic growth to serve as the background against which our policy and discussions can proceed?

Start with the idea that an economy can grow along either of two dimensions: it can either increase in its number of people (holding material living standards constant), or it can increase its average material living standards (holding the number of people constant). Call the first kind of growth "extensive" and the second "intensive". And in order to track these two dimensions of growth we need estimates of two things: human populations, and levels of material well-being--levels of average real annual incomes per capita.

Population

I take my estimates of human population from Kremer (1993), but it would not matter if I had chosen some other authority. All long-run estimates of human population that I have found are quite close together (with the exception of estimates of population around 5000 BC, where Blaxter (1986) estimates a population some eight times that of other authorities). Note that this does not mean that the estimates are correct—just that they are roughly the same.

Kremer (1993), following McEvedy and Jones (1978), sees human populations as growing at an increasing proportional rate from perhaps 125,000 in one million B.C. to 6 billion today. Population reached perhaps 4 million toward the end of the mesolithic hunter-gatherer age by 10000 BC, 50 million by 1000 BC, and 170 million by the year 1. Population then reached 265 million by the year 1000, 425 million by 1500, and 720 million by 1750 before exploding to 1.2 billion by 1850, 1.8 billion by 1900, 2.5 billion by 1950, and 7.2 billion today.

Consensus forecasts are that the world will complete its demographic transition and attain zero population growth around 2050, with a maximum global population then of some 9.2 billion.

Workbook2

Real Annual Incomes per Capita

Gapminder.org

http://www.gapminder.org, relying on the U.N. International Comparison Project, Angus Maddison (1995), and a number of other sources, has constructed estimates of real annual incomes per capita for the world from 1800 to 2012. I am more comfortable thinking about labor productivity than about income per capita, and if you are willing to accept the rule of thumb that about half the population are adults engaged in net economic production that contributes to measured national income (or would contribute to national income if it were measured properly), the second measure is simply double the first. And I feel confident enough to update the 2012 numbers to 2015, so that they will be more current rather than more stale for the rest of this current decade. These estimates:

  1. Assign a value for 2005 real annual income per capita in the United States equal to what U.S. current-dollar income per capita was in 2005, and use that as a yardstick. Thus the estimates are in "2005 dollars": "2005" for the year, and "dollars" for the country whose currency is used.

  2. Assign values for 2005 annual incomes per capita in other countries based not on purely on the U.S. dollar value of incomes in that country in 2005, but correcting for systematic differences in price levels across countries. In all countries the prices of internationally-traded manufactured goods are pretty much the same, but the wages of unskilled labor and the prices of goods and services produced using substantial proportions of unskilled labor are much lower. This is a purchasing-power-parity adjustment, or a "PPP-adjustment".

  3. Calculate real annual incomes moving forward and backward in time from 2005 not by calculating the change in the number of dollars received but adjusting that for inflation--for changes in the amount of goods and services that a given quantity of money commands. This is an "inflation adjustment". The estimates it creates are called "real" or "inflation-adjusted", as opposed to "nominal" estimates.

  4. Value goods in relative terms using the relative prices found not in the U.S. but instead in a country in the middle of the world distribution of income. This produces "international dollar" as opposed to "U.S. dollar" estimates.

  5. Do not take explicit account of the benefits of the introduction of new goods and new types of goods, but instead calculate GDP per capita in the past by valuing the commodities produced in the past at recent prices—and not making any correction for the restricted range of choice enforced by limited production possibilities in the past.

All of these save the last (5) are very reasonable ways of proceeding--are, in fact, in my view vastly preferable to the alternatives. Let us return to the last of these later. Adding up these estimates produces numbers for:

  • Global world real annual income in 2012: 79.9 trillion in $2005.
  • Global average real annual income per worker in 2012: 22,200 in $2005.
  • Global world real annual income in 1800: 675 billion in $2005.
  • Global average real annual income per capita in 1800: 1500 in $2005.
  • Plus all the intermediary estimates for the intervening years.

20140526 Very Long Run Economic Growth numbers

With graphical snapshots showing the divergence of average annual real incomes in different countries from the global average:

Gapminder World

Gapminder World

In the 2012 graph, on the far right we have the oil sheikdom of Qatar and the money-laundering havens of Macau and Luxembourg, all with annual income per capita levels above $70,000. Then come Singapore, Norway, Brunei, Greenland, Hong Kong, Kuwait, and the United States, all with levels between $40,000 and $50,000. Germany at $34,000, Japan and Britain at $31,000, France at $29,000, Russia at $15,000, Mexico at $12,000, South Africa and Brazil at $10,000, China at $8,000, and by the time we get to India, Pakistan, and Vietnam at $3,000 we have covered nearly all of the world outside of Sub-Saharan Africa. Below $3,000 we get the bulk of Sub-Saharan Africa between Nigeria at $2,500 and the Democratic Republic of the Congo at $400, with Yemen, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, and Haiti also in that range.

In the 1800 graph, on the far right we have Britain—the first industrial nation—at $2,700, followed by the Netherlands at $2,400, the United States at $1,900, Germany at $1,700, and Belgium, Switzerland, and the Czech Republic at $1,600. China, Russia, and Mexico are at $1,000. India is at $600. And the Democratic Republic of the Congo (and a few others in Sub-Saharan Africa) is down at $400.

The first thing to note is the extraordinary rise in averages: from $1,500 in 1800 to $22,200 in 2012—a nearly fifteen-fold rise in material prosperity.

The second thing to note is the extraordinary rise in range: from a range of six to one in 1800 to a range of two hundred to one in 2012—a more than thirty-fold rise in how much relative difference choosing parents of the right (or the wrong) nationality can make. There are major issues involved in a world of such extraordinary inequality of choosing one number as an index of economic growth and prosperity. When we do so, recognize that this number is much more an indicator of humanity's societal productive power at the current data. Because of its extraordinary maldistribution, taking the average as some kind of indicator of human material well-being as opposed to productive potential is extremely hazardous.

But we would like to extend our temporal vision: what can we say about global-scale economic growth in the future? And how does the economic growth we have seen in the past two centuries compare with what went on before?

The Future

First let us extend these http://gapminder.org estimates forward into the future via growth forecasts to 2050. We are fairly confident in our 9.2 billion population estimate for 2050--a lot would have to change and change relatively quickly as far as demography is concerned to get a 2050 population much below 9 billion or above 9.5 billion.

The question of what the global average real annual income per capita will be in 2050 is much more up for grabs. The U.S. value for labor productivity in 2015 is $90,000 per year. That is a reasonable guide to the average level of labor productivity that our modern technology could enable if it were properly-distributed around the globe.

  1. One line of reasoning would be to note that modern information and communications technologies should allow modern technologies to diffuse across the globe quickly, and that a generation should be more than enough time. It would note that for more than a century labor productivity in the U.S. has been growing at an average pace of 2.0%/year. Do we then project forward today's $90,000/year number for the U.S to 2050 at this growth rate, reach a number of $181,000/year, and forecast that this technologically-feasible level of labor productivity will be reached over the entire globe?

  2. A second line of reasoning would note that, historically, human productivity has been constrained by three things: the need for strong backs to perform large-scale gross manipulations of matter, the need for nimble fingers to perform large-scale fine manipulations of matter, and the need for human brains to make these matter manipulations useful. The rise of the nineteenth-century First Industrial Revolution first-wave machines--of steam, coal, iron, and machinery--removed the first constraint. The flowering in the early twentieth century of the Second Industrial Revolution second-wave machines--those of petroleum, internal combustion, machinery, chemicals, continuous process, and the assembly line--removed the second constraint. And now the coming of modern information processing and communications technologies is, finally, allowing for the control of gross-manipulation and fine-manipulation machines by something cheaper than a human brain. The human brain is a hitherto-unequalled cybernetic control mechanism: after all, it fits inside a shoebox, and draws only 50 watts of power. But the replacement of human brains as cybernetic control mechanisms by third-wave machines promises a previously-unimaginable upward leap in the pace of economic growth, so this line of argument. Is a level of $181,000/year for 2050 labor productivity too pessimistic?

  3. Yet another line of argument is that what we demand is, overwhelmingly, food, shelter, clothing, and medical care; but that the major innovations to make those commodities cheaper already happened in the century-long enormous wave of the Second Industrial Revolution; and further technological progress in better satisfying those core human needs will be slow and difficult. There will be sectors of enormous technological progress, this line of argument goes, but those sectors will take up only a small portion of what we spend and hence have only a small impact on our overall well-being: yes, we will have godlike powers to read any book or watch any drama we wish instantly, but how much will that really matter? This line of argument foresees a fall in the rate of technological progress in the U.S. to 0.5%/year or so: not $181,000 in 2050, but $107,000.

  4. Yet a fourth line of argument notes that global income inequality has, except for the years since 1975, been rising steadily since 1800. It is certainly the ace that modern technologies of information, communication, migration, and goods transportation should make it much easier to transfer technology across the globe, but it has not happened. Moreover, this line of argument notes, the reduction in the variance of the global income distribution since 1975 has been entirely the result of successful accelerations of economic growth in two and only two of the 200 countries in the world: China and India. Because these countries have such huge shares of the world population, their convergence toward North Atlantic standards has had an enormous impact on global statistics. But, this line of argument concludes, it would be rash to think that the world in 2050 will be, in relative terms, any less unequal than the world today. Even at the 2%/year growth rate seen in the United States for the past century and more, that would only give us a year-2050 level of global average real annual income per worker of $44,000.

  5. A fifth line of argument could combine (3) and (4): a slowdown in productivity growth in the North Atlantic, and no further relative convergence toward North Atlantic levels across the rest of the globe. That would give us a year-2050 level of $26,000/year per worker.

  6. And a sixth line of argument would note that the twentieth century brought us three violent totalitarian régimes and the admission of three world rulers--Hitler, Stalin, and Mao--to the 30 million club, that club consisting of those rulers whose policies led directly and immediately to the premature deaths of more than 30 million people. And they barely had chemical, and did not have biological or nuclear weapons at their disposal. Our, or other people's, rulers might get medieval, or get 1984, or both on us.

As we construct our picture of global economic growth, let us be relatively optimistic. Let us eschew (5) and (6) and settle on (4): forecast a year-2050 world average level of labor productivity of 44,400/year $2005. (And let us recognize that the more optimistic scenarios of (3), (1), and most optimistic of all (2) are out there in our possible future.)

The Distant Past

Suppose we want to peer backward into the economic past before 1800. Suppose we want to look as far back as the beginnings of agrarian civilizations, around 5000 BC.

Malthus: The first thing we note is that the economies in the long-ago past were very different from our economy of today. For 95% of the time since the invention of agriculture, economies have been Malthusian. Back in the agrarian age, improvements in productivity and technology showed up in the long run not as increases in average standards of living but as increases in population levels at a roughly constant standard of living. The second thing we note is that in the long-long ago the pace of invention and innovation can most optimistically be described as glacial: two hundred years or so to achieve the pace of relative change in technology that we see in twelve months. And the third thing we note is that, from the first two, arithmetic tells you that in the long-long ago the overwhelming majority of those who are or become well-off have either held on to what their parents bequeathed them or proven successful in zero-sum (marrying the right heir or heiress) or negative-sum redistributional struggles—rather than having found or placed themselves at a key chokepoint of positive-sum productive processes.

This means that, even though we lack reliable quantitative data on what economies were like before 1800, we can get remarkably close by simply spinning numbers out of thin air according to the logic of a slowly-growing technologically-stagnant Malthusian economy.

For example, we can make sound and solid global inferences from very low pre-1500 population growth rates. We know that a preindustrial not-very literate population with ample access to food and resources can and will roughly double every generation: that is the pace of European settler expansion in the Americas, after all. And we know that from 5000 BC to 1345 the average rate of global population growth was 0.07%/year—not the 2.5%/year of normal human biology with ample food and other resources. The inescapable conclusion is that resources were scarce: just barely more than necessary to keep human populations from declining given the socio-cultural institutions then prevailing. We are thus confident that during the long agrarian age—from 5000 BC up until the Black Death, say—global average material standards of living tracked “subsistence”, whatever that “subsistence” might be.

We can check this inference by consulting the long-run biomedical studies of Rick Steckel (1995), “Stature and the Standard of Living,” Journal of Economic Literature 33:4 (December), pp. 1903-40, and many others. We can use Steckel’s estimates of the relationship between height and income found in a cross-section of people alive today and evidence from past burials to infer what real incomes were in the past. The conclusion is inescapable: people in the preindustrial past were short—very short—with adult males averaging some 63 inches compared to 69 inches either in the pre-agricultural Mesolithic or today. Therefore people in the pre-industrial past were poor—very poor. If they weren’t very poor, they would have fed their children more and better and their children would have grown taller. And they were malnourished compared to us or to their pre-agricultural predecessors: defects in their teeth enamel, iron-deficient, skeletal markers of severe cases of infectious disease, and crippled backs.

Pre-industrial dire poverty lasted late. Even as of 1750 people in Britain, Sweden, and Norway were four full inches shorter than people are today—consistent with an average caloric intake of only some 2000 calories per person per day, many of whom were or were attempting to be engaged in heavy physical labor. And societies in the preindustrial past were stunningly unequal: the upper classes were high and mighty indeed, upper class children growing between four and six inches taller than their working-class peers. Moreover, there are no consistent trends in heights between the invention of agriculture and the coming of the industrial age. Up until the eve of the industrial revolution itself, the dominant human experience since the invention of agriculture had been one of poverty so severe as to produce substantial malnutrition and stunted growth.

It is this experience that makes Jared Diamond conclude that the invention of agriculture was the worst mistake ever made by the human race.

Quantifying Malthus: If we look at the http://gapminder.org data we have for 1960, if we look at the scatter of population growth and life expectancy, and if we draw a line through the scatter of those countries that had not in 1960 gone through the demographic transition, we would conclude (a) that zero population growth for a pre-demographic transition economy goes with a life expectancy of 15, but (b) that there are no such economies in 1960—not even close.

If we look at the guesstimates we have for 1800, if we accept http://gapminder.org definitions of real income per capita in 2005 PPP-adjusted international dollars, and if we draw a line through the scatter of life expectancy and estimates of real GDP per capita, we conclude that an economy would have a life expectancy of 15 if it had a level of income per capita of $160 2005 PPP-adjusted international dollars per year—and, once again, that there are no economies anywhere near that level of penury in 1800.

And if we wanted to erect a structure on top of these extremely shaky foundations, we would then say that the long-run demographic data suggests to us that material standards of living in the world during the long agrarian age from 5000 BC to the Black Death were—roughly—30% of the world’s standard of living in 1800: $160/year in 2005 PPP-adjusted international dollars in income per capita, or, with about half the population in the effective adult labor force, some $320/year in average labor productivity.

Now two corrections are needed. First, as Lemin Wu has pointed out convincingly, humans do not just produce necessaries and conveniences. They also produce luxuries, defined as commodities that we enjoy but that do not help us scramble out of the muck and have more children who will survive to adulthood. If the fraction of spending that is spending on luxuries is higher, a society will have a higher standard of living with the same generation-to-generation population growth rate. We know that luxuries tend to be invented and developed over time. Does spending on them increase? How much of spending is spending on luxuries? I do not know. And your guess is as good as mine.

Second, there is the matter of “public health”: The same level of necessaries and conveniences that could fuel a given amount of demographic expansion could fuel more or less depending on whether the health environment is better or worse. And note that “health environment” here has to be broadly construed: the classical Greek practice of large-scale female infanticide via exposure is part of the health environment. (It certainly isn’t a luxury.) How has the “health environment” changed over time? How much does it matter? I do not know. And your guess is as good as mine.

We thus find that we have to make a number of guesses in order to construct our picture of world economic growth since 5000 BC:

  1. We have to guess at what the level of "subsistence" labor productivity was in 1800: at what level of output per worker would women have been so malnourished that their fat levels fell so low that they did not ovulate regularly, would children have been so vitamin-deprived that their immune systems were compromised and they would fall victim in larger numbers to disease, and would general poverty have robbed society of the stored grain needed to tide the population over a minor famine without severe loss, all given global institutions as they stood in 1800? My guess is: 320/year $2005. But your guess will be different.

  2. We have to guess at how much worse “public health” was back in 1300 than in 1800. By how much would extra mortality and non-fertility raise the level of material prosperity corresponding to “subsistence” and effective zero population growth? (Note that this increase in material prosperity consistent with zpg--whether due to war and chevauchee, plague, lack of sewers, more virulent diseases, large-scale infanticide, enforced celibacy, or whatever--is not an increase in human utility. My guess is: 80/year $2005. But your guess will be different.

  3. We have to guess at how much less availability of “luxuries” in 1300 than in 1800 lowered the level of material prosperity (and the level of human utility!) corresponding to “subsistence”. My guess is: $0. But your guess will be different.

  4. We have to guess at the annual pre-1300 trend in “public health”--as things got even worse in the more distant past, this raises the level of material production (although not of human utility!) consistent with the extremely slow generation-to-generation population growth that we see. My guess at the effect of this trend in raising “subsistence” as we go further back in time is: 0.01%/year. But your guess will be different.

  5. We have to guess at the annual pre-1300 trend in the introduction of new “luxuries”, which has the countervailing effect of raising the growth rate of “subsistence” over time. My guess is: 0.01%/year. But your guess will be different.

  6. A guess as to what the global level of material prosperity was in 1500, on the eve of the Colombian Exchange, in the moment well before we are willing to even try to make quantitative estimates as crude as those of http://gapminder.org for 1800, but well after the negative population and positive income shock of the Black Death diverts the global economy from its high-Malthusian trap trajectory. I really do guess--and this really is a complete guess: $550. But yours will be different.

  7. Remember: we also need our estimate of growth in global average labor productivity from 2015-2050. Mine is the relatively optimistic: 2%/year. But yours will be different.

  8. And then there is a wild card: an extra factor to deal with the tremendous expansion since 1800 in the types of commodities we can even imagine producing. My guess is: 4. But yours will be different.

New Goods: This last wild card needs considerable additional explanation. A large proportion of our high standard of living today derives not just from our ability to more cheaply and productively manufacture the commodities of 1800, but from our ability to manufacture whole new types of commodities, some of which do a better job of meeting needs that we knew we had back in 1800, and some of which meet needs that were unimagined back in 1800.

Consider the question of what the 1500/year $2005 global average labor productivity in 1800 from http://gapminder.org is supposed to mean. The number is one-quarter of the present-day prosperity of India, and about equal to the average material prosperity of the poorer half of the countries of today’s Africa. But when we say “someone has an income of $1500 in today’s dollars” we think of what $1500 could buy today. And that is wrong. Looking at the things around me right now, $1500 in 1800 could be used to buy cups, water, paper, seats, foodstuffs, glass, textiles (seats and clothes), buttons (clothes), leather (shoes and wallets), keys, books, and orange juice. It could not be used to buy plastic tray-tables, styrofoam insulating cups, sealed aluminum cans of diet coke, other plastics, ice in summer (unless you were very lucky), headphones, LCD screens, iPhones, iPads, Macbook Airs, or the services of a stretched late-model Boeing 737 with just barely the range to carry me from SFO to EWR in 5 hours and 15 minutes (with a healthy tail wind) in no greater discomfort than the London-to-Bath stagecoaches of 1800. How much would I think $1500 would be worth today if I was also told: “Oh, you have to spend this only on marginal additions to your consumption out of commodities that existed in 1800”? Would it be worth $750? $375? When we calculate the rate of growth in global output per worker since 1800, should we take the gap minder.org growth rate of 1.25%/year and boost it up to the1.9%/year needed to get in two additional doublings in material standard of living because of all the new luxuries that are rapidly becoming conveniences and necessities in our minds that we did not have the slightest clue how to produce back then?

How much has this change—the fact that we make not just the same goods, but new goods and new types of goods—enhanced our material prosperity? Nordhaus (1997) provides perhaps the most eloquent and sophisticated argument that standard measures—like those of Maddison that underlie much of http://gapminder.org—that do not take explicit account of these factors grossly understate the rate of economic growth over the past two centuries.

I know that I at least would be extremely unhappy if I were handed my current income, told that I could spend it on goods at current prices, but that I was prohibited from buying anything that was not made before 1800. In at least some models of growth in which the set of goods that can be produced expands, the correct measure of real output is proportional to the product of purchasing power (income divided by the average price of a good) and the number of goods that can be produced. As best as I can determine, about three-quarters of world expenditure today is spent on commodities that simply did not exist back in 1800.

Thus my (8) guess of 4: an additional fourfold multiplication to real labor productivity since 1800 in addition to what is in http://gapminder.org. But your guess will differ. Angus Maddison's certainly did--this number of 4 made him very unhappy indeed.

So consider both sets of numbers: those that do and those that do not make this crude adjustment for new goods and new types of goods...

Choosing numbers for these eight guesstimates--these eight fudge factors--gives me my best-guess bird's-eye picture of economic growth on a global scale, at least as far as global averages are concerned, from 5000 BC to 2050.

20140528 Very Long Run Economic Growth numbers

This is what I think it looks like. But you can and will have a very different view.

So go and download a copy of:

https://www.icloud.com/iw/#numbers/BALQOsZQWrwUfQ0v1zSBWvd5S85rZX-BKGyF/20140528_Very_Long_Run_Economic_Growth.numbers

Then fill in your own guesstimates in the eight yellow boxes. Choose for yourself the eight numbers we need in order to build a longest-run picture off of http://gapminder.org. And argue for your choices in comments, if you wish...


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Estimates of World GDP, One Million B.C.-Present [1998]: My View as of 1998: The Honest Broker for the Week of May 24, 2014

Time to update this, as my thinking on a bunch of issues has changed over the past sixteen years. But first, as I think about how to so, let me reprint it...


I construct estimates of world GDP over the very long run by combining estimates of total human populations with largely-Malthusian estimates of levels of real GDP per capita.

Population

I take my estimates of human population from Kremer (1993), but it would not matter if I had chosen some other authority. All long-run estimates of human population that I have found are quite close together (with the exception of estimates of population around 5000 BC, where Blaxter (1986) estimates a population some eight times that of other authorities). Note that this does not mean that the estimates are correct—just that they are roughly the same.

Delong typepad com print 20061012 LRWGDP pdf

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The Honest Broker: Mr. Piketty and the “Neoclassicists”: A Suggested Interpretation: For the Week of May 17, 2014

Over at the WCEG Equitablog:

Mr. Piketty and the "Neoclassicists": A Suggested Interpretation

NewImageJ. Bradford DeLong

U.C. Berkeley and NBER :: [email protected] :: http://equitablegrowth.org/blog/ :: @delong :: http://delong.typepad.com/

May 2014

Slides: https://www.icloud.com/iw/#keynote/BAJs-2mixMk5lB4hKcKBifsco49lBMrormKF/20140520_Mr._Piketty_and_the_%22Neoclassicists%22--A_Suggested_Interpretation.key

NewImage

I. Introduction

The reference of course, is to Hicks (1937): “Mr Keynes and the ‘Classics’: A Suggested Interpretation”. An important, sprawling book of economic analysis. A complex and nonobvious relationship to a previous economics literature. Large political economy and policy stakes at hazard. Is this John Maynard Keynes's General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money? Or is this Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century? READ MOAR

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FREEDOM FROM GIRL-COOTIES! LADYPARTS!! FREEDOM!!!: (Not) The Honest Broker: Live from The Roasterie CLXXIV: May 14, 2014

This was supposed to be part of The Honest Broker about conservative objections that ObamaCare was an unwarranted and unnecessary infringement on negative liberty--on individual "freedom". But it was unsuccessful. It ran into two things along the way. First, it ran into my complete failure while teaching Economics 2 to successfully draw a line between "negative" and "positive" liberty that would allow one to say that the competitive market equilibrium was in some sense a perfection of negative liberty and that further restrictions on it were not: I wound up convincing myself that it was the jungle equilibrium that was the perfection of negative liberty, and from that point forward it was utilitarian promotion of positive at the expense of negative liberty all the way down...

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Over at the WCEG: Reading Reihan Salam's "Why I signed up for Obamacare": The Honest Broker for the Week of May 10, 2014

So this morning I am reading the highly-intelligent Reihan Salam's bill of indictment against ObamaCare. He says that ObamaCare "will eventually have to be either drastically reformed or replaced outright" because of its many problems. As I, at least, read the problems he thinks he sees, I find myself thinking that they are of five kinds:

(1) Problems that seem to me to be problems of politics:

  1. The more familiar people become with Obamacare and its consequences, the less they like it....
  2. 62 percent oppose the law, an increase of 4 percentage points since November....
  3. 20 states... have so far refused to take part in [Medicaid expansion].

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Over at the Washington Center for Equitable Growth: Notes and Finger Exercises on Thomas Piketty's "Capital in the Twenty-First Century": The Honest Broker for the Week of April 19, 2014

Over at the Washington Center for Equitable Growth: When I look at Thomas Piketty's big book, I see one thing that he failed to do that I think he really should have done. A large part of the book is about the contrast between "r", the rate of return on wealth, and "g" the growth rate of the economy. However, there are four different r's. And in his book he failed to distinguish between them.

The four different r's are:

  1. The real interest rate at which metropolitan governments can borrow: call this r1.

  2. The real interest rate that is the actual average return on wealthin the society and economy: call this r2.

  3. The real interest rate that is the average risky net rate of accumulation--what capital receives, minus the risk of confiscation or destruction or taxation, plus appreciation in valuation multiples, minus what is spent in order to keep the world in the appropriate social position: call this r3.

  4. A measure of the extent to which capital and wealth serve as an effective claim on income independent of how much capital there is--a standardized measure of what the society and economy's return on wealth would be at some standardized ratio of wealth to annual income: say, 4: call this ρ.

These four r's are very different animals. READ MOAR

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Over at the Washington Center for Equitable Growth: The Launch of fivethirtyeight.com and Climate Change Disaster Weblogging: (Trying to Be) The Honest Broker for the Week of March 29, 2014

Over at the Washington Center for Equitable Growth: The Launch of fivethirtyeight.com and Climate Change Disaster Weblogging: (Trying to Be) The Honest Broker for the Week of March 29, 2014: I confess that I had forgotten about the existence of Roger Pielke, Jr.--the last trace I can find of him in my Augmented Memory Packs dates to February, 2010[1] when Google sent me off to:

http://fabiusmaximus.com/2014/03/25/nate-silver-climate-pielke-66723/

and I read:

Nate Silver goes from hero to goat, convicted by the Left of apostasy: Pity Nate Silver. Hero of the Left for his successful take-down of GOP’s election forecasts, shooting down their delusions about Romney’s chances of victory. Good Leftists like Brad DeLong and Paul Krugman heaped praises on Silver, catapulting him into a sweet gig at ESPN. The poor guy thought the applause was for his use of numbers in pursuit in truth, when it was purely tribal. Their applause were just tribal grunts — we good, they bad — in effect chanting: “Two legs good. Four legs bad.” Right out of the box at his new venture, ESPN’s FiveThirtyEight, Silver committed apostasy, and the Left reacted with the fury true believers mete out to their betrayers. He posted “Disasters Cost More Than Ever — But Not Because of Climate Change” by Roger Pielke, Jr....

Since, as I said, I had forgotten about the existence of Roger Pielke, Jr., I was somewhat annoyed at being told that my applause for Silver had just been a "tribal grunt". So I asked: READ MOAR

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Talk: Preliminary Notes on Fiscal Policy in a Depressed Interest-Rate Environment: The Honest Broker for the Week of March 15, 2014

No paper, just notes--a not-very-successful attempt to deliver on my promise to Larry Summers to think about "secular stagnation" issues. What I think economists need to be thinking about if we are semi-permanently in a world in which demand for safe assets is very high, trust in the private-sector ability to create and guarantee such assets is very low, and inflation remains low...

  • Slides: Fiscal Policy in a Depressed Interest-Rate Environment: .pdf | .key
  • Notes on Fiscal Policy in a Low-Interest Rate Environment:
    • The Historical Pattern of Interest Rates: .pdf | .pdf
    • Countercyclical Fiscal Policy: .pdf | .pages
    • The Treasury as Renaissance Banker for the Twenty-First Century: .pdf | .pages
    • Reinhart-Rogoff Issues: .pdf | .pages

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ObamaCare as Dire Infringement of Individual Liberty and in a "Death Spiral", and LADYPARTS: (Trying to Be) the Honest Broker for the Week of March 8, 2014

Last night pieces by the thoughtful and knowledgeable Uwe Reinhardt, the smart and hard-working Marty Lederman, and that brilliant man of unsound methods Richard Epstein collided on my computer screen, and then held an all-night insomniac hoedown.

This is the result:

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What Market Failures Underlie Our Fears of "Secular Stagnation"?: Second Draft of the Honest Broker for the Week of February 15, 2014

I: The Lesson

The first part of our lesson for today consists of a piece based on his AEA presentation by the terrifyingly brilliant Lawrence Summers: Strategies for sustainable growth: "Last month I argued that the U.S. and global economies may be in a period... in which sluggish growth and output, and employment levels well below potential... coincide... with problematically low real interest rates....

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Talk: Preliminary Notes on Fiscal Policy in a Depressed Interest-Rate Environment: The Honest Broker for the Week of February 2, 2014

No paper, just notes--a not-very-successful attempt to deliver on my promise to Larry Summers to think about "secular stagnation" issues. What I think economists need to be thinking about if we are semi-permanently in a world in which demand for safe assets is very high, trust in the private-sector ability to create and guarantee such assets is very low, and inflation remains low...

  • Slides: Fiscal Policy in a Depressed Interest-Rate Environment: .pdf | .key
  • Notes on Fiscal Policy in a Low-Interest Rate Environment:
    • The Historical Pattern of Interest Rates: .pdf | .pdf
    • Countercyclical Fiscal Policy: .pdf | .pages
    • The Treasury as Renaissance Banker for the Twenty-First Century: .pdf | .pages
    • Reinhart-Rogoff Issues: .pdf | .pages

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ObamaCare as Dire Infringement of Individual Liberty and in a "Death Spiral", and LADYPARTS: (Trying to Be) the Honest Broker for the Week of January 19, 2014

Last night pieces by the thoughtful and knowledgeable Uwe Reinhardt, the smart and hard-working Marty Lederman, and that brilliant man of unsound methods Richard Epstein collided on my computer screen, and then held an all-night insomniac hoedown.

This is the result:

Continue reading "ObamaCare as Dire Infringement of Individual Liberty and in a "Death Spiral", and LADYPARTS: (Trying to Be) the Honest Broker for the Week of January 19, 2014" »


The Relative Efficacy of Fiscal and Monetary Policy at the Zero Lower Bound: Where Are the Goalposts, Anyway?: The Honest Broker for the Week of January 5, 2013

Since 1950 and before 2007, the way to bet was that, whatever the current gap between U.S. real GDP and potential output was, the U.S. economy would close 2/5 of that gap over the course of the next year with roughly neutral policy. Unusually stimulative policies given the state of the economy would push it up; unusually contractionary policies given the state of the economy would push it down; but the way to bet was that the output gap in a year would be only 60% of its current value, in two years 35%, in three years 20%.

FRED Graph St Louis Fed 7

Then came 2008.

FRED Graph St Louis Fed 3

Real GDP fell 7.5% below potential output. But--in spite of policies that would have been classified as very stimulative indeed back in 2007--the economy did not then bounce back, closing 2/5 of the gap vis-a-vis potential in each year. Instead, over the past four years the gap has been closed at a pace of only 1/12 per year--and that gap-closing has been accomplished not by real GDP growing faster than the pre-2007 trend but rather by potential output growing more slowly post- than pre-2007.

And toward the end of 2012 two shifts took place in macroeconomic policy:

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Tomas Piketty: Capital in the Twenty-First Century/Inequality and Capitalism in the Long Run: The Honest Broker for the Week of December 28, 2013

The hawk-eyed Cardiff Garcia writes:

Piketty previews Piketty: A hat tip to reader @zapatique for sending us to Thomas Picketty’s recent lecture, which previews the forthcoming English-language edition of his new book (click here to open pdf)...

and so reminds me that the English-language translation (by Arthur Goldhammer) of Tomas Piketty's Capital in the Twenty-First Century is coming out in March. And he gave a talk on it in Helsinki.

And the esteemed and eminent Kevin Drum writes:

New French Book Will Become Important When It's In English: Tyler Cowen says today that "The forthcoming Thomas Piketty book will be very important." That "will be" is sort of interesting. You see, the name of the book is Le capital au xxie siècle, and it was published three months ago. But no one is talking about it. Presumably, it will become very important—and very talked about—only next March, when Capital in the 21st Century hits the shelves.

I don't have any grand point to make. It's just interesting that fluent French is now so rarely spoken among American academics that an important French book can't even get the time of day until its English translation comes out. It makes sense that widespread conversation would have to wait, since you can't very well have that until lots of people have read the book, but you'd think there would be at least a few reviews out there along with a bit of discussion. But if there has been, I've missed it.

Well, you would need somebody who is:

  1. interested in communicating with a mass audience among les Anglo-Saxons;
  2. tooled-up to evaluate and discuss a work of macroeconomic history;
  3. tooled-up and evaluate a work in the ongoing inequality debate; and
  4. who at least reads something written in Französisch Sprache...

Why is everybody all of a sudden looking at me?

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Tomas Piketty: Capital in the Twenty-First Century/Inequality and Capitalism in the Long Run: The Honest Broker

The hawk-eyed Cardiff Garcia writes:

Piketty previews Piketty: A hat tip to reader @zapatique for sending us to Thomas Picketty’s recent lecture, which previews the forthcoming English-language edition of his new book (click here to open pdf)...

and so reminds me that the English-language translation (by Arthur Goldhammer) of Tomas Piketty's Capital in the Twenty-First Century is coming out in March. And he gave a talk on it in Helsinki.

And the esteemed and eminent Kevin Drum writes:

New French Book Will Become Important When It's In English: Tyler Cowen says today that "The forthcoming Thomas Piketty book will be very important." That "will be" is sort of interesting. You see, the name of the book is Le capital au xxie siècle, and it was published three months ago. But no one is talking about it. Presumably, it will become very important—and very talked about—only next March, when Capital in the 21st Century hits the shelves.

I don't have any grand point to make. It's just interesting that fluent French is now so rarely spoken among American academics that an important French book can't even get the time of day until its English translation comes out. It makes sense that widespread conversation would have to wait, since you can't very well have that until lots of people have read the book, but you'd think there would be at least a few reviews out there along with a bit of discussion. But if there has been, I've missed it.

Well, you would need somebody who is:

  1. interested in communicating with a mass audience among les Anglo-Saxons;
  2. tooled-up to evaluate and discuss a work of macroeconomic history;
  3. tooled-up and evaluate a work in the ongoing inequality debate; and
  4. who at least reads something written in Französisch Sprache...

Why is everybody all of a sudden looking at me?

Continue reading "Tomas Piketty: Capital in the Twenty-First Century/Inequality and Capitalism in the Long Run: The Honest Broker" »


"The Honest Broker"

800px Berliner kongress 2 jpg 800×405 pixels

Over at Equitable Growth's Equitablog I am starting a hopefully-weekly feature I am going to call: "The Honest Broker". The point of it is to, once a week, give people a 3000-or-so-word introduction and assessment that will bring them up to speed on some particular issue of importance to equitable growth.

This will be in large part the point of the Equitablog weblogging exercise: we want to play our position, and help focus the attention of the public sphere on the issues that are truly important, rather than joining the webloggy equivalent of the 20 six-year-olds in a mass around the soccer ball who have forgotten which goal is there's and are kicking randomly.

And putting out, once a week or so, an introduction-and-assessment of an issue area seems a good way to do that.

In a year we will have 52 slots. That should be enough to cover great deal of the issues relevant to equitable growth--to the seamless web of advancing material well-being, in its components of accumulation and investment (of factors, ideas, and institutions), production (providing incentives to use accumulated and invested resources to produce stuff, producing stuff in the right proportions, and ensuring demand is there to get the produced stuff bought), distribution (plus its feedbacks onto production and accumulation and investment), and implementation.

Plus dialogue: this will work only if we get the dialogue going...

So: Suggestions? Examples? Pitches? Requests?


The first three are:


Ashok Rao on Has Rising Inequality Really Been a Problem Over the Past Generation?: The Honest Broker for the Week of December 8, 2013

Attention Conservation Notice: 2700 words mostly by Ashok Rao reviewing--and dismissing--the arguments against worrying that rising inequality has been a major problem over the past generation.


The near-consensus view over here at Equitable Growth and at the Equitablog is that U.S. economic growth over the past generation has been very disappointing. Too-much of our economic growth has been wasted producing the wrong stuff and delivering it to the wrong people, and we have failed to properly and productively invest at the rate we could in people, machines and buildings, ideas and organizations, and institutions. The hunch around here is that these two are tightly coupled: that the rapid rise in inequality as a result of the derangement of incentives has both decoupled the links between higher measured real GDP and human economic welfare and material well-being, and has also slowed the growth of our potential to produce real GDP.

But we could be wrong. And many argue that we are. What do we think of their arguments at their best?

Overwhelmed with work, I asked the smart, thoughtful, and enthusiastic Ashok Rao--along with Evan Soltas one of the leading lights in the next generation of webloggers--to take a look at the arguments of Scott Winship (formerly of Brookings and now of the Manhattan Institute) and others. He was not persuaded: cherry-picking and tendentious shifting of the burden of proof was his assessment.

So let me turn the microphone over to Ashok Rao:

Continue reading "Ashok Rao on Has Rising Inequality Really Been a Problem Over the Past Generation?: The Honest Broker for the Week of December 8, 2013" »


The Honest Broker: Is Growth Getting Harder? If so, Why, and What Can We Do About It?: For the Week of December 7, 2013

Attention Conservation Notice: tl;dr. 9000 words trying to work my way through and in the process provide a reader's guide to the techno-growth stagnation arguments of Robert Gordon, Tyler Cowen, and Brink Lindsey. The arguments are powerful. The authors are very serious economists. I wind up skeptical, and optimistic--partly because I am a techno-optimist by nature, partly because I am a politico-optimist and I think the literature confuses the past generation's failures in distribution and demand-management due to political dysfunction with failures in accumulation and innovation, and partly because I have a different more micro-incremental conception of the process of economic growth than does Robert Gordon.


I. Once and Future Ages of Diminished Expectations

Back in 1990 Paul Krugman wrote a little book--a very nice little book--called The Age of Diminished Expectations. The central point was that the long era of more than a century during which Americans could expect 2%/year growth on average in their real per capita incomes and standards of living was over. This era stretched back to the immediate aftermath of the Civil War. This era saw each generation attain a level of material wealth and well-being twice that of its predecessors: 2%/year growth for 35 years is a doubling. And, Krugman wrote, the slow growth from 1973-1990--during which real GDP per worker had been a mere 1%/year--was a harbinger of a new, more pessimistic future: an age in which Americans' formerly-great expectations of the future would have to be diminished.

FRED Graph St Louis Fed 4

Continue reading "The Honest Broker: Is Growth Getting Harder? If so, Why, and What Can We Do About It?: For the Week of December 7, 2013" »


The Honest Broker: Is Growth Getting Harder? If so, Why, and What Can We Do About It?

Attention Conservation Notice: tl;dr. 9000 words trying to work my way through and in the process provide a reader's guide to the techno-growth stagnation arguments of Robert Gordon, Tyler Cowen, and Brink Lindsey. The arguments are powerful. The authors are very serious economists. I wind up skeptical, and optimistic--partly because I am a techno-optimist by nature, partly because I am a politico-optimist and I think the literature confuses the past generation's failures in distribution and demand-management due to political dysfunction with failures in accumulation and innovation, and partly because I have a different more micro-incremental conception of the process of economic growth than does Robert Gordon.


I. Once and Future Ages of Diminished Expectations

Back in 1990 Paul Krugman wrote a little book--a very nice little book--called The Age of Diminished Expectations. The central point was that the long era of more than a century during which Americans could expect 2%/year growth on average in their real per capita incomes and standards of living was over. This era stretched back to the immediate aftermath of the Civil War. This era saw each generation attain a level of material wealth and well-being twice that of its predecessors: 2%/year growth for 35 years is a doubling. And, Krugman wrote, the slow growth from 1973-1990--during which real GDP per worker had been a mere 1%/year--was a harbinger of a new, more pessimistic future: an age in which Americans' formerly-great expectations of the future would have to be diminished.

FRED Graph St Louis Fed 4

Continue reading "The Honest Broker: Is Growth Getting Harder? If so, Why, and What Can We Do About It?" »


Chilean Politics, "Neoliberalismo", Once-And-Future President Michelle Bachelet, "Seeing Like a State", the Really-Existing Socialist and Neoliberal Projects of the Twentieth Century, and the Electoral Victory of Her New Majority Coalition: The Honest Bro

Attention Conservation Notice: Harley Shaiken at the Berkeley Center for Latin American Studies asked me if I could write a short comment on a piece he was running by Javier Couso about Chilean politics, "neoliberalismo", once-and-future President Michelle Bachelet, and the electoral victory of her New Majority Coalition--Couso being one of the co-authors of the currently highly influential El Otro Modelo: Del Orden Neoliberal al Regimen de lo Publico. The piece got out of control, and is not a success...

But if you are interested in my not-very-well-connected thoughts on Chilean politics, "neoliberalismo", once-and-future President Michelle Bachelet, Seeing Like a *State the really-existing socialist and neoliberal projects of the twentieth century, and the electoral victory of her New Majority Coalition, they are below the fold...

Continue reading "Chilean Politics, "Neoliberalismo", Once-And-Future President Michelle Bachelet, "Seeing Like a State", the Really-Existing Socialist and Neoliberal Projects of the Twentieth Century, and the Electoral Victory of Her New Majority Coalition: The Honest Bro" »


Review of Gerhard Weinberg, A World at Arms, and Others

2000: Review of Gerhard Weinberg, A World at Arms, and Others http://www.j-bradford-delong.net/econ_articles/reviews/weinberg.html:

  • Gerhard Weinberg (1994), A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 0521558794).
  • Gerhard Weinberg (1995), Germany, Hitler, and World War II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 0521566266).
  • Donald Cameron Watt (1989), How War Came (New York: Pantheon Books).
  • Ernest May (2000), Strange Victory: Hitler's Conquest of France (New York: Hill and Wang: 0809089068).
  • William L. Shirer (1959), The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (New York: Fawcett Books: 0449219771).

For some years now I have been looking for a good global history of World War II, both to serve as a reference for myself and to give to others who wish to know about that particular axis on which so much of twentieth century history turned. Until now I have always recommended William L. Shirer's The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. Shirer's book has many excellences-- . But it has some flaws. And now I have found a proper replacement, in Gerhard Weinberg's A World at Arms.

Continue reading "Review of Gerhard Weinberg, A World at Arms, and Others" »


Trade Policy and America’s Standard of Living: An Historical Perspective

Trade Policy and America’s Standard of Living: An Historical Perspective http://delong.typepad.com/1995-trade-policy-delong.pdf

The U.S. has not always been a pro-free trade country. Before the Great Depression, the U.S. went through waves of protection and liberalization, as the federal government’s demands for revenue and industry pressure for protection waxed and waned. Some advocates of protection then as now argued that it would enhance economic development: translated into the language of modern economics, they argued that protection shifted American economic activity toward manufacturing, and that increasing returns to scale and externalities made specialization in manufacturing uniquely valuable for economic development.

But even if protection generated endogenous productivity growth by increasing economic activity in the externality-generating manufacturing sector, it slowed the rate of growth of wages because high tariffs on imported capital goods retarded capital deepening and delayed the development of capital-intensive infrastructure and industry. For plausible magnitudes, this second effect dominates: whatever Americans gained in faster mastery of technology as a result of protection in the late 19th century, they lost more because the higher price of—imported—capital goods made it more difficult and costly to build America’s transportation network and industrial base.